HISTORICAL SKETCHES

OF THE

SOUTH OF INDIA,

IN AN ATTEMPT TO TRACE THE

HISTORY OF MYSOOR;

FROM THE

ORIGIN OF THE HINDOO GOVERNMENT OF THAT STATE, TO THE
EXTINCTION OF THE MAHOMMEDAN DYNASTY IN 1799.

FOUNDED CHIEFLY ON INDIAN AUTHORITIES COLLECTED BY THE, AUTHOR
WHILE OFFICIATING FOR SEVERAL YEARS AS

POLITICAL RESIDENT AT THE COURT OF MYSOOR.

BY COLONEL MARK WILKS.

VOL. II.

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PREFACE

TO

THE SECOND AND THIRD VOLUMES.

When an interval of several years has elapsed, between the publication of a first and second volume, the readers of the work may think themselves entitled to some explanation of the causes of delay.

There was no affectation in the original announcement, that the appearance of a second volume, or the entire abandonment of the design, would depend on the reception of the first; and I waited the event with entire resignation. Those periodical publications, which influence public opinion, and may be deemed its organs, were not early in their notice of the first volume: but there is, if possible, less affectation in declaring, that their approbation, when it did appear, exceeded my expectations. The work was resumed, but no considerable progress had been made, when it was interrupted, by a call of public duty to a foreign station, from which I only returned in June, 1816; and by subsequent causes, improper to be obtruded on public notice, which unhappily fixed my mind on other cares.

Inexperience or unskilfulness have caused this portion of the work to double the original calculation; and the second and
third volumes are now presented to the world, with the disad-
vantage of unexpected circumstances, which have interfered
with a sufficiently careful revision of a certain portion of their
contents. This explanation applies not to the matter, but the
manner. If I were aware of any errors of fact, the work should
stop, at whatever stage; but I submit to the responsibility of
minor faults.

I have received a liberal extension of aid in the researches
connected with these volumes, and some, of which I am restrain-
ed from making a particular acknowledgment.

A continuation of access to the records at the India House,
was greatly facilitated by the kind attention of the late Mr. Hud-
son, to whose department those records belonged.

I am indebted to the kindness of Sir Henry Cosby, for the
perusal of his accurate journal of the war of 1767-9, and for per-
sonal explanations of great value.

To my long-known and cordial friend, Colonel Allan, I am
obliged for his intelligent and interesting journal of the camp-
paigns of 1790, 1791, 1792, and 1799, with the drawings
and plans necessary for their complete illustration; and for a
mass of regularly arranged historical materials, from 1767 to
1799, which would have exceedingly abridged my own labours
at Madras and at the India House, if I had known of their
existence in sufficient time.

From my friend, Sir John Kennaway, I have received the
communication of numerous and valuable facts, connected with
his own diplomatic services from 1788 till 1792: and a volumi-
nous collection of documents in the Persian language, bequeath-
ed to him by the late Colonel William Kirkpatrick, comprising,
among others, a variety of original compositions, in the handwriting of the late Tippoo Sultaun; and consultations, authenticated by the original signatures of his ministers. Translations of some of these are published in Kirkpatrick’s curious collection of Tippoo’s letters, to which my obligations are acknowledged in the body of the work; and the unpublished portion has afforded many valuable facts and illustrations.

The delicacy involved in the later periods of this work requires no explanation: but in these periods, the circle is enlarged of those friends, who may be enabled, not only to detect inaccuracies, but to furnish me with the requisite authorities for their correction, in a future edition, if the Public should demand it.

London,
25th June, 1817.
CONTENTS

OF

THE SECOND VOLUME.

CHAPTER XIII.

CONSEQUENCES of the diplomatic error in the treaty of Paris — of deriving rights from the extinct authority of the Mogul — General Calliaud’s treaty with Nizam Ali — vague, and at variance with the views of Lord Clive — Complex views of the parties in the war which ensued — Hyder’s plan of defence by the desolation of his own country — discussed — Description of reservoirs peculiar to the south of India — Mahrattas not arrested — capture Sera — Defection of Meer Saheb — Hyder attempts negotiation — Amusing specimen of Indian diplomacy — succeeds in purchasing the retreat of the Mahrattas — General Smith and Nizam Ali advance to co-operate with the Mahrattas against Hyder — find themselves over-reached and ridiculed — continue to advance — Nizam Ali’s secret negotiations with Hyder — Open mockery of the English — General Smith retires towards his own frontier — Hyder relieves himself from the domestic danger of the intrigues of Nunjeraj — Singular generosity of Nizam Ali before uniting with Hyder against the English — Hostile operations of the English in Bārama-bāl — Capture of numerous places of little importance . . . . Page 1

CHAPTER XIV.

Hyder and Nizam Ali descend the ghauts — operations — carry off the cattle of the army — Hyder takes Caveripatam — Smith moves to join Wood — followed by Hyder — Battle of Changama — Smith, although victorious, retires to Trinomalee — Allies recriminate — Smith in distress for food — Council of war declares the necessity for going into cantonment — prohibited by the government — Various manoeuvres — Decisive victory of Trinomalee . . . . 24

vol. ii.
CHAPTER XV.

Mutual crimination and reconciliation of the Allies — Smith goes into cantonments — Hyder takes the field in consequence — re-takes Tripatore and Vaniambaddy — besieges Amboor — Excellent defence of Captain Calvert — Singular incident ascribed to supernatural agency — Relieved by Colonel Smith — who pursues Hyder — Affair of Vaniambaddy — Junction with Colonel Wood — Hyder occupies a fortified position at Caveripatam — Mâphuz Khân — close of his political career — Hyder's attack of the convoy under Major Fitzgerald — Personal efforts and disappointment — Attack of Nizam Ali's dominions, by troops from Bengal — detaches him from his alliance with Hyder — Treaty of 1768, between the English and Nizam Ali — discussed and condemned — Hyder, at the same time, moves his whole force to the western coast to oppose a diversion from Bombay, which takes Mangalore, Honâver, &c. with the fleet — Hyder's plan of operation — Easy re-capture of the English conquests — Punishment of the inhabitants who aided the English — Deceitful compromise with the chiefs of Malabar — Returns to the eastward . . . . Page 42

CHAPTER XVI.

Character of General Smith — view of the several plans of military operation, proposed by him and his government — Success of Colonel Wood to the southward — Military faults — General Smith takes Kistnagherry — accompanied by field deputies — Mahommed Ali, and the Chevalier St. Lubin — Defective intelligence — Ascends the pass of Boodicota — Mulwâgul taken by the bold stratagem of Captain Matthews — Colar surrenders — Baigloor — Oossoor, &c. — Ignorant plans of Mahommed Ali — Junction of Morari Row — Scene of operations the former dominions of Shahjee — Hyder's unsuccessful attack on the camp at Ooscota — Singular defence of Morari Row — Hyder's plans — Approach of Colonel Wood from the southward — Movements in consequence — Designis of Hyder, and Smith's counter-project — both marred by Wood — Subsequent movements — Hyder to Goorumconda — Reconciliation with Meer Saheb — reviews his own situation — offers peace — and great sacrifices for its attainment — Failure of the negotiations, from the unreasonable expectations of the English and Mahommed Ali — Battle of Mulwâgul — Remarkable stratagem of Captain Brooke — General Smith at length speaks out regarding his incumbrances — Mahommed Ali and the field deputies — who are attacked in Colar — Alarmed, and return to Madras — Indirect re-call of General Smith — His plan of future
CONTENTS.

operations — Recantation of the Madras Government, regarding the Nabob and deputies — Colonel Wood’s division reinforced — moves for the relief of Oossoor, while the remainder of the army, under Major Fitzgerald, covers the departure of the deputies — Oossoor imperfectly relieved — Disaster at Baugloor — Retreat of Colonel Wood, attacked by Hyder — relieved by Major Fitzgerald, who represents his incapacity — Wood ordered in arrest to Madras.

Page 62

CHAPTER XVII.

Hyder’s General, Fuzzul Oolla Khân, descends from Seringapatam to Coimbetoor — His success over the unmilitary dispositions of the English — Interesting anecdote of Serjeant Hoskan — Gujelhutty — Orton, provincial commander, retires to Eroad — Treachery at Coimbetoor, &c. — Captain Johnson at Darapoor — Bryant at Palgaut — Singular retreat round Cape Comorin — Faisan at Caveriporam — holds out — The minor posts fall — Hyder descends the pass of Policcode into Baramahal — and turns towards Coimbetoor by the pass of Topoor — Government of Madras awakes from its dream of conquest — Corps of Major Fitzgerald follows Hyder from Mysoor — Places fall to Hyder in rapid succession — Fitzgerald’s reasons for inclining towards Trichinopoly — Hyder towards Eroad — takes Caroor — destroys the corps under Nixon — appears before Eroad — Strange conduct of Ortan — Surrender of Eroad — and of Caveriporam — Breach of capitulation — justified as retaliation for a breach of parole — Reflections on that transaction — Hyder desolates the country to the east — Military contribution on Tanjore — Major Fitzgerald, as usual, in want of food — Contrasted conduct of the belligerents — Attempt at negotiation through Captain Brooke — Statesman-like conversation of Hyder — Mission of Mr. Andrews in consequence — Cessation of hostilities for twelve days — Resumption of hostilities — Smith in command — Hyder frequently embarrassed by the superior skill of his opponent — sends to the westward the mass of his army — and suddenly appears at the gates of Madras with cavalry alone — Mr. Du Prê sent out to negotiate — Smith orders Lang to attack Hyder’s army when entangled in the pass — himself following Hyder in person — stopped by the positive orders of his Government — Negotiation and treaty of 1769 — discussed — Short review of the conduct of the war.

102

CHAPTER XVIII.

Hyder, after a short repose at Bangalore, makes a tour, for the purpose of levying contributions to the N. E., N., and N. W. — Beaten off from Bellâri. — Conjectures regarding the secret treaty between Hyder and Nizam Ali — Invasion of
Mádoo Row — Hyder retires to Seringapatam — attempts negotiation without success — Observations on Mahratta claims — Reza Ali — the destined Nabob of Arcot — and one of Hyder's envoys — abandons his service, and remains with Mádoo Row — Designs of that chief — reduces the range of N. E. forts — Resistance at the obscure fort of Nidigul — which is at length carried — Anecdote of the commandant — Mádoo Row taken ill, returns to Poona — leaving the army under Trimbuc Mama — who takes Goorumconda — and returns to the western part of Mysoor — Destruction of a detachment from Bangalore — Hyder takes the field — position near Savendy Droog — Trimbuc Mama declines to attempt it — moves across his front to the west — Hyder moves to the strong position of Milgota — in which he is invested — attempts a retreat to Seringapatam — Drunkenness — savage conduct to his son — his army entirely destroyed at Chercooli — Escape of Hyder — of Tippoo in disguise — Curious appendix, illustrative of the characters of Hyder and Tippoo — Curious surgical incident — Conduct of Fuzzul Oolla Khán — Errors of the Mahrattas — Hyder recovers the panic — ventures on two detachments from Seringapatam — Tippoo to Bednore succeeds — Mahommed Ali to Periapatam compelled to return after a severe conflict, and murdering his own prisoners — Minor operations omitted — Peace of 1772 — gives to the English the contact of a Mahratta frontier, in return for their infraction of their last treaty with Hyder — Murder of the pageant Raja — Successor — Horrible exactions — Base ingratitude to Fuzzul Oolla Khán — Rapacity proportioned to insecurity.    Page 130

CHAPTER XIX.

Death of Mádoo Row — Conjuncture favourable to Hyder — Invasion of Coorg — Decapitation — Conquest — Detachment descends to Calicut — Rapid restoration of authority in Malabar — Tippoo's operations to the north — entirely successful — recovers all he had lost by the Mahratta treaty — Ragoba moves against him — met by a negotiator, who succeeds in consequence of unexpected events at Poona — Treaty with Ragoba — Insurrection in Coorg — quelled by a movement of his whole army — Death of the pageant Cham Raj — Ridiculous ceremony of choosing a successor — Embassy to Kurreem Khan — Obtains a corps of Persians — His opinion of the specimen — Their extinction — Rapid march to Bellâri — Its causes and result — Defeats Nizam Ali's besieging army — and takes the place for himself — Goes against Gooty — Siege — Obstinate defence of Morâri Row — Treaty — broken off by the imprudent disclosures of the negotiator — Unconditional surrender — plunder — Fate of Morâri Row — Ragoba, a fugitive from the Mahratta territory, concludes a treaty with Bombay, 1775 — annulled by the Government of Bengal — who conclude a new treaty
through Colonel Upton, 1776 — Remarks — Renewed treaty with Ragoba, in
1778 — In consequence of the first, Ragoba invites Hyder to advance, and in
1776, he invades Savanoor — occupies one half — interrupted by the monsoon —
returns to Seringapatam — Fiscal measures. . . . . Page 156

CHAPTER XX.

Union of Nizam Ali and the ministerial party at Poona, against Ragoba and
Hyder — A corps of Mahrattas invades Savanoor — is attacked and defeated by
Hyder’s general, Mahommed Ali — Main armies advance in two separate bodies,
by the distant points of Savanoor and Rachoor — first, under Perseram Bhow,
retires after some timid skirmishing — second, Nizam Ali’s bought off — and
Hyder for the present relieved from apprehension — Siege of Chittledroog —
Characteristic defence — Composition settled and partly paid — when Hyder
hears of the advance of the whole Mahratta army, under Hurry Punt, for the
relief of the place — destroys his batteries and trenches — marches off and orders
the Poligar to follow his standard — he hesitates and disobeys — Battle of
Rârâvee — Defection of Manajee Pânceria — Defeat of the Mahrattas — Back-
wardness of Ibrahim, the general of Nizam Ali — Hyder pursues the Mahrattas —
reduces the whole territory south of the Kistna, conformably to his arrangements
with Ragoba — returns to the south — resumes the siege of Chittledroog —
Surrender of the place — History and character of the new governor — Hyder
sweeps off the inhabitants, and forms the foundation of his Janissaries — Hyder
marches against Kurpa — Retreat and surrender of the Kurpa cavalry — Singular
attempt of eighty prisoners to assassinate Hyder in the midst of his army —
Surrender of the Chief of Kurpa — conditions — subsequent destruction of the
males of the family — Character of Hyder’s amorous propensities — Refusal and
subsequent assent of the beautiful daughter of this chief — Meer Saheb entrusted
with the new conquest — Hyder returns to the capital — Revision of civil admi-
istration — finance — police — cruel, ignorant, and ungrateful exactions —
Apajee Ram — The bankers — Embassy to Delhi — Monsieur Lally’s corps —
anecdote — system of military payments — Double treaty of marriage with the
Nabob of Savanoor — Embassy from Poona — negotiation, explanatory of the
union of Hyder with the Mahrattas against the English. . . . 177

CHAPTER XXI.

Retrospect of Hyder’s relations with the English, since 1769 — Disgraceful
intrigues of Mahommed Ali in England — Direct negotiation with the ministry —
who send out Sir John Lindsay as ambassador — Unites in Mahommed Ali’s
views for the infraction of the treaty with Hyder — Error of the treaty of 1769
now practically discovered in 1770 — Discussions regarding Tanjore — siege of
that place in 1771 — Trimbuc Mama threatens to relieve it — bought off by
Mahommed Ali — and sold to both parties — Mahommed Ali fabricates a mock
Mahratta invasion — Deception unveiled — Strange proceedings of the royal
negotiator — Able statement of the nature of the English connexion with Ma-
hommed Ali — Proposal of the Mahrattas in 1771, to unite with Hyder for the
conquest of the South and East — Manly and candid avowals of Hyder to the
English — His most advantageous offers rejected — through the influence of Ma-
hommed Ali — Hyder’s unfavourable treaty with the Mahrattas in 1772 — the
consequence of his adherence to these political principles — Tanjore taken by the
English in 1773 — Hyder’s embassy to Madras — renews his offers of alliance —
again frustrated by Mahommed Ali — Resentment of the Mahrattas for the cap-
ture of Tanjore — Mahommed Ali sends an embassy to Hyder — a mere mockery
— they are dismissed in 1775 with an explicit intimation of Hyder’s sentiments
— Mahommed Ali occupies and improves the fortress of Tanjore — raises an
army — determines on resistance to the orders for its restitution — fails when the
time arrives — restored to the Raja by Lord Pigot in 1776 — cabal of private
creditors, and Mahommed Ali obtains the revolutionary arrest of Lord Pigot in
the same year — durst not proceed the meditated length of restoring Tanjore —
English connexions with the Mahrattas — Colonel Upton’s treaty of 1776 —
Ragoba — Designs of the French connexion with Hyder — with Poona through
Mr. St. Lubin, 1777 — A party at Poona propose to restore Ragoba — conse-
quent treaty of Bombay — confirmed by Mr. Hastings — correct and enlarged
views of that statesman — Diplomatic and military measures, 1778 — Designs of
the French — discovered — and anticipated — Tardy and weak measures at
Bombay — Field deputies — Army advances — is foiled — Convention of War-
gaum — disavowed by the Governor of Bombay — Army under Goddard crosses
to Surat — Ministerial party at Poona make advances for peace, 1779 — and
avow their design of marching against Hyder — Escape of Ragoba to General
Goddard, changes their politics, and makes them unite with Hyder as above
related — Relations with Nizam Ali — Guntoor Sircar and Bazâlut Jung — Erro-
neous views in the connexion of Madras with that chief — March a corps to join
him — opposed by Hyder — Returns — Resentment of Nizam Ali — appeased
by the wise measures of Mr. Hastings — Return from digression — Correspond-
dence of Hyder with Madras in 1778 — evades negotiation — English at length
desirous of a treaty with Hyder — but the period had passed away — Capture of
Pondicherry stated — that of Mâhê announced, 1779 — Hyder explicitly avows
hostility in that event — Mâhê with Hyder’s colours displayed with those of the
French, fails — Hyder’s open declarations of intended hostility — Mission of
Schwartz to Hyder — Strange mystery never explained — Mission of Mr. Grey —
Negotiation fails — Reiterated hostile declarations of Hyder — Torpor at Ma-
dras — roused by the invasion.
CHAPTER XXII.

Erroneous impression of Hyder’s general devastation — English attempt to assemble an army — and defend the fortresses — Warriapollam Ginjee — Carnaticghur — Wandewash — Distinguished character of Flint — State of parties at Madras — Military opinion of Lord M’Leod — of Sir Hector Munro — the latter takes the field — Bad combinations — Route of Baillie — Hyder raises the siege of Arcot — on the day Sir H. Munro arrives at Conjeveram — Want of food at the commencement of the campaign — Baillie stopped by the river Cortelaur — crosses it — attacked by Tippoo — reciprocally discouraged — Sir H. Munro reinforces Baillie — Hyder attacks and destroys him — Observations — Anekdotes — Mr. Lang — Twigg — Mahommed Booden — Measures of Hyder — Retreat of Sir H. Munro — Chingleput and Madras — Emergency reported to Bengal — Character and measures of Mr. Hastings — calls on Sir Eyre Coote to vindicate the honour of the British arms — he arrives at Madras — Suspension of the last Governor, and appointment of Mr. Smith — Council of War — Hyder takes Arcot — Sir Eyre Coote takes the field — Capture of Carangoooy — Flint’s distinguished defence of Wandewash — relieved by Sir Eyre Coote — Promotion of Lieutenant Flint — rendered nugatory — his admirable arrangements for supply — Arrival of the French fleet — Sir Eyre Coote relieves Permacoil — moves to Pondicherry — Hyder appears — Sir Eyre Coote moves to Cuddalore — Cannonade by night — French fleet at Pondicherry — Critical and desperate situation of Sir Eyre Coote — relieved by its departure — Hyder moves to Tanjour — Sir Eyre Coote reinforced with troops — but distressed for provisions — Military criticisms of the government of Madras — treated with asperity by Sir Eyre Coote — who himself condems, on views equally limited, the continuance of the Mahratta war — Just and manly views of Mr. Hastings — Sir Eyre Coote attacks Chillumbrum — is repulsed — Arrival of the fleet — Lord Macartney governor of Madras — Dutch war — Hyder appears — Battle — Imperfect consequences of the victory — Fall of Tiagar — Second relief of Wandewash — Sir Eyre Coote forms a junction with the division from Bengal — at Pulicat — Military prudence of Sir Eyre Coote — Faults of Hyder.

CHAPTER XXIII.

Wretched state of military equipment — Sir Eyre Coote turns his attention to Tripassore — Hyder attempts to relieve it — without success — The place
falls — Negotiation regarding prisoners — shewed Sir Eyre Coote’s imperfect knowledge of Hyder’s character — Fights Hyder on ground chosen by himself — Battle of Polliloor described — Dubious victory — does not improve the aspect of English affairs — New means of carrying grain — Western and Chittoor poligars — promise supplies — Sir Eyre Coote determines to relinquish the command — but is prevailed on by Lord Macartney to resume it on the faith of these promises — disappointed — perseveres — Battle of Sholinghur — Poligars come over from Hyder to Sir Eyre Coote — enters the Pollams — erroneously supposed to be inexhausted and abundant — reason — Hyder sends a detachment to ruin the Pollams — defeated and dispersed by Sir Eyre Coote in person — Detaches Colonel Owen — Hyder attacks him in person — dangerous retreat — junction of Sir Eyre Coote — Distress of Vellore — relieved — Retrospective account of Hyder’s operations against that place — and its gallant defence — Sir Eyre Coote returns to the Pollams — takes Chittoor — Defective intelligence — Loses his depot in the Pollams — distress — necessity of returning to Tripassore — Serious loss from the monsoon — Misconduct of Mahommed Ali — Assigns the country for the support of the war — Strange misinformation regarding Chanderghery and Mahommed Ali’s brother — Facts related — Hyder’s brutal outrage — Affairs of Tanjour during this campaign — Hyder’s treaty with the Dutch at Negapatam — Colonel Brathwaite’s assault of two successive posts — wounded — succeeded by Colonel Nixon — more successful — Colonel Brathwaite resumes the command — defeats Hyder’s provincial field force — Sir Hector Munro besieges Negapatam — Effective co-operation of the fleet — Capture of the place — Monsoon — Critical situation of the fleet — Capture of Trincomalee — Renewed distress of Vellore — Sir Eyre Coote marches to relieve it — Alarm for his life — recovers and effects the service — Cannonaded on his approach and return — Ineffective attempt to pursue Hyder — who makes a fresh demonstration near Sholingur — the English army returns to Madras.

CHAPTER XXIV.

Affairs of Malabar — Siege of Tellicherry — from 1780 to 1782 — relieved — Besieging army defeated and taken — Peculiar plan of the siege — Defeat and capture of Colonel Brathwaite’s corps in Tanjour — Despondency of each belligerent from causes unknown to the other — stated — Sindea detached from the Mahratta confederacy — Nature of the influence of this event on the connexion between Hyder and the Mahrattas, concealed from the English — explained — Digressive illustration of Sindea’s mixed character of dependency and superiority, in a sketch of the Mahratta constitution — Origin of Choute, &c. — Return from the digression — Hyder seriously reviews his actual situation — determines to concentrate
his force and move to the westward — Commences the destruction of the posts and
the desolation of the country — Speech to Poonree — Detaches to Malabar —
Coorg and Bulhum — Spoliation of Coromandel in full progress — Unexpected
arrival of the French at Porto Novo, and difficulty of supplies in consequence —
Efforts of the French and English nations in India — Bussy — capture of his first
division by Admiral Kempenfeltz in 1781 — of a second in 1782 — arrives at
the Isle of France — troops sent to India before his arrival — Suffrein — Sir Edward
Hughes — First naval action off Madras, 17th February — English equipments
Commodore Johnson, and General Medows — Naval action at Porto Praya —
Capture of the Dutch merchantmen in Saldanha bay — Commodore Johnson re-
turns with the frigates — Remainder of the expedition proceed to India — and had
joined before the above action — Dissensions between Sir Eyre Coote and Lord
Macartney — explained — discussed — Second naval action, 12th April — French
take Cuddalore — Appear with Hyder before Permacoil — March of Sir Eyre
Coote for its relief — dreadful storm — Permacoil falls — Enemy advance to
Wandewash — relieved by Sir Eyre Coote, who offers them battle — moves to
Arnee — Battle of Arnee — Question of the baggage of an Indian army, discussed
and described — Connected incidents — Dallas — Grand guard cut off — Singular
plan for the relief of Vellore — succeeds — The escort taken in its return —
Suffrein appears before Negapatam — Sir E. Hughes sails — Third naval action
July 16 — Suffrein takes Trincomalee — Fourth naval action September 3 —
Erroneous estimate of the importance of Trincomalee — Suffrein winters at Acheen
— Further relief of Vellore — Sir Eyre Coote plans the re-capture of Cuddalore
— Precarious nature of naval co-operation — returns to Madras — Sir E. Hughes
sails for Bombay — Arrival of Sir R. Bickerton — Hyder's advances for peace
— Strange result of English dissensions — Suffrein's scandalous transfer of his
prisoners to Hyder — Sir Eyre Coote proceeds to Bengal — hostile fleets as
already stated — Hyder to the neighbourhood of Arcot for the monsoon.

Page 358

CHAPTER XXV.

Affairs of Malabar — since the defeat and destruction of the besieging army at
Tellicherry — Reduction of Calicut — Arrival of Colonel Humberstone — lands
and assumes the command — defeats Hyder's corps under Muckdoom Ali —
Plan for the attack of Palgautcherry — Loss of his stores — Moves to Paniani —
Mysoreans rally — Second defeat — Colonel Humberstone moves for better cover
to Calicut — his measures contrary to the views of the Government of Bombay
— and of Sir Eyre Coote — The latter, however, disappointed, directs Colonel
Humberstone to remain under the orders of Bombay — and recommends a con-
centrated effort — Before the communication of these views, was again in motion

VOL. II.
against Palgaut — Extreme peril of the attempt — Driven back to Paniani with precipitation, by Tippoo and Lally — arrival of Colonel Macleod — Circumstances which led to this attack — Colonel Macleod strengthens his position at Paniani — Tippoo attacks it — is repulsed — retires to await the arrival of his heavy guns — disappears in consequence of the death of Hyder — Interesting circumstances attending that event — Concealment of his death — His army marches towards the point of Tippoo’s approach — Tippoo’s first measures — for Malabar — New Governor of Seringapatam — arrives in camp — Succession acknowledged — Resources to which he succeeded — French connexion — Tippoo obliged to depart to the west, before the arrival of Bussy — Dissensions in Madras, consequent on Hyder’s death — Animadversions of Mr. Hastings — Madras army at length takes the field — Lord Macartney assumes the direction of military measures — their character — General Stuart’s conduct — Demolition of Carangoly and Wandewash — Offers battle to the French and Mysoreans — Revictuals Vellore — Change of opinion consequent on the departure of Tippoo — Suffrein’s early appearance in the upper part of the bay of Bengal, 1783 — rendezvous with Bussy at Trincomalee — lands him and his troops at Cuddalore — his grievous disappointment at the departure of Tippoo — English march for the siege of Cuddalore — Sir Eyre Coote embarks at Bengal — chased — agitation — and death — review of his military character. . Page 403

CHAPTER XXVI.

Want of harmony between the Government of Madras and General Stuart — Description of the fort and vicinity of Cuddalore — General Stuart unexpectedly takes a position to the south — Monsieur Bussy assumes and fortifies a corresponding position — daily becoming more formidable — Attack of this position — Serious contest — and its results — The French retire into Cuddalore — Original misapprehension at Madras, regarding the nature and extent of this service — Reciprocal want of confidence regarding the junction of the southern army — French fleet under Suffrein, appears on the day of the action — Sir E. Hughes covers Cuddalore — quits his station, which is seized by Suffrein — who is reinforced by Bussy, and sails to meet the English fleet — Action — Ostensible superiority and real inferiority of the English — Fleet crippled — Suffrein attains his object — and resumes his station before Cuddalore — lands a reinforcement of seamen — Monsieur Bussy makes a vigorous sortie — entirely unsuccessful — Capture of the Crown Prince of Sweden — The force under General Stuart not equal to the service undertaken — Bussy, superior in numbers, determines to march out and attack his camp — General Stuart, assuming the tone of being abandoned by
his government, determines to abide the result—Crisis averted, by the intelligence of peace, and the arrival of a flag of truce—Commissioners from Madras settle a convention with Monsieur Bussy—Its relation to Tippoo—His intermediate operations

CHAPTER XXVII.

Resumption of the affairs of the western coast, from the disappearance of Tippoo at Paniani, in December 1782—General Matthews sent from Bombay, to support the troops at that place—hearing of Tippoo's departure, lands at Rajmundroog—Reasons—Carries the place—Colonel Macleod ordered up from Pania—Capture of Honaver (Onore) and ships of war—Government of Bombay, hearing the death of Hyder, send positive orders to General Matthews, to quit all operations on the coast, and march to Bednore—Fatality of incessant contention—General Matthews protests and obeys—the letter, not the spirit of these inconsiderate orders—lands at Cundapoor—which he attacks and carries—violating the letter of his orders in the very act of obeying them—marches for the Ghauts—Colonel Macleod carries the works at their foot—Attack of the Ghaut—carried with Hyderghur at its summit—Bednore surrenders on terms—Extraordinary facility of this success—explained by the personal enmity of Tippoo, to the Governor Ayâz, and the design not only to supersede, but destroy him—Singular mode of discovering these designs—which determined the surrender—Lutf Aly, the successor of Ayâz, arrives in the vicinity—reinforces Anantpoor—which is carried by the English by assault—Cruelties imputed to the English on that occasion—disproved—Lutf Aly ordered to Mangalore—General Matthews relieved from the restraint of the positive orders—acts as if they were still in operation—and disperses instead of concentrating his force—Strange superstition regarding his past and future fortunes—Imputations of corruption and rapacity retorted—Illustrations—Approach of Tippoo—Flight of Ayâz—Tippoo takes Hyderghur—assaults and carries the exterior lines of Bednore—siege—capitulation—surrender—Infraction imputable to the English—garrison confined in irons—Tippoo descends for the recovery of Mangalore—Attack of an advanced position—Critical circumstances—The place summoned—Preparations—Cavalry sent above the ghauts, overtaken by the monsoon—Kummer-u-Deen sent to Kurpa, in consequence of a diversion in that quarter ordered from Madras—Brief notice of this diversion—Siege of Mangalore—Excellent defence—Intelligence received by the garrison—Intimation from Tippoo, of the cessation of hostilities at Cuddalore, treacherously postponed—Armistice—Arrival of Brigadier-General Macleod—lands and is entertained and deceived by Tippoo—Disguised
plan for gradually starving the garrison — Tippoo throws off the mask — but allows General Macleod to depart — The garrison subsists on short allowance, till November 22d, when General Macleod appears with a large armament for its relief — Extraordinary correspondence with Tippoo — General Macleod departs, having thrown in a nominal month's provision, but without being permitted to communicate with the garrison — Discussion of the reasons assigned for this erroneous conduct — Appears with another insufficient supply, on the 27th December, which is landed, but still no intercourse — Shocking extremities to which the garrison was reduced — Council of war — Capitulation — which was fulfilled — Death of Colonel Campbell — Reflections on Tippoo's conduct — Remarkable incident during the siege — Execution of the late Governor, and death of Mahommed Ali — Explanation of these events. Page 446

CHAPTER XXVIII.

Retrospect to the affairs of Malabar — Mr. Sullivan's communications with Colonel Humberstone — The talents with which he retrieved the affairs of the South — Extension of his views to an eventual invasion of Mysoor — frustrated by Sir Eyre Coote's disapproval of his plans — Consequent danger of Colonel Humberstone's operations — Mr. Sullivan opens a negotiation with Tremalrow, the supposed agent of the imprisoned Ranee of Mysoor — Character and history of that person — Opinion of the Governor and Council — of General Stuart — Treaty ratified — its conditions — delays — Colonel Lang, accompanied by Tremalrow, besieges and takes Caroor — Hoisting the Mysoor colours deemed inexpedient — Tremalrow fails in his first conditions — Discussion of his probable means — Aravacourchy — Dindigul — Supercension of Colonel Lang — Colonel Fullarton invested with the command — receives contradictory orders from Government, and from the Commander-in-chief — takes a just view of the public interests, and risks the responsibility of disobeying the superior authority — marches on Cuddalore — On the cessation of arms ordered to return to the South — Financial difficulties — Receives intelligence of the treachery at Mangalore — moves west — takes Palgaut — communicates with General Macleod — Reasons for returning eastward — takes Coimbatoor — prepares to ascend the Ghaunts — Confidence of disaffection in Tippoo's army, founded on the execution of Mahommed Ali, and a late conspiracy at Seringapatam — Account of that conspiracy — Shamia the reputed head — Defective communications — The plot discovered on the night prior to its intended execution — Punishment of the conspirators — Discussion of the facts of the case— Colonel Fullarton influenced by these supposed proofs of disaffection, to prepare for the ascent of the Ghaunts — stopped by orders from the English plenipotentiaries, proceeding to the court of Tippoo. 486
CHAPTER XXIX.

Preliminary events which had led to the appointment of these plenipotentiaries — Advances from Lord Macartney before Tippoo's departure from Coromandel — his messenger returns, accompanied by an envoy, at first without powers, and afterwards equivocally conferred — Conferences broken off — resumed in consequence of the peace in Europe, the armistice of Cuddalore, and the invitation of Monsieur Bussy — Tippoo sends Apajee Ram — His demand of Ayáz as the slave and property of Tippoo — Discussion of the conditions of a treaty — Apajee skilfully suggests the deputation of English ambassadors to Tippoo's court, to obviate the delays occasioned by reference — Real intention — Messrs. Stamton and Sadlier named — Tippoo's pretended accessions to the treaty of Salbey — Plenipotentiaries arrive at the camp of Seyed Saheb, at Arnee — Prompt order to Colonel Fullarton, to abandon his conquests and retire — Examination of its expediency — Colonel Fullarton, knowing the state of facts at Mangalore — waits farther orders before retiring — Seyed Saheb professing to be in full march on his return, stops — Negotiations — Proposed conditions inconsistent with these hasty orders — Plenipotentiaries differ in opinion — a third added to the number, Mr. Huddleston — Government of Madras review their situation — Erroneous conclusions — Direct Colonel Fullarton to obey the order of the plenipotentiaries, literally — he obeys at the moment that Tippoo's troops continued to occupy Coromandel — and furnishes Tippoo with direct excitements to persevere at Mangalore — Swartz the missionary — his acute observations — The troops scarcely in cantonment, before the Madras Government sees its error, and countermands the order — Journey of the Commissioners Plenipotentiary — by dangerous routes to prevent the stipulated communication with the prisoners — Contemptuous deceptions — Arrive near Mangalore a few days after the evacuation — Gibbets erected in front of their tents — General Macleod arrives in the offing — Communication prohibited — He considers them as prisoners — Alleged intention to escape — Mysterious silence — discussed — The escape prevented by the officer commanding the escort — Reasons of Tippoo for a separate peace with the English, independently of the treaty of Salbey — Conditions — Cautionary retention of two places on each side — Camanore, one of these places, restored by Brigadier-General Macleod, in violation of the treaty and the orders of the Commissioners — Prisoners detained contrary to the treaty — Interesting fate of the boys — Contrast of conduct of the officer commanding the escort, and of the Commissioners — Two examples — Treatment of the prisoners — by Hyder — by Tippoo — General description of their condition — Europeans — Sepoys — the Good Seyed Ibrahim.
CHAPTER XXX.

Tippoo's own account of his long detention at Mangalore — The defection of the French — Treachery of Mahommed Ali — Delicacy regarding his treaties with the Mahrattas and Nizam Ali — delayed the English vakeels on various pretences till his allies should declare themselves — Abject conduct of the Commissioners — Ridicule of the prisoners — Return to statements of fact — Horrible expatriation and forcible conversion of the Christians of Canara, related in his own words, highly characteristic — Army marches through Bullum into Coorg — State of that country during the war — Capture of the late Raja's family, and among them the future Raja — Tippoo's recital of his own adventures — His moral harangue to the inhabitants — Return — Progress to Bangalore, where he establishes his harem — New insurrection in Coorg, from the forcible violation of a woman — Zein-ul-ab-u-deen sent to command — his history and character — fails — Tippoo again enters Coorg — Plan for seizing all the inhabitants — succeeds in a great degree — Driven off to Seringapatam — and circumscribed — Separation of the adscripti glebae — to be slaves to the new landholders — The design fails — Intermediate proceedings — Tippoo's views in the peace of Mangalore — Early pretensions of superiority over Nizam Ali — who tries to propitiate Tippoo, but leagues with the Mahrattas, who have a separate ground of quarrel with Tippoo — Circumstances connected with Neergund — Interference of the Mahrattas resisted — Tippoo sends a force against the place, under Burhan-u-Deen and Kummer-u-Deen — Opposed by Perseram Bhow — Raise the siege and defeat him — Carry the advanced post of Ramdroog, and resume the siege — Absurd distraction of authority — Tippoo's ferocious and unprincipled instructions — Premeditated infraction of the capitulation — Imprisonment of the Chief — Infamous violation of his daughter — Mahrattas and Tippoo each procrastinate — Force of Kummer-u-Deen destined to make a treacherous attack on Adwânee — countermanded to Seringapatam — Suspicious route and supposed connexion with Nizam Ali — Report of the Sultaun's death, propagated for the purpose of inveigling Kummer-u-Deen — succeeds — He comes post to Seringapatam, and is seized — Erroneous conception of his influence and authority. Page 525

CHAPTER XXXI.

Negotiations of the Poona Mahrattas, for the eventual conquest of Mysoor — Sin-dea's experiment on the new Governor-general, Mr. Macpherson — Demand of Choute — Forced apology and disavowal — Rana Furnavese persuades himself, that
he may consider the English as a reserve at command, in case of danger, but is unwilling to allow them a participation of advantage — Begins the war federated with Nizam Ali only — Tippoo assumes the rank of King — Circumstances attending the ceremonial — Reasons — Confederates open the campaign with the siege of Bādghīm — Būrḥān-u-Deen acts defensively — The Sultaun makes his first marches in that direction — but deviates to Adwa'nce — Reasons for this line of operation — Siege pushed with precipitation — Assault repelled with great slaughter — A second assault repulsed — Confederates approach — Tippoo raises the siege — Reasons for evacuating the place — Operation covered by a partial action — River fills immediately after they had retired across it — Tippoo returns to resume the siege — but the garrison march out at the opposite gate, and he takes quiet possession — Removes the stores, and dismantles the place — Determines to remove the seat of war across the river — A daring attempt, which succeeds from its great improbability — Confederates arrive too late — Operations — Tippoo's junction with Būrḥān-u-Deen — Hostile armies encamp in view of each other, near Savanoor — Night attack, and cannonade in the morning, favourable to Tippoo — Confederates assume a position near Savanoor — Dislodged — Tippoo enters the town — The Nabob takes the protection of the Mahrattas, in preference to that of his son-in-law — Cause of the disagreement — Demands exacted in a manner ruinous to the country — and consequent resentment — Quiet celebration of an annual festival in both armies — Negotiation — Tippoo's challenge to Holkar — and his reply — A more successful night attack — Corps mounted on camels — Tippoo moves to Behander Binda — Siege and capture — Infraction of the capitulation — Subsequent movements — Night attacks — Reasons of each for severally desiring peace — Conditions ultimately settled — Cessions — Pecuniary payments by Tippoo — Instances of bad faith and inhumanity — Confederates retire — Tippoo instantly re-occupies one of the ceded places — Sultaun's account of his night attacks — Seizure and murder of the poligars, Raidroog and Harponelly, and assumption of their territory.
ERRATA. Vol. II.

Page 7, line last, for "for" read "to."
26, 3, for "or" read "of."
41, Note, for "Hyder" read "Ayder," the word being so written by the French author.
104, 5 from the bottom, remove the semicolon after "coadjutor" to the next line after "Ali."
186, 4 from the bottom, transpose "and" after siege to between the words "year" and "Hyder."
226, 12, for "that nobleman" read "Lord Pigot."
267, last, for "south-east" read "south-west."
318, 2, for "Vellore" read "Nellore."
369, 9 from the bottom, for "Bhoomla" read "Bhounsla."
368, 1, for "Zulfeear" read "Zulfecar."
436, 11 from the bottom, for "rallied" read "sallied."
496, 4 from the bottom, expunge "the."
532, 6 from the bottom, for "Zeen" read "Zein."
533, 4 and 5, transfer the semicolon from after "Coromandel" in the fourth line to after "Bednore" in the fifth line.
CHAPTER XIII.

Consequences of the diplomatic error in the treaty of Paris — of deriving rights from the extinct authority of the Mogul — General Calliaud's treaty with Nizam Ali — vague, and at variance with the views of Lord Clive — Complex views of the parties in the war which ensued — Hyder's plan of defence by the desolation of his own country — discussed — Description of reservoirs peculiar to the south of India — Mahrattas not arrested — capture Sera — Defection of Meer Saheb — Hyder attempts negotiation — Amusing specimen of Indian diplomacy — succeeds in purchasing the retreat of the Mahrattas — General Smith and Nizam Ali advance to co-operate with the Mahrattas against Hyder — find themselves over-reached and ridiculed — continue to advance — Nizam Ali's secret negotiations with Hyder — Open mockery of the English — General Smith retires towards his own frontier — Hyder relieves himself from the domestic danger of the intrigues of Nunjeraj — Singular generosity of Nizam Ali before uniting with Hyder against the English — Hostile operations of the English in Baramahal — Capture of numerous places of little importance.

By the treaty of peace between France and England concluded at Paris on the 10th of February, 1763, the former had renounced all pretensions to its acquisitions on the coast of Coromandel and Orixa; and each agreed to restore what had been conquered from the other. Salabut Jung, who had long been deposed by his younger brother, was, by the singular diplomatic error already noticed, acknowledged to be the lawful Sooba (Soobadâr) of Deccan; and Mahommed Ali, who had supplanted his elder brother in such rights as either of them possessed, was recognized as the
lawful nabob of Carnatic. Two European nations had thus assumed to themselves the right of conferring the official appointments, and determining the interior arrangements of the Mogul empire; and Mahommed Ali who, as a servant of that state, could not, by any extravagance of assumption, claim a higher rank than that of deputy’s deputy, began very prudently to rest his pretensions to a non-descript authority, on the legality very imprudently recognized by two powers far more competent to decide a questionable claim. In the eager anticipation of boundless dominion, the limits of this newly-created sovereignty, became too narrow for his growing fortunes. The Soubadâree of Decan, including the whole South, was the lowest but the most immediate object of his grasp. The projects concerted for its attainment were more open and undisguised than was consistent with the practical and sober prosecution of less difficult achievements, and the inflated ambition of this political pretender was nourished and incited by the still more absurd and corrupt counsels of his European advisers.

In the month of July 1765, Mâphuz Khan, whose pretensions had yielded of necessity to the better fortunes of his younger brother, had professed, in the ordinary practice of those Asiatics whom the world has not favoured, to renounce the world; and had taken leave of Mahommed Ali, with the declared intention of proceeding on a pilgrimage to the temple of Mecca, as the first and most meritorious step in a life of austere devotion. The route of the pilgrim to his port of embarkation at Mangalore, led him near to the camp of Hyder Ali then engaged in the conquest of Malabar; and these vows, whether the offspring of disordered fancy, or affected sanctity, quickly yield-
ed to the worldly temptations of a jageer, and a public employment, which Hyder offered to his acceptance. The development of the extravagant plans of Mahommed Ali, suggested to Hyder the project of employing the elder brother of his own rival, as the fittest instrument to concert with Nizam Ali the means of mutual security and joint retaliation; and Mâphuz Khân was accordingly dispatched to Decan as the agent of Hyder, and the advocate of his own cause.

Lord Clive on receiving from the Mogul the dewannee of Bengal in 1765, had solicited and procured at the same time royal grants, conferring on the English East India company, the possession of the northern sircars, and in dispatching them to Madras, had enjoined the necessity of immediate occupation, which had accordingly been in a great degree* effected in 1766. But after thus seizing, under the direct authority of the Mogul, this extensive territory as an independent possession, it was deemed wise by the government of Madras, to send an embassy to Nizam Ali, which negotiated a treaty, submitting to hold it as a free gift, and tributary dependency from this avowed inferior and equivocal deputy, to whose exclusion it had been conferred, and in despite of whom it had been seized. It is not here intended to discuss the suggestions which have been mixed with our earlier investigations†, regarding the moral or political force of either the authority or the act which has now been described; but to mark in all these transactions, the vicious preference for ostensible dependence, and the unprofitable and degrading tendency of political simulation.

* The exceptions were Cicacole and Guntoor.
† Vol. i. the first half of p. 220, and the whole of p. 261.
Although an anticipation of subsequent events, it affords a striking illustration of these observations, that when the Mahratta chief, Madajee Sindia obtained possession of the person of the Mogul, he extorted from that unfortunate prince, a patent appointing the Peshwa *vakeel ul mutluck* (absolute vicegerent), and Sindia himself the naib or deputy of that imaginary officer: the patent and seals were expedited to Poona, but were never used by that state: a remarkable example of a feeling of dignity in a Mahratta, superior to that of a British Government. Sindia however was not so scrupulous, and in his subordinate capacity exercised, in the most absolute manner, the whole authority of the Mogul empire, to the full extent that his means admitted. In the whole of the political transactions of India, we perceive Hindoos, Mahommedans, French, and English, searching for a shadow, to sanction their pretensions, instead of resting their claims on more substantial grounds. In the course of events, however, the shadow and the substance have both fallen into the hands of the English; and on their part at least, it is time that the scene of simulation should finally close. The treaty with Nizam Áli, which was concluded at Hydrabad by General Calliaud on the 12th November 1766, made a temporary exception in favour of the Sircar of Guntour, which formed a part of the Jageer of Basàlutjung, and was not to be possessed by the English until his death, unless his conduct should prove inimical to that nation. It was also agreed that an English auxiliary force, indefinite in strength, and equally loose in its application, should be at the disposal of Nizam Áli, "to settle the affairs of his government in every thing that is right and proper;" and as he was at this very time concerting with the Mahrattas, a plan
for the conquest or plunder of Mysoor, it was distinctly understood that this was the first service on which the auxiliary troops were to be employed; although Lord Clive had expressly suggested that any aid which might be afforded to Nizam Ali, should be directed to restrain the formidable power of the Mahrattas, instead of co-operating for their aggrandizement. To check the growing ambition of Hyder in any direction which might affect the British interests, was in his judgment an object of legitimate policy; but to crush the only power in the South who had been able to oppose any respectable resistance to the aggressions of the Mahratta states, and who formed, if his friendship could be secured, a barrier between them and the Company’s dominions, was in direct opposition to the views of that profound statesman. This policy, however, unless directed by the hand of a master, is certainly of a most equivocal character. If an intermediate state be capable, from its strength, of becoming a real barrier, it is also liable, from the same cause, to become an object of jealousy. If too weak for its purpose of defence, it only courts aggression from abroad; and instead of a barrier, it becomes the high road of invasion.

Colonel Joseph Smith, who arrived in India in September, 1766, was selected to proceed to Hydrabad, for the purpose of concerting the details of this co-operation, and commanding the troops. The unofficial narrative of this officer, (unpublished and unrecorded,) which after the conclusion of the war he addressed to his friend, Lord Clive, in explanation of his own conduct, and the journal of an officer* of deserved reputation, who bore a distinguished part in the military operations, enables us to compare

* Sir Henry Cosby.
and correct what is deficient in the public records; and a short preliminary view of the objects and designs of the principal powers who were parties in these transactions, is necessary for rendering distinct and intelligible a narrative of events which might otherwise appear to be intricate.

Every confederacy of the Mahrattas, with whatever power, has uniformly two distinct objects, which follow each other in regular order: the first, anticipation in plunder during the confederacy; and the second, exclusive conquest after its close.

Mahommed Ali’s secret views were directed to the deposition of both Nizam Ali and Hyder; and they were meditating a counterplot for deposing Mahommed Ali. Nizam Ali was moving to the south for the promised co-operation with the Mahrattas; having the option, also in his hands, of employing the English force against Hyder; of directing Hyder’s force against them and Mahommed Ali; or of successively adopting both these combinations, if both should promise to replenish his military chest. According to the second of these plans, Hyder was to be the future nabob of Arcot, by the mock authority of Nizam Ali, because he was able to aid in his own elevation; and Mâphuz Khân was to be amused with indefinite expectations, because he could furnish neither troops nor talents. Mahommed Ali deprecated the royal grant of the Sircars, because the same authority might with equal facility, have been brought to confer on the English Company the possession of Arcot; he had learned with deep apprehension the orders for seizing those provinces in the name of the Company, as indicating more distinct views of their actual situation than had yet been exhibited at Madras, and a more manly assertion of the character which they were entitled to as-
sume; he accordingly viewed with complacency an arrangement inexplicable on any grounds that are fit to be avowed, by which the Government of Madras, continuing the absurd policy which had effected his own unconditional elevation, gratuitously bowed the neck as tributaries to a new master. This convenient humility reconciled him also to the union of the British Government with his rival Nizam Ali; because their fond election of the secondary place in politics, and of the first in peril, and the absence of all definite compact in their relative situation with himself, left to him in his newly assumed character of the sovereign of Carnatic, the claim to all the benefits of their combined efforts, in a war ostensibly undertaken for the reduction of the power of Hyder; who, (in the loose and misapplied acceptance of a geographical term) had made encroachments on Carnatic, of which the conquest of Kurpa was confidently cited as a prominent example; and on these grounds Mahommed Ali became more urgent than any of the coalesced powers for engaging in the war against Hyder. After this brief description of the designs of the other powers, it is scarcely necessary to add, that the English were about to engage in the contest, in the exclusive character of dupes. “The Company (say the Government of Bengal in 1765) are put to the choice of remaining as merchants, subject to the country governments, or supporting their privileges and possessions by the power of the sword;” but it was in Bengal alone that a mind * existed capable of comprehending, in all its relations, the true nature of the character which they were thus compelled to assume.

For the negotiation confided to Mâphuz Khân, for averting

* The great Lord Clive.
one branch of the danger which threatened Mysoor, a fruitless attempt had been added to purchase the retreat of Mādoo Row *, the Mahratta chief; who professed nothing short of the entire subversion of Hyder’s usurped authority. The amount of the Mahratta force, and Hyder’s experience of the talents by which it was directed, determined him not to risque his own army beyond the protection of the capital; and to have recourse to other modes of impeding the enemy’s progress. In conformity to this new plan of defence, he issued the most peremptory orders to all his officers, civil and military, to break down the embankments of the reservoirs of water, on the approach of the Mahratta army; to poison the wells with milk hedge †; to burn all the forage, even to the thatch of the houses; to bury the grain; to drive off the wulsa ‡, and the cattle to the woods; and to leave to the Mahrattas neither forage, water, nor food.

The reservoirs in question, peculiar to the south of India, (unlessindeed the lake Mœris, may be supposed to have resembled them, by distributing as well as receiving the superfluous waters of the Nile) may seem to merit a short description.

The converging points of two ranges of hills are sometimes united by an embankment, and the vale above is converted into a lake. One of these which I sounded, at the distance of a few yards from the embankment, was thirty-two fathoms in depth, measured by a native of ordinary stature. In plain countries, a gentle descent is intersected by a horizontal line of embankment for many miles: the excavation to form

* Properly Māhádeo Row.
† Euphorbia Tiraculli.
‡ For an explanation of this term, see vol. i. p. 308,
the embankment, becomes the deepest part of the reservoir, the shallowest extending backwards, as far as the point of intersection with the sloping plain, formed by an horizontal line, passing from near the summit of the bank. In countries of an intermediate character, feeders* in the form of trenches extending along the sides of the swelling eminences, intercept the rain which falls above on an area of many square miles to be conveyed to the reservoir, and the overflow of rivers in the rainy season is led wherever practicable to replenish the artificial lake. Effectual provision is always made for discharging the superfluous water: and a simple contrivance opens or stops the channel by which these accumulated treasures are made to irrigate the greater part of the rice grounds of the South of India. An effectual breach in such an embankment, of course discharges the water, and in a few days converts the lake into a bed of mud.

The perfect execution of such a scheme of defence requires that the body of the population should feel an interest in its success; but the interests of the people do not enter into the calculations of an unenlightened despot; and the reader must be aware that the actual administration of affairs had little tendency to produce examples of self-devotion, or to shake the characteristic indifference of the Hindoos in a choice of masters. Repeated experience has since shewn that however efficacious against a regular army, the project is mere theory, against the overwhelming mass of a genuine Mahratta invasion; which, instead of moving in regular columns, whose route and intentions may

* I think this is the technical term of the English canal makers.
be foreseen, and counteracted; covers the whole face of the
country; and almost divests of poetic fiction the Mahommedan
illustration which compares them to a cloud of locusts. Such
a plan may distress, but cannot stop such an army: for-
age* exists independently of dry straw: the cavalry even of an English army subsists on the roots of grass: the
sudden and unwilling exertions of a district can neither
destroy nor poison all its reservoirs: the discovery of buried
grain has become a practical trade: men furnished with pointed
rods of iron thrust them deep into the ground, and from the
sound, the resistance, and above all from the smell of the
point when withdrawn, form their conclusions with surprising
sagacity; and finally, cattle cannot retire where they cannot
be pursued and found. The Mahrattas accordingly made good
their march across this imperfect desert; and Mâdoo Row
who had pushed on to Raidroog early in February, followed
the course of the Hogree, a river in its appointed season, but
then exhibiting an arid bed of sand. A sufficient supply of
water was however found by digging as is usual, shallow pits
beneath its surface; which enabled Mâdoo Row, without im-
pediment, or material distress, to reach Sera. Meer † Saheb
the brother-in-law of Hyder was stationed at this place with
4000 horse and 6000 infantry, chiefly irregular, and to him
Mâdoo Row proposed a capitulation which was gladly accept-
ed; by which he betrayed his trust; gave up the fort and
district of Sera; and received in return, as a Mahratta depend-

* Necessity has since instructed the natives of countries subject to Mahratta in-
vansion, to bury even their forage in immense subterraneous pits.
† Meer Ali Reza Khan.
ency, the fort and district of Goorumconda, 150 miles to the eastward, which had formerly been possessed by one of his* ancestors. This unexpected defection, added to the probable influence of his misfortunes on the politics of Nizam Ali, who was approaching as a gleaner, after the Mahrattas should have gathered the harvest, determined Hyder to repeat his efforts at negotiation. Madoo Row peremptorily refused to receive any ambassador who should not be furnished with full and final powers, for the execution of which his own person should be the guarantee. Apajee Ram, a bramin in the service of Hyder was selected for this delicate service: his acceptance of the trust evinced a reciprocal confidence worthy of a better state of society, and in this his first diplomatic essay, some traits of personal character were unfolded which reflect a corresponding light on the national manners of a Mahratta camp. Apajee Ram was received by Madoo Row in the great tent of audience, in a full durbar, consisting of all his officers of state, and chiefs of the army, amounting to near four hundred persons. After the inspection of his powers, he was referred for details to the putwurdun†, and directed immediately to proceed, in open

* His grandfather was an orphan, and was provided for by the Kuttub Shâhee Court of Golconda, according to an established practice of that dynasty, by which all orphans of the Shâea persuasion, male and female, were educated in distinct wards of the palace, under the respective patronage of the King and his chief begum; and at the age of puberty intermarried. The grandfather of Meer Ali Reza, thus educated, was distinguished by court favour, and had the fort and district of Goorumconda assigned to him in jageer. The son of this Jageerdar (the father of Meer Saheb), was dispossessed by the Patan Nabob of Kurpa, who, at a subsequent period had purchased the retreat of a Mahratta invasion by the cession of Goorumconda. It now returned to the family of its former possessor. Meer Saheb, born to better prospects, became, at an early age, in consequence of the misfortunes of his father, a mere soldier of fortune, and not of very promising fortune, as we may infer, by his having given his sister in marriage to Hyder Naieb, during the campaign of 1750.

† The ancestor of the late Perseam Bhow. Putwurdun.
CHAP. durbar, to explain to him the business of his mission, Mâdoo Row himself affecting to be occupied with other concerns. The envoy was not discouraged by these affected indications of indifference; he made no objection to the unusual demand of entering on business in the first audience of ceremony, but commenced his speech without a moment’s hesitation. In an exordium of some eloquence, he expatiated in a pathetic strain on the miseries of war, and on the moral obligations of those to whom Providence had confided the destinies of nations, to confer on their people the blessings of peace. He then proceeded in a clear and business-like train of argument to represent, that Hyder considered every cause of dispute to have been settled by the peace of Bednoor; and that he was not aware of any deviation from his engagements which could justify the present invasion.

The Putwurdun replied that the peace of Bednoor was concluded with the Raja; that since that period it had become notorious that the Raja was a prisoner, and Hyder an usurper; and that the liberation of the Raja, and his restoration to his legitimate authority, were essential towards establishing the previous relations of the parties on which Hyder had founded his complaints of aggression. A general murmur of approbation throughout the assembly, announced that this argument was considered unanswerable.

Apajee Ram, in a tone of repentant humility, acknowledged that the Raja was virtually a state pageant in the hands of Hyder; but, added he, with an immovable gravity of countenance, the arrangement is not an invention of our own, but a distant and respectful imitation of the conduct of our betters; and if those eminent authorities will lead the way in the moral
doctrines they inculcate, we shall unquestionably be ready to follow so laudable an example. The reader will of course re-collect, that the Mahratta Raja, the descendant of Sevagee, was a prisoner in Sittâra, and that Mâdoo Row the Pêshwa or general, was hereditary usurper.

Mâdoo Row hung down his head, the whole assembly refrained with difficulty from a burst of laughter, and the ground was quickly cleared for actual business. The preliminary points were soon understood, and in a private audience, to which he was admitted on the following day, the retreat of the Mahratta host was purchased for thirty-five lacs of rupees, half of which was paid on the spot late in the month of March. Mâdoo Row had obtained possession of all the districts of Mysoor to the south-eastward of Sera, and the treaty provided for the immediate restoration of the whole, with the single exception of the fort and district of Colar, which remained in pledge for the payment of the remaining sum of seventeen and a half lacs of rupees. But this sum being also discharged in conformity to the treaty early in the month of May, Mâdoo Row finally evacuated Colar, and turned his face towards Poona.

The influence of wit and humour on the formality and selfishness of political discussions belongs to the legitimate province of history, and may be deemed still more appropriate when intended to convey a living transcript of national manners which are little understood. Critics who plead for the dignity of history have not always the same respect for its gravity, and may deem the considerations which have been stated to constitute a sufficient apology for the following additional anecdote.

Apajee Ram was sent to Poona on a subsequent occasion, and
being somewhat free in his private conduct, his manner of life was reported to Mâdoo Row, who like most Asiatic chiefs was addicted to loose conversation, and pleased with the impure wit arising from such discussions. Apajee, said he, my female subjects complain that you are intolerable, and beg that you may be sent away. "Their complaints have some foundation," said Apajee, "and pray, Sir, relieve your female subjects by dispatching my business." A smile was on the side of Apajee, but he was not satisfied with the success of his retort, and shortly afterwards taking his leave, stopped at the outer door, and as the durbar was breaking up, imitating the tone of the public crier, proclaimed in a loud voice, "A miserable sinner stands in the door, let all who have not transgressed put their hands on his head*, declare their innocence, and pass on; let his fellow sinners acknowledge their faults and endeavour to amend." A roar of laughter was on the side of Apajee; none touched his head; all acknowledged themselves of his fraternity; and Mâdoo Row, in making his confession, ornamented the penitent with a valuable decoration of pearls and diamonds from his own neck.

During this negotiation, by which Hyder had delivered himself from the most formidable of his enemies, and felt more at ease regarding the disposal of the remainder, Nizam Ali approached, at the interval of a full month later than Mâdoo Row, by a more eastern route, the resources of which were, by compact, to have furnished his supplies, but had already been rifled by the Mahrattas. A formidable English corps

* To swear by the head of a bramin, touching it with the right hand, is among the most solemn forms of adjuration.
was moving in separate columns, to form a junction with him on the northern frontier of Mysoor; and the tributary powers in the route, were summoned to join the standard; but by the time this tardy host, levying revenues on its own subjects, by the power of the sword, to provide for its immediate necessities, had reached the river Toombuddra, on the 9th of March, intelligence was received, that Mâdoo Row had taken Sera; and, on the 24th of the same month, that his retreat had been purchased by Hyder. Colonel Smith, who from the first day after joining Nizam Ali, began to suspect that his own government had engaged in what he terms a disjointed expedition, strongly urged, in his dispatches of the 9th of March, the indispensable necessity of insisting on the adjustment of "some reasonable plan of action; without this preliminary," he adds, "one of three events can only happen, either Mâdoo Row will do his business himself, or we shall be beaten in detail, or we shall do nothing at all; and on the 24th, the minister of Nizam Ali avowed to him that this was the third conjoint expedition in which his master had been deceived by the Mahrattas in precisely the same way. While still not half way advanced towards his object, this chief began to meditate on repassing the rivers, and returning in the ensuing year; but in order that he might not incur the shame of being doubly over-reached, he resolved to make a few marches in advance, for the purpose of accelerating the determination of Hyder, who had repeatedly urged him to accept of 20 lacs, and the promise of a fixed tribute of six, but who since his adjustment with Mâdoo Row, had observed a profound silence on the subject of money, and strongly incited him to a joint retaliation on the English and Mohammed Ali: "they (the Court of
CHAP. XIII.  
Nizam Ali) have,” says General Smith, “been outwitted by the Mahrattas, and are poor, indolent, rapacious, and unsystematic, themselves.” Still however the armies continued to advance, Mâadoo Row was encamped near Colar, while the united force of Nizam Ali and the English was moving towards him, with the feeble hope of sharing in his spoils, or prevailing on him to persevere in the original project of the war. Colonel Tod was deputed for this purpose, by Colonel Smith, and was accompanied by a confidential person on the part of Nizam Ali. The application of the latter for a part of the spoil, was treated with broad ridicule; and Colonel Tod, on his return, reported*, “that when he declared to Mâadoo Row, that he was come to talk on business, they (the Mahratta durbar) could not keep their countenances, but burst out a laughing in his face.”

The Mahrattas, having previously sent their heavy equipments in advance, finally moved northwards on the 11th of May; and Nizam Ali marched on the same day towards Bangalore. The cold cloudy weather of the months of June, July, and August, which renders this climate a delightful refuge from the burning heats of the lower countries to the eastward, is preceded, in the month of May, by tremendous thunder storms, on nearly the same invariable hour of every afternoon, and the violent alternations of heat, and deluging rain which precede and follow them, had so much increased the sick of the English troops, that they were

* Letter from Mr. James Bourchier and Colonel Smith, 3d May, 1767. When Colonel Smith had plainly intimated to government his opinion of the necessity of more vigorous councils, they sent Mr. Bourchier to relieve him from a portion of his political cares.
compelled to remain at Deonhully, for want of the means of conveyance, which had been liberally promised by their good ally. Colonel Smith, who had long suspected inimical combinations, suspicions which were confirmed by finding that Nizam Ali, on entering Mysoor, treated it as a friendly country, had on the 3d of May, officially announced his conviction of the fact, and recommended to his Government the most vigorous preparations against a hostile invasion of their own territory, by the combined forces of Hyder and Nizam Ali. In consequence of these representations, the option was allowed to him, of returning to the lower countries with the troops, whenever he and Mr. Bouchier should deem that measure to be proper; and they accordingly determined to present to the minister of Nizam Ali the distinct alternative, of moving the troops in that direction, or obtaining from him some satisfactory explanation of his actual intentions. Assurances of inviolable attachment, fictitious explanations of an important negociation with Hyder, the success of which absolutely depended on the union of the English troops, and pressing intreaties to join his camp near Bangalore, again deceived them. The ground to be occupied for this purpose was marked out by the staff of the two armies; but as the English troops entered the encampment at one point, they perceived with astonishment the troops of Nizam Ali departing at the opposite, for the purpose of marching, without explanation, to a distance of twelve miles. Hyder, who had secret reasons for suspicion, to which we shall presently advert, was not so credulous as the English: he had plainly declared his apprehension of being deceived by Nizam Ali, and his fear of moving from the protection of his capital, without some overt proof that his conjectures
were groundless; and this exhibition of open and contemptuous mockery was concerted for the purpose of satisfying all his scruples.

Colonel Smith in sullen indignation, moved with the body of the troops towards his own frontier: his government, however, still professed to discredit the existence of an hostile confederacy: Mr. Bouchier continued to believe that something might still be effected by negotiation, and the minister of Nizam Ali cherished this easy credulity, by new and extravagant professions of sincerity; by acquiescing in the convenience of moving the body of the English troops, for the present towards their own frontier; and by earnestly entreating, that three battalions with their field-pieces attached, might be permitted to remain in his camp, as a demonstration of friendship and alliance; a request which was granted, contrary to every principle of military prudence, or political dignity.

The suspicions of Hyder had in the mean while been roused by the discovery of a source of domestic danger which it was necessary to remove. When his old benefactor Nunjeraj was last reconciled and undeceived, a stipulation had been made, and hitherto observed, for his residing in a certain degree of dignity at Mysoor; and it was now ascertained, that he had long been engaged in secret correspondence with Madoor Row, and Nizam Ali, for the destruction of Hyder, whose power he represented, with truth, to have been founded on the infraction of every bond of gratitude, and all the duties of allegiance; and the object of these negotiations was to subvert the usurpation of Hyder, and restore the Hindoo government; or rather, in point of fact, to revive his own previous usurp-
Hyder, in consequence of this discovery, sent repeated messages to Nunjeraj, representing, that in the actual state of affairs, his presence and counsel were required at Seringapatam; and the old man, probably finding that resistance or refusal would be ineffectual, at length consented to proceed, on the solemn assurance, that his own guards should accompany and remain with him; and that no change should be made excepting in the place of his abode. For the performance of these engagements, he exacted the most sacred obligation which a Mussulman can incur; and two of Hyder's confidential friends, Khâkee Shah, and Ghâlib Mahommed Khan * were sent to confirm and guarantee the promises of Hyder by an oath on the Korân. On the arrival however of Nunjeraj at Seringapatam, his guards were seized; his jageer resumed; and he was thenceforth furnished as a state prisoner, with the mere necessaries of life. The splendid cover on which this sacred oath had been confirmed, enveloped no more than a simple book of blank paper; and it was thus by a solemn mockery of the religion which they both professed, that Hyder and these religious casuists reconciled to themselves the double crime of a false oath, upon a false Korân.

All the essential conditions of the alliance between Hyder and Nizam Ali, were already mutually understood; and among other stipulations it was agreed, that Hyder, as the more experienced officer, should regulate and direct the united operations of the troops; but during the period of preparation, an interchange took place of the most pompous deputations of oriental ceremony; over the first, from Nizam Ali, presided his prime

* The brother of Fuzzul Oolla Khan, or Hybut Jung.
CHAP. XIII. 1767.

minister, with the Nabob of Kurnool, and the minister of finance; the composition of Hyder’s deputation was intended to point without disguise to his own objects, and was perfectly successful in casting a mixture of obloquy, and irresistible ridicule, on the history of his opponents; it consisted, besides his eldest son and chief military officer, of Māphooz Khān and Reza Ali Khān, the rightful heirs, as far as any right existed, of the two rivals whom the English and French had respectively supported as the Nabobs of Arcot.

The arrangements for passive defence, to which Hyder had necessarily confined his views, on the hostile approach of the confederates, rendered some time necessary before he could collect and arrange the equipments for an active offensive campaign; and during this interval Nizam Ali, who had come forward to Cenapatam for the purpose of these public demonstrations of alliance, moved again for the convenience of forage to the north-east. The officer commanding the English detachment was amused on one day with the assurance of being in full march to Hyderabad, and on the next with some silly reason for moving towards the opposite point of the compass: the sepoys, meanwhile, being without pay and destitute of credit, in an enemy’s country, were nearly in a state of mutiny for want of food; and as hostilities against Hyder had actually commenced in another quarter, the difficulty of supplying them became a serious consideration. Captain Cosby detached by Colonel Smith, with five hundred men and a small supply of money, performed this delicate service with admirable address, having so skilfully evaded the corps detached to intercept him, as to return with the loss of one man only; after having performed a circuitous
march, guided chiefly by the compass, of upwards of 350 miles in thirteen days, including two days occupied in delivering his charge and refreshing the troops.*

At length however the English brigade with the army of Nizam Ali, was suffered to depart, leaving five companies as a guard of honour to this still equivocal friend. The chivalrous spirit which dictated this permission affords some relief to the mind, after the disgust of contemplating incessant fraud. As a feature of Mahommedan character it is an example not altogether singular of the mixture of pride and meanness which accompanies imperfect civilization and defective morals. A ray of seeming generosity broke through the gloom of habitual deception; it was the affectation of courage that assumed the garb of probity; and the mind which had abandoned truth, and the virtues which are her offspring, was yet sensible to the shame of being influenced by fear: such is the ground of distinction on which superficial reasoners have affected a preference for the virtues of uncivilized life; and such was the sentiment which continued to influence Nizam Ali in giving safe conduct to the five companies three days preceding his actual commencement of hostilities.

During the period in which the confederated forces were approaching Mysoor from the north, the English from Madras had moved a respectable corps to the westward, for the purpose

* The single man lost in this expedition, was one of the native troopers, by whom the money had been carried in their holsters; this man delivered the 800l. with which he was intrusted, and deserted the next day. That he did not desert with the money, was a point of honour not without parallel among these troops, and worthy of being recorded as an illustration of their character.
CHAP. of endeavouring, by the possession of Baramahal to extend their frontier to the summit of the second range of hills; while Hyder should be prevented by the armies of Poona and Hyderabad from disturbing their operations: and Nizam Ali continued, to the last moment, the deception of recommending a perseverance in these efforts, for the purpose of influencing his important negotiations with Hyder, which were to confer unknown benefits on his English allies. The total want of previous information, with regard to the country in which they were to operate, rendered these efforts entirely abortive: Veniambaddy, Tripatore, Caveripatam, and other mere village bulwarks, surrendered without opposition; but the places of real strength, erected on the summits of naked, lofty, and insulated mountains of granite, were provided with respectable garrisons: an attempt was made to carry one of these droogs*, Kistnagherry, the reputed capital of the district, by surprise, on the night of the 3d of June. The walled town at the foot of the rock having for some time been occupied without any serious opposition, a petard was prepared for forcing the gate of the upper fort; but the men who carried it, as well as the forlorn hope which preceded them, being all killed by showers of detached rocks precipitated from the summit, the party retired with the loss of nearly the whole grenadier company which led the enterprise; and on its failure the

* These fortresses, on granite rocks, have annexed to their names the general epithet of Droog or Durgum, implying that they are inaccessible. Xenophon, in the fourth chapter of the Anabasis, has an interesting description of the stratagem, by which the ten thousand Greeks carried a post so defended; the assailants found the cover of some clumps of trees on the ascent, from whence they made false demonstrations, until the defenders had expended their supply of stones, when the Greeks ascended without difficulty.
siege was converted into a blockade, which neutralized what little of plan had been preconcerted, by locking up the great body of the troops in this ineffectual operation. On the return of Colonel Smith from Bengalore, he was directed to assume the general command of the British troops on the frontier; Nizam Ali was already on the crest of the hills which overlook Baramahal, and Hyder in full equipment followed at the interval of two days' march. "Although," says Colonel Smith*, "it was as plain as noon day to every person (except the council) that they were preparing to enter the Carnatic jointly, no measures were taken to establish magazines of provisions in proper places, nor any steps to supply our army in time of need," and even three days before the invasion, this officer was positively directed, to pass to the enemy a supply of provisions, of which his own troops were in the greatest want.

* Letter to Lord Clive.
CHAPTER XIV.

Hyder and Nizam Ali descend the ghauts—operations—carry off the cattle of the army—Hyder takes Caveripatan—Smith moves to join Wood—followed by Hyder—Battle of Changama—Smith, although victorious, retires to Trinomalee—Allies recriminate—Smith in distress for food—Council of war declares the necessity for going into cantonment—prohibited by the government—Various manoeuvres—Decisive victory of Trinomalee.

The errors which have been transmitted to later periods regarding the topography of these mountains lessen our surprise at finding Colonel Smith erecting a defensive work in the eastern gorge of one of the passes, and only discovering his mistake by the presence of the united armies which had descended in full force by much better roads considerably to the southward of his position, while he believed them to be hesitating on the possibility of forcing the pass, on which they had merely made a demonstration to draw his attention from their actual movement.

Aug. 25. The first act of hostility, on the 25th of August, was an actual surprise; the cattle of the army grazing with their accustomed confidence of security were driven off; the cavalry hastily moved out for their recovery, and found themselves unexpectedly assailed by very superior numbers, under Muckhdoom Ali, the brother-in-law of Hyder, who charged them into the very lines of the encampment, after destroying about one-third of their number, and carried off the greater part of the cattle, a mis-
fortune which still farther crippled the already inefficient equipments of the English army*, and prevented it from moving until the 28th, during which interval Hyder had besieged Caveripatam; and the imprudence of occupying such places, was evinced by its falling on the second day.

A corps of British troops from Trichinopoly, under Colonel Wood, had been ordered to join Colonel Smith; and the fortified Pagoda of Trinomalee, to the eastward of the first range of hills, had been indicated as the point at which he would receive his farther orders: although Hyder was aware of the approach of this corps, and that it was still at the distance of ten days march at the least, he committed the apparent error of not placing himself between Colonel Smith and the pass of Singarpetta‡, by which the junction must necessarily be formed. From assuming a strong position near Caveripatam, he seems to have expected that his adversary would be guilty of the rashness of attacking him before he had received his reinforcements; and the necessity

* Colonel Smith's letter estimates the several armies as follows:

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<th></th>
<th>Cavalry.</th>
<th>Infantry.</th>
<th>Guns.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nizam Ali</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyder</td>
<td>12,860</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42,860</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>109</td>
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<th></th>
<th>Cavalry.</th>
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<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>800</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>3 16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mahommed Ali</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,030</td>
<td>5,800</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
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‡ Or Changama, see note to vol. i. p. 413.
of Colonel Smith's situation, from the causes which have been stated, prevented him from reaching Singarpetta before the 30th.

In the preliminary communications or the allies, Hyder had been lavish of his eastern assurances, of cutting the English army to pieces wherever he should come up with it: a shyness so little corresponding to these boasts, might in part be ascribed to the distinction between promise and performance, so well understood among uncivilized nations; and also, in some degree, to the actual contact which had just been experienced at Caveripatam, where, previously to capitulation, three companies of English sepoys, under Captain McKain, had twice repelled the assault of the flower of his army: and a position which should place his rear on an impenetrable wood, with only one narrow road through it, was suited to troops not only confident but determined not to be forced. Nizam Ali indignant at the timid policy which seemed to have purposely allowed the enemy to secure his retreat, indirectly upbraided Hyder with the too delicate use of his powers of command; and intimated that if he chose to persevere in the plan, which in explanation he proposed to recommend, of acting on the enemies' supplies, he (Nizam Ali) had in his own power a more summary mode of adjusting his differences with the English. Whether the omission of Hyder in suffering the unmolested movement of Colonel Smith had been of error or design, he now found himself under the necessity of yielding to the impatience of his ally, or risking the benefit of his co-operation. From that moment therefore he began to press upon the rear of the English army, in its movement to form a junction with Colonel Wood: the first march from Singarpetta was through a road of ordinary breadth, formed
by felling the trees of a forest, considered as impenetrable in most places to ordinary travellers, and consequently favourable to a small body retiring in a single column; the surprise of the English troops was however excited, by the sudden appearance of bodies of predatory horse on the flanks, scrambling for booty among rocks and thickets, accessible with difficulty by regular infantry. On the two following tardy marches, nearly due east to hangama; as the country became more open and practicable, the English column of march was every where surrounded, and impeded by horse; and during the whole night the encampment was harrassed by flights of rockets.*

The direction of the next march was about S. E. and at the distance of nearly four miles; the road passes between impracticable ground on the left, and some of those lower hills, which form the undulating base of the great range of mountains. In approaching the pass which is thus formed, a fordable river, running to the eastward, crosses obliquely the line of the road; Colonel Smith, desirous of moving beyond this pass without molestation, all that impeded his march, did not move at his accustomed hour; but keeping his tents standing till near noon,

* This Indian instrument receives its projectile force from the same composition which is used in the rockets of ordinary fire-works; the cylinder which contains it, is of iron; and sometimes gunpowder, at its extremity, causes it to explode when it has reached its object; a straight sword blade is also not unfrequently affixed to the rocket; an attached bamboo or reed steadies its flight; the rocket men are trained to give them an elevation proportioned to the varying dimensions of the cylinder, and the distance of the object to be struck: as those projected to any distance describe a parabola of considerable height, a single rocket is easily avoided, but when the flight is numerous, the attempt would be useless, and their momentum is always sufficient to destroy a man or a horse. Such was the ancient Indian instrument, so inferior to the Congreve rocket of modern European warfare.
then suddenly struck them, and dispatched his baggage in advance, under a respectable division of his army, formed in the following order: A battalion of sepoys, in column of companies, was followed by the Nabob's cavalry, receiving, not affording protection; the baggage of the army succeeded, covered on each flank by a battalion of sepoys, moving in column of files: at a short interval, followed the remainder of the army, with its flank companies formed into a separate corps, as a rear guard: Hyder, however, had penetrated the enemy's design, and was already moving in a converging line from the west, to occupy a position to the south-west of the river, nearly parallel to its course on the left, and towards the right, inclining more to the eastward: one of the hills already noticed, near the right of this position, with a village at its foot, was the key of the pass; and was already occupied by a select corps of the army of Nizam Ali, followed at a short interval by Hyder himself, with the flower of his troops. One of the corps of the English advance, commanded by Captain Cosby, was ordered to dislodge the enemy from the village, which he effected at the point of the bayonet; and finding himself annoyed from the hill, proceeded with equal success to drive them from that position also, while the advance pursued its route and cleared the difficulties of the pass. From this hill Captain Cosby perceived the rapid approach of Hyder's regular infantry, and reporting his observations to Major Bonjour, who commanded the advance, requested and obtained his permission to call up the leading corps of the main body, commanded by Captain Cowley, to occupy the hill, before he should quit it to join the advance; a judicious suggestion, which essentially con-
tributed to the success of the day. The confederates were entering their position, but had not occupied it, when Colonel Smith, on approaching the river, and hearing the report of Captain Cosby, perceived the necessity of quickening his pace: he was marching by his left, in a single column of files, and pushed on without stopping to notice the enemy’s fire, until the head of his column was nearly united to the corps on the hill, when by facing to the right, this portion of his little army, was at once formed in line opposite to the enemy. Hyder who perceived, when too late, the gross error which he had committed, in not occupying this important post in the first instance, and in force, with his best infantry, made several ineffectual efforts to dislodge the English sepoys from the hill; his loss in these charges in mass, is stated to have been enormous; and in one of them Ghālib Mahommed Khān * was killed; foiled in these attempts, the confederates kept up an ill-directed fire of musquetry, from an extent of under-wood towards their left, from which their infantry made several efforts to break through the English line, and from fifty pieces of cannon against fourteen; an attack on the two last of the English field pieces which crossed the river, had long impeded the rear guard; but on its closing with the line, a disposition was made for a forward movement of the whole, which ended in completely routing the immense host of the confederates; the pursuit was continued until the day closed; two guns were abandoned by the enemy, and left spiked in the bed of the river, but the

* Colonel Smith erroneously calls him Hyder’s brother-in-law. He estimates Hyder’s loss in this action, in killed alone, at 2000 men, which is a very large calculation; his own loss was no more than 170 killed and wounded.
necessities of Colonel Smith's situation prevented him from carrying off his trophies. During the action, the enemy's horse had broken in on his baggage and captured his scanty store of rice; his dependance for a further supply was on Trinomalee, which it was necessary for him to reach without delay, from the farther apprehension that the enemy by another practicable road, might attempt to intercept his march in this desperate state of his supplies. The victory had thus been followed by the immediate necessity of a movement resembling flight; for with the exception of a short interval on the field of battle, and two hours halt after midnight, Colonel Smith continued his retreat throughout that night and the greater part of the ensuing day (the 4th of September), the troops having been upwards of twenty-seven hours without refreshment or repose, when they reached Trinomalee.

The Nabob Mahommed Ali, had given the strongest assurances to the government of Madras, and they to Colonel Smith, that he should find at Trinomalee, an abundant depot of provisions of every description, for all the troops of his own army, and of the different corps for which it had been appointed the rendezvous; and in this persuasion some military stores and equipments had been sent by the government of Madras to the same place. Colonel Smith on his arrival, found that there was no rice, and of paddy (viz. rice in the husk) which required time to prepare it for food, as much only in the town and neighbouring villages, as was sufficient to supply the most immediate necessities of his troops. Three days after Colonel Smith's arrival at Trinomalee, an event occurred unexampled in the history of English warfare in India,
the desertion of an officer, Lieutenant Hitchcock: the army afterwards learned with delight that the traitor was suspected, and sent to prison, where he lingered in infamy, and died unpitied.

The allies, discouraged by the result of their first encounter; and each, as usual, ascribing to the other the blame of failure, employed that time in the discussion of the past, which ought to have been devoted to the care of the future, and Hyder again committed the fault of permitting Colonel Wood to join (on the 8th), without molestation. Although Colonel Smith found Trinomalee, a place of no strength, he was compelled to risk his sick, wounded, and military stores in this critical situation, from the absolute necessity of moving to the villages to the eastward, in quest of food. On his departure, the allies still occupied in discussion, neglected to attack Trinomalee, until the 14th, when Colonel Smith having collected a scanty supply of provisions, returned for its protection, in time to see the enemy draw off the cannon, which they had been in the act of placing in battery against it: a corps of 10,000 horse, which had been advanced to cover this operation, was driven in with some loss, and the battering guns accompanied by the whole allied army, hurried off to the north-west, and encamped late in the evening, at only six miles distance from the English position.

Colonel Smith being now joined by most of his detachments, determined to attack the confederates on the ensuing morning, and moved at day light for that purpose: but, on approaching their position, he found them in complete security from the interposition of an impassable morass. In this short interval, his supply of provisions was again expended; and he
was again compelled to move to the eastward, for food on the 16th.

In this wretched state, the frequent torrents which among these hills, precede the north-east monsoon, having already commenced, a corps of regular infantry, destitute of every equipment of supply, that constitutes an efficient army, moving through a country ravaged and exhausted by forty thousand horse, was left to prowl for food, within a limited circle, from which it could not depart without abandoning its hospital and stores. Under these circumstances a council of war was unanimous in the expediency of evacuating Trinomalee, and endeavouring to place the wounded and the stores in Chittapet, a place of some strength, garrisoned by the Nabob Mahommed Ali, distant about two marches to the north-east, and that the troops should then move into cantonment, at Arcot, Vellore, or any other place where they could obtain food.

Although the errors of the government, and in the front of these the cardinal vice of leaving the very existence of the troops to depend on the performance of the promises of a nabob, had reduced the army to its present critical situation, they saw and deprecated the consequences of placing it in cantonment, while the cavalry of the confederates had overspread the country up to the very gates of Madras, and their whole army was consuming or destroying its resources. Colonel Smith continued accordingly to manoeuvre in the neighbourhood of Trinomalee, under all the disadvantages which have been described. The confederates after the last action, had agreed on the propriety of sending light detachments of irregulars to ravage the country in every direc-
tion, and to reserve their best horse for the purpose of distressing the English army, and uniting in the attack, which they determined to make, when it should be reduced by famine and fatigue to the expected extremity of retiring from the frontier in the direction of Arcot. Rumours which appeared to be authentic, had conveyed to them tolerably distinct accounts of the deliberations which had been held, regarding the necessity of moving into cantonment: they believed that Colonel Smith was postponing this measure, under the pressure of urgent distress, in the hope that the approach of the north-east monsoon should first induce them to move into the upper countries; and they resolved to protract their departure to the last, in the confidence that they should find the English army progressively enfeebled and disheartened by the long continuance of these severe privations, and every day less capable of resisting their ultimate attack. In his excursions to the eastward, however, Colonel Smith had by judicious combinations received some reinforcements of troops, small convoys of provisions and stores, and above all, had been enabled to relieve his most serious wants by the discovery of large hidden stores, which the inhabitants are accustomed to keep sometimes for many years in subterraneous excavations, as well for security against hostile invasion, as because experience has shewn this mode to be the most effectual for the preservation of the grain: and troops which the confederates supposed to be in the lowest stage of wretchedness and want, had, for the last fortnight been daily improving in physical strength and efficiency. The confederates, apprehensive that the supposed wretchedness of their enemy might produce efforts of desperation, had assumed a
strong position, which they fortified with regular redoubts; covering not only the front and flanks of their encampment, but commanding every avenue by which their retreat could be interrupted; and steadily declined all the opportunities which Colonel Smith presented to them of attacking him in the plain. At length, however, these wearisome expectations began to relax in confidence, and Nizam Ali, who had left his capital to share in a campaign of unresisted plunder, and had been led into the present operations by the assurance of easy conquest, perceived nothing but disappointment in the successive plans which were to destroy his opponents in this distant service; and had intelligence of sources of danger nearer home, to which we shall presently advert. He therefore insisted on the necessity of bringing the contest to the issue of a general action; and while he was concerting with Hyder the best mode of effecting this object, Colonel Smith, who had by great efforts collected the means of making a movement on a more extended line, was occupied in devising the means of drawing the confederates into the plain; and had encamped as near as circumstances would admit to the front of their main position, with a force of 10,430* effective men, besides 1500 bad horse.

Sept. 26. About noon on the 26th of September, the confederates moved a column, accompanied by sixteen of their heaviest cannon, to a position in front of Colonel Smith’s left, from whence they com-

* European infantry - - - - 1,400
Native - - - - 9,000
European cavalry - - - - 30
Native - - - - 1,500
Field pieces - - - - 34
menced a distant cannonade. A morass intervened, difficult but not impassable, and not perceptible without a close examination. It was Hyder’s plan to entangle his opponent in this difficulty, in which he would necessarily sustain considerable loss. If he should pass the impediment without discomfiture, a line of redoubts was still in his front, and the main strength of the confederated army was disposed in a situation to fall in force on his right, in the moment of his advancing within range of the redoubts. Colonel Smith made a movement on his left, which shewed that he was ignorant of the existence of the morass, but which also enabled him to ascertain the exact nature of the impediment. Commencing at an unknown distance on the left, it extended beyond his right to the foot of a hill, which concealed the great body of the confederates from his view; but he concluded that this hill must form the termination of the morass; and that by making a circuit to his right, he might be enabled to turn or come in contact with the left of the confederates. His own left was therefore withdrawn from the forward manoeuvre which had been attempted, and he moved off from his right in execution of the plan which has been stated. The first direction of his column of march pointed to the north-east. The confederates who had not dismissed the persuasion that the English army was in a state of absolute want, perceived in this movement nothing less than their final retreat towards Arcot, after being foiled in a last impotent effort: they accordingly put their troops into instant motion, for the purpose of crossing the direction of the English column, pressing on its flanks, and rear, and rendering its retreat impracticable. The confederates were thus marching round the hill from the south-
west, and the English from the south-east, the movement of each
being thus concealed from the view of the other; and to their
reciprocal surprise their advanced corps were nearly in contact
on rounding the northern extremity of the hill. The advan-
tages of discipline everywhere conspicuous, are most pro-
minent in unexpected occurrences: the confederates made a
hurried movement to occupy the hill, but an English corps,
commanded by Captain Cooke, anticipated the design, repulsed
them from its summit, and secured a support for the left in the
first formation of the line. Some rocks on the plain, formed a
point of considerable strength for the support of the future move-
ments, but before it could be fully occupied by a large body of
the best infantry of the confederates, three English battalions,
commanded by Captains Cosby, Cooke, and Baillie, were con-
tending with these superior numbers for its possession, and dis-
lodged them after an obstinate resistance. This point became
the subsequent support of Colonel Smith's left, and his line was
quickly made to extend opposite to the great mass of the enemy,
who, during this movement, completed their formation on a
commanding eminence, and placed some guns in position, which
annoyed the English army while deploying into line. A power-
ful body of infantry was drawn up in the rear and on the flanks of
the confederate artillery; enormous masses of cavalry, formed a
huge crescent, enveloping the British troops, and apparently ready
to overwhelm them, on a concerted signal. But Hyder's plan
had been disconcerted; of upwards of 100 pieces of cannon no
more than 30 could be brought into action, the remainder were
in the redoubts, or had not joined from the positions allotted to
them in the original plan. The English artillery amounted to
31 light pieces, (three having been left for the protection of the baggage) steadily and skilfully served: the line cautiously advanced from one strong position to another, and after nearly silencing the artillery of the enemy, the English cannon directed their fire against the thickest masses of cavalry, in whose presence a decisive forward movement would have been imprudent; a few minutes of torpid and motionless astonishment seemed to indicate a reluctance to retreat, and an expectation of orders to charge; but the consternation had pervaded the chiefs as well as the soldiers; and the havoc produced by the active and correct fire of the English artillery quickly covered the field with a disorderly rabble of cavalry flying in every direction; the infantry and guns continuing to maintain their ground. The English line now began to move on at a steady pace, preceded by the cannon, which fired in advancing. Hyder who, from the first moment of Colonel Smith's dispositions after rounding the hill, perceived that the battle was lost, drew off his own cannon within the line of the redoubts, and rode towards Nizam Ali to entreat that he would give similar orders, and cover the operation by the movements of his cavalry: but that chief was indignant at what he deemed so spiritless a proposal, and declared his determination to maintain his position to the last. When, however, the British army began its advance in line, Hyder renewed his remonstrances, and the guns were ordered to commence their retreat, covered by Hyder's infantry, which made a regular and respectable demonstration until the near approach of the English line, when they retreated in tolerable order within the protection of the works. It was the absurd, but invariable practice of Nizam
Ali to be accompanied in the field by his favourite wives, with all the splendid appendages of rank. He was on horseback when Hyder approached; and his line of elephants carrying the women, was at no great distance in the rear: when he had determined on the retreat of the guns, he desired that the elephants should instantly turn. "This elephant," replied a female voice from the covered vehicle, "has not been instructed so to turn; he follows the standard of the empire." The loss of several elephants was the consequence of this demur, for the chivalrous damsels would not allow her's to move; until the standard had passed her in its retreat, and the English shot fell thick among those that followed in her train. A considerable body of cavalry rallied by the mere force of shame, approached to charge the right of the English during their advance; but the troops which had been detached to the left in the early part of the day were now moving in column for the protection of this flank, and foiled the feeble attempts of this disheartened body. Night closed upon the English army as they reached the last ground which had been abandoned by the enemy, within a mile of the redoubts: only nine guns for the present fell into their possession, and they lay upon their arms in expectation of farther events.

The confederates had sustained a considerable loss, but it is obvious that nothing had hitherto occurred which could be a motive, with troops accustomed to the events of war, for abandoning a fortified position, no part of which had been carried, and which was still as tenable as before the action: but Nizam Ali, who, an hour before, had answered the remonstrances of Hyder, with a declaration that he would prefer a death like that
of Nasir Jung to a dishonourable flight, was now at full speed, with a select body of his cavalry, in a western direction; and did not stop till he was fairly through the pass of Singarpetta; leaving to the minister and commander-in-chief, Ruccun-ud-Dowla, the care of directing the immediate retreat of his other troops. Hyder, finding himself thus abandoned, began to provide, in the best manner, for the security of his own army; and from his better knowledge of the requisite arrangements, and the superior equipments of his ordnance, had put his field train into full march on the only road, before that of his ally was in readiness to follow: his infantry occupied the redoubts, and the whole night was employed in getting the artillery and baggage into motion, and clearing the fortified position.

Colonel Smith, who perceived in the confusion of the enemy's camp the opportunity of striking an important blow, made a disposition, after his men had taken a slight refreshment, for an attack about midnight, to be led by the grenadiers of the army, under Major Fitzgerald, and supported according to events by the remainder of the troops. Whatever military errors may be imputed to Hyder, the conduct of his department of intelligence was unrivalled. One of his most faithful spies was the guide in English pay, who led Major Fitzgerald, and conducted him to a swamp which he had described as difficult, and which was found to be impassable. After much time had been lost in reiterated attempts to sound it in various directions, the guide proposed a circuitous route, which seemed objectionable on many accounts, besides the lateness of the hour, and after some farther fruitless efforts, the Major reluctantly returned to camp. At daylight, the army was in motion, and soon passed the redoubts,
which were entirely abandoned; but on ascending an eminence, the road as far as the eye could reach, was seen covered with the confederate army; and a train of artillery was distinctly visible, which it still seemed practicable to overtake: the English army quickened its pace, at this cheering intelligence, and in the course of the day captured forty-one pieces of heavy artillery, all belonging to Nizam Ali; fourteen more being discovered afterwards, which had been overset, for concealment, in the woods. Hyder, in person, rather observed than covered the rear, attended by his retinue of state, a troop of European cavalry, and 3000 select horse; but as he could not quicken the pace of Nizam Ali's inefficient equipments, and seldom ventured to unlimber a gun, from the apprehension of greater delays, he was compelled to abandon one after another, to the English infantry, with little material resistance. But the English officers had frequent opportunities of noticing his personal exertions, and observing the splendor of his retinue, which seemed to be purposely exhibited for their admiration. It consisted of 300 select men on foot, clothed in scarlet, and armed with lances, or pikes, of light bamboo, about eighteen feet long, twisted round from bottom to top with thin plates of silver in a spiral form: the equal intervals of polished silver, and the dark brown of the seasoned bamboo, give a splendid and not inelegant appearance to this ornamental but formidable weapon.

Excessive fatigue terminated the operations of the day, and Colonel Smith was under the positive necessity of relinquishing the more decisive results to be expected from a second day's pursuit, and of retracing his steps, to procure food. The loss of the English army in this achievement amounted to no more
than 150 men killed and wounded; that of the confederates probably exceeded 4,000, with 64 guns, chiefly 18 and 16 pounders, with their tumbrils, and a large quantity of stores of every description, excepting rice, a small supply of which at this moment would have exceeded in value all the trophies* of the day.

Tippoo Sultaün, then seventeen, in the exercise of a first nominal command, under the guidance of Ghâzée Khân, his military preceptor, and the best partisan officer in Hyder's service, was plundering the very country houses of the council of Madras, when he heard the result of the battle of Trinomalee. He retired with precipitation to join his father; his example being followed by all the other light detachments, in exact opposition to the conduct which true military policy would have instructed them to pursue. — Colonel Smith, finding the country cleared of its invaders, no longer delayed covering his troops against the approaching monsoon, and proceeded himself to Madras, with the hope of effecting some new arrangement of the departments of supply, which were as inefficient as such departments must for ever be, when kept as much as possible beyond the control of the commander in chief.

* The Frenchman calling himself commander of artillery, and general of ten thousand in the army of the Mogul, who has published the history of Hyder Ali Khan, and was present in this service, states the single trophy of the English to have been one iron three pounder; this is a specimen of what he may be presumed to have seen. What he relates, on the authority of others, resembles the information of a dramatic quidnunc, who hears every thing, and seizes the wrong end of all that he hears.
CHAPTER XV.

Mutual crimination and reconciliation of the Allies — Smith goes into cantonments — Hyder takes the field in consequence — re-takes Tripatore and Vaniambaddy — besieges Anboor — Excellent defence of Captain Calvert — Singular incident ascribed to supernatural agency — Relieved by Colonel Smith — who pursues Hyder — Affair of Vaniambaddy — Junction with Colonel Wood — Hyder occupies a fortified position at Caveripatam — Mâphuz Khán — close of his political career — Hyder’s attack of the convoy under Major Fitzgerald — Personal efforts and disappointment — Attack of Nizam Ali’s dominions, by troops from Bengal — detaches him from his alliance with Hyder — Treaty of 1768, between the English and Nizam Ali — discussed and condemned — Hyder, at the same time, moves his whole force to the western coast to oppose a diversion from Bombay, which takes Mangalore, Honáver, &c. with the fleet — Hyder’s plan of operation — Easy re-capture of the English conquests — Punishment of the inhabitants who aided the English — Deceitful compromise with the chiefs of Malabar — Returns to the eastward.

The result of the battle of Trinomalee, produced a considerable change in the views of the confederates. Nizam Ali, full of open indignation at the conduct of Hyder, and feeling little of secret complacency at his own, assembled his army at Calaimuttoor, in Bâramahâl, and Hyder established his head quarters at the same place; where they remained for near a month, without action, or determination, or interview. Each, however, had so much of real blame to impute to the other, that it was at length agreed to waive all discussion of past events, and endeavour to
concert more successful operations. Ostentatious visits of ceremony were to announce their confidence in the future, and at one of these, Hyder placed his guest on a seat or musnud, composed of bags of coined silver, amounting to a lac of rupees, covered with cushions of embroidered silver; all of which the attendants were desired to carry away, with the other presents, according to the established etiquette in similar cases.

Hyder knew that Colonel Smith, reckoning on the inaction of his enemies, during the three rainy months of October, November, and December, had disposed his army in cantonments, extremely objectionable, from their distance from each other, namely, at Conjeveram, Wandewash, and Trichinopoly; and he calculated on having time for objects of importance, before a sufficient force could be assembled to interrupt his operations.

The first of these, was the recapture of Tripatore, and Vaniambaddy, two of the indefensible places which remained in possession of the English, in the northern part of Bārāmahal, and these fell, without material resistance, on the 5th and 7th of November; from thence, Hyder proceeded to the siege of Amboor, a place of considerable strength, situated on the summit of a mountain of smooth granite, accessible on only one face, terminating the valley of Bārāmahal, on the north, and overlooking the fertile vale, which, forming a right angle with Bārāmahal, extends to the eastward, down to Vellore and Arcot. He arrived before the place, on the 10th of November, and on the 15th, had so completely dismantled the lower fort, that Captain Calvert, who commanded, deemed it no longer tenable, and retired to the summit of the hill, with a garrison of five hundred sepoys, one officer, one serjeant, and fifteen Europeans.
The Kelledaree, or Government of Amboor, with a * jageer for the maintenance of the garrison, had been conferred by Anwar-u-Deen on an officer named Muckhls Khân, who from the revolutions of fortune which he had witnessed, seemed to have conceived that possession was among the most valid arguments of right; and in the commencement of the operations against Bâramaâhâl, when it was deemed expedient to occupy this post in a regular manner as a depôt, the Kelledar, although professing unlimited deference to any order addressed to himself, refused admission to any troops but his own, and stratagem had been employed gradually to introduce a sufficient number of faithful sepoys, and, successively, of officers, to exact obedience in another form. Captain Calvert, a brave and rough officer, who had been wounded in the battle of Trinomalee, was sent to assume the command of Amboor, and discovering, at the critical moment of retiring to his citadel, that Muckhlis Khân was in correspondence with Hyder, for the surrender of the place, he imprisoned him and his chief officers on the summit of the rock, and disarming his garrison, compelled them to work in the labours of the siege. Hyder, in determining on the attack of Amboor, had certainly rested his chief hopes of success on the aid of Muckhls Khân; the operations which he adopted were calculated to destroy or enfilade every portion of the defences; but a practicable breach was effected in a part of the works which was inaccessible; and the whole plan seemed to be suited rather to afford an opportunity to the disaffected within, and to wear out the garri-

* The grant revocable at pleasure, of the revenues of a district for a specified purpose.
son with incessant alarms, than ultimately to carry it by open force. After a variety of attempts to discover the means of entering by surprize, Hyder tried the effect of other means. An introductory flag of truce, for the purpose of summoning the garrison, conveyed an eulogium on its brave defence, to which Captain Calvert replied, that Hyder had not yet afforded him an opportunity of deserving the compliment. A second, made the direct offer of a large bribe, and the command of half his army, with magnificent appointments. In answer to this proposal, Hyder was admonished to spare the lives of his servants, as the next bearer of such a message would be hanged on the breach: after a steady and meritorious defence of twenty-six days, Captain Calvert was relieved, on the 6th of December, by the approach of the English army: and the government marked their approbation of the conduct of the corps which composed the garrison, by directing the rock of Amboor to be borne on it's colours; an honorary distinction still preserved by the 1st battalion of the 10th regiment.

Among the losses which Hyder most lamented in the course of the siege was that of Khākee Shāh, his relation, and most confidential friend, who was killed by his side in an early part of the service. It will be recollected, that Khākee Shāh had been one of the emissaries of Hyder to Nunjuraj, and Ghālib Mahommed Khān, his associate in that infamous transaction, had also, in the course of the campaign, been killed in the battle of Changama; both, however, as the Mahommedans of the south continue to believe, were destroyed by the visible wrath of heaven, within the same year in which they had pro-
faned the holy Korân by a fraud and a perjury*, and this belief is not shaken by the impunity of the author of the crime; nor by the arrogance of thus gratuitously pronouncing on the ways of heaven, and placing man upon the judgement-seat of God.

The history of one of these persons presents some features highly illustrative of national manners. Khâkee Shâh was considered the wittiest man of Hyder’s court, and was more familiarly admitted than any other to the intimacy of his looser hours. Hyder delighted in the practical jest, in these days denominated a *hoax*; Khâkee Shâh’s near alliance to many of the inhabitants of the Harem, gave him the liberty of communications by message; and in the intercourse of unreserved raillery, he had occasionally ventured on messages in Hyder’s name, which had produced some mischievous disappointments in the Harem, and were afterwards the subject of broad mirth between the friends. On the occasion of some reciprocal raillery, regarding their domestic arrangements, Hyder adopted the coarse and cruel trial, of causing a letter to be written to the wife of Khâkee Shâh, then at Sera, announcing the sudden death of her husband. The lady who was passionately attached to him, swallowed poison in her first despair; and the husband, on receiving the intelligence, made a vow to renounce the world. It was, on this occasion, that he assumed the name of Khâkee Shâh. Shâh or king is the spiritual designation assumed by this description of Mahommedan saints, and Khâkee Shâh, may be rendered king of the dust, intimating, as it should seem, spiritual

* See on this subject, vol. i. p. 285.
sovereignty, and temporal humility. This unhappy event, although it interrupted, did not dissolve the intimacy of the parties: after a short interval Khâkee Shâh resumed with Hyder his usual habits, and was reciprocally treated with increased confidence and regard. The manner of his death afforded some colour to the belief of extraordinary interposition. Hyder and he, after examining the works of Amboor, alighted among some scattered rocks, and seated themselves behind one which completely covered them from the direct fire of the fort; and in this situation Khâkee Shâh was cut in two by a cannon shot, close to the side of Hyder, who was unhurt. That the shot must have reverberated from the other rocks, is admitted; but although the library of Seringapatam contained some copies of mathematical works, there does not seem to have been in the whole court (probably the most unscientific in all India), a sufficient degree of elementary knowledge, to comprehend a simple occurrence, which a billiard table, if they had possessed one, would have illustrated without the necessity of referring to supernatural agency.

A friend of mine in a situation nearly similar, had occasion to watch the numerous revolutions of a cannon shot, every time striking the rock near to himself in the same spot, until its force was expended, and it rolled harmless into a hollow, in the centre of the rocks from which it had reverberated.

The forces of Colonel Smith had scarcely been established in cantonment, before it became necessary, from these movements of Hyder, to make arrangements for re-assembling them; but nothing could be effected towards promoting the efficiency of the
departments of the army. The silly ambition of Mahommed Ali to be the object of all expectations, and to be considered as every thing while capable of nothing useful; the poisonous influence which procured, not confidence, for that was impossible, but the semblance of confidence, in the performance of his promises, contrary to the universal experience of his whole conduct, prevented the formation of a plain, practical, independent system of supply; and there is reason to infer, that a secret jealousy of the commander-in-chief tended still farther to disperse the efforts which ought to have been concentrated.

The division of Colonel Wood, which had been cantoned at Trichinopoly, was ordered to move to Trinomalee; and from thence, as might be concerted, to enter Bâramahâl by the pass of Singarpetta: the remainder of the army, under Colonel Smith, assembled at Vellore; and being under some uneasiness for the fate of Amboor, he hastened to its relief, and had the satisfaction of perceiving the British colours still flying on the morning of the 7th of December. After making the requisite arrangements in the course of that day, Colonel Smith moved in pursuit of Hyder, whom he found on the morning of the 8th, after a short march, at Vaniambaddy, with his right covered by the fort, and his front and left by some bad redoubts lately constructed, and by a fordable river. Nizam Ali had moved farther south into Bâramahâl, and Hyder's position, although by no means judiciously chosen, seemed to Colonel Smith to indicate a determination to risk a battle; but his real intention was no other than to gain time by this demonstration for the retreat of Nizam Ali; and for the uninterrupted movement of his own heavy artillery, which had been sent off on the first appearance
of the English army; the degree of resistance was proportioned to this intention; Vaniambadda was abandoned, but he had the mortification, during this affair, to see his European troop of horse under Monsieur Aumont, move off in a body and join the English army, in consequence of a concerted arrangement, of which he had no previous suspicion; in other respects the loss on either side was unimportant. To overtake the superior equipments of Hyder, although attempted, was a visionary pursuit; and on the succeeding day, the miserable commissariat of the British army compelled it to halt to receive provisions from Amboor. Colonel Tod, with the advance, followed the enemy as far as Tripatore, which he also found abandoned; but, contrary to Hyder's usual precaution, containing a supply of grain and some cattle. The confederated armies retired towards Caveripatam, and Colonel Smith was again reinforced by Colonel Wood, without an attempt on the part of the enemy to interrupt the junction. On Hyder's capture of Caveripatam, in 1767, he had thrown up some field works to strengthen the position under its cover, which Colonel Smith had then declined to attack; and, on finding that he should be obliged to raise the siege of Amboor, he had sent one of his French officers, to extend and improve the same camp, as a safe position for the confederate armies. Immediately after the junction of Colonel Wood, Colonel Smith approached to examine it. A river passed the northern face of the town and petta of Caveripatam: this face had been strengthened by a good covered way, and by two large detached redoubts, which enfiladed the north, the east, and the west faces: five similar redoubts completing the circuit to the south, covered the whole position: and two more distant rocky
mounds to the south and south-east were crowned with redoubts, which commanded the most accessible approach: good lines of retreat, in the event of discomfiture, were provided, by crossing the river towards Kistnagherry, or moving along its right bank to Ryacota. On the first glance of this much improved * position, Colonel Smith determined to decline the risk of an attack; and the measures of the enemy relieved him soon afterwards from the necessity of so desperate an attempt. Sources of separate but serious alarm, which we shall endeavour to relate in the most convenient order, distracted the attention of both the confederates. Hyder sent off his heavy guns and baggage to the westward on the 14th, accompanied by his son Tippoo and Ghazee Khan, with a light corps; and on the 18th Nizam Ali, with the main body of his army, re-ascended the ghaunts, and moved to the northward: a light field train, with nearly the whole efficient force of his army, remained with Hyder; and political considerations still detained with him a corps of some thousand horse, in the service of Nizam Ali, as an escort to the brother of his prime minister.

A more convenient opportunity may not again occur, of closing our narrative of the destiny of a person, whose pretensions entitled him to occupy a larger space than he has filled in the history of these times. Maphuz Khan, on the descent of the confederates into the lower country, had the part assigned to him of employing his influence among the Poligars of the South to excite a general insurrection; and aided by the resources of Dindigul to wrest the whole of these provinces from Mahommed Ali.

* Described from a plan in the author's possession, drawn apparently by Colonel Call, in 1767.
and the English. The formation of the army had drawn all their disposable troops from those countries, and Mâphuz Khân, with a slender escort, was moving from the residence of one chief to another, in furtherance of his views; when Colonel Buck, who commanded at Madura, sent out a detachment by night, which surprized and conveyed him to that fortress as a prisoner, on the 2d of October, 1767. He was given up to Mahommed Ali, and closely confined during the war: but it must be added, to the credit of that nabob, (of whom truth has permitted us to narrate little that is good,) that he afterwards liberated his brother, and provided him for the remainder of his life, with a decent maintenance at Madras.

While the heavy equipments of Hyder were moving to a far distant object, it was necessary that his intentions should be veiled to the last moment, by the appearance of encreased activity. From the strong position near Caveripatam, detachments of his light troops were actively employed on the line of Colonel Smith's supplies, and imposed on that officer the necessity of moving strong detachments of his army for the protection of the most unimportant convoys. Against one of these, expected by the pass of Singarpetta, under Captain Fitzgerald, Hyder thought proper to move in person, with a force of 4000 select horse, 2000 infantry, and five guns, in the confidence of an easy conquest over a single battalion, without guns, embarrassed by a cumbrous convoy: but Colonel Smith, who had penetrated his intentions, detached a reinforcement of two companies of grenadiers, a battalion of sepoys, and two field pieces. Hyder, not being aware of this junction, attacked the convoy with great vivacity and imprudence; charging in person at the head of his cavalry, he had his horse...
shot under him, and received a bullet through his turban; the
loss of several of his best officers evinced an effort of more than
usual determination, and their repulse reflected corresponding
credit on Major Fitzgerald, who commanded the united detach-
ments. The hope which Hyder had cherished of terminating the
campaign with a creditable exploit was thus converted into the
mortification of returning in disappointment to his head-quarters.
The heavy equipments which had preceded him, having now
made sufficient progress, he left a strong and efficient division,
chiefly cavalry, under Muckhdoom Saheb, to watch the operations
of the English army, and disturb its supplies; and ascended the
ghauts with his remaining force, about the close of the year, at
the exact time that the English army, after having been two days
without rations, was obliged once more to move in an opposite
direction in quest of food.

The Government of Bengal, although originally adverse to a
confederacy, by which the aggrandizement of the Mahrattas
should be promoted by hostility with Hyder, were perfectly
aware of the expediency of restraining the ambitious views of
that chief upon their own possessions; and of convincing him
whenever a favourable opportunity should occur, of the danger
of provoking their hostility: they accordingly supported with
their whole power the efforts of Madras under the circum-
stances of the present war; and to an abundant supply of
treasure for their immediate exigencies had added the aid of a
powerful diversion by sea, under Colonel Peach; who landed in
the northern sircars, and by a course of vigorous and judicious
operations, had penetrated to Commanet, and Warankul, the
antient capital of Telingâna, considerably to the north-east of
Hyderabad; and was securing and extending his conquests, in a manner which gave solid ground of alarm to Nizam Ali, for the safety of his capital. These apprehensions, added to the unpromising aspect of his own southern campaign, had induced him to open a secret communication with Colonel Smith early in the month of December: an intercourse of this nature could not be long concealed from Hyder; who in every estimate of the conduct of Nizam Ali, remembered that he was the murderer of his own brother; and held his character in as much contempt as was consistent with the incessant fear of being over-reached by some unsuspected treachery: assuming, however, the air of open confidence, he announced his knowledge of these communications; and assented to the necessity of a temporary accommodation with the English, and waiting a more favourable opportunity of re-uniting the Mussulman interests, for their expulsion from the peninsula; but added that it was no longer proper, that the armies should have the appearance of an union which did not exist. Nizam Ali, who was embarrassed regarding the means of separation, and had actually been meditating the treachery which Hyder apprehended, was happy to part on such easy terms; and had moved, as already stated, in a northern direction on the 18th December, sending on the same day an emissary to treat openly with Colonel Smith for peace. That officer informed the envoy, that he was not furnished with the requisite powers; and distinctly stated his conviction, that after the shameful duplicity which had been practised by his master, the British Government would be satisfied with no demonstration, short of a formal mission of his prime minister to Madras, as an evidence of sincerity in his present professions,
and as an humble and open reparation for the insolent treachery of his past conduct.

After an interchange of various messages, Nizam Ali, by those artifices, to which the open character of an Englishman renders him perhaps more accessible than the native of any other country, had nearly succeeded in making Colonel Smith defeat his own professed object, by paying him a visit previously to the dispatch of the minister; and the artifice did partly succeed, by his being prevailed on to send a field officer (Major Fitzgerald) to Nizam Ali’s camp, then situated at the head of the Damalcherry pass, about 120 miles north-east from Madras, for the purpose of conducting the minister to that place; where the Government assuming a proper dignity, disapproved even this mark of condescension on the part of their commander-in-chief. Hyder at the same period deputed a messenger to Colonel Smith, with pacific overtures, but the reference which was made in return to his superiors at Madras, appeared to Hyder to be a civil but distinct rejection of his advances, and he refrained from repeating them.

The negotiations with Nizam Ali terminated on the 23d of February 1768, in the conclusion of a treaty, differing in many important particulars from that of 1766, but exhibiting both in its concessions, and assumptions, evidence of the ascendancy of Mahommed Ali; whose name Nizam Ali had positively refused to admit in any manner into the former treaty. He was now one of the contracting parties, together with the English East India Company, and Nizam Ali, in a treaty, by which it was declared, that the Mogul had, on the 26th of August 1765, conferred on Mahommed Ali, the government
of Carnatic Payeen ghaut, that Nizam Ali had released him from all dependance on Decan, by a sunnud dated 12th November, 1766; and to complete the confusion of ideas and relations, Mahommed Ali acknowledged himself to hold as a free gift from Nizam Ali, not only Carnatic Payeen ghaut, but the subordinate office of Kelladar of two petty forts, one in the dominions of Hyder, and the other under the direct authority of Nizam Ali. Regarding the first of these instruments, it would be difficult to infer any thing without the actual inspection of the original. No copy is to be found in the Company’s records, and it is probably a mere fabrication. I have seen in a manner, which I am not at liberty to publish, copies of two instruments, authenticated by the seal of Mahommed Ali, which may convey some idea of the credit which is due to such performances. The first from the Mogul Emperor Ahmed Shah, dated in the 3d of his reign (1751), confers on Mahommed Ali Carnatic Balaghaut, and Payeen Ghaut, from the river Kistna to the borders of Malabar, as an hereditary possession. This is probably one of the documents, fabricated for the edification of the English and French commissioners, in the first negotiations to determine these pretensions. The second is from Shah Aâlum, dated in the 8th of his reign (1769). This instrument confers the same possession as an Ėnauum (free gift), but the manufacturer had not studied geography, and describes Carnatic to extend from the river Kistna to the confines of Bombay. It is difficult to contemplate without indignation, the government of Madras, under circumstances which imposed no visible necessity for departing from the dignified tone with which they had opened the negotiation,
resuming their grovelling position of tributary* dependants for the circaers, and with a ludicrous mixture of arrogance and humility, proclaiming Hyder Naick a rebel and usurper, and declaring their determination to conquer and retain his territories, with the concurrence of Nizam Ali; who, on the condition of receiving a further tribute of seven lacs of rupees, graciously ceded his claim to a territory, which he neither possessed, nor had the most distant hope of ever possessing; and these speculative conquerors even anticipated the claim of the Mahrattas, by gratuitously, and in the body of a treaty to which they were not parties, promising them the choute, or fourth part of the revenue; while the Company relinquished, without condition, the important hold which had been obtained for them by the efforts of the troops from Bengal; and Nizam Ali returned to his capital, with abundant cause for self-gratulation, on the address which had relieved his complicated embarrassments.

It has been suggested to the author, that the policy so frequently arraigned, may have been dictated from England, where the Company were intimidated by the administration, and the administration by the fear of giving offence to France from avowing their independency. Nor was this duplicity confined to Madras. The double government exercised in Bengal, and

* The English had conferred on Mahommed Ali, a rank which he construed into sovereignty, and then accepted from him a jageer, as an express mark of dependency. To keep them in the habit of exterior dependence on Indian chiefs was essential to his ultimate objects; and the farce of accepting dependent gifts himself, was an example for the imitation of his good friends, in every thing but paying tribute, of which he was too sagacious to give the example.
the acceptance of the Dewanny from a conquered and ineffective king conferring upon the Company a sovereignty which they had acquired by their own power, and exercised still with an attempt to hide it under fictitious characters, were all parts of the same weak policy. That any English administration should expect to veil from the observation of France the true tendency of any of these transactions, appears to be extremely improbable; but that such a policy as the spontaneous growth of the great mind of the great Clive seems next to impossible. The public records afford no means of solving this problem.

The arduous and distant operations in which Hyder had been involved, revived a hope of independence among the Chiefs of Malabar; who, with too much jealousy of each other, even in their actual state of depression, to admit of any extended plan of combination, had succeeded in carrying several of the block-houses*, and keeping Hyder's provincial commander in a state of incessant alarm, although assisted by the whole force of Ali Raja, the Mapilla chief of Cannanore. The chiefs of the English establishments on that coast, had been directed to aid and encourage these combinations, and the government of Bombay was equipping a formidable expedition, for the purpose of obtaining possession of the Mysorean fleet in the harbours of Canara; reducing the places of strength on the coast; and eventually penetrating into the interior of that part of the dominions of Mysoor. Hyder's intelligence of these designs, was too explicit to admit of doubt; it was his fixed principle of conduct, on every occasion, to bend his chief force against the most prominent danger, and where this was incompatible with an efficient opposition to

* Constructed by Hyder, see vol. i. p. 472.
minor perils, he uniformly treated them with temporary disregard, until the removal of the greater evil. It was in conformity to this ground of action, that instead of sending reinforcements, he resolved to move with his main force to the westward; and if he could not arrive in sufficient time to avert, he would at least be present to remedy this paramount danger. The light force under Tippoo, was destined by forced marches, to reinforce the provincial commandant Lutf Ali Beg; the heavy train followed, at the regulated rate of movement; and, about the 20th of January, he had himself refitted his equipments at Bangalore, the defence of which he committed to the care of Hybut Jung (Fuzzul Oola Khân), and proceeded by long marches to the western coast.

The rendezvous of the English expedition having been appointed off Onore, (Honâver) its appearance on that part of the coast, deceived Lutf Ali Beg, with regard to the first object of attack: marching in that direction with his whole force, he imprudently left Mangalore with an insufficient garrison, and it was taken without material opposition in February. The immediate commander of Hyder's fleet, disgusted with the superintendence of his Lord High Admiral (Lutf Ali Beg, an officer of cavalry,) in conformity to previous compact, surrendered to the English his force at Honâver and Mangalore: it consisted of two ships, two grabs of two masts, and about ten gallivats. Honâver, Buswaraj Droog, (or fortified island,) and several minor places were reduced; and, during these operations on the coast of Canara, an injudicious attempt from Tillichery, to carry by assault one of the principal detached works of Cannanore, was repulsed with the loss of fifty-seven Europeans and thirty-three natives killed.
and wounded. The English force had, however, been so dispersed by their numerous successes in the occupation of their conquests, that no attempt could be made to penetrate inland, without very considerable reinforcements, which they demanded from Bombay.

On Tippoo’s first junction with Lutf Ali Beg, the loss of Mangalore, and the insufficiency of their means to attempt its recapture, induced the officers commanding, after closely examining the state of that place, to retire inland, to limit their exertions to the preservation and order of the interior; to cutting off the English force from all means of intelligence; and by apparent inaction lulling them into security, until the arrival of the efficient means, which were approaching under Hyder’s personal command. It was his object to make these means as imposing as possible; and not a man was visible, until the overwhelming mass of his whole united army appeared at once before Mangalore, early in the month of May. The impression was disgraceful * in the last degree to the British arms; a wretched defence terminated in embarking the garrison, consisting of 41 artillery, 200 European infantry, and 1200 sepoys, in a most unsoldier-like manner; shamefully abandoning the sick and wounded, consisting of 80 Europeans, and 180 sepoys, and all their field-pieces and stores. The remaining objects on the coast, and chiefly the recapture of Honâver and Buswaraj-droog, were accomplished without much difficulty; and Hyder was enabled to reascend the ghauts before the monsoon had actually burst. The body of the army with all the heavy equipments moved by easy marches, on the shortest route by the pass of Subramanee

* So stated by General Smith.
to Bangalore, while himself with a select corps, ascended northward to Bednore, to which capital he had summoned all the principal land-holders of the province, for the purpose, as he pretended, of adjusting the arrangements of revenue for the ensuing year. In point of fact, Hyder had discovered, that a general discontent at his severe exactions, had rendered this class of his subjects well disposed to favour the designs of the English invaders; that to the amount of a willing assistance with provisions they had generally testified this partiality; and that a correspondence for combining their farther exertions had been extended nearly over the whole province. A sagacity undisturbed by mental compunction, enabled this extraordinary man in all cases, to extract the greatest possible advantage from incidents which, to ordinary minds, would have furnished only food for apprehension. He coolly announced to the assembled land-holders, that he had discovered their treasons; and had determined on a punishment more convenient to his affairs than a sentence of death: a list was then produced, containing the detail of the enormous fines, which had been previously annexed to the name of each individual: such as were present were delivered over to the charge of the department of torture, for the realization of the amount; and effectual means were taken to levy the same contributions on those whose fears had restrained them from attending.

His affairs in Malabar also demanded some decisive measures, previously to his return to the eastward: the detached efforts of the Nairs were beginning to assume a more combined form; most of the block-houses had been carried, or necessarily evacuated; Assud Khan Mehteree, his provincial commander-in-chief had been killed in action; and his successor, with forces
very inferior to the service, was making the best efforts in his power, to stem the increasing torrent, when Hyder's instructions to Madana, his fiscal governor, relieved him for the present from these embarrassments. Madana opened insidious but skilful negotiations with most of the chiefs, which intimated in substance, that his master had found his conquest of Malabar an acquisition (as they well knew), hitherto more chargeable than advantageous; that if the chiefs should consent to reimburse the heavy charges which he had incurred, he would be ready to restore their possessions; and to aid before his departure in transferring to those who should accede, the territories of those who should decline so reasonable an arrangement. All were forward in embracing the terms; Hyder's provincial troops, whose escape would otherwise have been impracticable, not only retreated in safety, but loaded with treasure; the willing contribution of the chiefs of Malabar — the purchase of a dream of independence. It had been made a special condition that Ali Raja should be undisturbed; Palgaut was studiously omitted in the negotiations; and remained in Hyder's possession; and two points were thus secured in the south-east and north-west of the province, from whence at any future period Hyder could resume at pleasure his designs on Malabar: the remainder of the western coast was safe; his central possessions were in the most flourishing condition; his coffers were replenished; and he was now at leisure to contemplate the improvident course of measures, which had been pursued by the English, while Aug. left with an open field by the absence of his army, for full seven months: for he did not recommence his operations from Bangalore before the month of August.
CHAPTER XVI.

Character of General Smith—view of the several plans of military operation, proposed by him and his government—Success of Colonel Wood to the southward—Military faults—General Smith takes Kistnagerry—accompanied by field deputies—Mahommed Ali, and the Chevalier St. Lubin—Defective intelligence—Ascends the pass of Boodica—a—Mulwágul taken by the bold stratagem of Captain Matthews—Colar surrenders—Baugloor—Oossoor, &c.—Ignorant plans of Mahommed Ali—Junction of Morari Row—Scene of operations the former dominions of Shahjee—Hyder’s unsuccessful attack on the camp at Ooscoa—Singular defence of Morari Row—Hyder’s plans—Approach of Colonel Wood from the southward—Movements in consequence—Designs of Hyder, and Smith’s counter-project—both marred by Wood—Subsequent movements—Hyder to Goorumconda—Reconciliation with Meer Saheb—reviews his own situation—offers peace—and great sacrifices for its attainment—Failure of the negotiations, from the unreasonable expectations of the English and Mahommed Ali—Battle of Mulwágul—Remarkable stratagem of Captain Brooke—General Smith at length speaks out regarding his incumbrances—Mohammed Ali and the field deputies—who are attacked in Colar—Alarmed, and return to Madras—Indirect re-call of General Smith—His plan of future operations—Recantation of the Madras Government, regarding the Nabob and deputies—Colonel Wood’s division reinforced—moves for the relief of Oossoor, while the remainder of the army, under Major Fitzgerald, covers the departure of the deputies—Oossoor imperfectly relieved—Disaster at Baugloor—Retreat of Colonel Wood, attacked by Hyder—relieved by Major Fitzgerald, who represents his incapacity—Wood ordered in arrest to Madras.
vernment, and their commander-in-chief, did not exactly coincide in their opinion of the most eligible. Colonel Smith was perfectly conversant in the technical part of his profession, and possessed in an eminent degree the confidence and attachment of those whom he commanded; from the labour of applying his knowledge and experience to a reform of the ill-administered departments of his army, he may be supposed to have been deterred, by the conviction of sources of counteraction, open and concealed, which he had not the power to control: but these causes cannot explain the strange carelessness of reputation, which, with a respectable talent of recording his own thoughts, left the care of his public dispatches to an incompetent Secretary. In truth he was the best tempered man living; and this was relatively the great vice of his character. He suffered himself to be overruled by men whose intellect was diminutive when compared with his own; he had not the heart to contest a point, although he knew himself to be in the right—and his character was stamped with indecision everywhere excepting in the presence of the enemy. An indifference, however, to objects not congenial to his taste, was compensated by the most indefatigable attention to duties exclusively military. Cool, cheerful, and unembarrassed, in the midst of danger, he evinced, in all movements to be executed in the presence of an enemy, a degree of rapid penetration, and sound decision, which indicated the hand of a master. As an executive soldier, he may justly be classed among the first of the age in which he lived; but in those more arduous combinations of political foresight and military skill, which constitute perhaps the highest effort of human intellect, he would be entitled to claim but a secondary rank.

On many occasions the Government of Madras appear to have
had just conceptions of the general outline of operations; and in others to have entertained projects too absurd for serious belief, if they were not found upon their records: among these was a grave discussion of the means by which their army of infantry was to cut off the sources of supply from the enemy’s army of cavalry. Upon the whole, although on some occasions they formed just views, on all occasions they miscalculated the means by which their ends were to be accomplished.

On the departure of Hyder’s main army, it was the general rumour in the English camp, that he had remained in person at the head of his cavalry, with the intention of changing the plan of the war; by withdrawing his infantry and guns to the upper country, for the purpose, as he had studiously reported, of watching the motions of a body of Mahrattas on his northern frontiers; and directing his efforts to starving the English army out of his own territory, and ultimately carrying fire and sword into theirs, for the destruction of its resources. While under the influence of this persuasion, and hopeless of a better system of military supply, Colonel Smith was of opinion, that to penetrate into the interior, where the difficulties of supply were stated to be excessive, for the purpose of striking a vital blow at the enemy’s capital, was a visionary project: that with an army equal to any efforts, experience had shewn that under the present arrangements, it would be impracticable to move fifty miles from the frontier, without the risk of being starved: that the great object of the war should therefore be, to occupy the whole of the fertile country contiguous to the frontier, between the first and second ranges of hills, extending from Vaniambaddy, on the north, to Dindigul and Palgaut on the S. E. and S. W. (a line of
operations extending over about three degrees of latitude,) and establishing as soon as possible depôts of provisions and stores, in the places most convenient to the old frontier, for supporting the eventual operations of the army. The opinion of the Government was more favourable to a single concentrated effort, for penetrating to Bangalore, and in the event of success, to Seringapatam: and with a force inadequate to the full execution of either of these projects, a plan of operation was concerted somewhat awkwardly, composed of both.

The army was formed into two divisions; one of which, under Colonel Smith, after appearing once more before Caveripatam, which was evacuated in the night, moved northward as far as Policonda in the vale of Vellore, for the purpose of approaching the army of Nizam Ali, then at Punganore, and quickening the negotiation of his minister at Madras: this object being effected, he returned to waste in the blockade of Kistnagherry, which surrendered on the 2d of May, the precious time which ought to have been employed in higher achievements. A second division of the army was in the mean while employed under Colonel Wood, who, after the capture of the remaining fortified places in the southern extremity of Bâramahâl, proceeded with rapid success to reduce* those which are situated in the districts of Salem, Eroad, Coimbetoor, and Dindegul. Hyder had the mortification to hear of the successive fall of every fortified place in those provinces, San-

* The order of the principal of these captures was as follows: — Tingrecota — Darampoory — Salem — Attoor — Nameul — Eroad — Satimungul — Denaikancota — the passes of Gujelhutty and Caveripoor — Coimbetoor and Palgaut — Darapoor — Aravaecourchy — Dindegul.
kerydroog alone excepted, the only place of strength which by a strange omission, is never once mentioned in Colonel Wood’s correspondence. Tingrecotta, the first place attacked, made a respectable defence, being garrisoned by regular sepoys, but capitulated when it was perceived that an assault was prepared. Darampoory, a place of no strength, was commanded by a brave officer, with troops unworthy to serve under him; the place was carried by assault, and the necessary consequences of such an operation bore a terror before the arms of Colonel Wood, which was more effectual than his cannon. Evoad alone, a place of fiscal importance, but no military strength, afterwards stood the assault, being encouraged by the presence of a body of horse, who promised to charge the flank and rear of the assailants in the act of storming, and did make a feeble effort for that purpose: all the other places, and among them Namcul and Dindegul, erected on hills of granite, surrendered without the semblance of a defence which could be reported to their master with even negative approbation. The practicability of securing these countries, by occupying the passes which connected them with Mysoor, was so strongly impressed on the mind of Colonel Wood, that he actually erected a redoubt for the purpose of commanding the descent of the pass of Gujelhutty, and garrisoned another small post, Talamalla, at its summit, as the name imports. He officially reported this pass, that of Caveriporam, and another intermediate one, to be the three only entrances from Mysoor into those countries; and that he was occupied in establishing positions which would effectually secure the whole. In eighteen days afterwards, he was apprized of his error, by the presence of bodies of horse, which
had penetrated through unsuspected roads; and he then expressed his conviction, that no force could prevent their descending at pleasure, through the difficult and secret passages of the hills. Notwithstanding this conviction, however, he practically persevered in his original error, by leaving two battalions to be dispersed in useless detachments, some of them extending through the Caveriporam pass, to within seventy miles of Seringapatam. To place troops, divided into mere guards, in situations to be inevitably lost in detail, was an error of judgment independent of the general plan of the campaign; which had the more radical fault of being undertaken with insufficient means, and of obliging Colonel Wood, either to spread abroad the greater portion of his troops in garrisoning such of the places as were tenable, or by reserving a disposable force to occupy them in an insufficient manner. He adopted the latter alternative on being called to reinforce Colonel Smith to the northward, and trusted to reinforcements from the old territory which were necessary to render any one of the places really defensible: the whole of these, as well as the subsequent operations and arrangements, were impressed with the mark of a short-sighted, second-rate, Indian policy, for realizing revenue and exactions; and as Mahommed Ali had the direct fiscal management of the territory thus loosely occupied, it is not difficult to trace the hand which influenced their adoption.

The possession of Kistnagheriy was deemed at Madras to be essential to the support of the future operations in Mysoor; although possessing less of command over any possible line of communication than many other of the congeries of droogs which were to be left untouched, and if it should not fall before these
operations should commence, a division was to be left to blockade it. On the 2d of May, however, it surrendered, and the plan was officially promulgated to the public, by which Colonel Smith was to be aided in the future operations of the war, with the advice and direction of two members of the council as field deputies; and that no source of distraction, inefficiency, and incumbrance might be wanting, the Nabob, Mahommed Ali, would accompany them, for the purpose of assuming the fiscal management of the territorial conquests; occupying with irregulars the minor forts; conducting the negotiations for "drawing off Hyder's adherents," and generally aiding with his advice on all other subjects. The records profess that the government had prevailed on the Nabob, Mahommed Ali, to accompany the army for these purposes, and that he had requested that some of the council should accompany him; and there is, perhaps, not one folly or one misfortune of these times that may not be traced to the same source. Still farther to perfect the inversion of all intelligible relations, one of the said field deputies, and a member of the government, was appointed commissary general to the army, the superior, the colleague, and the inferior of the commander in chief. A person calling himself the Chevalier St. Lubin, who had travelled over land from Europe, affected to have been received with distinction at the court of Hyder, and professed to possess the most intimate knowledge of all his plans and resources, and an extensive influence among his officers, native and European, accompanied the deputation as its privy counsellor and guide. The whole history of his adventures, as above sketched, was implicitly believed; he possessed the most ridiculous influence over the measures of the English army, and,
as it will be unnecessary to recur to the operation of his suggestions in each individual case, we shall comprise and dismiss his true character in the single word, impostor.

In entering, however, on the narrative of these operations, the reader must not be left in the error of imputing to the Government of Madras, during the whole of the period which had elapsed from the departure of Hyder in January, the wilful apathy of failing to take some sort of advantage of the open field, which was left for their operations: such were the defects of the plan of intelligence pursued by Mahommed Ali and the English, and such the unrivalled excellence of Hyder’s police, that the very instructions to the field deputies, dated the 7th of April, enjoin the necessity of watching the motions of Hyder, to prevent his marching to Bednore, and overpowering the troops from Bombay, nearly three months after his departure for that purpose: and one of these personages, on the 22d of the same month, when communicating with Mahommed Ali at Arcot, officially reports as an article of news*, that Hyder was said to have recently marched in that direction: but the general impression continued to correspond with the tale which Hyder had caused to be propagated, of his having moved in a N.W. direction to oppose the Mahrattas.

On the 8th of June, the advanced division of the British army, under Colonel Donald Campbell, ascended the pass of Boodicota: on the 16th he had reduced, and occupied as a post of communication, Vencatigherry, a mud fort without a glacis,

* The fact, however, is stated in Captain Cosby’s journal, on the 24th of March.
three marches to the northward; and from thence sent back a detachment, to open the direct road from the vale of Vellore, by the pass of Pedanaickdurgum, and to reduce the rock of that name. These arrangements being accomplished, his next objects were the droog of Mulwâgul, situated two marches north of Vencatigherry; and Colar on the plain, about the same distance to the N.W.; the lower fort of Mulwâgul was possessed without any resistance; but, on reconnoitring the rock, it was, in Colonel Campbell's judgment, too strong to be attempted by open force; the provincial commander* of both these places was on the rock, and officiated as its kelledar or governor: it was discovered that he was disposed to open a secret negotiation for its surrender; and the terms were adjusted without much difficulty. For the purpose of favouring the plan, Colonel Campbell moved off to Colar, professing to abandon his designs on the rock; and leaving a garrison in the lower fort, which is so situated as to be in a great degree independent of the droog, and not at all commanded by it. The kelledar was the only unfaithful man of the garrison; but it so happened, that he had been commissioned by Hyder, to obtain, during his absence, the greatest possible number of recruits for his infantry; and to give special encouragement to men who had been disciplined by the English, to come over

* Jaffier Hussein Khan. Abd-ul-Wahâb Mahommed Ali's brother, had married this person's sister, and when foujedar of Arcot, had conferred on him the fiscal government of Trinomalee. When Abd-ul-Wahâb was removed to his small jageer of Chittoor, his brother-in-law went over to Hyder, that he might not have to render his accounts to Mahommed Ali: he was now tired of the service, and offered to betray his trust, on the condition that these accounts should be considered as closed; to which Mahommed Ali consented.
with their arms, from the service of Mahommed Ali, in which the kelledar had many connexions. In conformity to these views, a pretended negotiation was communicated to the officers under his command, by which he was, on an appointed night, to receive the important acquisition of two hundred recruits, composing two complete companies, with their native officers; who were to ascend the rock by a concerted route. Captain Matthews * dressed and painted like a soubadár, headed this party of faithful English sepoys, and obtained admission about four o'clock on the 23rd of June, but abstained from any discovery until there was sufficient day-light clearly to distinguish all objects; he then whispered his orders for the disposition of attack, and directing the grenadiers' march to be beaten, as a sudden and terrible evidence of the presence of English troops, he had the satisfaction of securing his object without the necessity of taking a single life. On the same day Colonel Campbell arrived before Colar, and on the 28th the place surrendered at discretion, after regular approaches had been carried to the crest of the glacis. Meanwhile the Nabob Mahommed Ali and the field deputies, moving with suitable dignity, with the commander-in-chief in their train, had ascended the pass of Boodicota, and moved on the direct road to Colar, as far as Arlier, where they heard of its surrender; and Colonel Campbell was directed to join the headquarters of the army. Muckhdoom Saheb, who had returned from a plundering expedition into the lower countries, when he heard of the ascent of the army, was now reported to Colonel Smith to have taken post under the walls of Baugloor, about

* The same officer who was taken in Bednore in 1783.
eighteen miles S.W. of his present encampment; and Captain Cosby, with a light and well equipped detachment, was sent in the evening of the 28th, to beat up his quarters during the night. Owing however to the unexpected length and impediments of the route, the day had dawned before he came in presence of the enemy, and, after a vigorous effort in which Muckhdoom sustained a trifling loss, Captain Cosby perceiving the attempt to be fruitless, desisted from the pursuit. Baugloor was the seat of a poligar, to whom Hyder had continued a restricted permission to govern the district, and occupy the fort, as his dependant: and this person very prudently abstained from hostility to the English detachment, professing to Captain Cosby, whom he accompanied to head-quarters, his best wishes for their success; but at the same time representing to Hyder his inability to resist, and the necessity of temporizing, until he had a better opportunity of evincing his allegiance. On the 3d of July, the army, joined by Colonel Campbell moved by Baugloor, for the siege of Oossoor, which fell on the 11th, and a detachment skilfully conducted by Captain Cosby, afterwards succeeded in obtaining possession of Anicul and Dencanicota, to the west and south of Oossoor. The poligar of the former place accompanied him to head-quarters, and reported to Mahommed Ali the existence of a series of other positions, commanding some revenue, to the southward as far as the Cavery, in the continuation of a narrow stripe from Oossoor, which was actually encompassed to the east, west, and south, by impenetrable woods and mountains; but which positions, according to Mahommed Ali’s ideas of military and fiscal policy, were to form a chain of defence for the lower countries in connexion with the conquests of Colonel Wood to the southward of the Cavery; and
a division of the troops under Colonel Lang was sent to realize this strange project, which detained the body of the army for some days longer at Oossoor.

The serious inefficiency which Colonel Smith had experienced in all his operations, from a total want of cavalry, had induced him, when last at Madras, to recommend that some of Mahommed Ali's irregular horse should be disciplined by English officers; and a small body, thus organized, had already attained habits of order and obedience, which made them useful in the field. He had also, at an early period of the war, recommended to govern-

ment to endeavour, if possible, to obtain the services of Morari Row, of whose efficiency in the wars of Laurence, he had the frequent means of personal observation. A negotiation had accordingly been concluded with that chief for his personal service, with a body of his select troops. Yoonas Khán, with the advanced-guard of 300 men, joined the army while it was still at Oossoor, and returned with it to Ooscota, two marches in a northern direction. On the 4th of August, a junction was here formed with Morari Row, whose force consisted of a nominal 3000 horse, with the proportion of irregular infantry, amounting to about 2000, which was necessary for their system of warfare; and the novel incumbrance of a few bad guns. But the reader will be prepared, from what has been developed of the Mahratta character, to expect that not one half the number for which this chief was paid, could ever be faithfully mustered.

The interval of inaction which had occurred since the reduc-
tion of Oossoor, was partly occasioned by the unfortunate combi-

* See vol. i. p. 278.
nations of military supply, which left, in the first stage of their progress from Madras and Vellore, the battering train destined for the siege of Bangalore, and intended to proceed by the intermediate posts of Vencatigherry and Colar, to Ooscota, the most advanced depot in this chain of connexion; and partly by the indisposition * of the Nabob Mahommed Ali, which subsequently fixed the army for a month to this encampment. Colonel Wood also, whose operations to the southward had now terminated with the capture of Dindegul, was on his march by the pass Tapoor, and the province of Bâramahâl, to be re-united to the main army, which would even then exclusively of Morari Row, not be so strong as at the battle of Trinomalee. It was the opinion of Colonel Smith, that at whatever period the siege of Bangalore might be attempted, the force ought to admit of being formed into two divisions, one for the operations of the siege, and the other to oppose the field army of Hyder, who would unquestionably make the greatest efforts for its preservation; and he doubted whether the greatest force which could be collected, would be sufficient for the accomplishment of this double purpose. The reader has had the opportunity of observing, that the scene of these operations corresponds with that of the local government which Shahjee † the father of Sevagee had established in the early part of the seventeenth century: when, however, Eccojee, on transferring the seat of a new government to Tanjore, had sold Bangalore and its dependencies to the Rajah of Mysoor,

* The early part of this indisposition was no more than a foolish ceremonial of mourning for the death of a relative. Afterwards it was real.
† See vol. i. p. 72.
in 1687, * a reservation was made in favour of grants which had been conferred on various branches of the house of Shah-jee, and its officers; and the numerous and successive Mahratta invasions of Mysoor had facilitated the continuance of these possessions, to the successors of the original grantees, under the declared protection of the head of the Mahratta empire; but in the essential objects of tribute and obedience, they were under the virtual government of Hyder. Such is the origin and history of the various towns which, in the English records of these times, are described as belonging to Mādoo Row; and among them was Ooscota, where the army now lay, whose governor found it expedient to consent to its occupation by the English, for the purposes which have been described.

On the very day that Morari Row formed his junction with Colonel Smith, Hyder with the light troops of his advance had entered Bangalore. On the 9th, they made their first appearance to reconnoitre; and from that period continued the usual practice of harrassing the skirts of the camp. Colonel Smith, on the first junction of Morari Row, earnestly recommended to him to encamp in communication with the English line, and within the protection of its picquets; but that chief smiled at the apprehension conveyed by this advice, and answering that he knew how to manage the Naick, established his camp about half a mile to the right of the English line; and in consequence of their remaining stationary from the illness of Mahommed Ali, had thrown up a slight line of works for its protection. On the night of the 22d of August, Hyder made a disposition 22.

* See vol. i. p. 92.
for the attack of Morari Row's camp, in the following order; 6000 horse in two divisions, preceded by elephants, to break down the flimsy works of Morari Row, were followed by two columns of infantry; and Hyder, with the body of his army, remained in reserve, to support the attack, and counteract any movements which should be made by Colonel Smith. The position had been previously examined by all the officers employed, and the cavalry was ordered to penetrate direct to the tent of Morari Row, whose head was the great object of the enterprize; to overwhelm the whole camp, and prevent their mounting, while the infantry should enter in succession, and complete the destruction of the whole. Morari Row, an officer at all times quick in perception, and fertile in resource, no sooner found that his camp was attacked by cavalry, than he gave instant orders that not a man should mount; but as the best means of defence, and the most certain of distinguishing friends from enemies, that each man should remain at the head of his horse, and cut down without distinction every person on horseback. The irregularity of the tents and huts, and the interspersion of the Beder peons opposed abundant impediments to the progress of cavalry in the night; and the confusion was increased by Morari Row's state elephant receiving an accidental wound, and breaking loose from his picquets; in this state he ran furiously through the camp; and seizing the chain in his trunk, wielded it to the discomfiture of the mass of cavalry which he met, and threw them back headlong over the columns.

* For the description of an Indian camp, see vol. i. p. 292.
of infantry, which were just entering, and ignorant of the cause of this retrograde movement, retired in dismay, considering the attack to have failed. Hyder was enraged at the punsillanimité of the infantry, but as the alarm was now given to the English camp, he did not think proper to renew the attack: the cavalry withdrew as they could from the embarrassment in which they were involved, and his loss in this most injudicious attempt, amounted to near 300 men killed and wounded, and 80 serviceable horses secured by the enemy, independently of the hurt. Morari Row’s loss amounted to no more than 18 men, and 30 horses killed and wounded, but among the latter was himself slightly in two places, his nephew severely, and the brave and experienced Yoonas Khan had his right arm nearly cut through by a sabre in two places, and the bone irretrievably destroyed. Colonel Smith had to lament the loss of his aid-de-camp Captain Gee, an intelligent and promising young officer, who rode into Morari Row’s camp on the first alarm, to ascertain the nature of the attack; and was cut down in the dark, in consequence of the judicious but indiscriminate orders which have been noticed.

Foiled but not discouraged in this first effort, Hyder continued to be occupied in revising and perfecting all the appointments of his army, and announced to his troops a campaign of more than usual activity, in which it would be necessary to divest themselves of every incumbrance. As the movements in his contemplation embraced an extended field of action, and the enemy had established himself in the vicinity of Bangalore, he even calculated on the possibility of an attempt being made on that fortress, while he should be too far
CHAP. distant to afford a timely relief; and accordingly directed the
reinval to the rock of Savendy Droog, of that branch of his
seraglio which was lodged in the palace, and of the treasure and
great mass of valuable articles which had been accumulated in
this early centre of his power. For the fortress itself he appointed
a sufficient garrison, under the nominal orders of his son, and the
Sept. 3. real command of his maternal uncle Ibrahim Saheb; on the 3d
of September he made a circuitous march in a southern direction,
with the hope of cutting off the division of Colonel Wood, now
ascending from the Bāramahāl. The illness of Mahommed Ali
could no longer be permitted to paralyze and ruin the whole
campaign, he was sent on the same day under a strong
escort with the field deputies to Colar, while Colonel Smith
covered the movement by an intermediate march by Maloor in
the direction of his reinforcements.
5. On the 5th it was expected that Colonel Wood would be at
Boodicota, and move towards Maloor on the 6th, but as Hyder's
motions for the two last days were unknown to Colonel Smith,
he threw his baggage into Maloor on the 5th, marched a few
miles farther on the same day, and early on the next morning
was in motion towards Boodicota. The route of Colonel Wood
to form the junction was through a long defile, which pointed
north-west for a few miles, and at a comparatively open spot,
where another road opened to the north-east, made an obtuse
turn in a direction due west. Hyder, calculating on Colonel
Smith's waiting the arrival of his reinforcements near to Maloor,
had taken the most effectual means to conceal his own move-
ments, and assumed a position to the north-eastward of the angle
of the defile which has been described, with the intention of seizing
the proper moment, for opening an enfilading fire on Colonel Wood; from positions previously chosen, and availing himself of the consequent embarrassment, completely to overpower him, while his own rear was open to the north-east in the event of failure.

The hills which formed these defiles, were interposed between Colonel Smith and Hyder, as well as between him and Colonel Wood; and as he sent persons early in the morning to their summits for intelligence, reports were brought him of both Hyder’s army and Colonel Wood’s division, being seen in motion in the directions described. He perceived from these reports, that he should be able to reach and clear the angle of the defile, sooner than Hyder, and to assume a position to receive him with advantage. He accordingly quickened his pace, and sent scouts across the hills, to apprize Colonel Wood of his intentions; but he had scarcely reached the angle of the defile, and was making dispositions for a formation, in the open country to the north-east, when he and Hyder were equally astonished at hearing a regular salute, in the defile to the south-east, which Colonel Wood had thought proper to fire, in honour of Colonel Smith, on receiving the message of his approach. The indignation of the latter was scarcely inferior to the disappointment of Hyder, the head of whose columns had just appeared, when he instantly countermarched to assume a more respectful distance. Colonel Smith made an immediate disposition for a vigorous pursuit, fruitless as usual, and remarkable only for the careless precipitancy of Colonel Wood’s division, who out-marched their guns, left two of them without protection, which were charged, and the artillery-men all destroyed, before the guns could be rescued.
After halting the next day, to make a proper distribution of the united force into two divisions, Colonel Wood's division now placed under Colonel Long, was ordered to pursue Hyder in the direction which he had taken by Batemungul, midway between Venkatigherry and Colar, while Colonel Smith should march in a separate column by the latter place, and regulate his movements according to circumstances. This pursuit, if such it may be called, led the two divisions considerably to the northward; but finding Hyder still to precede them, with a rapidly increasing interval, they once more returned towards Colar, having established a post at Moorgamalla, two marches to the northward of that place.

Hyder had been drawn still further to the north, by an object which was of the most essential importance to his affairs; the defection of his brother-in-law Meer Saheb, and his establishment at Goorumconda, deprived Hyder of the most distinguished and efficient corps of his army. His wife had, in corresponding with her brother, exerted all her eloquence, to detach him from the unnatural connexion which he had formed with the Mahratta state; she assured him, that Hyder was disposed to consider with reverence his attachment to the place which contained the ashes of their forefathers, and to believe, as she had endeavoured to impress, that when he surrendered Sera as a matter of necessity, he stipulated for the government of his ancestors, in the direct hope of thereafter being permitted to hold it as a dependency of Mysoor; and she pledged to her brother the influence

* That officer had desired permission to resign his command, in consequence of the displeasure expressed by Colonel Smith, at the incomprehensible salute which deprived him of a probable victory.
which she possessed with Hyder, as the mother of his children, for the continuance, and even the enlargement of his present jageer, if he would return to his allegiance at this critical period of her husband’s affairs. Meer Saheb, having no immediate hope of relief from any quarter, long hesitated between the fear of extinction and the hope of independence: on Hyder’s march to Goorumconda, he even wrote to invite the English to fall upon his rear; but on his nearer approach, the terms of reconciliation were finally adjusted, and in the event were mutually and faithfully observed, during the remainder of their lives. This important object being accomplished, Hyder, after deviating to the right, to destroy the largest possible portion of Morari Row’s territory, returned, respectably reinforced, towards Colar, where the battering train of the English army was drawn out, and the field deputies continued to report their confident expectation of the early investment of Bangalore.

The affairs of Hyder were, according to superficial observation at least, certainly in a critical state— one half of his territory and some of his places of strength, were in the possession of his enemies: a chain of posts had been established, and a battering train advanced for the siege of the second place in his dominions; and an officer of merited reputation was at the head of the hostile army. Hyder knew that the greater part of these imposing appearances rested on no solid basis; that not one of the captured places was adequately occupied; that the possession of territory under such circumstances, was but a fleeting vision; and that a respectable defence at Bangalore would enable him to destroy the whole chain of communication, and starve the besiegers; while his lighter troops should carry fire and sword into the open and
defenceless territories of the enemy, and extinguish their resources. He understood also the nature of those impediments which palsied the arm of the able officer who was opposed to him; but external pressure might produce united effort, and in the midst of well-founded hope, the chances of war exposed him also to disaster. It is certain, therefore, that in the advances for peace which Hyder now made to the English, he was actuated by a desire of making moderate sacrifices for its attainment: in an early part of the negotiation, he professed his readiness to cede the province of Bāramahāl, and pay ten lacs of rupees to the English, (not to Mohammed Ali, whom he refused to admit as a party to the treaty); and to this proposal he continued steadily to adhere to the last moment of the discussions; but his adversaries, who were the substantial aggressors, demanded reimbursement of the expences of the war, to an enormous amount; and a line of territory, which should at least include Kistnaherry, Sankerydroog, and Dindegul; numerous concessions on the coast of Malabar; the payment by Hyder of that tribute to Nizam Ali which the English had engaged to pay in the event of their conquest of Mysoor, together with some important cessions to Morari Row. The negotiation consequently failed; military operations had not been discontinued, but nothing serious had been attempted on either side, during its progress; and soon after its close, about the end of September, the government of Madras saw abundant reason to regret, that they had not been more reasonable in their expectations.

The rock of Mulwāgul was one of those which Colonel Smith had deemed it necessary to occupy with his own troops; but
during his absence, the field deputies had thought proper to relieve that garrison, with a single company in the service of Mahomed Ali; and Hyder, on his return from Goorumconda, found means to practise on the Mussulman officer who commanded, so as to carry the place apparently by surprize. Colonel Wood, who had resumed the command of his division, and was nearest to the place, made a movement on the first alarm, to relieve or recover it; he was too late for the first, but recovered the lower fort, near to which he encamped; and, on the same night, was beaten off with loss in an attempt to carry the rock by escalade. On the ensuing day, the 4th of October, a light body of troops appeared in motion towards the rock, as if covering a convoy to be thrown into the garrison; and Colonel Wood, who had no suspicion of Hyder’s army being near, moved out himself, with two companies and a gun, to reconnoitre; and with this insufficient escort, allowed himself to be drawn to the distance of two miles from his camp, when he perceived a body of 3000 horse, followed by a heavy column of infantry, in motion to surround him. In this situation, he galloped back to the nearest picquet, consisting of two companies and a gun, from whence he sent orders for the line to be formed, and the baggage to be thrown into the lower fort; and returned with the picquet for the support of the party which he had left. He found it completely surrounded, but penetrated through the enemy, and joined it. By this time Hyder’s whole army appeared, advancing over an eminence about a mile in his front, and sending reinforcements to overpower him; thus circumstanced, to retreat with celerity seemed to be the single chance of safety: he accordingly formed his four companies into
a little square, abandoned his two guns, and commenced his retreat at a quick pace. The battalion of Captain Matthews, detached from the line to his support, saved him from impending destruction, by attacking in flank the body through which he was attempting to force his way; and the united corps, although hard pressed, were enabled, by successive stands, to continue their retreat until within reach of further support from the line. The whole extent of the ground, which was the scene of the farther operations of the day, consisted of a congeries of granite rocks, or rather stones, of unequal heights and dimensions, and every varied form, from six to sixteen feet diameter, scattered like “the fragments of an earlier world,” at irregular intervals, over the whole surface of the plain. Obliquely to the right, and in the rear of the situation in which the advanced troops were engaged, was a small oblong hill, skirted at its two extremities with an impenetrable mass of such stones, but flat and covered with earth at the top, to a sufficient extent to admit of being occupied by rather more than one battalion: the rocky skirts of this hill extended in a ridge of about three hundred yards towards the plain of stones, and under its cover the Europeans had been placed in reserve, until the action should assume a settled form. Hitherto, amid a mass of cover and impediment, which bade defiance to a regular formation, the intervals between the rocks, and sometimes their summits, were occupied by troops; the smaller openings were converted into embrasures for guns, and support successively arrived from each army to those who were engaged: it was a series of contests for the possession of rocks, or the positions formed by their union, without any possibility of the regular extension of a line on either side, so that a rock was
sometimes seen possessed by Mysoreans within the general scope of English defence, and by the English among the Mysoreans. Point after point was, however, yielded by the English to superior numbers and increasing energy. The action had commenced under the most unfavourable circumstances, and not an instant of exemption from pressure had allowed time for a more skilful disposition. Hyder’s guns were served with skill, spirit, and decision; and being superior in number, had obtained a manifest superiority over those of the English: his infantry, as occasion offered, were led to the charge of the bayonet, or forced forward by the sabres of their own cavalry: in the rear, a column accompanied by cannon, had made a circuitous movement, and pressed on the flank and rear of the European reserve: no successful effort appears to have been made for restoring order and confidence; every where the tendency was retrograde, and the countenance desponding; nothing seemed to remain, but the early and too tragic close of such a scene; when the whole was saved, by one of those happy expedients, which bring the knowledge of human nature into the ranks of human destruction, and exemplify the proud ascendancy of mind. Captain Brooke had received a severe contusion in the escalade of the preceding night; four companies of his battalion formed the baggage guard in the lower fort, and the sick, wounded, and followers, had of course been sent to the same protection. He saw the impending peril; the enemy was too much occupied to attend to an insignificant baggage guard; he collected the whole of his little garrison, with every sick and wounded man, who was able to crawl; two guns which had been thrown into the place, were dragged by volunteer followers, and manned by wounded artillerymen; and with this
crippled equipment he moved by a concealed but circuitous route, to the summit of a flat rock which he had marked as the scene of his operation; his two guns with grape opened with the utmost vivacity on the thickest and most formidable mass of the enemy's left flank, every voice which accompanied him, exclaiming at the same instant, huzza! huzza! Smith! Smith! The cry of Smith was murmured through the masses of the enemy, and re-echoed, with exultation from the English ranks: friends and enemies believed that his division had arrived: order and energy revived together: regulated movements ensued; and in a few minutes, the hordes which had pressed forwards with impatience on their destined victims, were, by a spell more potent than the force of magic, driven outwards in every direction, excepting that of the supposed Smith. Colonel Wood, on discovering the stratagem to which he was indebted, availed himself of the respite thus acquired, to assume a more regular disposition: the oblong hill, which has been described, formed the centre of the new position, and the remainder of the force was disposed in connexion with it, in such a manner, as to give entire confidence to the troops; the slope of the hill towards the enemy, which was tolerably free from stones, being the most accessible part of the position. Hyder was not slow in discovering the error, which had rescued the English troops from his grasp, and returned with indignation to resume the attack: the whole of his cannon, including those captured in the early part of the day were brought to bear upon the position; and he even made the desperate attempt to charge up the hill with his cavalry; but the day closed upon these ineffectual efforts, and left Colonel Wood in possession of the field of battle: the loss
of Hyder was estimated at a thousand men, that of the English amounted to eight officers, two hundred and twenty-nine rank and file, and two guns; and both had expended nearly the whole of their ammunition. Colonel Wood, aware of his own inability on this account to maintain a second action, and ignorant of the same impediment to its renewal by the enemy, sent dispatches by separate messengers to Colonel Smith, who was then at Colar: the first of these reached him on the forenoon of the sixth; he moved on the same day, Oct. 6. and early on the seventh, encamped near Mulwágul. Hyder had in the intermediate time continued closely to reconnoitre the position of Colonel Wood, now connected with the lower fort, for the purpose of making another effort with his remaining ammunition; but found it too strong to be attempted until he should receive a fresh supply; and by the time of Colonel Smith's arrival, he was again invisible.

From the earliest opportunity of examining the army and equipments of Hyder, distinct from those of Nizam Ali, since his return from the west, Colonel Smith had stated his opinion, in the council of field deputies, in three distinct propositions; first, that with the relative force actually possessed by thecontending armies, the siege of Bangalore could not be safely undertaken, unless Hyder should be previously beaten in a general action: secondly, that it was impracticable, while moving in one body, to force him to a general action contrary to his inclinations: and, thirdly, that the only hope of such an event rested on moving in two divisions, and seizing such accidental opportunities as had been marred by the unfortunate salute of Colonel Wood. The steady behaviour of the enemy's troops in the af-
fair of Mulvāgul, so much exceeded all calculations founded on former experience, as considerably to detract from the security of moving in two divisions; but the action had been commenced by Hyder, under circumstances which in their effects gave him advantages nearly equal to those of a surprize, and was not a fair test of the result of a regular contest with one of these divisions. Colonel Smith, however, deemed it prudent to summon a council of his principal officers, and to hear their opinions regarding the most eligible course of measures. The result was a determination to persevere in those which have been stated, to collect every disposable man, for the purpose of strengthening the divisions; to obtain from Vencatigherry supplies of ammunition and stores, (which, in two separate letters* written by Colonel Smith to the government on this occasion, for the purpose of desiring the interposition of their authority, are described to be insufficient for the current consumption of the army, notwithstanding his incessant remonstrances:) and to divest the army of every possible incumbrance, by taking that opportunity of sending the sick and wounded by Vencatigherry to Vellore. The report of Colonel Smith on the subject of this consultation, adds a modest hint of the advantages which might be derived from the presence of Mahommed Ali near to Madras, for the purpose of enabling the government to reflect, that he and the field deputies were not only the most ponderous of his incumbrances, but withdrew from his disposeable force a body for their protection at Colar, little inferior in strength to one of his divisions.†

* 9th and 11th October, 1768.
† Captain Cosby's journal states the force in Colar, at the time of Hyder's appearance before it, on the 5th of November, to have been 200 Europeans, and five
On the 14th, the two divisions were again in motion to the northward, and continued throughout the remainder of the month, by a series of movements which, being productive of no definite result, it is unnecessary to describe the vain attempt of endeavouring to force or entrap the enemy into a general action; every attempt at pressing Hyder to the northward, almost necessarily drove him on the territory of Morari Row; and he never failed to improve these opportunities, by indulging in the most merciless depredations. Incessant complaints of deficiency in every species of equipment and supply, served only to embitter the regret of the English army, and to diminish, at every successive march, the faint hope of succeeding in their efforts. Hyder outstripping their crippled movements with his main body, and keeping each division perpetually harassed by his light troops, made a circuitous movement, in which he amused himself, on the 5th of November, by alarming the nabob and the field deputies at Colar, chiefly with the intention of drawing Colonel Smith from the country near Deonhully, which it was his wish to preserve; but he was also prepared, if he saw a favourable opportunity, to attempt the place by escalade. A cannonade on the pettah, or walled town annexed to the fort, enabled him to observe, that the military arrangements were directed (by Colonel Campbell) with a degree of confidence and skill, which afforded little prospect of success in a more serious attack; and he retired on the 7th, after having driven off the wulsa, and burned the villages, in

battalions of sepoys; of the latter, one was a Bengal battalion, and another the 11th regular corps. I cannot trace whether the other three were Nabobs' or Company's battalions.
a circuit of several miles around, for the purpose of augmenting the incipient distress for food, of which he possessed the most accurate information; his measures having for some time been directed to deprive this place of all material supplies, but those which were received in regular convoys by the route of Vencatigherry.

Colonel Smith was recalled by the intelligence of this alarm, and returned to Colar on the 8th, through a continued deluge of rain. The geographical position of this district, subjects it in a considerable degree to the influence of the north-east monsoon; and the periodical storms had burst with violence at this period, and continued for a week longer to fix the whole army at Colar. Mahommed Ali and the deputies, although abundantly stationary throughout the greater portion of their visit to Mysoor, had not found a campaign to be so pleasant an amusement as they had anticipated: they had hinted a wish to return, which was now complied with. The report of Colonel Smith from Mulwāgul, placed facts upon the records of Government, the examination of which could not well be evaded; he was directed to submit a plan for more successful operations, with his present means; and in such event he was invested with the direction of the war: but if he could suggest none that could be immediately carried into effect, he was requested to repair to Madras, for the purpose of aiding the deliberations of the Government. Colonel Smith, whose continuance in a nominal command, under the degrading tutelage which has been described, cannot even now be contemplated without sorrow and surprise, had not the farther meekness to undertake the sole responsibility of operations,
which the misguidance of others had brought to the verge of disaster. He distinctly and practically understood the sources of counteraction, which would convert into mere mockery the delusive professions of investing him with the direction of measures; and he most properly determined to adopt the latter branch of the alternative, and proceed to Madras; where without animadversion on the past, he distinctly stated how they were to succeed in future. The regiments of his own army were reduced to mere skeletons, but if the detachment under Colonel Peach, still in the northern circars, could be spared, he risked the opinion, that no probable impediment could prevent his bringing the war to an issue, by penetrating from Coimbetoor to the enemy's capital, excepting the want of provisions; and notwithstanding the lamentable failure which had hitherto been felt, he distinctly stated that this want "could be abundantly provided against."

General opinion ascribed the ostensible demand for Colonel Smith's advice at Madras, to the desire of leaving the command of the army to Colonel Wood; whose career in the southern campaign, and personal attentions to the deputies, and the nabob, had established with them, and with the members of Government, the reputation of transcendent military talents. The nabob, the deputies, and Colonel Smith, accordingly departed on the 14th of November, under the escort of a division, Nov. 14. accompanied by Morari Row, (whose corps however remained with the army,) for the purpose of ostensibly relieving this movement from its actual character, or in the language of the deputies, to prevent any bad impression from the return of the nabob; the Chevalier de St. Lubin being the only personage of this
The general tendency of Mahommed Ali's military talents may be traced throughout every part of his history; and in noticing the effects on the fortune of the war, of the unhappy commission, whose operations were thus closed, I have endeavoured to restrain, as far as stubborn facts would admit, the mixed tone of ridicule and indignation, which their proceedings were calculated to provoke: seeking the light of truth as my single guide, I have been jealous of the possible influence of professional prejudice, in the opinions which I have formed; and I seek for security against that influence, in describing these effects, in the language of the authors of the measure. The Government, which formerly professed to have accomplished a great public object, in "prevailing on Mahommed Ali to accompany the army," expressed a hope, in their letter to Colonel Smith, dated the 15th of October, that before that time "he will be disburdened of the Nabob," and their letter to the deputies, of the same date, is so ample and explicit, that the passage shall be cited at length. "We cannot help expressing our amazement, and great disappointment, that so unexpected an obstacle should now be discovered; the laying in magazines of grain was to be one great object of your attention; and we have always understood that a sufficient store to supply you during the intended siege, had been laid in at Colar, and other places; if that has not been done, to what end have we been put to the expense of sending such quantities of artillery and ammunition, for the siege of Bangalore? To what end have all operations been suspended? Colonel Wood recalled from the southward, and our whole attention drawn to that ob-
ject, when it is most certain neither that nor any essential service could be undertaken, without ample supplies of grain: if you have been deceived in this respect, why have we not been advised from time to time? We can hardly say, we hope it is not so, because Colonel Smith's assertion is positive. We desire you will explain this to us immediately, for our anxieties are too great to admit of delay, and we cannot help remarking with sorrow, that never army met with more impediments: at one time the want of artillery and stores for the siege keeps it inactive; then the nabob's sickness fixes it immovably in its camp; at another time the rains prevent all operations; and last of all, it is rendered useless by the want of provisions."

The departure of Mahommed Ali and the deputies had caused the movement of Colonel Smith's division to the eastward of Colar: in the first march intelligence had been received, that Hyder was besieging Oossoor, and Colonel Wood's division was in consequence reinforced by the 2d regiment of Europeans, and Captain Cosby's battalion of sepoys, in order that he might move for its relief; the remainder of Colonel Smith's division, under Major Fitzgerald, the senior officer, continued at Vencatig-herry, to cover the retreat of the nabob and the deputies, and furnish escorts to place them in a situation of security.

Colonel Wood marched for the relief of Oossoor, on the 16th, with two regiments* of Europeans, five battalions of sepoys, and their usual field-pieces; to which were added two brass 18 pounders: he reached Baugloor, on the 17th; and

* The two regiments were about 700 men, the five battalions about 4000.
the night attack, which he meditated on Hyder's camp, he ordered the whole of his baggage, camp equipage, and surplus stores, into the walled town, or pettah of Baugloor; the two 18 pounders being now classed and deposited among the incumbrances. Having given these orders, he proceeded at ten on the same night, towards Oossoor, which he did not reach till seven in the morning of the 18th, and was of course foiled, in the design which he had planned, of a night attack, on an army embarrassed in the operations of a siege. Hyder had, on the preceding evening, withdrawn his preparations for the siege, and remained on his ground of encampment, northwest of the fort, until Colonel Wood's advance was entering Oossoor. The march had been so hurried, that a small portion only of the provisions and stores intended for the relief of the garrison was brought up; and while these were entering the place, and the requisite arrangements were in preparation for giving repose and refreshment to the troops, the whole of Hyder's cavalry were making demonstrations in various directions, while his infantry, by a circuitous movement, turned the flank of the English, and got between them and Baugloor. Clouds of dust, indicating the movement of troops in that direction, had been observed, and reported by the outposts; but disregarded by Colonel Wood. About two o'clock, however, repeated and heavy discharges of cannon and musquetry, explained the circumvention, and obliged him to retrace his steps with fresh precipitation.

Baugloor, like most of the fortresses in that country, above the rank of a walled village, had a little fort or citadel, the habitation of the chief, his officers, and garrison; and a walled
town connected with it on one side, the residence of the agricultural, commercial, and mixed classes of the community; and the place was garrisoned by one of the best corps in the service of Mahommed Ali, under the command of Captain Alexander. It had been found, on trial, that the gate of the pettah was too narrow to admit the eighteen pounders, and they were accordingly left with a guard at the outside. Some of the most portable of the stores were removed within the fort: the mass of stores and baggage was deposited, without much order, in the streets, and the draught and carriage cattle had chiefly taken shelter under the walls; but when the enemy’s columns appeared, returning from Oossoor, the cattle were driven, with precipitation, within the town. These apparent ramparts are generally no more than mere single walls of mud, from fifteen to twenty feet high, and not exceeding a cubit in breadth at the summit: the gate-way is converted above into a turret for musquetry; and if at the exterior angles there be other similar turrets, these, with the distant fire of the fort, hardly ever furnishing a true flanking defence, are considered a respectable protection against cavalry, which they are chiefly intended to resist. But it is evident, unless time be given for erecting platforms for musquetry, along the interior of the curtains, that the infantry without and within such a line of defence are not far removed from a state of equality. Hyder approached in several distinct columns, preceded by cannon, and attended by pioneers, and ladders, to clear the breaches, or surmount the walls. Captain Alexander personally directed his chief attention to the preservation of the eighteen pounders; but on finding that the enemy had penetrated in the rear of both his flanks,
he retreated with haste, towards the fort: the officer left in charge had fortunately ordered the gate to be shut, on the first moment of his perceiving an enemy within the pettah wall; without this precaution every thing must have been lost: the few sepoys that had been left within the fort, now manned the ramparts with confidence, and kept up a brisk fire, which assisted in preventing the enemy from cutting off Captain Alexander’s retreat. The camp followers, and many of the inhabitants, on perceiving the entrance of the enemy, pressed into the pettah towards the gateway of the fort: men, women, and children, driving camels, horses, and oxen, with the hope of obtaining admission. This was prevented by the precaution which has been stated, and a scene ensued too horrible for description: the heavier and more active animals pressed forward on the weaker, until they were piled on each other, in a mass of dead and dying, of which the human beings formed too large a proportion: and the perils which the retreating garrison encountered in clearing this dreadful scene, to be drawn up by ropes into the fort, were not inferior to those which they sustained from the pursuing enemy. Hyder made no attempt on the fort, but the eighteen pounders were quickly put in motion; the mass of baggage in the pettah, was placed upon his spare carts and tumbrils, but chiefly on the gun carriages, which were loaded to the utmost that each could carry, and successively dispatched on the road to Bangalore. The arrangements were completed, and the whole of his army nearly out of sight, before Colonel Wood’s return, to lament the loss of above two thousand human beings, an equal number of draught and carriage bullocks, two eighteen pounders, and nearly the whole of the stores, baggage, and camp equipage of his
army. On the 20th he returned to repair one of the errors of his precipitation by throwing some ammunition and stores into Oossoor. On the 21st, he measured back his steps to Baugloor, now destitute of provision for the use of his troops, and on the same evening prosecuted his march to Arlier, an intermediate post on the road to Colar, where there was a small supply. Hyder had by this time disposed of his trophies and his spoils; and while Colonel Wood believed him to be at the distance of twenty-five miles, suddenly made his appearance about noon of the 22d, his cavalry and light troops driving in the outposts, for the purpose of masking, according to his usual custom, the movements of his infantry and guns. Two batteries consisting of twelve of his heaviest pieces, and among them those which he had taken at Baugloor, soon opened, from an eminence too distant to be returned with much effect by the English field pieces. Colonel Wood's line was entirely exposed, but he had no baggage to impede his movements, and the relative situation was such, that, divested of the depression which seemed to have overwhelmed his faculties, no English officer would have hesitated many minutes in making a disposition for advancing on the enemy's guns. In this situation however, Colonel Wood, whose greatest military fault had hitherto been deemed a too ardent courage, remained the whole day wasting his ammunition in returning this absurd cannonade, in which he lost in killed and wounded, one captain *, six subalterns, twenty Europeans, and two hundred sepoys; at night the enemy made a shew of retiring to a distant encampment, and, at ten on

* Captain Cosby severely wounded by a contusion in his side, from a cannon ball.
the same night Colonel Wood resumed his march; but had scarcely cleared this ill-fated ground before Hyder's infantry commenced a fire on his rear and right flank, which they continued throughout the night, obliging him frequently to halt, and repel their attacks. At day-light on the 23d, being still pressed in the rear; he was moving, with a ridge of rocky hills on his right, which seemed to promise a temporary respite from attack on that flank. The order of march was in two columns, with the small remnant of baggage, and Morari Row's horse interposed, and the advanced and rear-guards covering the intervals, and forming what is not very scientifically termed an oblong square: but just as the advance had passed an opening in the hills, the flower of Hyder's army was perceived pressing in mass through the opening, with a view to intersect the English columns, and destroy them in detail. The bravery and the bayonets of the European troops rendered this effort abortive, and the columns continued their march, again, however, hard pressed, upon the right as well as rear, after clearing the hills. At the distance of two miles more, another similar range afforded cover to the left, when Hyder, one of whose columns had succeeded in gaining a position, which arrested the English front, brought forward the whole of his infantry, and compelled Colonel Wood once more to halt, and take post among the rocks. The attack was here resumed with redoubled fury and perseverance: Colonel Wood's ammunition began to fail, and the confidence of his sepoys to decline, when about noon, without any visible cause, Hyder drew off his troops, and commenced his retreat to the south-east. For upwards of an hour, the joy of this deliverance was unmixed with any other feeling than that of wonder; but as the atmosphere began to
clear, with the recession of Hyder's troops, an approaching column of dust from the north-east, explained the arrival of succour. Rumour had quickly conveyed to Major Fitzgerald, at Vencatigherry, the unfortunate events at Baugloor; and successive reports concurring in all the material facts, left him in no doubt, that Colonel Wood had sustained the loss of some of the most important equipments of his army, and would probably be in distress for provisions. He accordingly recalled all detachments within his reach, collected the largest possible supply of rice, and on the 22d made a forced march, in a direction which left Colar a little on his right. On the ensuing morning he was again early in motion; the fire of the contending armies, which soon became audible, furnished the point of direction, and quickened the pace of his troops; the relief was most critical, for the lavish expenditure of ammunition, in the disgraceful cannonade of the preceding day, had left Colonel Wood but five rounds for his field guns. The manifest despondency of the officer commanding, had produced its inevitable effects, and the native troops in particular, evinced a visible want of confidence in the talents of their leader. The direction of Hyder's march was towards Baugloor, and the situation of that place became the first object of discussion. Major Fitzgerald, a firm and judicious officer, on the ostensible ground of his division being comparatively fresh, suggested that with the reinforcement of the European flankers, and the exchange of a raw battalion for the disciplined corps of Captain Matthews, he should be sent to relieve and withdraw the garrison, while the remainder of the army should repair its losses at Colar; but Colonel Wood, so far from
risking a division, declared his fixed opinion that the whole was insufficient to oppose Hyder. Such, in short, was the dreadful aspect of this despondency, that Major Fitzgerald felt it incumbent on him to address a public representation to his commander-in-chief, Colonel Smith, stating the urgent necessity of placing the troops under other direction "for the recovery of their lost honour." Colonel Smith received this representation on the very day of his arrival at Madras, and sent it, without comment, to the Government, who immediately ordered Colonel Wood* to proceed in arrest to Madras, and Colonel Lang, in consequence, assumed the command of the army early in December. Previously however to this supercession, Colonel Wood had once more put in motion the united divisions; and by a series of fatiguing movements, productive of no effect, had repeatedly been in sight of Hyder, who amused himself with leaving his tents standing until the English columns were within random shot, when he would strike the encampment, and be in motion in a few minutes, for the purpose of exhibiting the perfection of his own equipments, and his derision of those of his enemy. While the divisions were separate, Hyder was in the habit† of declaring, in ordinary conversation, that he desired no contact with that of Colonel Smith, but would not fail to attack Colonel Wood wherever he could find him. On the approach of Major Fitzgerald, he supposed the division to be still commanded by

* He was tried, but incapacity, the chief fault of Colonel Wood, is not one of those, for which the articles of war provide a punishment.

† The uniform statement of all his principal officers.
Colonel Smith, and that impression caused him for some days to observe a respectful distance; but when he received authentic information of that officer's departure, he had no longer any anxiety for Bangalore, and prepared to execute, without delay, the farther objects of his campaign.
CHAPTER XVII.

Hyder's General, Fuzzul Oolla Khán, descends from Seringapatam to Coimbetoor — His success over the unilitary dispositions of the English — Interesting anecdote of Serjeant Hoskan — Gujelhutty — Orton, provincial commander, retires to Erood — Treachery at Coimbetoor, &c. — Captain Johnson at Darapoor — Bryant at Palgaunt — Singular retreat round Cape Comorin — Faisan at Caveripoor — holds out — The minor posts fall — Hyder descends the pass of Policode into Bāramahal — and turns towards Coimbetoor by the pass of Topoor — Government of Madras awakes from its dream of conquest — Corps of Major Fitzgerald follows Hyder from Mysoor — Places fall to Hyder in rapid succession — Fitzgerald's reasons for inclining towards Trichinnopoly — Hyder towards Erood — takes Caroor — destroys the corps under Nixon — appears before Erood — Strange conduct of Ortan — Surrender of Erood — and of Caveriporain — Breach of capitulation — justified as retaliation for a breach of parole — Reflections on that transaction — Hyder desolates the country to the east — Military contribution on Tanjore — Major Fitzgerald, as usual, in want of food — Contrasted conduct of the belligerents — Attempt at negotiation through Captain Brooke — Statesman-like conversation of Hyder — Mission of Mr. Andrews in consequence — Cessation of hostilities for twelve days — Resumption of hostilities — Smith in command — Hyder frequently embarrassed by the superior skill of his opponent — sends to the westward the mass of his army — and suddenly appears at the gates of Madras with cavalry alone — Mr. Du Prè sent out to negotiate — Smith orders Lang to attack Hyder's army when entangled in the pass — himself following Hyder in person — stopped by the positive orders of his Government — Negotiation and treaty of 1769 — discussed — Short review of the conduct of the war.

HYDER, on his return from the west, had relieved Fuzzul Oolla Khán from the command of Bangalore, and sent him to
Seringapatam. The commandants of all the principal garrisons and field corps, had, in conformity to a general instruction, been employed, since the commencement of the war, in procuring new levies, which were now sufficiently instructed to take the garrison and provincial duties; and the old troops, including the respectable detachment from Malabar, had been directed to repair to Seringapatam, where Fuzzul Oolla Khân continued to be actively employed, in giving them the requisite organization and equipments, as a field force. Early in November, this officer took the field with a well composed corps of 7000 cavalry and infantry, and ten guns, and a command over the irregular infantry, which was intermixed with the mass of the inhabitants below the ghauts: he knew that he should be aided by the active exertions of this numerous class, and by the best wishes of a population driven to despair, by the horrible exactions of Mahommed Ali's collectors of revenue, whose system of misrule left at an humble distance all the oppression that had ever been experienced from the iron government of Hyder: but proceeding with a skilful caution, he moved towards the passes of Caveriporam and Gujelhutty, to obtain a perfect knowledge of the number and nature of the English posts* before he should attack them. At the former of these, an honest and brave serjeant, named

* The unmilitary disposition of those of Caveriporam, are thus described by Captain Faisan, the officer commanding on the 5th of November. "My present situation is such, that I am unable to move to the assistance of any post, I have one serjeant and one company at Caveriporam; one company at the first pass, ten miles from hence; one company at the second pass, with one gun and one tumbril, 25 miles distant; one serjeant and one company at Allembady, 40 miles north; and one serjeant and two companies at Adjiporam, 55 miles west."
Hoskan, who commanded the advanced post of two companies and one gun in a ruined mud fort, repelled the attempts of Fuzzul Oolla to take it by a coup de main; and without the most remote suspicion of his perilous situation, after modestly reporting the fact to his officer, adds, with the most interesting confidence and simplicity, "I expect them again to-morrow morning in two parties* with guns: I will take the guns from them with the help of God." But his confidence was disappointed, for after the post had been made a heap of ruins, it was carried by a sanguinary assault; but I am unable to satisfy the reader's anxiety for the fate of the brave serjeant. The other posts fell in succession: that at Gujelhutty, where a Lieutenant Andrews commanded, stood two regular assaults; but he was killed in the second, and the place surrendered on the 19th of November. The troops in the pass, under the command of Captain Orton, who, until the moment of attack, continued to maintain the absurd doctrines of Colonel Wood, successively abandoned their positions and their guns, and retreated with precipitation to Satimungul; and from thence to concentrate the remaining force at Eroad. Among the strange military anomalies of Colonel Wood and his coadjutor; the fiscal agent of Mahommed Ali, the former commandant of Coimbetoor, who had betrayed it to the English, was continued in the command of the irregular troops of his former garrison—as kelledar of the place, exercising a joint non-descript authority, with the

* 700 horse, 3000 regular infantry, 2000 irregulars, and 3 guns, 12 pounders was the detachment he reported; but they had been reinforced with 4 additional guns.
European officer, who commanded the regular troops. While the greater part of these were out at exercise on the 29th of November, with the willing aid of the inhabitants, he seized the occasion to massacre all those within, to shut the gates, and, assisted by a body of cavalry, who had approached for the purpose, made prisoners the men at exercise, who, as usual, had only blunt cartridges. Fuzzul Oolla Khan who had concerted the plan, waited for its accomplishment before he should descend the Gujelhutty pass, with his main body, and immediately sent a dispatch to Hyder, to report that he should have completed his descent by the 4th of December; the treachery at Coimbetour, and a similar exploit at Denaicancota gave just cause of alarm to all those officers whose garrisons were not exclusively composed of English sepoys; all of them being aware, that they had no means of defence. In a few days the rumour of Hyder's approach from the north was abundantly confirmed. Captain Johnson who commanded at Darapoor, with 400 faithful sepoys; made good his retreat to Trichinopoly, in the face of Fuzzul Oolla's whole force; a gallant and skilful achievement, which deservedly fixed the reputation of that respectable officer. Lieutenant Bryant who commanded at Palgant, with a small detachment of his own sepoys, and the remaining part of the garrison, composed of Nabobs' troops, and irregulars hired in the country, having certain intelligence of a plan of massacre within, and

* Among the unfortunate victims was Mr. Hamilton, the paymaster of the district.

† It was then so precipitous that the gun carriages were taken to pieces, and sent down piece-meal on sledges.
the evidence of being invested without, concerted with his
faithful sepoys the means of escaping from these complicated
dangers: they withdrew unperceived in the night, and following
a secret path known to one of the sepoys, through the woods
and mountains, to the south-west, arrived in safety at Travancore;
and thence returned by Cape Comorin to the south-eastern dependencies of Madras. The option had been given to
Captain Faisan of evacuating Caveripoor, and joining Captain
Orton at Eroad, but he preferred to await the events of war,
in the post which he had been ordered to defend. All the
minor posts throughout the country, successively fell without
resistance.

On the 6th of December, Hyder descended eastward into
Barāmahāl, by the excellent pass of Pulicode, and thence south-
wards through that of Topoor, through a chain of hills run-
ing east and west, which at this place connects the first and
second ranges of great mountains, whose direction is north and
south; and Colonel Lang, who now commanded in Mysoor,
on receiving intelligence of this event, which had long been
foreseen, detached in the same direction a light but efficient
division, composed of the best troops of the army, under Major
Fitzgerald, which marched on the 10th. No adequate means
had been adopted, for repairing the losses to be expected in
the sepoy ranks, from the ordinary casualties of war, and by
a sick list necessarily augmented in the last campaign, by the
change of climate, which is ever felt more sensibly by the
Indian, than by the seasoned European soldier. After there-
fore furnishing to Major Fitzgerald an efficient corps of 5000
men*, Colonel Lang found himself under the walls of Ven-
catigherry reduced to a force, exclusively of garrisons and de-
tachments, of 370 Europeans, and 900 sepoys; two 6 pounders,
one 3 pounder, and two howitzers.

On Colonel Smith's arrival at Madras, the Government were
roused to the consideration of an opinion, which although he
had never attempted to conceal, he ought never to have suf-
f ered the deputies to over-rule; that Colar was no place of
safe deposit for stores, without an army in its vicinity; and
they awoke from the golden dreams of conquest in Mysoor,
to the sad reality of providing for the security of these means
which had been ostentatiously prepared for the capture of
the capital. A light corps under Tippoo, ranging round his
head quarters at Bangalore, was the only force in those pro-
vinces, and Colonel Lang was directed to withdraw the battering
train from Colar, while Hyder's absence rendered it practi-
cable; but it was determined to risk a garrison there, under
the command of Captain Kelly, for the purpose of resuming
offensive operations in that direction, if the future chances
of war should justify the attempt; and the egregious impro-
vidence of scattering troops over a country in untenable posts,
which promoted no one object of the war, was now evinced,

* One troop of Europeans, and all the disciplined black cavalry 500
  The 3d regiment of European infantry - - - - 350
  Flank companies of the 1st and 2d ditto - - - - 150
  Five select battalions of sepoys - - - - 4000
  
5000

8 six-pounders and 6 three-pounders, with their proportion of artillery men, with
the best equipments which the army could furnish, if army it might be called.
by the necessity of sending directions to all the garrisons to escape by night, as they could, to the nearest places of strength.

Hyder, in descending through the pass of Policode, was preceded by emissaries in every direction, who announced the intelligence of his having defeated and destroyed the English army, and of his approaching to re-occupy his own posts in the lower country, preparatory to the conquest of Madras. The garrisons, with the exception of Eroad and Caveriporam, were composed, in various gradations of inefficiency, of the same materials as those which have already been described, excepting that in those of the provinces of Bāramahāl and Salem, the garrisons were of Nabobs’ troops, without any intermixture of regular English sepoys: they followed the same disgraceful fate as those in the province of Coimbetoor, and fell, as if a magic wand had accompanied the summons. Major Fitzgerald, who followed with rapid strides, had the mortification to hear at each successive march, of the surrender* of the place which he next hoped to relieve. As he approached the Caveri, he had intelligence that Hyder had crossed, or was about to cross the river, a little to the eastward of Caroor; and had determined to leave Fuzzul Oolla to invest that place, and Eroad, and to proceed himself with the main army to attempt Trichinopoly, or levy contributions on Tanjore, and the southern provinces. Deeming Eroad to be safe for the present, from his knowledge that at least 200 Europeans,

* Their surrender is reported by Major Fitzgerald on the following dates. On the 6th Darampoory—7th Tingericotta—12th Oomaloor—15th Selim—17th Nameul—19th Caroor—25th Eroad—31st Dindegul. Caveripoor and Palgaut are not mentioned in his dispatches.
1200 regular sepoys, eight pieces of good battering cannon, and two mortars, had been allotted for its defence; and knowing Trichinopoly to be in a defenceless state, from having been drained of its troops, for the service of Coimbetoor, he inclined to the eastward for the protection of that more important object. This movement determined Hyder to the opposite direction; Caroor fell without much resistance; and he moved up the right bank of the Caveri for the siege of Eroad.

On the departure of Colonel Wood from this province, Colonel Freschman had been appointed to succeed him; and after the descent of Fuzzul Oolla had retired sick to Trichinopoly, leaving the command of the troops in the province to Captain Orton, whom we have already noticed, as retreating from the passes, to concentrate his force at Eroad. The cruel rapacity of Mahommed Ali’s management had caused provisions to disappear over a province not exceeded in fertility and abundance by any portion of the earth; and Captain Orton, who had been assured by the fiscal officers of an ample supply of provisions at Eroad, found the quantity totally insufficient, even for a short siege; and had sent to Caroor, a distance of 40 miles, a detachment under Captain Nixon, composed of 50 Europeans, 200 sepoys, and two three-pounders, to escort a supply from thence. The approach of Hyder was known, but it was calculated that before his arrival, there would be time to bring up two more convoys from Caroor; and the force was deemed sufficient to oppose any detachment which could be sent against it, by Fuzzul Oolla, who was supposed to be at some distance. It had not however proceeded much above an hour on its march, before a small encampment was observed to the eastward, of about a thousand
horse; these were soon mounted, and after examining the force of the detachment, withdrew, skirmishing, as they retired, for some miles. There was between Caroor and Eroad, a small intermediate post, where Captain Nixon intended to halt; and as he had just mounted the summit of a rising ground, from whence he could descry it at the distance of two miles, three well directed cannon-shot from some masked guns plunged into the head of his column; he immediately formed, but had scarcely time to unlimber his three-pounders, before he had the mortification to find his party cannonaded by ten field-pieces, extremely well served, at a distance little exceeding point blank. He judiciously fell back a few paces, to cover his men in some degree, by the interposition of the crest of the hill, until he could examine the best means of forcing his way to the post, which he supposed to be still occupied by his own troops; conceiving the body opposed to him to be no more than a re-union of Fuzzul Oolla's detachment. It was Hyder's whole army; and in a few minutes, two deep columns of infantry appeared, directing their march against his little party, and a body of about 12,000 horse, moving with the utmost rapidity, to envelope and destroy them. The English detachment maintained the firmest attitude, in the face of these overwhelming numbers; they reserved their fire, until the enemy's column was within twenty yards: when the little band of 50 heroes gave their fire, rushed in with the bayonet, and caused the column opposed to them to break, and fly with the utmost precipitation: unhappily this effort of useless gallantry only accelerated their destruction; the cavalry of Hyder seized that moment to charge the left and rear of the sepoys; and the rest
was such a scene of carnage, as always follows the triumph of such troops. Not an officer or man, European or native, escaped without a wound, with the single exception of a Lieutenant Goreham, who by speaking the language, an attainment rare in those days, was enabled to explain himself to an officer of rank, who had the humanity to preserve him, by desiring that he would mount behind himself on the same horse. The wounded were immediately placed in litters, or other conveyances, and Hyder, who always availed himself of recent impressions, hurried off to display his barbarous trophies, before the walls of Eroad: and for the purpose of distinctly unfolding the facts, a flag of truce was sent in for an English surgeon, to dress the wounded. In a sufficient time after his return, Lieutenant Goreham was enjoined to translate into English, a summons in Hyder's name, demanding the surrender of the place, and inviting Captain Orton to repair in person to Hyder's tent, under the assurance that if the terms of capitulation could not be adjusted, he should be at liberty to return for the defence of the place: there is too much ground for believing the report, that Captain Orton had dined when he received and accepted this strange invitation. His next in command was Captain Robinson, who had capitulated at Vaniambaddy in the preceding year, under his parole not to serve during the remainder of the war, and was now acting in violation of that parole, necessarily under the authority of his government, who had thus appropriated all that they could of his dishonour. The knowledge of this fact was Hyder's chief motive for desiring the conference, to which Captain Orton had so absurdly consented; but affecting to have first discovered it in the course
of conversation, he declared that he considered this violation of compact to absolve him from the obligation of observing his own; but if Captain Orton would write an order for the surrender of the place, he would still engage for the safe conduct of the whole garrison, with their property to Trichinopoly. Captain Orton resisted this dereliction of duty throughout the first day; and the modes cannot be distinctly traced, but may well be imagined, by which, in the course of the next, he was induced to write the order; which no officer ought to have regarded; and least of all an officer in the predicament of Captain Robinson. Such, however, is the fact, that the garrison surrendered * on the same evening. All this intelligence preceded the arrival of Hyder before Caveriropam, a place possessing not half the means of defence, but commanded by an officer who was animated by another spirit. This place had long been besieged by the main body of Fuzzul Oolla's corps; a whole face of the miserable rampart had been laid open; successive lodgements had been cut off by corresponding retrenchments, until Captain Faisan, converting the houses into lines of defence, prolonged his resistance in a remnant of the ruins; till having intelligence more authentic than that announced by the enemy, of the actual state of affairs, he felt the duties which he owed to the surviving troops, and capitulated on the condition of being sent himself, and the whole of his garrison,

* The French author of the life of Ayder, makes the capture of Captain R. to have occurred in a march from Madras to Madura; and the incidents relating to Eroad, at Elwassinoor, near Tiagar. Captain R. is said to have been immediately hanged on a tree. It is not the justice of the sentence, but the truth of the fact that is in question; he died in prison.
as prisoners on parole, to Trichinopoly. Hyder's convenient casuistry found no difficulty in maintaining the justice of retaliation on an enemy, in all cases, in more than an equal degree; and the garrisons of Caveriporam as well as Eroad, were sent, without compunction, to the dungeons of Seringapatam, in return for an individual violation of a parole of honour. It is not intended to insinuate, that a violation of honour by one party is an excuse for it in another; nor can it be safely affirmed, that Hyder would have regarded the faith of the capitulation, if unprovided with the plea afforded by Captain Robinson. In his general character he was as ostentatious of good faith, as he was prompt in seizing a pretext for its violation: but how culpable soever he may have been, or would have been, the government of Madras had no ground of complaint; since, by their employment of Captain Robinson, they converted his individual guilt into national disgrace, and furnished a perpetual motive for distrust of their own faith, and perpetual ground for retaliation.

The year 1768 closed with these events. Of the territorial possessions which had been wrested from Hyder in the course of two campaigns, he had recovered the whole in about six weeks from the commencement of Fuzzul Oolla's operations, and little more than three from his own descent; not one of the conquests, which had overspread so much paper, in the pompous dispatches of the two preceding years, now remaining to the English, except Colar and Vencatigherry, two untenable posts; and Kistnagherry, where the garrison might remain safely perched on the summit of the rock, without any probable influence on the future character of the war. These places were left without anxiety, to be sealed up by the provincial troops. The corps of Fuzzul
Oolla was sent to operate from Dindegul upon the provinces of Madura and Tinnevelly; and Hyder, recrossing the river Caveri, directed his march to the eastward, along the northern banks of that river. Major Fitzgerald, who had been under the necessity of detaching from his small force, for the security of Trichinopoly and Madura, was at Munsoorpet opposite the former place; and finding on Hyder’s nearer approach that he pointed to the north-east, marched with all diligence to place himself farther north, for the purpose of intercepting his direct progress to Madras. Hyder, to whom, in the career of destruction which he meant to pursue, all routes were for the present indifferent, crossed to the south-east, in the rear of Major Fitzgerald’s tract. A wide expanse of flaming villages marking the direction of his course, he descended by the branch of the Caveri, which here assumes the name of Coleroon, and accepting four lacs of rupees from the Raja of Tanjore, for sparing his country, returned to the situation which Major Fitzgerald had been obliged to abandon, to seek for food, at Cuddalore, on the sea coast; according to the wretched combinations of mis-rule, by which an English corps has so often been made to starve in the midst of an abundance which was professedly its own.

At this critical period, the belligerent powers pursued a course, which furnishes a tolerably accurate criterion, of the political wisdom by which they were respectively directed, in the course of the war. The Government of Madras, who, in their imaginary career of conquest, had rejected the most reasonable terms, now made advances for accommodation; which Hyder in that course of prosperity, which had excited their
alarm, received with moderation and complacency. He returned through Major Fitzgerald a suitable answer to the Governor's letter; and requested that a confidential officer might be sent to his camp, to whom he might explain the grounds of accommodation to which he was willing to consent. Captain Brooke, whose prompt and judicious conduct at Mulwââgul had produced such fortunate effects, was selected by Major Fitzgerald for this purpose; and his report of the conversation furnishes at once some features of Hyder's character, and a tolerably correct abstract of the conduct of the parties.

Hyder began the conversation by observing, that for the last four years *, Mahommed Ali had been incessantly engaged in endeavours to create a rupture between him and the English; that he had failed in his attempts with Mr. Pigot, and Mr. Palk, the preceding governors; but had unfortunately succeeded with Mr. Bourchier, who was too manifestly the aggressor in the present war. That he (Hyder) had for many years kept an envoy at Madras, for the express purpose of endeavouring to establish a solid and lasting amity with the English; but his efforts were perpetually counteracted by Mahommed Ali. That since the commencement of the war, he had made two unsuccessful overtures for accommodation, the first to Colonel Smith, at Kistnagherry, and the second to the field deputies at Colar; in which, although the party aggrieved, he had consented to considerable sacrifices: that on the western coast, the commercial establishments from Bombay had long been in the habit of exchanging the manufactures of Europe for the sandal, the pepper, and other products of these pro-

* The commencement of the sovereignty of the treaty of Paris.
CHAP. vinces; that the intercourse was equally advantageous to both parties; and promoted the good-will which he desired to cherish; until the influence of Mahommed Ali extended thither also, and compelled him to return from the East for the preservation of his western possessions; that during his absence a large portion of his country was over-run, and exclusively of the destruction inseparable from war, Mahommed Ali had levied pecuniary contributions to the amount of twenty-five lacs of rupees; that notwithstanding these injuries, and his recent successes, he was still willing to make peace with the English if they would look to their own interests; exclude Mahommed Ali from their councils, and send up Colonel Smith*, or a member of council to the army with full powers to treat. He then proceeded to observe, that the Mahrattas periodically invaded his country to levy plunder; and that his opposition to them rendered Mysoor a shield to Arcot; that they had frequently proposed to him a partition of the latter country, a measure which he had uniformly declined, from the conviction that it would be ultimately injurious to himself; he then dismissed the attendants, and stating that what he had now to say, was in confidence to the English alone,

* Hyder at all times professed the highest respect for the military talents and personal character of Colonel Smith; at the conclusion of the peace, he expressed an anxious desire for an interview with his preceptor, as he named him, in the science of war, whom he wished to make his friend on the return of peace; circumstances did not admit of Colonel Smith's complying with this desire, and Hyder then requested that he might be favoured with his portrait; which some time afterwards was accordingly sent. It was deposited by his son Tippoo among other lumber, and on the capture of Seringapatam in 1799, was sold by auction with other prize property; and is now in the possession of my friend General David Smith, of Cometrow, in Somersetshire.
he announced the preparation of the Mahrattas* for a powerful invasion in that direction; a fact he added, of which the English must be perfectly aware, from their vakeel at Poona; that his interests were directly opposed to any union with that people; but he was unable to oppose both them and the English, at one and the same time; that he would be under the immediate necessity of making his election of a friend between the two, and that it now depended on the English what election he should make; whether as heretofore to shield them from danger for the preservation of his own interests; or in a more unpleasant pursuit of the same interests, to combine for their destruction. To these open, simple, and statesman-like remarks, Captain Brooke replied in a suitable manner; that being furnished with no powers, he could only observe from himself, that from Hyder's own statement of the case it was his obvious interest to cultivate the alliance of the English, whose friendship it depended on himself to render a permanent good; while that of the Mahrattas resembled the delusive † streaks of light which precede a storm. These Hyder replied were precisely his own thoughts; and it was therefore that he wished Colonel Smith in particular to come up to the army, invested with full powers. Captain Brooke intimated the probable expectation of his sending a vakeel to Madras; to which Hyder replied, that he never would so

* All this was perfectly true, and Nizam Ali was a member of the confederacy; the Government of Madras had stated this apprehension in their dispatches to Coimbetoor, in the preceding October, Madoo Row had actually marched from Poona, but was recalled by intelligence of an unfavourable nature from Malwa.

† The simile is taken from Captain Brooke's dispatch.
negotiate a peace; because independently of the umbrage it might give to the Mahrattas, in consequence of the expectation of confederacy which he had found himself obliged to encourage, he knew that at Madras every effort would be frustrated by Mahommed Ali; who would always desire to keep the English at war, in order that he might himself plead poverty, (as he was now doing after having rifled the richest provinces of Mysoor,) and thus keep them in a state of perpetual dependence, poverty, and impotence. Captain Brooke, on taking leave observed, that it would be an acceptable evidence of his friendly disposition, to put an end to the plunder and violation of the defenceless inhabitants; to which Hyder significantly replied, that his treasury was not enriched by such excesses; but that the exigency of his affairs had obliged him to accept the services of some volunteers*, whose conduct it was difficult to restrain. The report of this conversation was forwarded to Madras, and Captain Brooke was again ordered to repair to Hyder's camp, to communicate an outline of the terms to which the Government was willing to agree; these terms, which Hyder deemed to be totally inconsistent with the actual condition of the parties, were positively rejected; but Hyder said, that he would be still ready to receive Colonel Smith, or a gentleman of rank, charged with reasonable proposals, and full powers. The Government accordingly determined to send Mr. Andrews, and once more requested Colonel Smith to assume the command of the fragments of their

* Meaning the Pindaries, who serve without pay, on the condition of being permitted to plunder at large.
armies, which were directed to reunite at Chittapet a fort about 70 miles to the S. W. of Madras, and conveniently placed for the junction of Colonel Lang's small division, then at Vellore, which was eventually destined to proceed towards Madras. Colonel Smith assumed the command on the 1st of February; and after some manoeuvring productive of no results, Mr. Andrews passed to Hyder's camp on the 14th. The Government had proposed, that during the conferences, his army should retire to Ahtoor, within the first range of hills, while Colonel Smith's should remain at Tiagar, not far to the eastward of that place. Hyder proposed to Colonel Smith to substitute Poloor, and Conjiveram, respectively 80 and 40 miles from Madras, which he rejected; and another series ensued of fatiguing movements, followed by no consequence. On the 22d, Mr. Andrews agreed to a cessation of arms for twelve days, and proceeded to Madras to report Hyder's ultimatum and receive orders; this interval was employed by Hyder in receiving a pompous deputation from the Council of Pondicherry, in which place the plunder of the country found a ready and convenient sale; but the Government at Madras having refused to accede to the propositions conveyed by Mr. Andrews, notice was given of the cessation of the truce. Hyder without intimating the least desire of prolonging it, took the opportunity of sending a vakeel to Colonel Smith stating his wish to receive an answer to his letter then transmitted to the Governor, before he should make a final determination. He assured Colonel Smith through the vakeel, that he was sincerely desirous of peace with the English; that he had rejected, and should continue to reject, the large pecuniary offers which he had received, for consenting to the mediation of Mahommed
CHAP. XVII. Ali; of whose political existence he recognized no trace, but in secret mischief: that his treaty must be directly and exclusively with those with whom he had been at war, and not with a person who would frustrate their mutual desire of amity; and finally he requested, through Colonel Smith, an early reply from the Governor, which should determine his future measures.

March 6. Hostilities were resumed on the 6th of March. The country was once more in flames; and as it was known to be Hyder's favourite object, to burn the black town and suburbs of Madras, the garrison was reinforced, and the division of Colonel Lang, now reduced to 300 Europeans, two battalions of sepoys, and the troops of Morari Row, was destined as a moveable corps to cover the Presidency, regulating its operations by the orders of the Governor and Council; while Colonel Smith was master only of the movements of his own corps. On the subject of arrangements so strangely unmilitary, and so destitute of political wisdom, we find it authenticated by the public records, that this corps was placed under the orders of Colonel Smith, on the 16th of March, because Colonel Lang had reported on the preceding day, that he could not move from the spot where the Council had placed him, namely, Conjeveram, distant 40 miles from Madras, in consequence of the sudden interposition of Hyder. Colonel Smith had so skilfully availed himself of the resources of Madras, that his infantry and guns now moved as rapidly as those of Hyder; and being directed by superior skill, he had more than once in the course of manoeuvres between Ginjee and Madras, involved the enemy in perplexities, from which the efforts of Hyder's cavalry had relieved him with considerable difficulty. The movement which had alarmed Colonel Lang and the Council, had apparently been forced
upon Hyder; and Colonel Smith, knowing Lang’s critical situation, was close to Conjeveram, before Hyder could by any possibility have seriously molested him. Confident from experience, that Hyder could have no leisure for serious mischief at Madras before he should overtake him, Colonel Smith pursued the enemy’s route, who had doubled to the southward, directing Colonel Lang to follow him, at the interval of a day’s march. The risk which Hyder had occasionally incurred, determined him to avoid future dangers of a similar kind; and to make the experiment of working on the fears of his enemies. The movements to which we have adverted, had again brought the armies nearly 140 miles to the southward of Madras; and from thence Hyder sent off the whole body of his infantry, guns and baggage of every description, together with the great mass of his cavalry with orders to retire through the pass of Ahtoor. The whole force which he reserved with himself consisted of 6000 chosen horse; and of infantry precisely two companies of one hundred men each, selected from the distinguished corps of Jehân* Khan, and Mân Khan, who themselves commanded these detachments as Hyder’s personal night guards. Not one gun, or impediment of any description, accompanied this chosen corps; with which he moved 130 miles in three days and a half; and on the 29th of March appeared with his cavalry within five miles of Madras; his companies of infantry not arriving till the succeeding day. He had, since the renewal of hostilities, again written to the Governor, to express his desire for peace; he now sent another letter to announce, that he had come for that express purpose; desired that a person might be sent to negotiate the

* This officer has personally related to me all the details of this severe march.
terms; and in order that nothing might be wanting to the character of perfect dictation, he himself nominated the English envoy; viz. Mr. Du Prè; who proceeded, according to appointment, to attend him at St. Thomas’s Mount.

Although nothing can relieve from the character of dictation Hyder’s nomination of the English envoy, his real desire for peace may justly be considered as the chief inducement for making choice of a man to treat with, on whose good sense he could confidently rely, when the object of both parties was peace upon fair and equal terms. The natives of India are expert in appreciating character, and Hyder possessed this talent in an eminent degree. It is also to be observed that Mr. Du Prè was nominated to succeed to the government of Madras, and Hyder had an interest in becoming acquainted with the talents and influence of those men whose counsels might affect his destinies.

Two days before the separation of Hyder from his army, Colonel Smith had reinforced the division of Colonel Lang, and sent him in the direction of Tiagar and Trinomalee, with orders to take post at either, if a greatly superior force should appear, and to act on the communications of the enemy, with the passes of Ahtoor and Changama. When apprised of the decision of Hyder, which was correctly reported to him on the very day of its execution, he sent orders to Colonel Lang, to risk an attack on these unwieldy bodies while entangled in the passes; in his narrative he complains that Lang made no attempt to annoy them; but in justice to that officer, we must recollect the fearful insufficiency of his force, for a contest with the main body of Hyder’s army, which he must necessarily have risked, by
moving under these circumstances to a distance from Tiagar. Colonel Smith himself, followed Hyder with his usual celerity, and early on the 31st, was met within ten miles of his camp by a mandate from the government, written at Hyder's solicitation, and dispatched on one of his own dromedary couriers, to desire that he would halt wherever that letter should meet him. The objects of Colonel Smith, in this campaign, induced him, on most occasions, to choose the road on which he was not looked for; and the courier, who expected to find him at the distance of 30 miles, had missed him by pursuing the ordinary tract. Hyder, on discovering that Colonel Smith's force had approached so near, frankly declared that no consideration should induce him to remain within twenty-five miles of that army: a fresh order was accordingly dispatched at his request, to desire that it might move beyond that distance, and Colonel Smith who received this order on the 1st of April, answered that he would obey it on the ensuing day. Hyder however observing that he did not move on the 1st, jealous of so close a vicinity, and meditating a fresh experiment on the issue of the negotiation, was in motion to the northward early on the 2d, and the Government, very needlessly alarmed for the black town, dispatched instant directions to Colonel Smith to march to the northward, or direct to Madras, as he might judge most expedient. That officer, who had uniformly recommended peace, but had never suppressed his indignation at the circumstances of unnecessary and insulting degradation under which his Government were now treating, obeyed the order with alacrity; but had not moved more than half way to his object before he was met
by another order directing him to halt. Hyder had waited to observe the effect of his movement, before he announced it, and on ascertaining the alarm it created, and the consequent movement of Colonel Smith, sent to explain that he had only moved ground for the convenience of forage, to a place about six miles to the northward of the black town. The treaty was in fact concluded on the same evening, and executed by both parties on the following day.

Considerable difficulties occurred in determining who were to be the parties to this treaty. Hyder in the first instance having declined the instrumentality of Mahommed Ali, and he in return having affected to object to be a party to any treaty in which Hyder should be styled a nabob; it was at length agreed by Mahommed Ali, that the Company should negotiate in their own name, for their own possessions, and for the Carnatic Payen Ghaut; and that he should by letter to the Governor, officially signify his consent to this procedure; a promise which, after the execution of the treaty, he refused to perform.

The motives assigned by Hyder in his first conversation with Captain Brooke, were the true grounds of the genuine moderation observable in this treaty; which provides for a mutual restitution of places and prisoners, with the single exception of Caroor, an ancient dependency of Mysoor, which had been retained by Mahommed Ali, since the last war, by tacit acquiescence, and was now to be restored to Mysoor. Hyder long contended for the restitution of his ships of war, but receded on the representation that they had probably long since been sold for the benefit of the captors; and finally consented to regulate his concessions and demands on the other coast, by a treaty of simi-
lar import, to be concluded with the Government of Bombay; and which was executed some time afterwards. The only article of the treaty with Madras, which demands observation, is the second; which stipulates, "that in case either of the contracting parties shall be attacked, they shall, from their respective countries, mutually assist each other, to drive the enemy out;" the pay of the auxiliaries to be defrayed at fixed rates, by the party demanding assistance. Hyder’s first demand, was for an alliance offensive and defensive, which, after much discussion, Mr. Du Prè distinctly refused; and declared, that if persisted in, the negotiation must there cease. Now as it was notorious to all India, and openly avowed by Hyder himself, that his country was periodically invaded by the Mahrattas, it is obvious, and the sequel will abundantly unfold it, that by the article ultimately adjusted, the Company subjected themselves to all the embarrassments of an offensive alliance without any of its advantages: and that Mr. Du Prè had acquiesced in the spirit of an article, to the letter of which he had objected, as fundamentally inadmissible. Historical justice demands this reluctant notice of an error committed by Mr. Du Prè, to whose profound wisdom and distinguished talents, the subsequent narrative will bear a willing testimony.

During the negotiation, Hyder had strenuously demanded the release of the wife and family of Chunda Saheb, and of a long list of Nevayets*, the descendants and adherents of the former dynasty of nabobs, who were imprisoned or detained in various fortresses by Mahommed Ali. Mr. Du Prè sought to evade this

* For an account of this race, see vol. i. p. 242.
demand, by observing that they were in the custody of a person who was not a party to the treaty; and Hyder so far acquiesced as to expunge the article which related to their liberation; but explicitly declared that he should understand it to be essential to his release of the English prisoners. Mr. Du Prè on the other hand professed that he could only engage for the request being made; and the subject was not resumed until after the execution of the treaty, when Hyder declared that unless every Nevayet detailed in his list should be permitted to accompany him to Mysoor, not one Englishman should return from thence; and after much opposition from Mahommed Ali they were actually released. It will be recollected that Hyder’s mother was a Nevayet, and the parade of belonging to that respectable family was strengthened by the solicitations of Reza Saheb, the son of Chunda Saheb who was still in Hyder’s service: but with the exception of the close prisoners, few of them had reason to rejoice at their change of situation; their polished manners but ill accorded with the gross habits of Hyder’s court; his notions also of liberal provision fell far short of their decent expectations; and in the language of one of the sect*, “they almost all died of hardship, broken hearts, and repentance.”

Mr. Du Prè, who negotiated this treaty, (in which we have ventured to suggest a serious misconception,) had lately arrived from England as a member of council, and provisional successor to the government; and although he found the state of public affairs too unfavourable to admit of being speedily restored by any talents; we find, from the period of his arrival, a tone of

* Budr u Zemán Khán.
enlightened reasoning to pervade the records of government, which is not so observable in the consultations of the preceding years. A passage in their general letter, dated on the 8th of March, contains the following striking commentary on the imbecility and improvidence of all their previous arrangements regarding Mahommed Ali: "the forces in the field are under the direction of your servants, but the means by which they must be supported are principally in the Nabob, (Mahommed Ali,) whose idle vanity, desire of power, and jealousy of control, render all dependance on him precarious: the Company, they observe in a subsequent letter, dated the 17th June, is subject to all the inconveniences, without any of the advantages of figuring in the character of a great European power." And resuming the subject two years afterwards they judiciously remark, that "in the late war your servants were, step by step, and by remote causes, drawn into measures by far too extensive for their means, depending on the support of an ally who ought never to be depended on." The liberal assistance derived from Bengal, alone enabled the Company to continue this ill-fated war: Mahommed Ali, as the general letters record, wished them to carry it on with their own resources; and they, on the other hand, deemed it "unreasonable to exhaust their treasures for the support of countries, and the acquisition of others from whence they were to derive no advantage." But it is the most remarkable feature in the conduct of this remarkable ally, that although during the war he could furnish neither pecuniary resources nor military supplies, yet on the point of concluding it, when Hyder steadily rejected his participation, he then pledged himself to furnish all the expences of the war, and to subsidize the Mahratta army, pro-
vided the government would consent to break with Hyder; fortunately for the public, Mr. Du Prè had, at this time, an ascendancy in the councils of Madras, and on a subsequent occasion found it necessary to remark, that when Mahommed Ali’s acknowledged debt to the Company came to be discussed, he had again no money.

On reviewing the conduct of this eventful war, an opinion may be risked that Hyder committed not one political mistake, and that of his military errors, more ought to be ascribed to his just diffidence in the talents and discipline of his officers and troops, than to any misconception of what might be achieved with better instruments. And of his opponent, Colonel Smith, it may as safely be affirmed, that he cannot be charged with one fault exclusively military; and, although his general views regarding the conduct of the war appear at an early period to have been extremely defective, it may yet be presumed from the confident judgment, which he was provoked to record at the most unpromising part of the contest, that his diffidence of more decisive measures at an earlier time was exclusively founded on his conviction of the radical and incurable vices of the system of command, as well as of supply, which rendered movements of calculation and concert altogether impracticable. The strange combination of vicious arrangements, corrupt influence, and political incapacity, which directed the general measures of the Government of Madras have been too constantly traced to demand recapitulation.

Hyder returned at his leisure to Colar, for the purpose of concluding the arrangements consequent on the peace; and from thence proceeded to Bangalore, where he gave his army
some repose. His intelligence from Poona satisfied him that the visit of Mādoo Row was not relinquished but deferred, and he determined to employ the intermediate time in levying such contributions, as should prepare his military chest for the heavy demands which it must sustain in the succeeding year.
CHAPTER XVIII.

Hyder, after a short repose at Bangalore, makes a tour, for the purpose of levying contributions to the N. E., N., and N. W. — beaten off from Bellári — Conjectures regarding the secret treaty between Hyder and Nizam Ali — Invasion of Mádoo Row — Hyder retires to Seringapatam — attempts negotiation without success — Observations on Mahratta claims — Reza Ali — the destined Nabob of Arcot — and one of Hyder’s envoys — abandons his service, and remains with Mádoo Row — Designs of that Chief — reduces the range of N. E. forts — Resistance at the obscure fort of Nidjgul — which is at length carried — Anecdote of the commandant — Mádoo Row taken ill, returns to Poona — leaving the army under Trimbuc Mama — who takes Gooramconda — and returns to the western part of Mysoor — Destruction of a detachment from Bangalore — Hyder takes the field — position near Savendy Droog — Trimbuc Mama declines to attempt it — moves across his front to the west — Hyder moves to the strong position of Milgota — in which he is invested — attempts a retreat to Seringapatam — drunkenness — savage conduct to his son — his army entirely destroyed at Chercooli — Escape of Hyder — of Tippoo in disguise — Curious appendix, illustrative of the characters of Hyder and Tippoo — Curious surgical incident — Conduct of Fuzzul Oolla Khan — Errors of the Mahrattas — Hyder recovers the panic — ventures on two detachments from Seringapatam — Tippoo to Bednore succeeds — Mahommed Ali to Periapatam compelled to return after a severe conflict, and murdering his own prisoners — Minor operations omitted — Peace of 1772 — gives to the English the contact of a Mahratta frontier, in return for their infraction of their last treaty with Hyder — Murder of the pageant Raja — Successor — Horrible exactions — Base ingratitude to Fuzzul Oolla Khan — Rapacity proportioned to insecurity.
transfer to the former of Kurpa, Kurnool, and other places between the Toombuddra and the northern limits of Mysoor, as nominal dependencies, on terms which I have not been able correctly to ascertain; but probably conditional; depending on successes which had not been achieved. Hyder however deemed it expedient to substantiate the existence of the right, by its early exercise; and moved to the north-east, levying contributions on Kurpa, and Kurnool, the territories of the Patan Nabobs; and Gudwall, the possession of an Hindoo Poligar: thence he inclined westward, for a similar purpose to the Hindoo Poligars of Côticunda, and Cuppethál, and deviated to Gooty, on which he was not yet prepared to execute his intentions; and therefore received with apparent complacency the amicable advances of Morari Row. The deep and determined animosity of these rival adventurers was veiled by an intercourse of pretended reconciliation, and confirmed by a personal interview, and an interchange of costly presents. From Gooty, Hyder proceeded to Bellâri, a dependency of Adwâni, the jageer of Basãlut Jung, where his demand of contribution being refused, he prepared to enforce it; and was beaten off with great loss, in an attempt to carry the place by a general assault. This unexpected failure, and the pressure of time, disposed him to compromise the reputation of his arms, by accepting the professions of dependency, and the promise only of future contribution. This event, however, would seem to throw a faint light on the obscure character of the compact between Hyder and Nizam Ali: the latter chief continued to view with jealousy and apprehension, the means of eventual rivalship which were still possessed by his brother; and secretly to wrest them from
him by the hands of another, was perfectly congenial with the character of Nizam Ali.

From Bellari, Hyder moved in nearly a south-western line, securing the contributions from the Poligars dependent on Sera, and assuming a direction apparently intended to oppose the invasion of Mâdoo Row, beyond his own frontiers, in the province of Savanoor: but the forces of that chief were too superior in number and in quality to admit of open competition in that plain country, and Hyder had once before suffered by the experiment of resisting him in the woods of Bednore. The military talents of Mâdoo Row were certainly of a high order; and Hyder did homage to those talents, in retiring as he advanced along the skirts of the woods, to the protection of his capital in January 1770. He persevered in the former plan of destroying his own country, without essentially impeding the progress of the enemy; but on this occasion, his own presence enabled him more effectually to enforce the destruction of its resources; and as this would necessarily compel the Mahrattas to preserve a constant communication with their own territory, he left Meer Saheb and Tippoo in the skirts of Bednore, to hang on their rear, intercept their supplies, and cut off their detachments. The charge of the heir apparent, and of the most important division of his army, was thus committed to the person, who not three years before, had betrayed an important trust, and had recently submitted to a forced reconciliation; but Hyder was a master of human character; he saw that Meer Saheb disgusted with the Mahratta connexion, had returned with delight to his natural attachments, and took a more than ordinary interest in the future hopes of his nephew; the
whole of his subsequent life evinced the sound penetration of Hyder, which, by reposing confidence, irrevocably fixed the allegiance of this his most valuable adherent.

At a very early period of this contest, and throughout its long continuance, Hyder was incessant in his demands of assistance from the English, for the expulsion of the Mahrattas, in conformity to the second article of the treaty of the preceding year; but the intricate discussions which occasioned its refusal, will most conveniently be postponed, in order that we may continue without interruption the narrative of Mahratta transactions.

Hyder understood too well the character and forces of the chief by whom he was opposed, to hope for a successful termination of the war by his own unaided efforts, and at an early period deputed Reza Ali Khân (the son of Chunda Saheb) and Apajee Ram, to treat for an adjustment of his demands. Mâdoo Row demanded a crore of rupees, on the ground, that Hyder had levied on his poligars a large sum of money; and owed on his own account two years tribute, which was always estimated by Mâdoo Row at twelve lacs, for the dominions possessed by Hyder, above and below the ghauts. The former of these demands will be partly explained, by observing that the dependency of the Poligars to the N. W. of Sera, was a contested claim between Hyder and Mâdoo Row; and most of them were now serving with the army of the latter: and both demands will be illustrated by recollecting that the Mahrattas, by the conquest of Vijeyapoor, claimed to succeed to all the rights of that Government; and among them, to the sovereignty of Mysoor, under the general designation of Carnatic Vijeyapoor; it should also be invariably remembered, that wherever Mahratta claims are con-
cerned, there is always the reserved demand of *choute*, (in itself an assertion of sovereignty, as we shall hereafter explain) and a multitude * of appended claims, which are either added to other more regular tribute, or substituted for it according to circumstances: Hyder, in answer to these exorbitant demands, observed, that he was a soldier of fortune, and possessed no treasure but his sword; that his territories had been too recently ravaged, and his treasury exhausted, by Mâdoo Row himself, to admit the possibility of complying with such unreasonable expectations; but that if twelve lacs would satisfy him for the present, he would endeavour to collect it. Hyder had in 1767 consented to the payment of a large sum, for the purpose of averting a confederated attack on his capital, which would probably have succeeded; but he had too much sagacity and spirit, to comply with demands, which would inevitably increase, in the exact ratio of his means, while the least hope remained of averting the evil by a manly resistance. The negotiation accordingly failed, and Appajee Ram returned. Reza Ali remaining in the Mahratta camp, under pretext of renewing the conferences; but in fact, with the determined resolution of quitting for ever the service and society of Hyder, which various considerations had rendered offensive to his feelings. In the event of complete success in the late confederacy with Nizam Ali the Nabobship of Arcot was to have been at Hyder’s disposal;

* During the Duke of Wellington’s campaigns in Deccan, he appointed an English collector to the district of Ahmednuggur, and on receiving his report was so good as to point out to me as an object of curiosity, the detail of I think twenty-five heads of *predatory assessment*, invariably deducted from the revenue, even in their own territories.
and he had alternately given confidential hints of encouragement to Mâphuz Khân, and to Reza Ali; and rumour had carried to other countries an assurance, that the deeds of investiture had been actually executed by Nizam Ali in the name of Tippoo. But it is the opinion of all those who were most intimately acquainted with Hyder's character and habits, that he never would have conferred during his life time, on either of those persons, that or any other authority which he could himself retain. The proposed marriage of Reza Ali with his daughter, was the bond of union by which Hyder persuaded that person, that the dignity was intended for him; and since the peace which terminated the project of sovereignty, that of the matrimonial union had been revived; but now that the connexion was shorn of its political lustre, Reza Ali, who had been reconciled to it by that single consideration, was alive to nothing but disgust at the degradation of the alliance; and having resolved to avert it by flight, availed himself of his present situation, to remain under the protection of Mâdoo Row; whose proceedings seemed to abandon the ordinary routine of Mahratta plunder, and to point to the fixed conquest of the whole country. Among other arrangements he was accompanied by garrisons regularly organized, and independent of his field force, for the occupation of the principal posts; the woody tract on his right, was passed for the present; but he proceeded to occupy all the posts in the districts of Cuddoor, Banâvar, Hassan, and Bêloor, and from thence eastward; passing for the present, Savendydroog and Bangalore, he reduced Nundiaroog, the two Balapoors, Colar, Mulwâgul which he carried by assault and gave no quarter, and nearly the whole range of
open country to the eastern boundary. His progress was, however, arrested for a considerable time, by the obscure fort of Nidgegul. The renter of the eastern district, named Narsena, had found it convenient to fix his residence at this place; and as it was thus the occasional deposit of treasure, he had been authorized to improve the works, and had rendered it a tolerably respectable fort. After the commencement of the siege, Sirdar Khan, an officer of reputation, had been detached from Bangalore, to throw himself into the place, by a forced night march, and assume the command. His force, including the former garrison, amounted to three thousand men; and he continued for three months to foil the efforts of the Mahratta chief, whose talent did not consist in the science of attacking fortified places. It happened that Narain Row, his brother, was wounded in directing the operations of the siege after an unsuccessful assault; and Madoo Row, already sufficiently indignant at being detained by this wretched place, ordered it to be instantly stormed, and no man to return at the peril of his life: the assault was nevertheless, again repulsed, and Madoo Row, in a fit of increased rage, ordered fresh troops for the storm, and was placing himself at their head, when the Poligar of Chitledroog* interposed to solicit the post of danger, and requested that Madoo Row, would, with his own hand, inflict the penalty of his returning from the breach; this chivalrous offer was accepted, and the Poligar placing

* Named Bedjcutty Berma. This was one of the poligars, whose dependance was contested. Hyder never forgave this memorable instance of attachment to his enemy; and it was the ground of the subsequent destruction of that poligar.
himself at the head of his brave beders, carried the place on the first of May, in a style of gallantry, which deservedly fixed the admiration of the whole army. In retaliation for a barbarous custom of Mysoor, to which we have formerly adverted, and which Hyder had lately ordered to be practised on some Mahratta plunderers, Madoo Row directed the noses and ears of all the survivors of the garrison of Nidjegul to be cut off on the spot: Sirdar Khân was last led out, and approached with a firm step, and undaunted aspect. Is it not consistent with just retaliation (said Madoo Row) that you also be thus mutilated and disgraced? The mutilation will be mine, the disgrace your's, replied the Mussulman, and Madoo Row immediately ordered his unconditional release.

This chief continued his operations, with the success which had hitherto always attended his invasions of Mysoor; but, being taken ill, he was no longer able to direct in person the progress of the campaign; he accordingly retired from the army to Poona, accompanied by his brother, who also required repose in consequence of his wound; and left Trimbuc Row, usually called Trimbuc Mama*, with the whole army to prosecute the war. His first enterprise was the attack of Goorumconda, commanded by Seyed Saheb, † the nephew of

* Mama, in the Mahratta language maternal uncle, such was his relation to Madoo Row, and so he always called him; and hence it became a sort of nickname uncle Trimbuc. These adjuncts are customary among the Mahrattas, and are not associated with any ideas of levity.

† His name was Meer Moyeen u Deen Khán. I use the abbreviated appellation for the convenience of the English reader. He was called Seyed Saheb to distinguish him from his uncle Meer Saheb, whose name was Meer Aly Beza Khan—Seyed and Meer being prefixes equally appropriated to mark the descendants of the prophet.
Meer Saheb, which sustained a siege of two months, and then capitulated, through the intervention and guarantee of Morari Row, (whose recent reconciliation with Hyder, had been followed by an immediate junction with his enemy Mâdoo Row) for the personal safety of the commandant; Seyed Saheb in consequence of this guarantee retired for the present to accept the hospitalities of Basâlut Jung at Adwâni; and did not return to Seringapatam, till the conclusion of the war. From hence Trimbuc Row returned to the west, and was occupied for several months, in possessing himself of Toomcoor, Devaraïdroog, and the posts and territories, to the northward of those which had been occupied in the first instance by Mâdoo Row. Exclusively of the main army at Seringapatam, Hyder had a considerable force at Bangaloor; and detachments were made from each of these places, as opportunity occurred, to beat up the Mahratta quarters, or attempt the recovery of some of the neighbouring places. In the end of January 1771, a strong detachment had been sent by night from Bangaloor, in the expectation of being able to carry great Balipoor (twenty-four miles distant) by surprise: the enterprize, however, not only failed in its object; but the detachment exhausted with fatigue, suffered itself to be surprised in its return, and was entirely cut to pieces by Trimbuc Row, who from thence moved to the plain immediately N.W. of Ootradroog.

Hyder, whether feeling himself relieved from the superior genius of Mâdoo Row, or more confident in his strength from having completed the equipments of his army, resolved to make
trial of his good fortune and military skill against Trimbuc Mama, with a force of 12,000 good horse, 15,000 regular infantry, 10,000 peons, or irregular infantry, armed with match-locks or pikes, and 40 field guns. Of the precise strength of Trimbuc Row's army I possess no information, which I can offer to the reader as authentic; and therefore deem it more safe to rely on the general impression of both armies, that his disposable force was nearly double that of Hyder.

In conformity to the plan which he had formed, Hyder moved in the direct line by Cenapatam, and the strong country between it and Savendy Droog, to assume a position to the north-westward of that impregnable rock, for the purpose of securing his retreat to its protection, in the event of disaster; and in this situation offered battle to the Mahratta army. Trimbuc Row perceived at the first glance, that no impression could be made on the enemy, while he occupied his present ground; and resolved to draw him from it, by moving across his front, and appearing to disperse his army, for forage and subsistence, over the whole face of the country to the north-west, which was visible from the top of the rock. Hyder was not deceived by this demonstration, but deeming the reputation of being able to keep the field to be essential to the success of the negotiations in which he was engaged; he determined to move from one strong position to another, in the hope of at length provoking the Mahrattas to attack him at a disadvantage. The moment that intelligence was conveyed to Trimbuc Mama of Hyder's being in motion to the westward, across the plain country towards Milgota, he collected all his detachments; but was too late for any operation,
excepting an unimportant attack on the rear guard, as it was entering the winding eastern pass of Milgota.

The hills which take their name from this celebrated Hindoo temple, run in a direction nearly N.W. and S.E. extending four or five miles in each direction, from the pass by which Hyder ascended: another pass at right angles with this, west of the principal ridge, and parallel to its general direction, leads to Seringapatam: a rugged table land, overgrown with jungle, extends for about two miles from the summit of these passes, to the westward, overlooking the low country, and descending with an easier slope to the plain. The whole of this elevated position may be considered as nearly inaccessible from the east, and south, excepting through the two narrow and difficult passes which we have noticed; and the approach from the west, although far from being easy, is the most practicable to an enemy. Hyder’s disposition of his force formed nearly a crescent, facing the west, his flanks resting on the portion of the hill which was most inaccessible, and the two passes being in the rear of his left and centre; a strong but most hazardous position, which in the event of discomfiture, left scarcely the possibility of secure retreat; inasmuch as one only of the passes could be safely used for this purpose: for if both should be employed, the respective columns would be entirely separated, by an impenetrable range of hills, with the risk of being cut off, before they could re-unite.

A detached hill, which formed the winding of the eastern pass, where the rear-guard had been attacked, overlooked a part of the basin inclosed by Hyder’s position; and this hill, rugged
on its western face, had a more practicable slope to the eastern plain. Instead of making their attack from the west, according to Hyder’s expectation, the enemy attempted to dislodge him from this position by a teasing daily cannonade from the hill which has been described, conducted in the usual Mahratta style, of withdrawing the guns to camp every evening, and bringing them forward again every morning, about eight o’clock; but during the intermediate time, rocket men, penetrating in various directions through the woods, near to the skirts of the position, continued, throughout the whole night, to keep the camp in perpetual agitation. The whole number of guns employed was but ten, of large calibre, which necessarily firing at a considerable elevation, plunged shot into all parts of the camp, from a distance which Hyder’s light artillery could not reach. The annoyance was without an interval, and however slovenly, was extremely harassing, and not ill adapted to the single object of driving him from the position, without risking an action, or exposing a point to attack. For eight days Hyder permitted himself to be thus incessantly insulted, without an effort of any kind to retaliate on the enemy, or to relieve his own troops from their discouragement, which the pressure of want began considerably to augment. He at length determined to retreat to Seringapatam, distant about twenty-two miles, by the southern pass, and the route of the hills of Chercoolee *, on the 5th of March 1771. The troops, with the exception of the outposts and rear guard, moved silently off, about 9 o’clock at night, with Hyder himself at

* These hills are to the south of the lake of Tonoor.
their head. Tippoo was charged with the care of getting the baggage in motion, and the rear-guard was directed to follow at midnight, after beating the *noubut* at that accustomed hour, as an indication to the enemy, that the head quarters were still there. If no untoward circumstances had occurred, it is probable that Hyder's plan would have been realized, of finishing the greater part of the march before day-light; but when the head of the column of infantry had marched about four miles, had cleared the narrow part of the pass, and was entering on the plain, Narrain Row, the officer commanding the whole regular infantry, fancying that he saw or heard the enemy in his front, most inexcusably, and not without the just suspicion of treachery, opened a gun, the report of which communicated to the whole Mahratta army, intelligence of the march, and to that of Hyder, already discouraged by a movement which indicated the fears of its leader, the certainty of being overtaken in its retreat. The infantry cleared the pass, and reached the open country, about six miles from the ground of encampment; but the baggage, embarrassed by the woods, and wandering in the dark, made no progress. Hyder had drank † in the even-

* A stunning discord of enormous kettle drums, and harsh wind instruments, constituting the *band* of state, and the privilege of high rank, which performs throughout the night at the periods of relief.

† Hyder was addicted to drinking, but these excesses were so prudently managed, as to be known to few; the time was soon before his usual hour of retiring to rest, and he slept off the effects. Whether the use of strong liquors at the time of retiring to rest, was intended exclusively as a sensual indulgence, or partly as a soporific, is a question on which his old associates are not agreed. Abbas Ali relates, (on the authority of Gholam Ali, one of the most familiar of his companions), that he was frequently in Hyder's tent, when after fatigue he would lie down in the day and take a short repose; on one occasion he observed him to start, and be much
ing to an imprudent excess; and not having relieved the
effects by his usual period of sleep, was in a state of stupid
inebriety. Repeated messages had been sent, to order Tippoo
to the front, but in the confusion of the night, he was not
to be found, and none had reached him till the dawn of day;
when on his approach, Hyder not only accosted him in a strain
of the lowest scurrility, but in a paroxysm of brutal drunken
rage, seized a large cane from the hand of one of his attendants,
and gave the heir apparent, a most unroyal and literally most
unmerciful beating.* Tippoo, as soon as he durst, withdrew
from his father’s rage, and at the head of his division, dashing
on the ground his turban † and his sword, “my father,” said he,
“may fight his own battle, for I swear by Alla and his prophet,
that I draw no sword to-day:” he kept his oath, and the divi-
sion was commanded by Yáseen Khan.

The whole infantry in four divisions, had already formed with
sufficient laxity, the sides of an enormous square, into which
not only the baggage, but the cavalry of the army was re-
ceived; a mis-application of a good principle of formation,
which rendered it the very worst that could well have been

* I have conversed with persons who saw his back in a shocking state upwards
of a week afterwards.
† Our fair country-women, who adopt the turban, are not, perhaps, aware that
it is exclusively a masculine habiliment. Mahommedan ladies only wear the—
pantaloons.
and Hyder, instead of assuming the post where his presence was most necessary, went off to the front, giving no other direction than chellaou, chellaou, get on—get on—the very watchword of panic, when retreating in the presence of an enemy. This enormous and unwieldy mass continued, however, to move on. The Mahratta cavalry, covered the face of the country in every direction: they had captured, and dragged on one of Hyder's guns, which had been abandoned near the pass, which, together with four or five of their own, opened at a great distance, and plunged shot into the interior of the square; their rocket men had also arrived, and contributed by flights of these missiles, to the general embarrassment. During all this time, no sort of effort was made; no orders were given; and the commandant of every corps was left to his own measures, to keep at a distance the heavy bodies of horse, which hung upon every portion of the square, ready to charge, whenever a favourable opportunity should occur.

The front at length arrived near the hills of Chercoolee, about eleven miles from Seringapatam: the direction of these hills was oblique to the route of retreat, the high road doubling round the western end of the range, and leaving it on the left: the left face of the square, which ought to have formed a considerable angle with that range, had become nearly parallel to it; and Hyder for some unexplained reason, was now with this division: it is obvious, that the square was now in a position to secure by the most simple change of disposition, the free movement of the baggage round the point of the hill of Chercoolee; but now as in the former part of the march, the army was without any orders. In this situation, a shot struck a
tumbril within the square, which exploded, and communicating with some camel-loads of rockets, increased the general confusion. The followers, and those nearest to the left, perceiving themselves to be close to a hill, which here, as in most parts of India, is skirted by a mass of loose angular stones, or rocks inaccessible to cavalry, pressed through the troops of the left face; who suffered themselves, "nothing loth," to be carried away with the crowd, and to ascend the hill: the flight of the left division being seen by the rest of the army, completed the general panic. Under its unreflecting impulse, every one, as if by common consent, began to press through the crowd to gain the hill: orders were no longer heard: the confusion was irretrievable; and the Mahratta horse charged in on the three remaining faces of the square. The rest was a scene of unresisted slaughter; and, happily for Hyder, of promiscuous plunder; with which every one was too much occupied to think of straggling fugitives. Personally he ascended the hill on foot, and by the greatest good fortune, found at the opposite side one of his own led horses, which a faithful and intelligent groom, escaping in the confusion round the point of the hill, had brought thither, foreseeing the point at which his master would attempt his escape. He mounted alone, and set off at full speed for Seringapatam, which he reached without interruption, being joined in his route by a few well-mounted fugitives.

When Tippoo, in the early part of the day, threw down his turban and sword, he also disrobed himself of his outer garments of cloth of gold, tied round his head a colored handkerchief, and, as is customary in the ostentation of disgrace, assumed the guise of one who had renounced the world: he was
therefore prepared for the character, which at this critical moment he was advised to assume, of a travelling mendicant, the son of a holy fakeer, attended by his faithful friend, Seyed Mahommed*; who, after slaughter had ceased, and plunder began, begged his way, as the servant of the young mendicant, through the mass of the spoilers and the spoiled, and conveyed him in safety to Seringapatam on the same night. Hyder, having in the mean while given him up as lost, long continued passionately to exclaim, in terms which indicated more resignation than his manner evinced, “God gave him, and God hath taken him away,” himself remaining at a small mosque to the north of the river, and refusing to enter his capital.†

I have gone over the ground which was the scene of all these operations, accompanied by men of observation and intelligence, who witnessed them, in situations of high rank in Hyder’s army, in order that I might obtain some distinct notion of a battle, on which the Mahrattas ground so much of their military fame, and which is the subject of general conversation among Indians of every sect. If the impressions which I have received be correct, and if I have been able to render them intelligible to the reader; he will be prepared to concur in the

* Afterwards kelledar of Seringapatam, from whom I take this part of the relation. Many narratives state, that he, and some that Hyder, fell for a moment into the hands of Morâri Row, who released his prisoner, on the promise of two lacs of pagados. This tale is pretty generally believed among the Mahrattas, but respecting Tippoo, it is certainly unfounded; and on a comparison of living authorities, I entirely disbelieve it with regard to Hyder also.

† Some curious facts, highly illustrative of the characters, both of Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultaun at this period, which could not with propriety be interwoven with the historical narrative, are thrown into an appendix at the end of the volume.
conclusion which I have formed, that this was no battle*; and that although the day was lost by Hyder, it was not won by the Mahrattas.

In resisting the ultimate charge of the Mahrattas, there were of course some examples of individual merit, forming honorable exceptions to the general panic. We have incidentally noticed the loss of an eye sustained by Yâseen† Khân, in the command of Tippoo's division. Lalla Meân, whose daughter Tippoo afterwards married, made a most gallant defence, at the head of his corps of infantry, and refused to receive quarter; he was at length taken, after being desperately wounded. In this state, a low Mahratta horseman ridiculed his situation, taunting the prisoner with the particular wounds which he himself had inflicted; and the indignant soldier accelerated his own death by the fury with which he rushed to seize the ruffian. An English gentleman‡ commanded one of the corps, and was most severely wounded, after a desperate resistance: others in the same unhappy situation, met with friends, or persons of the same sect, to procure for them the rude aid offered by Indian surgery; the Englishman was destitute of this poor advantage; his wounds were washed with simple warm water, by an attendant boy, three or four times a day; and under this novel system of surgery, they recovered with a rapidity not exceeded under the

* Both Hyder and Mâdoo Row describe it in their official letters to the Government of Madras, and of course in very different colours; Hyder as a trifling affair, in which, although he lost some guns, the advantage was on the whole in his favour; and Mâdoo Row as a sanguinary action, in which his own army lost 2000 horses killed, and many officers killed and wounded; among the latter Trimbuc Row.
† Vol. i. p. 422.
‡ Afterwards known by the appellation of walking Stuart.
best hospital treatment. * The only person, however, who is known to have conducted himself with successful judgment and entire self-possession, was Fuzzul Oolla Khân, who (as we shall presently have occasion to explain) was in disgrace, and followed the army by order, without exercising any military command.

He was within the square, and near to the western point of the hill, at the period of the general confusion, and being attended by a few friends, whom degradation had not separated from his fortunes, and surrounded by a considerable number of unattached † horsemen, who foresaw defeat, and looked to him as the leader who was to extricate them from disaster; he formed these adherents into a compact body, and cutting through the enemy, retired, in perfect order, by the ford of the river Caveri at Caniambady, only four miles distant, where he crossed, and continued his retreat, without further molestation, along the right bank, to Seringapatam; the Mahrattas being intent on more valuable game, than the pursuit of men who had no plunder but their swords.

After the affair of Chercoolee, in which Trimbuc Row received a slight wound, the Mahrattas, more intent on plunder than improving the successes of the day, suffered the unarmed fugitives to reach Seringapatam on the same night, and gave to Hyder the long interval of ten days (in which they were absorbed in the division and disposal of spoil) to collect, arm, and reform a

* Related to me by the late Sir Barry Close.
† There are many such in all Indian armies, under the designation of Metteferika; soldiers of family or reputation, serving on superior pay to that of ordinary horsemen, and expectants of command.
sufficient number of men for the defence of the place, which had been left absolutely without the means of resistance, if the panic of Chercoolee had been followed up by a great and vigorous effort on the capital. At the expiration of that period, Trimbuc Row appeared before the place, and continued, according to his fashion of warfare, to cannonade the fort every day, from the nearest heights, and to withdraw his heavy guns at night. This miserable and ridiculous semblance of what he called a siege, was of service to Hyder alone, by affording to his troops the opportunity of partial encounters with the enemy, and of recovering in some degree from the panic of the late disaster. At the expiration of a month, however, the Mahratta discovered that this notable operation was only restoring the spirits of the enemy; and he divided his army, for the purpose of attacking such forts as were necessary to his purpose, and ravaging the open country, both above and below the mountains. Although the views of Madoo Row extended to the fixed conquest of Mysoor, the semblance of permanent occupation had not restored the ordinary progress of agriculture, nor prevented the necessity of large and incessant convoys from the north; which, after Tippoo had been withdrawn from Bednore, continued to proceed without an escort to the Mahratta camp. Hyder was desirous of again disturbing these communications, but Trimbuc Row continued himself to watch the capital, with a corps of observation, which rendered small detachments hazardous. Hyder, however, risked two corps; one under the orders of Mahommed Ali, an experienced officer of infantry, who was directed to attempt the recovery, by surprise, of Periapatam, thirty miles to the west, or if he could not effect this object unobserved, the movement
CHAP. XVIII.  1771.

would serve as a feint to draw off Trimbuc Row, and enable the other detachment, under Tippoo*, with 3000 irregular horse, and five battalions of infantry, to get clear off to the woods of Bednore, to act on the line of the enemy's supplies. The latter branch of the plan was successful, and the detachment, among other services, captured a convoy of one hundred thousand oxen, laden with grain, which they conveyed in safety to Bednore. The detachment of Mahommed Ali, consisting of only four battalions, was overtaken, on the morning after its march, at about twenty miles distance from Seringapatam, and attacked with great energy by Trimbuc Row, with the whole force which he had been able to bring up: Mahommed Ali took post in a ruined village, and made a gallant resistance throughout the day; at night his preparations seemed to announce the intention of attempting a retreat; and his numerous wounded, on receiving this intelligence, began to utter the most dreadful lamentations at the fate to which they were destined. In order that the alarm might not by these means be communicated to the enemy, he went round to assure them, that they should not be abandoned to perish by famine. The fearful mental reservation of this assurance referred to a plan of novel barbarity, exceeded only in later times, by an atrocity which has been ascribed to a people calling themselves more civilized. When every thing was ready, he sent round a certain number of persons properly instructed, who at a concerted signal murdered all the wounded. In the horrible silence which ensued, he commenced his retreat by an unsuspected path, and

* He was on this occasion put under the tuition of Sree Nawas Row Berkee, a noted partizan, who, as well as his troops, were better qualified for this description of service than Meer Saheb.
taking a circuitous route, reached Mysoor by day-light; a respectable garrison having always been kept at that place, which was too near* Seringapatam, to be well suited for the operations of a Mahratta siege.

It is not intended to fatigue the reader's attention, by a detail of the minor operations of this desolating war, which offer no illustrations of character: fifteen months had elapsed after the defeat of Chercolee, before Hyder, wearied with a hopeless warfare, and mourning over the destruction of his resources, saw any reasonable prospect of being able to effect a peace. Apajee Ram was again his confidential envoy: Morâri Row had engaged to employ his good offices; and Trimbuc Row had also a secret reason (the dangerous illness of Mâdoo Row) for listening to these advances: a treaty was accordingly concluded, in the month of June, which stipulated the payment of thirty lacs of rupees; one half in hand, and the remainder hereafter; a species of Grecian calends which Hyder well understood: there was however another head of charge, the prompt payment of which could not be evaded: namely, five lacs for bribes, chiefly to the civil officers of the Mahratta camp, a demand which custom had so familiarized, that it became a shameless object of open negotiation, under the courtly designation of "durbar expences;" an example, which, although more cautiously guarded, had not then been totally excluded from English negotiations in India. Of the territory, Hyder was reduced to the necessity of leaving in the possession of the Mahrattas, Goorumconda, Chenroy-droog,

* Nine miles.
Mudgerry, Sera, and even Ooscota, and Great Balipoor, and Colar, with their dependencies, reducing his northern * frontier within narrower limits than those which had been possessed by the Hindoo house of Mysoor at the commencement of the century. And the English had thus acquired by their infraction of the treaty of 1769, in refusing the stipulated succour, the portentous contact of the Mahratta frontier to the province of Arcot, along the whole extent of the ghauts, from the great pass of Damalcherry, to that of Peddanaick-doorgum.

We have seen that in 1766, while Hyder was engaged in the war of Malabar, he treated as an affair of ordinary routine the death of the pageant Raja, and the mock elevation of a successor (Nunjeraj Wadeyar) who had been farther restricted in his confinement, in consequence of having testified some impatience. During the low state of Hyder's fortunes in the preceding year, this youth, then 23 years of age, had made the vain attempt of opening a communication with Trimbuc Row; and Hyder, deeming him to be no longer a safe pageant, ordered him without hesitation to be strangled in the bath; and his brother Cham Raj to be registered as the successor to this perilous distinction.

After the peace with the Mahrattas, Hyder resided for some time at Seringapatam. His finances had suffered severely; but he seldom failed in devising extraordinary means to meet extraordinary occasions: many still remained of those who had held offices of trust under the antient Rajas; and had amassed considerable wealth; the exterior appearance of disregard du-

* See the smaller map in vol. i. illustrative of the limits of Mysoor in 1704.
ring a period of twelve years, had rendered them incautious; and Hyder had taken secret means, to ascertain with precision their actual funds, as a resource in the day of exigency. The torture was applied in cases of doubt, and a large sum was realized by these means. His old benefactor Nunjeraj was privately compelled to contribute his full proportion; and the death of that person in the succeeding year, relieved him from the last of his antient rivals. Among the cases which contributed to replenish his coffers on this occasion, one exhibits too striking a picture of the general character of Asiatic courts to be blended with the general mass.

Fuzzul Oolla Khân (Hybut Jung) entered as we have seen into Hyder's service, or rather became his associate*, at the low-
est ebb of his fortune, when he had fled from Seringapatam to Bangalore: this officer had stipulated for the singular distinction of sitting on the same musnud, and having two honorary attendants standing behind him, with fans composed of the downy feathers of the humma. No individual contributed so largely as Fuzzul Oolla to the subsequent aggrandisement of Hyder, by his military talents, and by a genuine zeal for the cause in which he was engaged. By the friends, and what was a higher testimony, by the enemies of Hyder, Fuzzul Oolla was esteemed the first officer in his service; and continued to be treated with the accustomed honours, until the arrival of the Nevayets from Drauveda. These persons, envious of the state which he assumed, compared his ancestry with their own; represented

* See vol. i. p. 422-3, for the terms; and for the ludicrous circumstances which led to his title of Hybut Jung, p. 439.

VOL. II.
the indecorum of treating the son of Chunda Saheb with inferior distinction; hinted at the new arrangements of etiquette and consequent new relations, which ought to result from Hyder's rank and title of nabob; and at length prevailed on him to send a message to Fuzzul Oolla, intimating that he must discontinue these privileges. The following reply has been repeated to me by many concurring authorities. "The morechal," (fan) said Fuzzul Oolla "is no more than a handful of useless feathers, but it has been the constant associate of my head, and they shall not be separated: he who takes one shall have both; in the pride of my youth I stipulated for one of the side pillows of the musnud; and I have not disgraced the distinction. Instead of depriving me of that one, it would have been more gracious, as well as more necessary, to prop up my age and infirmities by a second. There is a simple mode of obeying the mandate—I will never again enter a court where ancient benefits are forgotten." Fuzzul Oolla had his house in the fort, in which his family always dwelt; but his tents, when at Seringapatam, were at all times pitched on the esplanade, and there he himself usually preferred to reside; there he received the order; and although he lived four or five years afterwards, he never after that period entered a house. On the present occasion, Hyder sent to demand from him eight lacs of pagodas. The requisition was not unexpected; and Fuzzul Oolla gave the messenger an order to his sister, who presided over his family in the fort, to give up, without reservation, every rupee he possessed. How much was realized, I have not been able to ascertain; but even the Nevayets were satisfied that he retained nothing. During the remainder of his miserable life, he subsisted by selling the few articles of camp
equipage, horses and household furniture, which were not swept off in the general plunder. He died in a wretched pal, or private tent, a patched remnant of his former splendour! An humble tomb, erected by the pious care of his family, marks the precise spot on which he received the order of degradation; and where, according to his solemn injunctions, they received his last breath, and deposited his earthly remains.

These hideous examples of ingratitude and oppression, are abundantly efficient to the extinction of probity, but not of avarice. The object of human pursuit is always a supposed good; and where probity fails to command distinction and reward, the reputation of that virtue will rarely be classed among the objects of attainment: wealth abstractedly considered, would seem to be no longer valuable than while it may be freely enjoyed; where courtiers therefore are sure to be plundered, as soon as they are sufficiently rich, wealth would at first view appear to be no longer of rational estimation: but on a closer scrutiny, the sole chance of saving a little is to bribe with much; wealth therefore becomes necessary, in proportion to the vices of the government, and men become rapacious in the exact measure of the insecurity of their possessions. The general notoriety of the flagitious occurrence which has been stated, did not prevent Hyder from exciting fresh hope in the rising generation, or from ostentatiously rewarding such of his military officers as had distinguished themselves in the late harrassing service; and he sent emissaries into Decan, to make fresh levies of the better classes of horsemen, whether Mussulman — Rajpoot — or Mah-rratta.
CHAPTER XIX.

Death of Madoor Row — Conjuncture favourable to Hyder — Invasion of Coorg — Decapitation — Conquest — Detachment descends to Calicut — Rapid restoration of authority in Malabar — Tippoo’s operations to the north — entirely successful — recovers all he had lost by the Mahratta treaty — Ragoba moves against him — met by a negotiator, who succeeds in consequence of unexpected events at Poona — Treaty with Ragoba — Insurrection in Coorg — quelled by a movement of his whole army — Death of the pageant Cham Raj — Ridiculous ceremony of choosing a successor — Embassy to Kurreem Khan — Obtains a corps of Persians — His opinion of the specimen — Their extinction — Rapid march to Bellari — Its causes and result — Defeats Nizam Ali’s besieging army — and takes the place for himself — Goes against Gooty — Siege — Obstinate defence of Morari Row — Treaty — broken off by the imprudent disclosures of the negotiator — Unconditional surrender — plunder — Fate of Morari Row — Ragoba, a fugitive from the Mahratta territory, concludes a treaty with Bombay, 1775 — annulled by the Government of Bengal — who conclude a new Treaty through Colonel Upton, 1776. — Remarks — Renewed treaty with Ragoba, in 1778. — In consequence of the first, Ragoba invites Hyder to advance, and in 1776, he invades Saxanoor — occupies one half — interrupted by the monsoon — returns to Seringapatam — Fiscal measures.

Madoor Row died on the 18th of November, 1772, his brother and successor, Narain Row, was killed on the 30th of August, 1773, and succeeded by his uncle Ragonaut Row, or Ragoba, who afterwards made so distinguished a figure in the English transactions at Bombay.

There was more in this conjuncture than the mere invitation of fatalism to try a new scene. The keen perception of Hyder penetrated the sources of internal discord, which were generated
by this event; and the whole of his leisure, since the conclusion of the war, had been devoted to preparation for whatever event the page of fate * should unfold. The pretended arrangements for paying the balance due under the treaty, were no longer even ostensibly continued; and he put forth his whole force at once for the recovery of all the territory which he had lost, in consequence of the English and the Mahratta wars. Among his first arrangements was an embassy to Madras, which will be most conveniently discussed hereafter. Tippoo was detached in September to the northward, for the recovery of the places recently ceded to the Mahrattas; and Hyder assumed in person the direction of operations preparatory to the recovery of Malabar.

His former communications with that territory were by two long and circuitous routes, passing through his own dominions, in the lower countries, into the northern extremity from Canara, and near to the southern from Coimbetoor. The great road to Canara crosses the hills of Bullum, south of Bednore; and to the left of this route the separate principality of Coorg, and the province of Wynaad, form the continuation down to the borders of Coimbetoor, of a narrow stripe of woody mountainous country, of the same climate and character as Bednore, interposed between Mysoor and Malabar.

For the purpose of direct communication, and permanent conquest, it was necessary to possess this interjacent country;

* His own words, as stated to me by several of his associates: “We will open the book of fate, and see what is written there;” alluding to the practice of opening the Korân, or frequently the poems of Hâfiz for a fâl, or omen, in the manner of the sortes Virgiliansæ of the Romans.
and Hyder accordingly entered Coorg in November 1773. The invasion was entirely unexpected; and the chief body of the Coorgs, without any previous arrangement, assembled on a woody hill, which Hyder encompassed with his troops. In imitation of the northern hordes, whose manners the Mahommedans of India affect to imitate, he proclaimed a reward of five rupees for each head which should be brought before him, and sat down in state, to superintend the distribution of the reward. About seven hundred had been paid for, when a peon approached, and deposited two heads, both of them of the finest forms; Hyder, after scrutinizing the features, asked him, whether he felt no * compunction in cutting off such comely heads; and immediately ordered the decapitation to cease, and prisoners to be brought in. From whatever motive the order may have been derived, it is the only feature in his whole life that incurs the direct suspicion of pity.

The apparent conquest was of little difficulty; the Raja (Divaia) betook himself to flight; and Hyder, whose chief object was to tranquillize the country, erected the fort of Mercara in the most central situation; and, confirming the landholders in their possessions at a moderately increased revenue, returned to Seringapatam, whither the fugitive Raja was soon afterwards brought, having been discovered in his place of concealment in the territory of Mysoor.

A force was immediately afterwards detached under Seyed Sáheb, and Sreenowas Row Berkee, through Wynaad, by the pass of Tambercherry; which descended at once on Calicut. The place soon fell into their hands: the Nair chiefs, who,

* Literally, did not your heart burn within you?
during their short relief from foreign usurpation, had only increased their misery, by intestine broils, were in a fit state to be acted on, by the skilful application of political division; and in a short time, the greater part of them arranged the terms of their future dependency on Hyder. Sree Nowas Row was accordingly left as foujdar (military governor) of the province, and Seyed Sâheb returned with the cavalry and disposable troops to Seringapatam.

This important acquisition having been achieved with a success more rapid than even Hyder had anticipated, he moved with his whole force, to give efficiency to his son’s operations in the north: his approach had its due effect; and before his junction, Tippoo had reduced Sera, Mudgery, Chenroydroog, Goorumconda, and their dependencies, leaving nothing for Hyder in person to accomplish, but the easy service of reducing Ooscota, and Great Balipoor. Thus, in one short campaign, from September 1773 till February 1774, he not only completely reconquered every place that had been wrested from him by the Mahrattas, but recovered, with increased stability, the province of Malabar, which he had wisely abandoned, during the pressure of difficulties, in his former war with the English.

An intercourse of civility had long subsisted between Hyder and Ragoba; it was through his mediation that the* peace of Bednore had been effected in 1765; and since that period, Hyder’s envoys at Poona had been directed to conciliate his good offices in the customary Mahratta form. On succeeding

* Vide vol. i. p. 466.
CHAP. to power, he had been early in the field against Nizam Ali; and although unsuccessful in an action with that chief, he terminated a short campaign by an advantageous peace; and was drawn to the south by the hostilities of Hyder; who was far from expecting so prompt a visit; and prepared to break the fury of the storm, by an early negotiation. His mission, headed by Apajee Ram, met Ragoba in full march to the south, at Calliandroog, to the south-east of Raidroog, on the exact day, when by a singular coincidence, he received information of the confederacy at Poona, which had openly announced their determination to depose him. The conferences had not commenced, when considerable corps of the army had begun to withdraw under their respective chiefs, to join the opposite party. Apajee Ram was too acute a negotiator to overlook the opportunity which was thus presented, of improving the political relations of his master; he saw that the aid which Ragonant Row would require, and his master could confer, formed the most solid basis of conciliation; he fairly and openly explained the reciprocal interests, which would be promoted by their union, and a treaty was concluded, by which Hyder acknowledged Ragoba as the exclusive head of the Mahratta state, and agreed to pay him, and him only, the reduced tribute of six lacs of rupees; on the condition, that he should be ready when required, to act with his whole force in support of Ragoba's pretensions. That chief was under the necessity of moving with haste to the northward; and Bajee Row Burva, his relation, was sent in consequence to Seringapatam, to receive and remit the first six lacs. In the mean while, however, the affairs of Ragoba.
became so desperate, as to oblige him to fly to Malwa, and Bâjee Row Burva remained for several years, as his confidential agent, under the protection of Hyder.

An insurrection in Coorg of the most determined aspect suspended for a time the designs of Hyder in other directions. Compared with the revenue in his old territories, that which had been arranged for Coorg was extremely low; but their standard of comparison was not what had been exacted from others, but what themselves had formerly paid: the very highest rate of assessment in Coorg had been a tenth of the produce: in general it was much lower; and a considerable proportion of the landholders, exclusively of military service, paid an acknowledgement to the Raja, which was merely nominal. Hyder deemed his own moderation to be excessive, in requiring not much more than the old Hindoo assessment of one sixth. The impatience of the inhabitants, at a detested foreign yoke, inflamed their discontent; for although Hyder trusted no Mussulman in his department of revenue, the Bramins whom he employed were held in still greater abhorrence* and contempt by the natives of Coorg. They destroyed all the minor establishments, which had been spread over the country for the collection of revenue; and surrounded the new capital of Mercara, for the purpose of reducing it by famine: the insurrection in short was universal; and Hyder was never in the habit of employing palliatives. The great mass of the army was at the capital, distant only 30 miles from the frontier of Coorg; and he moved the whole infantry in several columns to penetrate at once into every portion of the

* For their religious tenets, viz. Jungum, see vol. i. p. 503.
CHAP. XIX.

1774.

territory, and suppress the rebellion at a single blow; the operation was successful, and as his intelligence was always excellent, he was enabled among his prisoners to distinguish the leaders; every man suspected as being above the class of an ordinary soldier was hanged; and for the purpose of overawing the natives, a series of block houses was erected, pervading every part of the country, and connected with each other, and with the nearest posts in Mysoor. These arrangements being completed, he returned to give his army a short repose at Seringapatam, about the beginning of the year 1775.

1775. About this period, the pageant Raja Cham Raj died; Hyder had hitherto professed to hold Mysoor in behalf of the Hindoo house; and amused his subjects on every annual feast of the Dessera, * by exhibiting the pageant, seated on his ivory throne, in the balcony of state; himself occupying the place of minister and commander in chief. This ceremonial, in most countries, would have excited feelings dangerous to the usurper; but the unhappy Hindoos saw their country every where sustaining the scourge of Mahommedan rule; the singular exception of the Mahratta state, a wide spreading example of still more ruthless oppression, restrained their natural preference for rulers of their own persuasion; and they were soothed with the occasional condescension, which treated them, and their institutions, with a semblance of respect. Hyder saw and indulged the working of these reflections, and determined to have another pageant. The lineal male succession was extinct, and he ordered all the children to be collected from the different branches † of the house,

* For an account of this festival, see vol. i. p. 52.
† See preface, p. xiv.
who, according to ancient precedent, were entitled to furnish a successor to the throne. The ceremonial observed on this occasion, however childish, was in perfect accordance with the feelings which he intended to delude, and sufficiently adapted to the superstition of the fatalist. The hall of audience was strewed round, with fruits, sweetmeats, and flowers, playthings of various descriptions, arms, books, male and female ornaments, bags of money, and every varied object of puerile or manly pursuit; the children were introduced together, and were all invited to help themselves to whatever they liked best; the greater number were quickly engaged in a scramble, for the fruits, sweetmeats, and toys; but one child was attracted by a brilliant little dagger, which he took up in his right hand, and soon afterwards a lime in his left. "That is the Raja" exclaimed Hyder, "his first care is military protection; his second to realize the produce of his dominions; bring him hither, and let me embrace him." the assembly was in an universal murmur of applause; and he ordered the child to be conducted to the Hindoo palace, and prepared for installation. * He was of the same

* There was then in existence, and is now living, a grandson of the Raja Chick Kishen Raj, (from whom Hyder had usurped the government,) by a daughter of his first wife, the daughter of Nunjeraj. The descendants of Nunjeraj assert the right of succession in favour of this descendant of a female branch, contrary to the rule of Hindoo succession. And many tales have been related regarding the surviving dowager, (vide vol. i. p. 378,) having interposed in favour of this succession. I have conversed with her on the subject, and she distinctly stated, that from the period of her husband’s death, she never had the opportunity or the privilege of remonstrating on that or any other subject, and never did attempt or wish to interfere, in favour of that rival branch, or any other; for she is also stated in these tales to have proposed a relation of her own.
name as his predecessor, viz. Cham Raj, and was the father of
the present Raja, who was placed by the English at the head of
the Hindoo house of Mysoor, on the subversion of the Mahom-
medan dynasty in 1799.

The Mahommedans of India, throughout every succession of
shade from fair to black, universally derive their descent from
the Arabian, the Persian, or the Mogul race*; and a claim of
superiority is asserted, and pretty generally allowed, in propor-
tion to their near approach to the parent stock; Hyder was
desirous of improving the composition of his army, by the
admixture and example of a body of Persian horse; and for this
purpose sent Shah Noor Oolla, the son of a native of Persia, on
an embassy to that country; he was received with distinction by
Kurreem Khan at Shiraz; and permitted to raise recruits for the
service of his master. One thousand men, accompanied him in
his return: horses, the property of the state, were assigned to
these cavaliers, and Hyder was so well pleased with their con-
duct in the first essay, that he sent a second embassy, with
considerable funds, to procure a farther levy: ship, ambassador,
and treasure, were however lost in the gulf of Kutch, and
Hyder did not renew the experiment. On farther acquaintance,
he stigmatized the bravery of the Persians, as a sort of courtly
virtue, possessing more of stage trick, and interested pretence,
than of genuine military daring; making a shew of gallantry, for
the direct purpose of demanding an increase of pay; vain-
glorious, discontented, and unmanageable. He was, however,

* The Afghan, or Patan, is not an exception; his origin is questionable; but as
a Mussulman, he ranks in estimation after them all, being considered a borderer,
or half Hindoo.
gradually relieved from their importunities; for though he would not permit their return, the climate successively thinned their ranks; and I have not been able to trace one survivor of this thousand men.

While preparing for a campaign of some importance, Hyder, in November, received an express from the Hindoo chief of Bellári, the equivocal dependant of Basálut Jung, who, as we have seen, after repelling Hyder in 1769, pledged the transfer of his allegiance to him, and made that transaction the excuse for refusing tribute to his former lord. The express informed him that Bojeraí, the minister of Basálut Jung, accompanied by the French corps of Monsieur Lally, in the service of that chief, had actually besieged the place; and as the event was unexpected, nothing but the speedy aid of Hyder could prevent the place from falling into their hands. Hyder retained in his service a large corps of Bramin mutteseddies, accountants of revenue, as the name implies, but destined, under his direction, to perform the most profligate offices of the most crooked diplomacy. Whenever an adjacent country was to be conquered, a detachment from this corps insinuated themselves into the confidence of one of the two parties, into which every country, free, or despotic, is found to be divided; and by false representations, fomented intestine division, which usually terminated in an application to Hyder to support the declining party, against some domestic danger, or foreign oppression. The infamy of this body of men has become proverbial in the south of India, and has not been much exceeded in the revolutionary history of modern Europe. Subsequently to Hyder's former repulse from Bellári, these emissaries had succeeded in
CHAP. XIX. 1775.

deluding the poligar into the hope of rendering himself independent of Basalut Jung, and in the moment of peril, into the fatal error of applying to Hyder for relief. On the instant of receiving the express which we have noticed, he issued the order of march; the distance on the map is nearly three degrees of latitude, which was performed in five days: a considerable number of his men died of fatigue; and of those who marched from Seringapatam, not one half were up to share in the first attack; such, if I have been correctly informed, was the nature of the forced marches, by which the modern French have so often anticipated their enemies. To attack any troops on such a march, is to destroy them; but while Hyder was still supposed to be at his capital, he fell by surprise on the rear of the besieging army. It was a complete rout, in which Bojera was killed, and Monsieur Lally escaped with difficulty. The guns were left in the batteries; the approaches and parallels were complete; and Hyder, without giving time for the entrance of supply, announced the object of this timely succour, by instantly manning the batteries, assuming the place of the late besiegers, and insisting on unconditional surrender. The unfortunate chief had already revealed the state of his resources for a siege: farther resistance was unavailing; and Hyder's garrison was introduced into the place on the 8th day after his march from Seringapatam. In the mean while, he had not neglected to avail himself of the panic, by sending a light corps in pursuit of the fugitives; and Basalut Jung had reason to acknowledge his moderation, in accepting a lac of pagodas, as the condition of abstaining from the plunder or attack of the remainder of his jagheer.

Hyder affected a disposition to compromise in the same
manner with Morari Row, by sending to demand a similar contribution from him, which he probably foresaw would be refused. The intercourse was in imitation of the Mahratta style; and it may furnish amusement to some of my readers, to observe how the ceremonial of plunder is clothed in the garb of hospitality. On entering the territory of Gooty, Hyder sent a complimentary message to Morari Row, to announce that he was arrived at his house, (country) that they were ancient friends, and that he would be troublesome to him for grain and forage for his horses; the value of which he estimated at a lac of rupees. Morari Row understood the Mahratta jargon, and replied in plain terms that he also was a *Cena putii* (General), and was in the habit of levying, not paying contributions. On Hyder's nearer approach to Gooty, he repeated a message of similar import, with the same result. He therefore sat down regularly before the place; the guns which Monsieur Lally had employed against Bellari, were a convenient resource; and a battering train for this very purpose had also been ordered from Seringapatam. The fort of Gooty is composed of a number of strong works, occupying the summits of a circular cluster of rocky hills connected with each other, and enclosing a space of level ground forming the site of the town; which is approached from the plain, by two breaks or openings, forming fortified gateways to the south-west and north-west, and by two foot-paths across the lower hills communicating through small sally-ports. An immense smooth rock rising from the northern limit of the circle, and fortified by gradations, surmounted through fourteen

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* Lord, or husband of an army.
gateways, overlooks, and commands the whole of the other works, and forms a citadel which famine or treachery can alone reduce. After a siege of about five weeks, the town and lower forts were carried by assault; and a large booty was found, consisting of two thousand horses, a considerable number of the elephants of state, a vast amount of private property, and a very respectable equipment of garrison and field guns, and military stores.

Hyder continued for two months longer the siege of the upper fort; and was repulsed in numerous attempts to establish himself in the lowest division of these works; but the improvident measure had been adopted of admitting within the walls of the citadel, an immense number of followers, of horses, camels, and even horned cattle: and although, with ordinary precautions, the reservoirs of water were numerous and ample the strange absurdity of the measure which we have noticed, had reduced the besieged to the utmost distress, and Morari Row found himself under the necessity of sending an envoy to Hyder to treat for peace. The conditions were settled after much discussion; namely, the payment of twelve lacs of rupees; eight in cash or valuables, and a hostage for the payment of the remainder. The cash amounted to only one lac, and plate and jewels to the estimated value of the remaining seven were sent by the hands of the hostage, the son of Yoonas Khan, the former commander-in-chief, who had been mortally wounded in the affair near Ooscota, in 1768.

Hyder received his hostage with great courtesy, and invited him to dinner; the young man, considering hostilities to be at an end, was induced by the gracious manners of Hyder
to be unreserved in his communications; the conversation was purposely turned to the events of the siege, and Hyder took the opportunity of paying some appropriate compliments to the experience of Morari Row, and the conduct of his troops; not omitting to observe, that he frequently noticed the exemplary gallantry of the young man himself. This of course induced some corresponding civilities; and in the warmth of discussing the past, he was so imprudent as to observe, that there was no want of troops or provisions, and nothing short of being reduced to three days water could have induced Morari Row to agree to such hard conditions. Hyder heard all this with his accustomed command of countenance; and after dinner referred the young man to the proper department, for the delivery of his charge. The description of the valuables had been generally stated in the negotiation, and it was understood, that if on a fair valuation the amount should fall short of the seven lacs, Hyder would still receive it, and accept the hostage for the remainder. The period of inspection was designedly prolonged; the appraisers on Hyder’s part were duly instructed, he himself testified great impatience for the adjustment, and when the appraisers accompanying the hostage, returned to report the total amount, including cash, to be only five lacs, Hyder affected the greatest disappointment and anger, said that Morari Row was trifling and deceiving him; and ordered the hostage immediately to return with his paltry five lacs, and announce the negotiation to be at an end.

He now fitted his operations to the circumstances of the siege, taking more care to prevent a single person from descending to hollows in the rock, which they had been accustomed to
risk, for a scanty supply of water, than to serve his batteries, or expedite his approaches; and the besieged could not even execute the alternative which he had proposed, of prolonging his defence, by secretly dismissing the greater part of his garrison.

On the third day after this mode of warfare had been adopted, Morari Row could no longer restrain his men from exclaiming, even from the parapets, to the besiegers, that they were dying of thirst, and begged to capitulate. Hyder coolly directed them to be informed, that there was abundance of water below; and if they desired to quench their thirst, they must all descend unarmed, with Morari Row at their head: that he would fire at any flag of truce, and reject all advances, except in the form which he had prescribed. In the course of the day, Morari Row accompanied by his son, and followed by his unarmed garrison, descended and threw himself on Hyder’s clemency. Every individual, before being passed, was separately searched, and plundered for Hyder’s sole benefit, of the trifling sum they possessed. His garrison then ascended the rock, accompanied by a deputation to take an account of all property public and private, and even the apartments, and persons, of the women were plundered of their remaining jewels and ornaments, to the amount of 5000 rupees only. The official servants of revenue were placed in separate custody; and Hyder, whose own experience enabled him to calculate the amount of embezzlement, which each could conveniently spare, satisfied himself for the present with levying on them ten lacs of rupees. These operations being completed early in the month of April, he received the whole of the prisoners, civil, and military, (their chief alone excepted,) into his gracious favour and service. The depart-
ments of the late government were put into immediate activity, as a branch of the general administration; orders were issued for the future regulation of the revenues, and the command of the subordinate garrisons; not a man attempted to disobey them and all the possessions of the house of Gorepora, were transferred with no other ceremony than the substitution of the seal of Hyder. For the present, the family was sent to Seringapatam; but after Hyder's return to that place, they were dispatched to Cabal Droog; where Morari Row soon afterwards died. Without the aids to which we have formerly* adverted, it is certain that a confinement on this rock is not necessarily a sentence of death; many of the family survived for fifteen years, and were destroyed in the general massacre of prisoners which was perpetrated by Tippoo's orders in 1791.

In the mean while the treachery of the Arab troops of Ragoob had precipitated the ruin of all his prospects, by the sudden alarm which caused him to fly, apparently without sufficient cause, from a field of battle to Cambay, and thence to Surat, where, on the 6th March 1775, he had concluded a treaty with the English Government of Bombay, for providing him with aid to recover his authority on terms of reciprocal advantage. An act of parliament had, in the year 1773, wisely conferred on the English Government of Bengal, now rendered the Government General, a controlling power over the other presidencies, and it was the first exercise of this authority, openly to disapprove and annul a treaty, concluded without their sanction. Colonel Upton was sent, in consequence, as the

* Vol. i. p. 233.
CHAP. envoy of the Government General, to treat with the actual Go-
XIX. vernment at Poona, (the ministers or ministerial party, as they
1776. are usually named in the records of these times;) but all that
could give force to a negotiation with such persons, had already
been conceded without negotiation. Already the Mahrattas had
nothing to fear, and the English reciprocally nothing to hope.
The secret history of these events, may be traced in the tortuous
policy adopted in England, of sending three councillors to Ben-
gal, ostensibly to aid, but (so far as intention can be inferred from
the result) practically to outvote the governor-general, Mr. Has-
tings, the most virtuous and most able servant of the state, in
the deliberations of the Government; in one and the same act,
conferring, and subverting authority; and seeking to establish
order through the medium of disunion. However pure the in-
tentions of these gentlemen may have been, and however faulty
the previous policy of Bombay, the sagacity was at least ques-
tionable, of thus gratuitously throwing themselves on the can-
dour of the most deceitful of the human race, and adopting a con-
duct, which such persons could scarcely fail to attribute exclusively
to fear. A treaty was concluded by Colonel Upton, on the first
of March, 1776, which the Government of Bombay characterize
as "highly injurious to the reputation, honour, and interests of
the nation, and the Company." An experience of the insolence
which such political courtesy inspired, failed to convince the
Government of Bengal, that they had begun at the wrong end;
and it was not until the Governor-general obtained a majority in
his own council, that the discussions terminated in the renewal
of a treaty with Ragoba, in November 1778. Shortly, however,
after the conclusion of the first treaty with Bombay, in 1775,
Ragoba addressed a letter to Hyder, through his agent Bajee Row Burwa, communicating the nature of this alliance, stating his confident expectation of recovering his rightful possession of the musnud of Poona, and proposing to Hyder an arrangement in perfect consonance with his wishes, namely, that he should take possession of the whole of the Malratta territory up to the right bank of the Kistna; and be ready from that advanced position to assist Ragoba in the execution of his designs, with military as well as pecuniary aid. Hyder certainly dispatched to Ragonaut Row, in pursuance of this arrangement, Soucars bills at different periods, to the amount of sixteen lacs of rupees. It was understood by him, that those countries should remain permanently annexed to the dominions of Mysoor, but, if Ragoba had succeeded in the re-establishment of his authority, it is probable that he would have given another interpretation to the equivocal terms of his letter.

It was in conformity to this arrangement that, immediately after the capture of Gooty, Hyder collected all his tributary chiefs on the northern border, with their respective quotas of troops, and the subjoined statement* of those which were actually assembled, will be the best evidence of his acknowledged depen-

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<tr>
<th>* The Poligar of Chitlementroog</th>
<th>Horse.</th>
<th>Peons.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Do. Harponelly</td>
<td>1,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dulwoy of Raidroog</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>3,000</td>
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<td>Do. Anagoondy</td>
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<td>Poligar of Kumnuckgeery</td>
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<td>Abd-ul-Hulleem Khan, Nabob of Kurpa</td>
<td>2,000</td>
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To these troops he paid at the rate of four Hyderi pagodas, or 16 rupees a month, for each mounted horseman; and one pagoda, or four rupees for each peon, while absent from their own territory.
dencies at this period. It had for some time been announced that the fall of Gooty would be the signal of march; and in a few days after that event, the whole was in motion for Savanoor. The Patān Nabob of that province had been deprived by the Mahrattas of one half of his former territory; and for sparing the remaining half, he offered a military contribution of three lacs of pagodas, which Hyder rejected, and proceeded without distinction of Mahommedan or Mahratta claims to occupy the whole. He had succeeded in making himself master of about one half of the province, when the monsoon burst with great violence, and the destruction which it produced among the horses and cattle of the army, induced him to break up for the rains. He accordingly left a select corps in Bancapoor, with directions to watch, and as far as possible, intercept, the supplies of the garrison of Darwar, not yet reduced; and inclining to the eastward, recrossed the Toombuddra in basket* boats; and having dismissed the tributaries, he pursued his march to Seringapatam, where he arrived in the month of August.

He made use of this interval of leisure to summon to the capital the whole of the Aumils † of his dominions, and the tribu-

* See vol. i. p. 417. This simple method of crossing wide and unfordable rivers, is recommended to military practice by the facility with which the materials can almost every where be obtained; it has been repeatedly adopted by English corps in India, for cannon as well as troops, a basket boat ten feet diameter, being adequate to the conveyance of an iron twelve pounder on its carriage.

† Aumil, or Aumildar, a collector or contractor of revenue, as the case may be; or generally, as with Hyder, exercising a mixed character, composed of both these functions. An Aumil, for example, agreed to give for a district a fixed sum, on the condition that a loss or a gain, not exceeding ten per cent. was his own; if either exceeded that sum, the difference was borne or received by the Government; this practice was introduced by Chick Deo Raj, and continued by his successors with modifications and exceptions.
taries in person, or by their agents, for the purpose of adjusting their past accounts and future revenues. His demands on the tributaries under the designation of Peshcush, was far from being the nominal acknowledgment of dependency, tolerated under weaker governments; the example of Anagoondy, which from 7,000 pagodas was raised to 12,000, exclusively of maintaining the military contingent of troops, (which were only paid by Hyder when called to the field), may serve to convey a general idea of the scale of augmentation in this branch of revenue; it was of course still proportionally increased, where he found it expedient to allow to a poligar the management of his country, without exacting a contingent of troops. The collectors or contractors of revenue were tolerably well aware, that the surplus demands would fall little short of the sums which they had irregularly exacted, or falsified in the accounts. Hyder was at all times accessible to complaints, and never failed to pursue to its source the history of an irregular demand, and to recover it with additional fines from the exactor. It is true that the amount was never returned to the complainant, but it frequently produced the dismissal of the offender; the certainty of investigation tended to restrain oppression, and, as Hyder was accustomed to say, rapacity in this case was nearly as good for his subjects, and much better for himself than a more scrupulous distribution of justice. He left the fiscal institutions of Chick Deo Raj as he found them, adding, however, to the established revenue whatever had been secretly levied by a skilful or popular Aumil, and afterwards detected: this produced a progressive and regular increase, and the result of complaints gave occasional, but also tolerably regular augmentations. On the present occasion he also levied upon
the whole country a forced contribution under the name of free gift, * for the support of the war. Few of my readers would feel interested in a more detailed description of these transactions, and the foregoing brief sketch may serve, without much future reference, as a general specimen of the fiscal administration of Hyder.

* Nezerána, as nearly as may be, the benevolence of English history.
CHAPTER XX.

Union of Nizam Ali and the ministerial party at Poona, against Ragoba and Hyder — A corps of Mahrattas invades Savanoor — is attacked and defeated by Hyder’s general, Mahommed Ali — Main armies advance in two separate bodies, by the distant points of Savanoor and Rachoor — first, under Perseram Bhow, retires after some timid skirmishing — second, Nizam Ali’s, bought off — and Hyder for the present relieved from apprehension — Siege of Chittledroog — Characteristic defence — Composition settled and partly paid — when Hyder hears of the advance of the whole Mahratta army, under Hurry Punt, for the relief of the place — destroys his batteries and trenches — marches off and orders the Poligar to follow his standard — he hesitates and disobeys — Battle of Raravee — Defection of Manajee Pameria — Defeat of the Mahrattas — Backwardness of Ibrahim, the general of Nizam Ali — Hyder pursues the Mahrattas — reduces the whole territory south of the Kistna, conformably to his arrangements with Ragoba — returns to the south — resumes the siege of Chittledroog — Surrender of the place — History and character of the new governor — Hyder sweeps off the inhabitants, and forms the foundation of his Janissaries — Hyder marches against Kurpa — Retreat and surrender of the Kurpa cavalry — Singular attempt of 80 prisoners to assassinate Hyder in the midst of his army — Surrender of the Chief of Kurpa — conditions — subsequent destruction of the males of the family — Character of Hyder’s amorous propensities — Refusal and subsequent assent of the beautiful daughter of this chief — Meer Sahib entrusted with the new conquest — Hyder returns to the capital — Revision of civil administration — finance — police — cruel, ignorant and ungrateful exactions — Apajee Ram — The bankers — Embassy to Delhi — Monsieur Lally’s corps — anecdote — system of military payments — Double treaty of
CHAP. XX. 1776.

marriage with the Nabob of Savanoor — Embassy from Poona — negotiation, explanatory of the union of Hyder with the Mahrattas against the English.

The powers of Decan and the south were ranged according to their interests with the parties which now divided the state of Poona. Hyder supported Ragoba, and Nizam Ali declared for the ministerial party, and the posthumous, or reputed son of Narain Row; for in lodging the widow at Poorunder* for the purpose of producing an heir, she is stated to have been accompanied by a considerable number of pregnant attendants, to prevent disappointment to the views of the party. A plan for the invasion of Mysoor by the confederated armies of Poona and Nizam† Ali was a consequence of these political connexions, and while the arrangements on a larger scale were in preparation, an army‡ composed of the contingents of four considerable chiefs proceeded to dislodge Hyder’s troops from Savanoor; and to make such farther progress as might be practicable, before the approach of the main armies.

Hyder§ prepared such a force as he deemed sufficient to repel this meditated attack; and conferred the command on

* Properly, I believe, Poonadur, a hill fort near Poona.
† The restitution of Dowlatabad to Nizam Ali, was the price of his adherence to the ministerial party. Its cession to the Mahrattas had been one of the conditions of the peace with Ragoba in 1774.
‡ The chiefs were, 1st, Pandrung Tatia — 2d, Letchman Heri — 3d, one of the Putwendun family — and 4th, a nephew of Morari Row, named Siveram.
§ From October 1776 till April 1777, Hyder’s troops in Malabar were engaged in hostilities with the Dutch at Cochin, but as the causes of dispute are connected with the English war of 1790-2, it will be more convenient to revert to these events, when tracing the origin of that war.
Mahommed Ali *, who was also invested with authority over the troops at Bancapoor. This skilful officer came up with the Mahrattas at a place called Saunsee, and found them drawn up to offer him battle. He made his dispositions, and commenced the action with his cavalry, by a feint in which he was repulsed in apparent disorder. The Mahrattas pursued with precipitation, in the confidence that the fortune of the day had already decided in their favour; when suddenly the fugitives were received through the intervals of a powerful reserve; and at the same instant, a tremendous fire of grape and musquetry poured in on the flank of the pursuers, from an ambush previously prepared. The slaughter was serious, and the confusion irretrievable: Mahommed Ali made a determined charge at the head of his cavalry, and completed the route. The pursuit was continued for nine miles from the field of battle; and the capture of † two out of the four chiefs, with a considerable number of subordinate officers, and three thousand horses secured for the service of the state, attested the decisive result of this combat.

The confederate armies were now approaching, that of the Mahrattas, under Perseram Bhow, estimated at 30,000 men, assembled near Meritch, on the left bank of the Kistna, for the purpose of penetrating by the province of Savanoor, in a south-eastern direction: the army of Nizam Ali, under Ibrahim Khan (Dhownsa) estimated at 40,000, moved by Rachore, and was to follow a course nearly south: thus, the two armies, by following the stated directions, or converging in their approach, would be

* The person who had distinguished himself by the murder of his own wounded.
† The first and last of those before mentioned.
enabled to enter the territory of Mysoor, at points varying in
their distance from each other, from 20 to 150 miles. Hyder
fixed upon Gooty as a depot, and point of support, for offen-
sive or defensive operations; and as the rendezvous of all the
subsidiary troops, who had attended his standard in the pre-
ceding campaign: and thither he also moved with the main
body of his own army, reinforcing Mahommed Ali with a
respectable corps, which left him tolerably confident with regard
to that branch of the attack. Perseram Bhow, on reconnoitring
the force of Mahommed Ali, and reflecting on the severe lesson
which he had recently given to the Mahratta troops, reported
to his court, that reinforcements were necessary; and after some
timid manœuvring, retired for security behind the Kistna.
Hyder had in the mean while operated on the court, and com-
mander-in-chief of Nizam Ali, by other and more concealed
weapons; and Ibrahim Khán was thus furnished with ostensible
motives of military propriety, besides the secret influence of
the gold of Hyder, for regulating his proceedings, by the re-
trograde movements of the Mahrattas. He had advanced as far
as Adwânee, when the movement of Perseram Bhow was re-
ported to him; there was no apparent ground for suspicion at
Poona, when he declared it too hazardous, under such circum-
stances, to preserve his advanced position; and he accordingly
retired behind the Toombuddra, and subsequently recrossed the
Kistna. The periodical floods of the south-west monsoon
converted the rivers into barriers shortly after these events, and
Hyder was, for the present, relieved from this formidable con-
federacy.

Of the tributaries who had been summoned to attend his
standard on this occasion, two had failed in their allegiance. The Nabob* of Kurpa joined the standard of his Mahomedan adversary, Nizam Ali; and the poligar of † Chittledroog influenced by the assurances of his agent at Poona, that the first military ‡ officer of the state, with an immense army would shortly invade Mysoor, and permanently relieve him from the dominion of Hyder, remained at home. Hyder, who had long and earnestly desired the possession of that fortress (celebrated beyond its real importance), and was jealous of the power and distinguished bravery of the poligar, and his formidable troops, marched from Gooty to Chittledroog, and rejecting the submissive offers of the unfortunate chief, to atone for his error by a large fine, sat down before the place in the month of July. The siege continued for three months, with more perseverance than military skill on the side of Hyder; and on the part of the besieged, with a mixture of enthusiastic fatalism, and heedless, headlong valour, which is strongly characteristic of the Beder tribe. A temple dedicated to the goddess § who delights in blood, was erected on the summit of the Droog, an appellative derived from an attribute || of the goddess; and so long as her rites should be duly performed, they believed that in fact, as well as in name, their fortress would be inaccessible. On every Monday, after performing their devotions to the goddess, the Beders made a religious sortie; this, after a few repetitions, was as

* Abd-ul-Helleem Khan.
† Sometimes called Chitrigul. In most of our maps they are erroneously inserted as two different places.
‡ Hurry Punt Purkia.
§ Cali.
|| Durga-Durgum, inaccessible, one of the epithets of Cali.
regularly known in the camp of the besiegers, as in the fort. A particular sound of the horn always gave intimation that they had finished their preparatory devotions and were about to sally: every thing was known, except the exact point of attack, and notwithstanding all the advantages of preparation, on the side of the besiegers, the Beders never once returned without penetrating into the trenches, and carrying off a certain number of heads, to offer at the shrine of Cáli. After the fall of the place, the heads were found ranged in rows of small pyramids, in regular order, in front of the temple of the goddess, to the amount of about two thousand. In every interval the poligar repeated his offers of atonement, and every successive sortie evinced increasing ardor, and furious confidence: the point of attack was always judiciously varied; and as they never once failed, the besiegers began to acquire the awkward habit of not awaiting it; and the fury of the assault would frequently fall far from the intended point; because after penetrating, and finding the posts abandoned, the Beders would generally take the trench in flank, and range along a considerable extent, before they could procure sufficient materials for the sacrifice; arrangements however were progressively made, by which the batteries being converted into redoubts, and strongly palisaded, inflicted terrible retribution on the Beders in their return. A composition was at length completed, by which Hyder professed to forgive the past, and accepted as a pledge of future obedience, thirteen lacs of pagodas; of which five in wrought-plate had actually been paid, when intelligence arrived that the ministerial com-

* A sort of large bugle, which, when well sounded, is a fine martial instrument.
mander-in-chief, *Hurry Punt*, was approaching from Poona, with an army rated at 60,000 horse, and a proportionate number of infantry and guns: that the rivers had fallen, and were already fordable: and that the advance of the hostile army was within a few days march of the Toombuddra. Hyder determined to put to a severe and immediate proof the professed allegiance of the poligar. The whole transaction was probably a snare; but the ostensible facts are, that he destroyed his batteries, and trenches, in the greatest haste; marched off to the north, and summoned the poligar instantly to attend his standard against Hurry Punt. If fortune should declare in favour of the Mahrattas, it is obvious that obedience would be fatal to all the hopes of the *poligar*, and if Hyder should prevail, to obey, or to disobey, would only leave a choice of ills; namely to pay the remainder of the treasure, or to stand another siege. To obey was inevitable evil; to disobey presented a chance of good: and in consequence of this reasoning, which has been circumstantially stated to me by one of his descendants, he promised—but evaded attendance.

Hyder, in the mean while, was actively employed through the medium of Bâgee Row Burva, the agent of Ragoba, in augmenting the discord which then prevailed in the Mahratta armies attached to either party; and a chief of 10,000, named Mânejee Pâneria, had been secretly gained by a bribe of six lacs of rupees, to separate his forces from those of Hurry Punt, in the first action; and afterwards serve Hyder, and the cause of Ragoba, on terms which were stipulated. The Mahratta army, after some delay in the arrival of reinforcements, and the vain hope of co-operation from the army of Nizam Ali, at length crossed the Toombuddra;
and was encamped at a place called Rârâvee, preparing to advance for the destruction of Hyder. That chief, as soon as he considered the arrangement with Mânajee Pâncria to be mature, advanced to offer battle to Hurry Punt. The armies came in sight of each other a few miles to the southward of Rârâvee; and reciprocally commenced their operations by a distant cannonade. The corps of Mânajee Pâncria had its place on the left flank of the Mahratta army, and was observed to leave an interval which was the concerted signal, preparatory to separation; but in its subsequent movements, there was a wavering, the effect of mere indecision, which led Hyder to the groundless suspicion of a double treason; with this impression on his mind, he sought to retort, by demonstrations which should induce Hurry Punt in his turn to suspect the fidelity of his double dealer. Light troops were spread abroad, to cover an apparent communication of dromedary couriers, and to exhibit the appearance of frequent messages from Mânajeé Pâncria. The impression on Hurry Punt was effectual, but it was that of a first and sudden alarm, the more serious from his ignorance of the extent of disaffection; he looked every where over the field with similar suspicion, but every where else there was an appearance of firmness: what he saw was however sufficient to determine him on a retreat; the disposition which was made in consequence affords evidence of considerable talents, and the most perfect self-possession. A general movement was observed to take place, and Hyder paused to ascertain its object, before he should make any corresponding dispositions. In a few moments an impenetrable cloud of dust arose, both in front and rear of the Mahratta line, which neither decidedly approached, nor decidedly receded; it was evidently the mass of
their cavalry in full charge; but not towards Hyder; some time had elapsed before he perceived that the corps of Manajee Panceria had been enveloped, and swept off the field; and that a powerful rear-guard presented itself to cover the retreat of the whole. The armies had not sufficiently closed to render the pursuit decisive, and two guns only were lost by Hurry Punt, in effecting his retreat behind the Toombuddra, where a strong position secured him from insult, and afforded him leisure to investigate the extent of the disaffection, which had produced his retreat. The troops of Manajee Panceria had made a tolerably gallant resistance, and attempted to move in mass towards Hyder; the greater part, however, were cut to pieces, and Manajee Panceria himself, wounded, and accompanied by no more than thirty select friends, had opened a way through the surrounding mass, and made good his escape to Hyder.

These events, however inferior to the full accomplishment of the plan which had been marred by Panceria’s hesitation, and Hyder’s impatience, were sufficient to defeat the whole project of the Mahratta campaign. Hurry Punt quitted his position, and continued his retreat; and Hyder availed himself with alacrity and judgment, of the opportunity which was thus offered of following up the impression. He hung close upon the rear, and harassed it with incessant attacks until the whole were driven north of the Kistna, in December 1777. In this second invasion, Ibrahim Khan affected to advert to the danger and disappointment which he had once already incurred, by advancing in the faith of a simultaneous movement which was not made; this time he would
CHAP. XX.

wait for the evidence of facts; and the gold of Hyder kept him inactive, until thus relieved by a second apology, founded on the conduct of his allies. The retreat of Hurry Punt was directed to a position thirty miles to the westward of Ibrahim Khán’s encampment, and the utmost endeavours of the party at Poona, failed to prevail on Nizam Ali to issue positive orders for his joining, and resuming the offensive.

1778. Hyder had now an open field for the realization of the plan concerted with Ragoba, for the occupation of the Mahratta territory* between the Toombuddra and Kistna; and his victorious pursuit of the main army prepared the minds of men for submission; the absence of all opposition in the field enabled him to detach Sirdar Khán for the siege of Darwar, where he expected a regular resistance; and he proceeded himself to the reduction of the Droogs of Copul and Behaunder Benda, which ought to be deemed impregnable, but fell in the month of April. The sieges of Gujjendergur, Badâmi, Jullihâl, and a number of posts of minor consideration occupied a considerable time, but presented little of the description of incident, on which the general reader would consider his attention to be either agreeably or profitably employed. Darwar also fell, after a protracted siege, and towards the close of the year, Hyder, in contemplating the fertile banks of the river Kistna, marked it with exultation as the northern boundary of an empire, which himself had made his own. The rapidity of the conquest was facili-

* This, like the territory inclosed between the branches of the Indus, is sometimes called the Penjáb, or country of the five rivers, viz. Toombuddra—Werda—Malpurba—Gutpurba, and Kistna.
tated by his attention to local circumstances; he found the country chiefly held by hereditary Deshayes*, the same description of persons, whom in other provinces we have found, under the designation of Wadeyars, Zemindars, Poligars, &c. (all Rajas,) and he consented for the present to receive from them their accustomed Pêshcush, on the condition of the prompt payment, as a free gift, of a farther sum equal to their annual revenue.

These arrangements being completed, about the close of the year he returned to the south. He had an account of disobedience to adjust with the chief of Kurpa; in which direction he detached Meer Sâheb with his own corps, to make such preparatory progress as he should find to be practicable, and himself with the main army sat down a second time before Chittledroog.

The Poligar and his adherents conducted the defence with their accustomed bravery; but, prodigal of life, the greater part of his relations and trusty chiefs were, at length, either killed or wounded in the incessant and determined sallies which he continued to make, and which Hyder had learned by experience to render destructive to the assailants. The Poligar had also a number of Mahommedans in his service, formed into a corps regularly armed, of about three thousand men, whom Hyder found means to corrupt through the medium of their spiritual instructor, a holy and unsuspected hermit †, who resided, un molested, on the plain below, near to Hyder’s encampment. When the Poligar ‡ discovered that he was betrayed, and had evidence,

* The chief of these were the Deshayes of Nergoond, Noolgund, Seretty, Dummul, &c. &c.
† I have seen and conversed with this holy personage, whose service on this occasion was liberally rewarded by Hyder.
‡ Mudgerry Naick.
in the failure of a recent sortie, that Cāli was no longer pro-
pititious to his vows, he ascended his palankee of state, ordered
himself to be carried to Hyder’s camp, and threw himself on the
mercy of the victor, in the beginning of March 1779. The
plunder of his habitation, including cash, jewels, and the per-
sonal ornaments of the women, amounted to no more than five
lacs of rupees: the whole family was of course secured, and
sent as prisoners to Seringapatam, and Hyder, after making the
requisite arrangements for the occupation of the place, prepared
to follow Meer Sāheb to Kurpa.

Among the prisoners carried off in the first inhuman emi-
gration from Malabar, was a young Nair, from Chercul, who
had been received as a slave of the palace, and to whom, on
his forced conversion to Islām, they had given the name of
Sheik Ayáż.* The noble port, ingenuous manners, and singular
beauty of the boy, attracted general attention; and when at a
more mature age he was led into the field, his ardent valour and
uncommon intelligence, recommended him to the particular
favour of Hyder, who was an enthusiast in his praise, and would
frequently speak of him, under the designation of “his right
hand in the hour of danger.” Throughout every period of Ma-
hommedan history, we find peculiar confidence reposed in
captives separated from their families in early youth: the pangs
of an afflicted parent are no part of a monster’s care; but he
calculates with cold accuracy, that the recollections of infancy
are soon obliterated; and that such children, being exempt from

* The same person afterwards Governor of Bednore at the accession of Tippoo,
and called in most English accounts Hyat-Saheb.
the ordinary ties of society, readily transfer the affections, implanted by nature for other purposes, in the form of undivided attachment to a kind protector; for such is certainly the character which the Mussulman assumes towards such of his slaves, whether captives, or born in the family, as evince talents and good dispositions. In the conversation of Mahommedan chiefs, a slave of the house, far from being a term of degradation or reproach, uniformly conveys the impression of an affectionate and trust-worthy humble friend, and such was Ayâz in the estimation of Hyder. To the endowments which have been stated; incessant and confidential military service had superadded experience beyond his years; and Hyder selected him for the important trust of civil and military governor of the fort and territory of Chittledroog. But modest as he was faithful and brave, Ayâz wished to decline the distinction, as one to which he felt himself incompetent; and particularly objected, that he could neither read nor write, and was consequently incapable of a civil charge. "Keep a cuerâ* at your right hand," said Hyder, "and that will do you better service than pen and ink;" then assuming a graver countenance; "place reliance," added he, "on your excellent understanding! act from yourself alone! fear nothing from the calumnies of the scribblers! but trust in me as I trust† in you! reading and writing!! how have I risen to empire, without the knowledge of either?"

* A long whip of cotton rope, about an inch and a half in diameter at the thick end, where it is grasped, and tapering to a point at the other extremity; this severe instrument of personal punishment, is about nine feet long; and Hyder was constantly attended by a considerable number of persons, too constantly practised in its use.

† For an allusion to Hyder's fixed estimation of this man, see note on Tippoo's strange compact, vol. ii. Appendix to the 18th chapter.
During the two sieges of Chittledoog, Hyder had found he natives of the territory, (also chiefly Beders) adhering to their chief with unconquerable attachment; no severity of military execution could restrain persons of each sex, and every age, from risking their lives with the constancy and exultation of martyrs, for the purpose of carrying to the besieged such supplies as an incessant succession of individuals could convey. To subsist his army exclusively on the resources of the country, to consume all its provisions, and to seize all the visible property, to the amount of twelve lacs of pagodas, was of no avail; and he was at length induced to sweep off the whole remaining population, which now consisted only of those who had the patriotism to devote themselves to the service of their besieged friends; all the rest having long before sought refuge in the woods, or in other provinces. The number thus carried off, to people the island of Seringapatam, amounted to about 20,000; from the boys of a proper age, he formed the first regular military establishment of captive converts, in imitation of the Turkish Janissaries (new soldiers), which, under the name of chêla battalions* arrived at maturity, and were so much augmented during the government of his successor.

Meer Sâheb, who had been detached towards Kurpa, had agreeably to instruction, recruited his cavalry to 5000; but a chosen band of two thousand Patân horse, commanded by the nephew of the chief of Kurpa, opposed such effectual and determined resistance to all his movements, that no impression of importance had been made, excepting on the resources of the country, which had been ravaged with the customary cruelty.

* Chêla in Hindostance, signifiès disciple as well as slave.
When Hyder had finished his arrangements at Chittledroog, he put himself at the head of his cavalry; and by forced marches, joined Meer Sâheb to the westward of a small river, which passes near to a place called Dooer, and unites farther south with the Pennâr. On the appearance of the advanced guard, the Patân troops thinking that they had only to do with Meer Sâheb, crossed the sandy bed of the river, and moved on with confidence into the plain. Hyder's advance was ordered to skirmish, and retreat to a concerted point; when the Patâns found themselves suddenly encompassed by the whole body of Hyder's cavalry: they commenced however their retreat, with a determined countenance; and Hyder who desired the preservation of these troops for his own future service, and hoped that they would surrender; at first directed his cavalry to abstain from the use of the keroolee (matchlock carbine:) the Patân horse did not however refrain from the exercise of their skill in archery, 'an antient and formidable missile ofretreating cavalry, not peculiar to the Parthians; and Hyder for the preservation of his own troops was compelled to revoke his first order. No infantry or cannon had yet arrived; the skirmishing of the matchlock carbines sensibly thinned the numbers of the Patâns, but they continued their retreat into the town of Dooer; where as they found themselves completely surrounded, and the main army approaching, this brave little band had no alternative but to surrender at discretion. Hyder turned from hence to the south-east, and took possession of the town of Kurpa without resistance; Abd-ul-Helleem Khan, the Patân Nabob*, had retired

* I am reminded by highly competent authority, that in following the practice of Mr. Orme, and the better sanction of the Company's records, in employing the term
from this his usual residence, to Sidhout, a place of inconsiderable strength to the north-east of Kurpa, whither also a division of Hyder's army had moved, and invested the place, while another was occupied in rifling the capital.

The horse of the Indian cavalier is generally his own, and with his sword, his bow and quiver, or his lance, often constitutes his only property: the reflexion of the separate risks of property, and life, cannot fail to operate most powerfully, in restraining the energy of enterprize: and in a declining cause, Hyder's known policy of neutralizing resistance, by restoring this property to the vanquished, was often his most powerful ally in the day of battle.

Of the prisoners taken at Dooer, he immediately released, and took into his service with their horses, such as had connexions in his own army, who consented to become responsible for their conduct; but among them were eighty ferocious

Nabob as the designation of office, I have been habitually inaccurate; and acknowledging the fault, I know not how to mend it, and to render the narrative always intelligible to the general reader.

*a wab*, the Arabic plural of *Naib*, a deputy, is, if I recollect right, employed in Arabia and Persia, simply in its primitive sense. In its acknowledged acceptation in India, it is a title of honour, indefinitely and indiscriminately applied to all persons in high official situations; but in regular form of speech, in letters, and diplomatic writings, never used as a designation of office. It is not, (as my friend remarks,) simply a corruption of language when so employed; it misleads the mind to the conception of rights appertaining to princely relation. These observations might be applied with greater justice to the strange misnomer of *king*, bestowed upon the Raja of Tanjour, the vassal of a vassal; a ridiculous error, which practically invested him with all the rights of royalty, acknowledged by the Company and the ministers of the King of Great Britain. In the text the Patân Nabob was properly *foujedar*; but had I so named him, many of my readers would have been at a loss to know who was intended.
Afghans* of the north, whose horses had been killed, and who could obtain no sureties for their release. In the proud spirit of savage independence, they refused to deliver their swords; and as among Mahommedans, a cavalier always ranks as a gentleman, whose honour is outraged by despoiling him of his arms, Hyder in deference to this feeling, and in expectation that the same intercession and pledge which had released their associates would be found for them also, although on the first clamour and refusal being reported, he only cried out “take a stick to them,” subsequently relaxed and did not enforce the surrender of their swords. Such is the explanation of the singular fact, that eighty of the most powerful, sanguinary, fierce, and treacherous men on earth, were placed with swords in their hands, under the ordinary guard of head quarters, exactly in front of Hyder’s tents; which like those of all chiefs of rank, were enclosed within a large square of tent-wall, about eight feet high, to veil them from vulgar observation. Offended and inflamed, by the attempt to disarm them, the prisoners had marked during their march from Dooer, the arrangements of the tents within the square, and secretly concerted their plan of revenge. In the dead of night they suddenly arose, overpowered and slew their guards, and rushed towards the sleeping tent. Hyder hearing the alarm, penetrated at once the nature of the com-

* Synonymous with Patáns. The complexion of this northern race is remarkable; the whole face has a tint approaching that which in other northern nations is diffused over the cheek only. From what I have seen of the natives of Nepaul, and the intermediate points, I am disposed to think, that this peculiar complexion is common to the inhabitants of the whole continuation of the Paropamisos, (Hindoo Kho,) or Indian Caucasus. In the lower range of hills, south of Nepaul, the complexion and features rather approach those of the Chinese.
motion, and with admirable presence of mind, covered with his quilt the long pillow of his bed, so as to resemble a person asleep; cut with his sword, a passage for himself through his own tent-wall, and that of the enclosure, and escaped to the protection of the nearest corps. Two only of the Afghans entered the sleeping tent, the remainder being disposed according to the pre-concerted plan, to cover their enterprize and retreat. The foremost entering the tent, made a decisive cut at the supposed Hyder; and on finding that he had escaped, was so stupified at the disappointment, as to remain in silent hesitation. One of Hyder's attendants, as was not uncommon*, had lain down to sleep, in a corner of the tent, with his lance of state by his side; he was roused by the blow at his master's bed; and a dubious light discovered to him a stranger and a drawn sword; without hesitation he seized his lance, transfixed the Afghan, and successively his associate, who advanced to his aid. The alarm was by this time given; and in a few minutes the remainder were either slain, or disarmed. On the morning, after his escape from this most serious danger, Hyder ordered some of the surviving assassins to have both their hands and feet chopped off, and in that shocking state, to be thrown into the highway, at considerable intervals from each other, to announce to his new subjects, and to passing travellers the terror of his name. The remainder were destined to a death if possible more horrible, by being dragged round the camp, tied by a short, loose cord to the feet of elephants. †

* Thalami consorte demissa.
† One of these men, left as dead, unexpectedly recovered; the circumstance was some time afterwards reported to Hyder, who observed, that such was the man's
This, among other incidents, contributed to shorten the de-
fence of Sidhout; many attempts to compromise were disdain-
fully rejected, and Abd-ul-Helleem Khân surrendered on the
27th of May, on the simple assurance of personal security, and May.
was sent as a prisoner, with his family and connections, to
Seringapatam. The characteristic improvidence of the Mussul-
man is peculiarly observable in the Batân; and the rifling of the
whole family, in all its branches, furnished no more than one
lac of rupees. The compact with the chief was literally ob-
served; but Hyder having, on his return to the capital, dis-
covered a new plot of assassination among the relations, caused
all the male adults of the family to be secretly dispatched.

No prominent occasion has hitherto occurred for pre-
senting to the reader's notice the private consequences of a
passion, not clashing with ambition; but exercising a joint and
equal dominion over the mind of this extraordinary man. The
polygamy and unlimited intercourse, supposed to be authorised
by the Mahommedan religion, is restricted, by the positive law
of the Korân, to four women at the most; including wives and
concubines. A separate revelation extended this indulgence for
the use of the Apostle himself, and his eventual successors were
already provided with about double the prescribed number.
Mahommedans of rank accordingly refer to example rather than
to precept, and revert to the kings and apostles, (as they hold
them) of Jewish history, to justify an unbounded * indulgence.

fate; and ordered him to be immediately received into his service. General Close
saw this person twenty years afterwards, a powerful, healthy looking horseman.

* There is, however, always a distinction between the lawful wives and those of
the imperfect contract; but none in the offspring, who have all an equal right to
Hyder observed neither limit in the extent, nor principle in the means of gratification; and on the capture of a place, a department charged with the scrutiny of female beauty, discharged their functions with as much vigilance as that which searched for treasure. In the capital and the provinces, branches of the same police conveyed accurate information of every thing deemed worthy of the sovereign's approbation. To Mahomedan families of rank the ceremony of the *nicka*, customary and unlawful as they all know it to be, covered with a thin veil the prostitution of their daughters, and obtained a forced and sorrowful consent. Among all the classes not Mahomedan there was no ceremonial but force; nothing escaped his research, and the power* and the will were combined in the most extraordinary degree, to render him the secret terror of every family, removed above the lowest vulgar of the sootiest hue. It were unreasonable to expect under such institutions, any touch of that fairy magic of mind, which is capable of transforming animal instinct into the most tender and delicate source of human happiness: but Hyder seems to have been unmoved even by those fleeting partialities, which accompany the grosser pursuits. There was nothing of mind in that which seemed to occupy so much of his thoughts: and neither that, nor any other object, was ever known to encroach on a single moment, which could be profitably employed in the career of ambition.

the inheritance, whether born of legitimate (or primary) wives, or concubines, with no legal difference between them, but that of the males being double the portion of the females.

* Amoribus mire crebris cupidinem explens, membro genitali magnitudinis eximiae mulieres maturas incommodo afficiens, virginum tamen amplexus potissimum appetivit; assuetus singulis fere noctibus puellam intactam stuprare.
The right of conquest gave him a claim to all the beauty of this ancient house; and a sister of Abd-ul-Helleem Khan, eighteen, but unmarried, was reported to exceed any thing that had yet entered the seraglio. Hyder considered no formality to be necessary, and merely ordered her to be informed of the honour to which she was destined. The lady formed a different estimate of this supposed distinction; her own honour and that of her house were the paramount considerations with which her mind had been imbued; in accepting the proposals even of such a marriage as he could offer, she deemed that she would be conferring, not receiving distinction; and she informed the messenger, that she was provided with secret and infallible * means of guarding her honour; and if Hyder persevered in his intentions, he could only receive a corpse to his bed. A negotiation ensued—the ceremony of the nicka was performed, and this lady,

* Diamond pulverized, reputed among the Mahommedans of rank, in the south of India, to be at once the least painful, the most active, and infallible of all the poisons. Whatever doubts may be entertained of the fact, there is none regarding their belief; and the supposed powder of diamonds is kept as a last resource, like the sword of the Roman: but I have never met with any person, who, from his own knowledge, could describe its visible effects. The Mahommedan medical men of that country have seldom much respectability, and frequently are not only ignorant quacks, but impostors; perfectly capable of receiving a diamond, and returning arsenic, or powdered quartz: like the apothecary in the very strange life of Benvenuto Cellini; who considers the diamond as a slow poison, and enters into the rationale of its mode of action, from the mechanical effects of its spicula. From the narrative of Cellini, who ascribes his escape from certain death to the dishonesty of the apothecary, who appropriated the diamond, and returned glass or sand, the poisonous effects of diamond would seem to have been considered as a familiar fact in Italy in the sixteenth century; and the fact, or the error, in both countries, may have a common source, which it would be at least an object of curiosity to investigate.
under the title of *Buckshee Begum*, was soon afterwards placed at
the head of the seraglio. *

Hyder's increased confidence in the fixed fidelity of his
brother-in-law, Meer Sâheb, was evinced by his adding the ter-
ritory acquired by the fall of Sidhout to the seat of his fathers
at Goorumconda, and conferring the whole, as a military de-
pendency, on the condition of maintaining for his service, to-
gether with the requisite garrisons, three thousand horse of
the first order of efficiency; and these arrangements being com-
pleted, he returned to his capital in the month of June, to
enjoy a year of triumph and of dreadful preparation.

The civil affairs of his government demanded, in his judgment,
a deliberate revision, and the description of these arrangements,
shall be compressed into as moderate a compass as is consistent
with rendering them intelligible. Among the preparatory measures
were the appointment of new ministers of finance, and of
police, the former named Mahommed Sâdik, and the latter
Shamia: the duties of the former office are sufficiently indicated
by the name, and the mode of administration may be illustrated
by a retrospective abstract.

Hyder's first dewan or minister of finance, after the defection
of *Kunde Row*, was one of the same school, named *Veneatapa*, a
bramin, who died in his service in 1765. A few days before his
death, he addressed a letter to Hyder, stating, that he found his

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* From the period that Tippoo was allowed an establishment of his own, his
mother, *Seydnee Begum*, was placed at the head of it; and was succeeded in the
charge of Hyder's by *Medina Begum*, formerly a dancing girl, or rather an élève of
that frail sisterhood, selected by Hyder at a very early age; declining health had
now rendered her incapable of so active a charge.
dissolution approaching, that idle conjectures would be formed
with regard to the amount of the wealth he had accumulated in
his service, and that he therefore determined, for the repose of
his conscience, and the security of his family, to make this dying
declaration. The fortune honourably made in his service was
50,000 pagodas or 18,750l. which he invited Hyder to receive
into the treasury on his death, and to leave his family in peace.
According to English notions, every spark of humanity and ho-
nour must be extinct in the breast of a prince, who should de-
spoil the family of a faithful servant, of a sum which the deceased
might well be supposed to have fairly acquired. Hyder, on the
contrary, conceived it an act of exemplary benevolence to accept
the amount, without putting the family to the torture. Vencatapa
was succeeded by another bramin named Chinneia, who was tor-
tured, plundered, and dismissed, in 1768. His successor, Assud
Ali Khan, a Nevayet, was the first Mussulman whom Hyder had
ever employed in a civil office of trust and importance; he died
in 1772, under the tortures which were inflicted, to extort mo-
ney which he did not possess; and was considered an able and
an honourable man. These examples were apparently calculated
to produce one of two consequences; either that no person
should be found to undertake the office, or that the acceptor
should plunder without limit. Neither of these consequences
ensued in the next successor, Sellahyiet Khan, another Nevayet,
was a man of the purest integrity, but of talents not altogether
equal to the situation in which he was placed. These reasons
for his removal were openly assigned by Hyder; but measuring
the principles of others by his own, he was not satisfied with the
honest declaration of the minister, that he possessed 10,000
CHAP. rupees, 1,250l. the exact sum with which he entered Hyder’s
service. He was imprisoned, but I think not tortured, and on
his death-bed, about five months afterwards, made the same de-
claration; that exact sum was found in his house, and Hyder
took it without the smallest compunction. The person now
chosen to succeed him was Meer Südik, who filled the same office
on the capture of Seringapatam in 1799; he was taken from the
situation of camp Cutwall, an office compounded of the functions
of clerk of the market, police magistrate, and prevôt martial.

We have formerly* had occasion to observe, that the de-
partment of police had at an early period been annexed to
that of the post-office; Hyder had, at different intervals, cor-
rected and improved the details of this office, and with the aid
of his new minister Shamia, a bramin possessing all the cool
acuteness necessary for giving efficiency to his plans, and unfet-
ttered by any scruples or compunctions that might obstruct their
operation, not only perfected those arrangements for the pre-
vention of crimes, which under all governments are indispen-
sible to a firm administration; but superadded a system of ex-
ternal and domestic intelligence, which pervaded all foreign
courts, and penetrated into the inmost recesses of every private
dwelling in his own dominions. From the union of these two
departments, of finance and police, he composed a special com-
mission for the investigation of embezzlements; which was not
only successful in the detection of actual frauds, but in estab-
lishing apparent proof of malversations which never existed.
When a public officer of trust was delivered over to the depart-

* Vol. i. p. 89. and 101.
ment of torture (a branch of that of police) the reader has probably not inferred, that this was effected without some previous form: for the designation of anche walla (post master) the idiom of the day had substituted that of puttee walla, (the man of statements,) in consequence of the well understood practice of making out a fictitious statement, supported by fictitious vouchers, and abundance of witnesses in waiting, and exhibiting a balance against the unfortunate victim, of the sum which they calculated on being able to extract. Shamia excelled all his predecessors in every branch of these horrible duties; his false statements were so skilfully framed, as to bear in public durbar, where they were read, the semblance of truth and accuracy; and his new and horrible contrivances of torture spread a terror, which sometimes rendered their application unnecessary. That neither talents nor services, however eminent, shielded their possessor from the reach of this frightful inquisition, may be inferred from the single example of Apajee Ram, who actually did not possess half the sum demanded of him, and borrowed the remainder from his friends. He had executed all his trusts with the most scrupulous fidelity; he had rendered to Hyder an account of all the presents which he received in his missions, and had generally been allowed to retain them. Hitherto he had trusted to the force of probity alone; but on this occasion, he declared to a confidential friend*, that he found it to be not only an unprofitable, but an impracticable virtue; and should henceforth avail himself without limit, of the licence to plunder, which the conduct of his master had now proclaimed. Military men alone

* The late minister Poornea, who related it to the author.
escaped. Hyder's arrangements rendered it difficult for them to be rich; the habits of the profession are seldom those of accumulation; and the extension of such a system to them, would moreover have been unsafe. The superior scale of civil allowances was a topic of ordinary animadversion among them; and it may even be apprehended, that the officers in Hyder's army did not view with the generous indignation, which such scenes are calculated to excite, this mode of refunding emoluments, of which they were jealous. A military officer, a native of Constantinople, and a commandant of infantry, was indeed one of the most noted instruments of the department of torture; and the public notoriety of the number of persons who died under his hands, could not restrain the puns and mongrel jests of the day. This person had been named Roomee from his country, and from his buffoonery Zerreef; a title which, on this occasion, was changed by common consent to Roomee Zerree, or Roomee the money finder. On these transactions one of my manuscripts has an observation which I shall copy verbatim;—"Those who had executed their respective trusts with moderation, and were really unable to pay the sum demanded, died under the torture: and those only escaped with life, who had enriched themselves by exaction, and were compelled to disgorge." Some of the unfortunate persons of the first description saved their lives by prevailing on sahoucars (bankers) to become their securities. All Indian Governments are aware of the large profits made by these bankers, in consequence of their connection with the administration of the revenue: but a policy obvious to the darkest ignorance had hitherto preserved to them the privilege of security in the midst of exaction. The judgment of Hyder, true to his
interests on most occasions, seems never to have been effectually obscured by any passion but avarice: he determined for the first time to levy a heavy contribution on the bankers; and thus gave a destructive blow to all future confidence; to the sources of commercial enterprize; and to the means of availing himself on any future occasion of the monied interest of the country. Of the sum fixed upon to be exacted from the bankers, a balance remained, for the present unpaid, of twenty lacs of pagodas, 720,000l.: and the consequence of this stupid but effectual banishment of capital from his dominions, was evinced in the well known fact, that all the subsequent tortures inflicted by himself, and by his successor, failed to realize this balance.

A splendid embassy was in this year dispatched to Delhi, for the purpose of obtaining for Hyder, the imperial grants of the soubadaree of the two Carnatics *, in order that an exterior dignity which still commanded some respect, might accompany the possession of an authority, which he had now an early prospect of conferring on himself.

Political considerations had induced Monsieur Lally to leave the service of Basalut Jung for that of Nizam Ali, and he was now farther disposed to leave both for the service of Hyder. He had been detached towards Kurnool, and took that opportunity of coming over, with a force of 100 European infantry, 50 European cavalry, 1000 Native infantry, and two guns, about one-fifth of the number which he had stipulated to bring; in consequence of which Hyder reduced the stipulated pay of the officer commanding.

* Vijeyapoor and Hyderabad.
CHAP. XX. The Frenchman either outwitted himself, or was disappointed by his troops; his proposals of service had included

- European infantry: 500
- Native ditto: 5000
- European cavalry: 300
- Guns: 14

and, as the commandant of such a force, his monthly pay was fixed at 5000 rupees. When the first month's pay was issued he received 2000 rupees, he demanded an audience, and talked, and gasconaded. "Be quiet," said Hyder, "and be grateful for getting so much — you have not fulfilled your stipulation; and I have overpaid you in proportion to your numbers. — I do not give an officer 5000 rupees a month for the beauty of his single nose."

A more convenient occasion may not occur for explaining, that neither in Hyder's nor in Tippoo's government was the issue of military pay regulated by any calendar: the abstract or written statement of monthly pay, and hence in ordinary acceptation, the pay itself, was called a *puttee*, a Canarese word which properly signifies a written statement of any kind. The Hindoo calendar, for the purpose of its numerous lunar* fasts and festivals, attempts to reconcile the solar year with the lunar months, the difference being adjusted, at the proper intervals, by an intercalary *month*, which rectifies the calendar. These are mournful revisions for an Indian army; for the leap year contains a thirteenth or supernumerary month, which has no pay annexed to it, and by the soldiers is nicknamed the *stone* month.

* Exclusively of the greater solemnities, there are two regular fasts in every month, the eleventh of the encreasing, and the same day of the waning moon.
stones, as they observe, being the only food provided for them. Hyder made it a merit to abolish the periodical discontents of the stone month, but substituted an arrangement no less beneficial to the treasury; instead of one monthly puttee he issued to the infantry two half-puttees in each month of account. The great convenience of this arrangement to the improvident soldiers, reconciled them to the artificial postponements, for which, festivals, Mahommedan or Hindoo furnished such numerous apologies. A postponement of one or two days in each half month, was scarcely noticed—double that number at the end of a month would have been a more prominent source of inconvenience and discontent. But in process of time the periodical return of the half-puttee crept on from sixteen, its original number, sometimes to twenty days; thus reducing the year of account to nine or ten months. The troops were habituated, from the first, to some irregularity in the period, and there was no calculation of arrears; it was a fixed rule, that whenever a puttee, or half-puttee, was issued, it was a payment in full of all past demands.

To the Silledar cavalry, or men mounted on horses, which were their own property, a whole puttee was issued once in thirty-five, and afterwards in forty, or even forty-five days, under this singular arrangement, that they received rupees of account, calculated at two-thirds of the actual value. These puttees were called bees rosè, or puttees of twenty days; namely, two-thirds of such a month as ought to have been reckoned and paid for, the remaining third was an arrear to be settled at the end of the year, or sometimes of two years; and the mode of paying these arrears was always in turbans, silks, chintzes, or
articles obtained in plunder, perhaps by the very men to whom they were returned, and estimated to the troops at about double their actual value. These troops were allowed to retain half the plunder they brought in, and the knowledge that they themselves were to be again plundered in this form, was their justification for defrauding the government to the utmost extent in their power. During Hyder's government this was difficult, under Tippoo exactly the reverse.

To the stable horsemen, as those were designated who were mounted on horses the property of the state, the rupee of account was not issued, and there were no arrears; the payments were regulated on the same principle as those of the infantry, except that they received their puttee at the same periods as the Silledar horse. During Tippoo's government, up to the termination of the English war in 1792, the troops of every description received at the rate of nine, and sometimes ten puttees in the year; after that period, the number was sometimes as low as seven.

Hyder in this year opened a negotiation with Abd-ul-Heckeem Khan, the nabob of Savanoor, which terminated in a double marriage; the eldest son of that nabob to Hyder's daughter*; and his second son, Kereem Saheb, to the daughter of Abd-ul-Heckeem. The half of Savanoor, which the Mahrattas had left in his possession, had after the conquest been restored by Hyder, on the annual tribute of four lacs of rupees: the remaining half was, on this occasion restored to the nabob, and the tribute reduced one half, on the condition of maintaining for Hyder's

The most notorious scold in the south of India.
service, two thousand select Patân horse, to be commanded by two of the nabob's sons. Of the three Patân nabobs, who had made so great a figure in the transactions of the south, the troops, and the resources of two were now transferred to Hyder; and the third of Kurnool* continued to be a doubtful dependent on Nizam Ali.

On the occasion of this double alliance, Abd-ul-Heckeem and his whole family visited Seringapatam; Hyder went out to meet them, with the greatest demonstrations of respect; and the marriages were solemnized, with a degree of splendor and magnificence, far surpassing all former example. Persons from all parts of the country assembled to witness the festivity. The whole capital was a continued scene of exterior joy and revelry; but the operations of police were not intermitted; and the groans from the dungeons were not permitted to disturb these unhallowed rejoicings.

From the period of the infraction by the English of the treaty of 1769, by repeatedly declining to afford the stipulated succour, Hyder had anxiously wished for a suitable opportunity to retaliate the wrong. But at this time, so far from having meditated the invasion of the succeeding year, his preparations were exclusively directed to resist the formidable invasion, which the ministerial faction of Poona Mahrattas, after the conventional surrender of an English army at Worgaum, and the capture of their opponent Ragoba, had not only meditated, but openly announced to the English, with whom they considered their differences to be ad-

* At one time this unfortunate chief found it necessary to pay tribute to three powers; the Mahrattas—Nizam Ali—and Mysoor.
justed. We shall presently have occasion to revert to those transactions, and in the mean while, it will be sufficient to state, that the escape of Ragoba on the 12th of June, from *Cholee Maheswer*, on the river Nerbudda, where he had been confined by Madajee Sindia, and his reception by General Goddard at Surat, suddenly induced the ministerial party at Poona to propose an union with Hyder, instead of prosecuting military operations against him, as they had previously determined.

It was in the midst of the marriage festivities, that an envoy, named Goneish Row arrived, to offer to Hyder the congratulations of the infant *Sewai Madoo Row*, (the posthumous, or reputed son of *Narain Row*, whom the ministerial party had installed as Peshwa,) on these auspicious events. The letter of congratulation concluded, with referring to the verbal communications of the envoy, for the sentiments of the court, on matters of political importance; and a brief abstract of the discussions which ensued, may afford some light to guide us through the maze, both of past and subsequent events.

The envoy represented that the English, again espousing the cause of the murderer Ragoba, now a second time a fugitive, had made war on the Pêshwa; that Hyder equally with the Mahrattas, had cause to complain of that nation, for a violation of their engagements; that Nizam Ali was equally well-disposed to the common cause; and that the period had arrived, when it was incumbent on the ruler of Mysoor, to unite with the powers of Decan, in taking effectual retribution; that it was necessary however as a preliminary measure, that the confederates should have the most perfect understanding with each other; that
Hyder owed a balance of twenty-five lacs, on account of the treaty of Trimbuc Mama, besides an arrear of eight years’ * pêshcush (tribute); that he had levied large sums on the poligars of Harponnelly, and that vicinity, who were properly the tributaries of Poona; and lastly, that he had wrested from the Mahratta state, the whole of their territory between the Toombuddra and Kistna; and previously to entering on the offensive league, which was the ultimate object of the mission, it was necessary that he should evacuate the countries he had seized, and make an amicable composition of the pecuniary claims.

On the part of Hyder, it was replied, in the first instance, that the poligars in question were the regular dependants of Sera; that the grant of the countries between the rivers had been made to him for a valuable consideration, by Ragoba, the heir, and actual head of the Government; and that the account of the tribute had been adjusted with the same person, and the balance acknowledged to be paid †, through the medium of Baageè Row Burva his accredited envoy.

Goneîsh Row retorted, that Ragonaut Row was a murderer, and an expelled usurper, who had fled to foreigners for refuge, and that his concessions were notoriously of no validity.

To these allegations it was replied, that Hyder left it to the contending parties, to decide which of them ought to be considered as usurpers; and had no intention to dispute the rights which by the actual possession of the Government, the ministerial party had for the present acquired; or to acknowledge, or

* Pêshcush, from Pêsh kusheeden, (Pers.) to bring forward or present; the word thus, originally signified an offering, and in its subsequent use, the voluntary gift became a tribute.

† He had actually paid sixteen lacs.
reject, the filiation of the present *Peshwa*; but that it was a foul calumny to brand as a murderer, Ragoba, who had actually received a wound in the defence of the person with whose murder he was charged; and that while the convocation of pregnant females, shut up in Poorunder with the widow of Narain Row, had not yet determined whether they should be able to produce a male infant among them, it was absurd to question the validity of the acts of the lineal heir, and actual possessor of the power of the state.

Such were the leading features of a discussion, which terminated in an agreement, that the grants of Ragoba to Hyder should be confirmed, with regard to the territory between the rivers; all past demands were declared to be discharged; eleven lacs of rupees was fixed as the annual payment to be henceforth made by Hyder for the whole of his possessions, (that for the current year to be paid in advance,) and on these conditions, Hyder engaged to put forth his whole force, to combine with the confederates, for the expulsion of the English nation from India. Nizam Ali invading the northern Circars; the Mahrattas of Berar, Malwâ, and the more northern parts of Hindostan, attacking the territories of Bengal, and Bahar; those of Poona and the south operating on the side of Bombay; while Hyder, accompanied by 2000 chosen Mahrattas, rather as a guard of observation, than an aid, should direct his whole force towards Madras. The detail of these negotiations was adjusted at Se-ringapatam; at their conclusion, Noor Mahommed Khan and Narain Row, accompanied Goneish Row to Poona, as the vakeels or ambassadors of Hyder, who commenced the most active preparations for the serious performance of his part of the compact.
CHAPTER XXI.

Retrospect of Hyder’s relations with the English, since 1769 — Disgraceful intrigues of Mahommed Ali in England — Direct negotiation with the ministry — who send out Sir John Lindsay as ambassador — Unites in Mahommed Ali’s views for the infraction of the treaty with Hyder — Error of the treaty of 1769 now practically discovered in 1770 — Discussions regarding Tanjore — siege of that place in 1771 — Trimbuc Mama threatens to relieve it — bought off by Mahommed Ali — and sold to both parties — Mahommed Ali fabricates a mock Mahratta invasion — Deception unveiled — Strange proceedings of the royal negotiator — Able statement of the nature of the English connexion with Mahommed Ali — Proposal of the Mahrattas in 1771 to unite with Hyder for the conquest of the South and East — Manly and candid avowals of Hyder to the English — His most advantageous offers rejected — through the influence of Mahommed Ali — Hyder’s unfavourable treaty with the Mahrattas in 1772 — the consequence of his adherence to these political principles — Tanjore taken by the English in 1773 — Hyder’s embassy to Madras — renew his offers of alliance — again frustrated by Mahommed Ali — Resentment of the Mahrattas for the capture of Tanjore — Mahommed Ali sends an embassy to Hyder — a mere mockery — they are dismissed in 1775 with an explicit intimation of Hyder’s sentiments — Mahommed Ali occupies and improves the fortress of Tanjore — raises an army — determines on resistance to the orders for its restitution — fails when the time arrives — restored to the Raja by Lord Pigot in 1776 — cabal of private creditors, and Mahommed Ali obtains the revolutionary arrest of Lord Pigot in the same year — durst not proceed the meditated length of restoring Tanjore — English connexions with the Mahrattas — Colonel Upton’s treaty of 1776 — Ragoba — Designs of the French connexion with Hyder — with Poona through Mr. St. Lubin, 1777 — A party at Poona propose to restore Ragoba — consequent treaty of Bombay — confirmed by Mr. Hastings — correct and enlarged views of that statesman — Diplomatic and military mea-
sures, 1778 — Designs of the French—discovered—and anticipated—Tardy and weak measures at Bombay—Field deputies—Army advances—is foiled—Convention of Wargaum—disavowed by the Governor of Bombay—Army under Goddard crosses to Surat—Ministerial party at Poona make advances for peace, 1779—and avow their design of marching against Hyder—Escape of Ragoba to General Goddard, changes their politics, and makes them unite with Hyder as above related—Relations with Nizam Ali—Guntour Sircar and Bazâlut Jung—Erroneous views in the connexion of Madras with that chief—March a corps to join him—opposed by Hyder—Returns—Resentment of Nizam Ali—appeased by the wise measures of Mr. Hastings—Return from digression—Correspondence of Hyder with Madras in 1778—evades negotiation—English at length desirous of a treaty with Hyder—but the period had passed away—Capture of Pondicherry stated—that of Mâhâ announced, 1779—Hyder explicitly avows hostility in that event—Mâhâ with Hyder’s colours displayed with those of the French, falls—Hyder’s open declarations of intended hostility—Mission of Schwartz to Hyder—Strange mystery never explained—Mission of Mr. Grey—Negotiation fails—Reiterated hostile declarations of Hyder—Torpor at Madras—roused by the invasion.

CHAP. XXI. 1779. The complex character of the transactions in which Hyder had been engaged with the native powers, since the conclusion of his treaty with the English in 1769, has suggested the convenience of reserving for a separate retrospect an account of his relations with that state during the same period, in order that we may be enabled to take a distinct and unbroken view of its political condition, at the period of the impending war, which threatened the utter extinction of the British power in India.

The sovereignty of the treaty of Paris in 1763, discovered and communicated to Mahommed Ali by an European adviser, suggested to him the mission of an agent to England in the year 1767, for the purpose of establishing a separate interest in the
administration and legislature of that country. To open a direct intercourse with the sovereign of England; to throw off the control of the local English Government, and render it subordinate to himself; to hold the balance between the French and English nations in India; to render them severally his instruments of imperial conquest, afterwards of their own mutual destruction, and ultimately to expel them both*, were the views which at intervals undesignedly unfolded themselves in a long and laboured course of intrigue; in which English gentlemen could make open and undisguised offers of their services to become Directors † of the East India Company, and members of a more august assembly, to a nabob of Arcot, a pageant, if possible, more deceived than deceiving, who is stated to have returned ‡ eight members in one British Parliament.

Services § performed and to be performed in this unhallowed cause, assumed the portentous shape of an overwhelming private debt, chargeable by the legislative authority of Great Britain.

* I have stated no inference that does not appear to me to be proved by written documents and indisputable facts, known to persons now living.
† Documents adverted to in p. 55. of this volume.
‡ Burke's speech on the Carnatic debts, the only performance of that great man on India affairs, which abounds in solid truth, as well as splendid eloquence. Mr. Burke himself was, however, not a mere spectator in the Indian transactions of that period. A complete history of the internal policy of those times, would be highly curious and instructive to the reader; but as yet too obnoxious, "recentibus odiis," for a compiler of this day. The materials are perfectly accessible.
§ Besides the speculative property in bonds, for the repayment of money not lent; there were more solid remunerations. Three members of the Council of Government of Madras, obtained a large assignment of territorial revenue in 1767, which gradually emerged to light in the two succeeding years. The Court of Directors comment on the transaction, in the following terms; "the servants of the Company, &c. &c. have in this instance unfaithfully betrayed their trust; abandoned the Company's interest; and prostituted its influence to accomplish the purpose of in-
CHAP. on the revenues of Arcot, to the direct prejudice of national claims: a British administration subverted and undermined the constituted authorities in India, by giving the sanction of the royal authority to a plenipotentiary charged with independent, indefinite, and unintelligible powers, to the native states. Majesty was degraded by affixing the royal signatures to letters addressed, as to an equal, to this factitious sovereign of English manufacture. An ambassador, (Sir John Lindsay,) with concealed powers, was deputed in the ostensible character of the commander of a frigate, and decorated with a ribbon and star of the Order of the Bath, a representative of the sovereign of Great Britain to Mahommed Ali. With these dignities, the ambassador burst at once upon the governor and council, as if by ambushade; and became from that time a partizan of this foreign power to which he was deputed, against the delegated government of his own nation.

When Hyder, on the invasion of Mysoor by Mâdoo Row in 1770, demanded from the Government of Madras the execution of the treaty of 1769, the erroneous conceptions of Mr. Du Prè in negotiating the 2d article of that treaty began to be distinctly unfolded. Mahommed Ali whose views required the extinction of Hyder as the very first step in his march of general conquest; reminded the government that being no party to that treaty, individuals, whilst the interest of the Company is almost totally neglected, and payments to us rendered extremely precarious."

These transactions afford some partial explanation of two facts relative to the war of 1767; 1st, the want of funds for conducting it, and 2d, the unhappy prevalence of Mahommed Ali's councils in its mismanagement. It is not intended to class all the debts of Mahommed Ali in one and the same unprincipled mass. A few had an honourable origin,
he was not bound to furnish funds for its execution. (It will be recollected that he had fraudulently refused to execute according to compact the instrument of his participation.) And the King's plenipotentiary ever acting in unison with Mahommed Ali, upbraided the Government with the circumstances under which it was concluded, as an argument to impeach its validity; "the time when, the place where, the peace was made," are the insinuations of the minister; "a peace (as the Directors afterwards remark,) to which the want of aid from his idol compelled us;" "such (as they emphatically observe,) are the honours, &c. (of the royal mission) the honour of humbling the East India Company before the throne of Mahommed Ali Khan."* The nabob and royal plenipotentiary urged not merely a passive infraction of the treaty, but its active violation, without one assignable pretext, by uniting with Mádoo Row for the destruction of Hyder; and the Government finding itself pledged to all the practical evils of an offensive alliance with Hyder, which they had so carefully professed to avoid; feeling the impossibility of executing the treaty in opposition to the nabob and the representative of Majesty, and resolved not to destroy the power which they were bound by treaty to defend; evaded the whole question, by representing both to Hyder and the Mahrattas the necessity of waiting for the result of a reference which they had made on the subject to their superiors in England.

A long and mysterious reserve, assumed by Mahommed Ali, in consequence of the refusal of the Government to accede to his designs, suddenly changed about the beginning of the year 1771, 1771.

* Company's Records.
to the most open and confidential communication, as the prelude to an under-plot which required the employment of the Company's army. A question raised into serious notice, by the gold of the contending parties, and the zeal of their envoys, for many years caused the British press to teem with the crudities of its European advocates, namely, whether, "according to the constitution of the Mogul empire," the Raja of Tanjour were the subject of Mahommed Ali, or an independent prince—whether a creature of the imagination had assigned to one or the other of two usurpers the right to oppress a foreign people. The only constitutional dependence of this Raja, was on the Mahratta state; and this dependence, which the Mahrattas uniformly claimed, and he acknowledged, made him the deputy of an usurping deputy. According to the law of the strongest, the actual payment of tribute had practically established the claim of Mahommed Ali to its continuance as long as he should continue to be the strongest. Long priority of usurpation, and a more just and lenient government, if such a claim were happily available in such discussions, were on the side of the Raja; and he was encouraged by the vicinity of his countrymen, then campaigning in Mysoor, to resist the demand. The nabob required from the British Government an army to enforce it; and they, for the first time desired, before a force should be assembled, to be satisfied regarding the resources from which the expenses were to be paid. These were of necessity adjusted; and the army moved in September, 1771, for the siege of Tanjour. The Raja had paid Trimbuc Row five lacs in advance, on the promise of his marching to raise the siege; and that chief had drawn from the warfare in Mysoor, a considerable body, which threatened to descend
into the province of Arcot; but four lacs from Mahommed Ali arrested their progress. The siege was considerably advanced, but was raised on the 15th of November, on the payment to Mahommed Ali of a large contribution. Trimbuc Row, like a true Mahratta, had sold himself to both parties, and Mahommed Ali was enabled by the compromise, to make a merit with the Poona Mahrattas, the ostensible lords paramount of Tanjour, of having desisted from the capture of that place out of pure deference to their friendship. But the mysteries of the scene were not yet completed. Although the Government of Madras, had openly announced to Hyder, and to the Mahrattas, the receipt of answers to their reference to England, which positively prohibited their assistance to either; they were still to be frightened into the belief of a Mahratta invasion, for the purpose of compelling them to join in the destruction of Hyder; and by a secret understanding, the Mahrattas even proceeded to plunder a part of the territory of Arcot; but Mahommed Ali, by declining the aid of the British troops for their expulsion, unveiled and terminated the deception.*

During this scene of childish fraud, the royal plenipotentiary, under the guidance of Mahommed Ali, opened a diplomatic correspondence with Trimbuc Row, of the progress of which, during its existence, the local government was kept in profound ignorance, but at its close were gravely informed by the royal envoy, "that he had proposed to the Mahrattas, in His Majesty’s name, a cessation of hostilities between their nation, the English, and the nabob of Arcot, until His Majesty’s pleasure should be known; and that he understood from the nabob that they (the

* See the extracts immediately following.
Mahrattas) had acceded to these proposals and withdrawn their troops.” — “Would it not (say the Government of Madras) have been more conformable to circumstances to have said, that the Mahrattas were desirous, in His Majesty’s name, to cease hostilities against the nabob; for neither the English nor the nabob have committed any hostilities against them: the nabob would not even consent to our moving an army to protect his borders, which the Mahrattas were plundering, while we remained peaceful spectators.” — “Why (they continue) an answer hath not been returned by the Mahratta general to the minister of the crown, who, in the name of the King condescended to make the proposal; or whether it be consistent with the honour and dignity of the crown of Great Britain, to be only an instrument in the hands of the nabob of the Carnatic, it may not become us to enquire.” The same able performance * contains the following judicious observations, on the nature of the English connection with Mahommed Ali, “Without money or resources, your apparent strength is real weakness; and if we must continue to be charged with the defence of an extensive country, the maintenance of a numerous army, and the support of an intricate political system, without authority, without the command of money or provisions, and without consequence, and what is still worse, in opposition to the power who commands all these: such a system is not to be varnished with specious descriptions; it may subsist for a while on the accidental weakness and embarrassments of our neighbours, but unless some effectual remedy be applied, it must sooner or later end in ruin.”

While the Government of Madras were thus restrained by in-

* General letter to England, 28th February, 1772.
superable impediments from the performance of their engagements to Hyder, and Mahommed Ali was thus obstructed by the talents and virtues of M. Du Prè, in his views of uniting with the Mahrattas; that state, whose direct object was the entire subjugation of the south, proposed to Hyder to compromise their differences, and unite for the conquest of the lower countries, to the eastward. Hyder made known these proposals to the English Government; stated that he considered an union with the Mahrattas, to be directly contrary to his interests; and the conquest of Arcot, through the medium of Mysoor, to involve his own inevitable ruin; that he had hitherto opposed their unreasonable demands on Mysoor, in the confident hope of receiving from the English, the aid stipulated by treaty, and would continue resistance as long as hope should remain; that he was aware of the influence which had hitherto prevented their performance of the compact; that he was willing to forget the causes of personal animosity towards Mahommed Ali, and to hope that the English would mediate a reconciliation; he authorized his envoys to propose, as the condition of prompt and effectual aid, the immediate payment of twenty lacs of rupees, and the cession to the English of the provinces of Bāramahāl, Salem and Ahtoor; and finally, the ambassadors were directed openly to announce, in the event of the rejection of all these advances, Hyder's reluctant determination to throw himself on the French for support.* To these ingenuous proposals, the Government felt themselves unable to make a suitable return; Mahommed Ali admitted the correctness of Hyder's statement regarding the views of the Mahrattas; but "that the friendship of the English

* In October, 1771.
ought not to be purchased with money," was an effusion of political Quixotism, not very advisedly risked, by the author of that breach of faith, which produced the sordid substitution of interested motives; and who in the whole of his connexion with the English nation, had uniformly tarnished their proudest trophies, with moral shame and political dishonour. Hyder evinced the earnestness and the soundness of his political views, by afterwards consenting to the humiliating peace which we have described in preference to the delusive strength which was offered to him by the Mahrattas, in their proposal for a joint conquest of Drauveda.

We have incidentally noticed the mission to Madras, which Hyder deemed material to his interests, when preparing to avail himself of the intestine commotions of the Mahratta state; the same circumstances had suggested to Mahommed Ali, the present moment, as the most favourable, for realizing his long projected design of possessing the fort and territory of Tanjour. An English army under General Joseph Smith, equipped with the means of a regular siege, arrived before the place on the 6th of August, and carried it by assault on the 17th of September. This new ground of jealousy between Mahommed Ali and the Mahrattas, augmented the hopes of Hyder with regard to the success of his mission: his ambassadors * arrived at Madras in December 1773, and opened their proposals; which were simply for a treaty (renewing the violated conditions of 1769,) to be executed by the English, by Hyder, and Mahommed Ali, and by the two latter to be confirmed by an oath on

* Aly Zeman Khan and Mhedee Aly Khan.
the Koran. Mahommed Ali repeated his former objections to this alliance, and placed in the front of his argument, a reason from which ordinary statesmen would have deduced an opposite conclusion; namely, that the Mahrattas, confessedly entertaining views of conquest over the whole south, would be too strong for the united forces of the allies. In the course of discussion however, he admitted, that after the capture of Tanjour, the Mahrattas would cease to place reliance in his promises; and that it would be wise to strengthen himself; by an alliance with Hyder. So long as these apprehensions continued, he seemed to yield to the opinions of the Government of Madras, regarding the impolicy of encreasing a power already too formidable; he passed with facility to the most gracious deportment towards Hyder’s ambassadors; he overwhelmed them with assurances of the most inviolable confidence and friendship, to the extent of unfolding all his designs, for the extension of the true faith; and “the delight * with which they should hereafter mutually view, from the terrace on which they were then seated, the expulsion of the last infidel Englishman over the surf which foamed at their feet;” he even submitted to the Government the draft of his project for a treaty: in which it is worthy of remark, that he proposed, as a special article, that the subjects of each who might fly away in disgust should be reciprocally given up; confining with his own hand, a fact which I have stated on other grounds of information, that his interior rule was more oppressive than even that of Hyder Ali. The negotiations

* Letter of the ambassadors to Hyder, found at Seringapatam in 1799. Mahommed Ali, however, made known to the government, that he affected an exclusive attachment to Hyder.
were continued; and when Ragonaut Row in 1774 was proceeding south after his advantageous peace with Nizam Ali, he shewed his keen resentment for the capture of Tanjour, and the general character of his designs, by the demands which preceded his approach. First, to join in the extirpation of Hyder; second, to restore Tanjour; “which belongs to the Sahoo * Raja;” third, to pay choute, (a fourth part of the revenue,) and Ser Déshmoukee (an additional tenth); claims which we shall hereafter attempt to unravel; but the intrigues at Poona compelled him to return; and a series of adventures, not within the direct scope of our design, which were encountered by that chief, would furnish abundant materials for a separate and interesting narrative. Successive and groundless apprehensions of treachery in the moment of victory, seem to have been the bane of his political career; and the abundant occupation of the Mahratta state in these intestine broils, relieved Mahommed Ali from his more immediate fears, and disposed him to resume his former political views.

The British act of parliament of 1773, among other remote benefits, had perhaps suggested to His Majesty’s ministers the expediency of revoking the powers of their Indian plenipotentiary which certainly had not been creditable to the wisdom of their councils; and the same act, in its immediate result, had rendered it necessary for the Government of Madras to refer, for the sanction of the Government General at Bengal, the proposed alliance with Hyder; but imperfect communications and inexplicable delays, protracted their decision; ambassadors † sent

* The pageant Mahratta sovereign, imprisoned at Sittora.
† Aly Nawaz Khán and Seyed Futté Ali.
by Mahommed Ali to Seringapatam immediately after the return of the Mysoreans, endeavoured to amuse Hyder with successive evasions; but in May 1775 that sagacious chief disgusted with procrastination, and distinctly perceiving the secret workings of the same crooked policy, which had uniformly impeded his alliance with the English, dismissed the envoys, with a civil letter, intimating, in polite terms, that as the climate appeared to be unfavourable to their health, he could not subject them to farther inconvenience: but in his personal audience of leave, he was sufficiently explicit: "you are respectable men" (said he) "and have acted in conformity to your orders; for seventeen months you have practised evasion, till you are ashamed of the part you have to perform: I will relieve you from the embarrassment, for I will no longer be trifled with; your master is desirous of shortening the thread of amity, but the time is not distant, when he will be glad to renew the advances which I have condescended to press upon him in vain: I have sincerely wished for an alliance in that quarter, but I must do without it, and you must return and say so." One of the envoys was a man of intelligence and observation, and his recorded report on his return, of the views and intentions of Hyder, was absolutely prophetic of every event that subsequently occurred from 1775 to 1780.

The capture of Tanjour had infused the greatest activity into all Mahommed Ali's projects of sovereign rule; he improved the fortifications of that place at an enormous expense; garrisoned it with his own troops; and augmented his regular force to twelve thousand sepoys, seven regiments of cavalry, and fifteen hundred artillery; the whole of which had now attained a respectable
degree of discipline and efficiency, under officers, on whose fidelity to their new master, the absurd confidence was apparently reposed, of relying on an oblivion of their prior and paramount duties as Englishmen. His plans being matured, he stated to the Governor, in a public conference, that his second son Ameer-ul-Omra, who had organized this force, was about to proceed to assume the command of Tanjour; that he mentioned the circumstance, not for the purpose of asking advice, but of announcing the fact, as an independent* sovereign. The intention must at this time have been either expressly known, or probably inferred; that early orders from England would arrive for restoring the country to the Raja; and if the notification we have stated had any meaning at all, it must have pointed to a resistance of these orders. Lord Pigot arrived in December, charged with their execution; and when the moment for decision arrived, Mahommed Ali discovering the† erroneous

* The sovereignty of the treaty of Paris, and the grants of the Mogul, were alternately used by Mahommed Ali, as the grounds of his pretensions; the former to alarm the English, regarding a guarantee without existence, and the latter, when it suited the argument, to represent his independence of all European power. The course of these discussions required that the former should be most prominent; he affirmed, that he had never asked the Company to obtain for him the royal grants, appointing him Nabob of Arcot, independent of the Soubadar of Decan. The absence of truth and modesty in this assertion, is sufficiently curious; but it is difficult to refrain from examining the question, whether, if these shadows of authority were to be employed at all, the English might not, with somewhat more of political foresight, (since it was equally easy,) have rendered themselves the sovereigns, and Mahommed Ali their deputy, or nabob.

† When the error was discovered, there was a second plan for getting rid of the European officers. Ameer-ul-Omra, vain and weak, as he was ambitious and unprincipled, had an ill choice of confidants, and one of them unwarily betrayed the secret, that “in a few weeks the Feringees’ (European officers,) heads would fly one way, and their topees, (hats,) another;” but he found that in this purpose also his
grounds of his calculating on the treason of his English officers, suffered all his mighty preparations to dissolve; the fort was occupied by British troops on the 9th February 1776; and Lord Pigot personally superintended the formal restoration of the Rajah’s authority in the month of April.

A curious evidence of Mahommed Ali’s designs was exhibited in his secret transactions with the East India Company of Denmark. A commission for military stores was given through Ameer ’ul Omra to the Danish Governor of Tranquebar; and the first lot, amounting to seven thirteen-inch mortars, twenty-six brass field pieces, with a proportion of shells and shot, four thousand musquets and carbines, two thousand saddles, &c. &c. arrived at Tranquebar in 1776, after the restoration of that place to the Rajah by Lord Pigot. All practicable secrecy was observed with regard to these stores until Hyder’s invasion in 1780, when Admiral Sir E. Hughes, at Mahommed Ali’s request, caused them to be conveyed from Tranquebar to Madras: and Hyder, whose vigilance nothing could escape, obtaining information of the removal of stores belonging to his inveterate enemy, which he deemed to be his own lawful prize, threatened the capture of Tranquebar, and compromised for a fine amounting to about fourteen thousand pounds sterling, which was actually paid.

A singular correspondence ensued in and after 1776, regarding the payment for these stores, and for countermanding the farther orders which had been given, “the circumstances under which the order was dispatched, had unfortunately changed, and might never instruments would fail him; the men would in preference have retorted such an order on its author. These facts, repeatedly stated to me in India, are supported by the information of one of those officers, now living, and in England.
return; but it was still of great importance that the transac-

tion should be concealed from the English.” Some instal-

ments were tardily paid; but on the assumption of Carnatic by

the East India Company in 1801, the Danes advanced their

claim on that Company for the payment of the balance. In

1803, a negotiation was carried on in England, in the course of

which the Danes were obliged to produce this secret correspond-

ence as evidence of the debt; and the English East India Com-

pany did accordingly discharge the balance then due, amounting

to 42,304l. 10s.

The powerful cabal of private creditors, who united with Ma-

hommed Ali, for the revolutionary arrest of that nobleman in

the succeeding August, could not dare to proceed the whole

length of re-placing Tanjouir in his possession. The phantom

of sovereignty had suffered a rude assault; but the delusive

hope of retrieving the blow, continued to be cherished, in a

subtle but weak mind, by a series of corrupt and interested de-

ceptions: a material ground of difference with the Mahrattas,

was however removed; and Mahommed Ali returned with ar-

dor to his former policy, of retrieving all past misfortunes, by

uniting with them, for the destruction of Hyder, and his other

enemies.

While the intrigues of Mahommed Ali, were thus preparing

for the English the hostility of Hyder, their transactions with

the Mahratta states were encompassing them with additional

dangers. Ragoba, supported by some of the most powerful

chiefs of the Mahratta state, is supposed to have taken a ground-

less alarm, in ascribing to them a participation in the treachery

of his Arab troops in 1775, which induced him, as we have
noticed, to fly to Cambay, and thence to Surat, and ultimately to proceed to Bombay; this imprudence left an open field to the ministers at Poona, who founded their authority on the custody of the reputed posthumous son of the late Pêshwa, a third gradation in the scale of usurpation; the guardians, or gaolers of the doubtful son of an usurper. The treaty of Colonel Upton, concluded with these ministers on the 1st of March 1776, among other conditions assigned a provision in a distant part of the Mahratta dominions, for Ragoba, who was in return to quit Bombay, and not to be supported by the English in any future efforts to disturb the government of the ministers. But that person protested against the treachery of thus delivering him up to the hands of his enemies: he claimed at least the protection offered to an ordinary resident, so long as he should give no political offence; and the Government of Bombay, who reprobated the whole transaction, were glad to rest their compliance with the request of Ragoba, on the powerful plea of common humanity.

In the mean while, the political preparations of the French, for the recovery of their lost ascendancy in India, were extended in every possible direction. The ill-fated councils which had estranged the English from Hyder Ali, had forced that chief into an intimate correspondence with Monsieur Bellecombe, the governor of Pondicherry: military stores of every description required, were furnished to him, through the medium of the French fortress of Mâhê, on the coast of Malabar, and the plans were concerted of future co-operation, at a more convenient season. At Guntoor, on the coast of Coromandel, French troops, as we shall presently notice, were introduced into the
service of Basâtut Jung; and Monsieur St. Lubin, whose adventures in the English service in 1768 have been slightly noticed, had now a real mission from the court of France; and was negotiating at Poona a treaty with the ministers, by which the port of Choul was to be ceded to France, for the purpose of introducing a body of French troops, to unite with that party in their hostile designs against the English power. Towards the close of the year 1777, a party at Poona, who preferred Ragoba under the protection of the English, to a French force for the support of a minister (Nana Furnanese) who had made a large stride towards open usurpation (by announcing his pretension to render hereditary in his own family, the office of minister to an infant pageant, the nominal usurper of the rights of another imprisoned pageant), opened their views to the British resident at Poona; and proposed a plan for the restoration of Ragoba, with the aid of an English force. The government of Bombay eagerly encouraged the project; and the governor general (Mr. Hastings) now restored to the authority of a casting voice at his own council, although he had disliked the connexion with Ragoba on its original footing, gave to the present plan his unqualified approbation. Uniformly disapproving the treaty of 1776, the Governor-general had recently proposed a modification of that instrument, in which he had introduced a provision against the danger he had long perceived to be most imminent, namely, the actual connexion of the ministerial party with the envoy of France, evinced by their repeated demands of troops; and by the attempt of St. Lubin, to obtain the permission of the Portuguese government, to pass two French regiments, for a purpose not exactly ascertained by the unsuspected route of
Goa from the south, and at the same time to occupy Damaun to the north of Bombay, inasmuch as the establishment conceded to that nation at Choul, was too near to Bombay, and at present too defenceless to be occupied, until some decisive blow should have been struck elsewhere.

The negotiations for counteracting these designs assumed various and fluctuating shapes, adapted to the exigencies of the times. Shabajee Bhoonsla, the Mahratta ruler of Berar, was to be supported in the hereditary claims which he was supposed to possess, as lineal * descendant of the great Sevajee; and was expected to overturn at once the complex usurpation which governed at Poona. A respectable force was also prepared in the north-western provinces subject to Bengal, destined to the arduous attempt of traversing the whole of Hindostan, to Poona, or to the western shores of India, as circumstances might require. The professed object of this expedition was the protection of Bombay, ruled by an inefficient government, against the hostile

* Letter from Bengal, 17th August, 1778. There are few persons so little likely to have been misinformed on such a subject as Mr. Hastings. The claim is said to have been founded on adoption; but I can trace none to the family of Berar.

Sevajee had two sons, Sambha and Ramah. The first of these had two sons Sahoo and Sambha. Sahoo died without issue, and I have been able to trace no adoption. Sambha adopted a son, from whom is descended the family of Colapoor, and according to Hindoo law, the present Rajah of that place is unquestionably the lineal heir of Sevajee, in the elder branch. The line of pageant Rajahs, confined in Sittara, being as unquestionably descended from Ramu, the second son of Sevajee; if the claim of Berar be founded on a supposed adoption by Sahoo, and that adoption be real; there would then be a precedency of two claims to the privilege of incarcerated royalty, over that which has actually been established; the precedency of Colapoor is certain, and if Mr. Hastings ascribed an adoption to Sahoo, he probably did so on good grounds.
designs of the French; and it commenced its march in May 1778, but was checked by various delays, independently of the death of Mr. Elliot, who was proceeding on a mission to Berar, connected with the accessory object of engaging the interest of Shahbajee Bhounsla. The death of that able public servant, and that of the actual Rajah, defeated the first project of placing him at the head of the Mahratta empire: but a better result followed, in the secret separation of this family from the Mahratta cooperation, and its effective support of the English government, when in 1780 the invasion of Bengal was committed to Moodajee, the successor of Shahbajee, as one branch of the confederacy for the expulsion of the English from every part of India.

Mr. Elliot had recently returned overland from England, and in passing through Paris had been confidentially informed by Lord Stormont, the British ambassador, that war with France was inevitable; and shortly before Mr. Elliot’s death, while on his route to Berar, he had, by seizing the person of Mons. Chevalier, intercepted a letter from Mons. Bellecombe to St. Lubin confirming the same intelligence, and desiring him to urge the Mahrattas to immediate action. This intelligence* induced the English to make those preparations which enabled them to anticipate the blow, by the early reduction of all the French possessions on the continent of India.

In the mean while the preparations at Bombay were conducted with a tardiness and imbecility which deprived Ragoba of the advantages of secrecy, and gave to his enemies the opportunity

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* The declaration of American independence, by M. de Noailles, was dated the 13th of March, 1778; on the 7th of August the Government of Bengal received official intelligence of the war, through M. Baldwin, at Cairo.
of discovering and destroying his adherents, and organizing at leisure the means of resistance. It has been objected to the cause of Ragoba, that no army appeared to join him on his entering the Mahratta territory; but the lessons of history, from the earliest ages, might instruct statesmen in the fallacy of resting in ordinary cases any plan of military operation on the expectation of such assistance: reflection might always suggest, that the organization and equipment of a military force, which requires the whole exertion of the established powers of a state, is not easily achieved by the desultory and sudden efforts of those who are watched and counteracted by those established authorities.

The Government of Bombay, had however, completed their preparations about the close of the year; and in imitation of the ludicrous policy of Madras, in 1768, appointed field deputies from their civil service to direct the military operations in the field, a measure which by a selection, at least as unwise, of a bed-ridden commander had been rendered almost necessary: On the 1st of January, 1779, the army, consisting of about 5000 men, including a small corps with Ragoba, surmounted the hills and moved forwards: the conduct of the officers and troops was highly creditable, and their losses severe; but after penetrating to a situation not twenty miles from Poona, the pressure of the overwhelming force by which they were incessantly surrounded, harassed, and starved, suggested the necessity of retreat, which terminated on the 14th of the same month, in the disastrous convention of Worgaum; this instrument provided on one hand for the safe return of the troops, and on the other for the surrender
CHAP. of Ragoba, the restitution of all former conquests, and the return to Bengal of the troops whose march has been noticed; and for the performance of the latter conditions, two English Gentlemen* were delivered as hostages. The Government of Bombay disavowed the treaty of Worgaum; and the Supreme Government conceiving that one of the parties to this convention, namely, the field deputies, had exceeded all powers with which they could possibly be deemed to be vested, by stipulating for that, over which the Government of Bombay itself had no authority, determined to sacrifice the hostages † rather than execute the terms of this disgraceful compact.

In the mean while the concentration of this Mahratta force in the direction of Poona, had relieved the detachment from Bengal from the presence of the troops, which were otherwise destined to oppose its march; and Colonel Goddard, who had succeeded to the command of this force, deviated from the course towards Poona, which he was pursuing, when he heard of the convention of Worgaum; and by a great and continued exertion arrived at Surat before the end of February.

The means which were thus placed at the disposal of the Government of Bombay, for the renewal of the war; and the powers with which General Goddard was invested for the conclusion of peace, disposed the ministerial party at Poona to an

* Messrs. Farmer and Stewart.

† It is creditable to the humanity of Madajee Sindia, whose prisoners they became, that he afterwards released them unconditionally. To Lt. Steward, who expressed to him his scruples, he replied, "resume your place in the army, your sword is your subsistence."
acquiescence in the modification of the treaty of 1776, to which we have formerly adverted. They expressed in a letter to Bombay their earnest desire for an immediate accommodation; and in the confidence of returning friendship informed that Government of the great preparations which they were completing, for marching in full force against Hyder Ali, at the opening of the ensuing season; when the escape of *Ragoba from the custody of Sindia, to General Goddard's camp on the 12th of June, changed the whole plan of their policy; and induced them to depute without a moment's delay, the embassy to Hyder, that terminated in the offensive alliance against the English, which has been already noticed.

But the hostility of these two states did not constitute the only danger which threatened the English power. The interference of France, in the dispute between Great Britain and her colonies, had now terminated in an open rupture between those two states; and although the capture of Pondicherry, after a gallant resistance in October 1778, and the reduction of Mâhê in March 1779, had relieved the English from the most imminent of their dangers in Coromandel and Malabar; still the vicinity of the French islands enabled that Power to give the most formidable support to the impending confederacy, which was farther strengthened by the active political efforts of Nizam Ali, the result of transactions with the Government of Madras which it remains to describe.

We have seen that in the arrangements which were concluded

* He was accompanied by his adopted son, Amrut Row, then seventeen, and Bâjee Row, four years old, born to him after the adoption of the former. This Bâjee Row is the present Pêshwa, 1816.
between Nizam Ali and the English regarding the cession of the northern Circars; that of Guntoor forming a part of the jageer of Basâlut Jung was reserved during the life-time of that chief, but the Company were declared to possess the full reversionary right to that district, and as a guard against the designs of his brother, the jealous condition had been added by Nizam Ali, of the right of the English to dispossess him at any earlier period, if his conduct should be hostile or injurious. The district of Guntoor occupies a considerable extent of sea coast, between the northern boundary of the dominions of Arcot and the river Kistna, which was then the southern limit of the other northern Circars possessed by the English. The trifling seaport of Mootapillee had been employed by Basâlut Jung for the introduction into his service of French officers and troops; and the disciplined corps under Monsieur Lally had attained a respectable degree of force and organization, at the period that we have described it as surprized by Hyder in its trenches at Bellari in 1775.

Basâlut Jung meditating to render this corps the foundation of retrieving his fortunes, continued to augment and improve it, to every practicable extent; and this incessant introduction of French officers and troops into the interior of the peninsula, and the interposition of a French force, between the different positions of the English territory on the coast of Coromandel, had caused repeated remonstrances from the Government at Madras, both to Nizam Ali and Basâlut Jung. The result of some previous negotiations produced, in the early part of the year 1779, an offer from Basâlut Jung to rent that Circar to the English; and subsequently an agreement by which he engaged
to dismiss the French corps from his service, on the condition of being furnished with a body of English troops for the defence of his dominions. The endeavours of the English to obtain an amicable transfer of that life interest in the district of Guntoor, which constituted the only impediment to their occupation of that territory, was a measure perfectly justifiable: but in connecting that legitimate object, with the loose condition of defending the other possessions of Basâlut Jung, they rushed into a wide and dangerous field of political discussion, utterly beyond their competence, as a subordinate presidency.

The improvidence of Basâlut Jung in an augmentation of force, disproportioned to his financial means, had caused the French corps to be ill paid and discontented: he hoped to retrieve his finances by stipulating, that the revenues of Guntoor should furnish the payment of his English auxiliary force; and when Lally*, already seduced by Nizam Ali, was about to leave his service, he transferred to the English the possession of Guntoor, and earnestly pressed the immediate march of their auxiliary troops to Adwâni, at the precise time that Hyder, after the capture of Chittledroog, was in motion for the conquest of Kurpa, a country exactly interposed between the ceded province and the capital of Basâlut Jung. The tardy arrangements of the Government of Madras had not prepared the detachment until the month of August, when Hyder, after completing that conquest, had long returned to Seringapatam, leaving the provincial command to the care of Meer Sâheb. The orders for the march

* The Government of Fort St. George, (general letter, 3d April, 1780,) state the reception of these troops by Nizam Ali, to be a direct violation of the treaty of 1768. I cannot find the condition which it violates.
of the British detachment were issued with the same loose unconcern, as if they had related to a simple interior movement: its route, by the provinces of Kurpa and Kurnool, amounting to at least two hundred miles of road distance, was through the most difficult passes of the peninsula, and across the territories of two powers, namely Hyder and Nizam Ali, who were directly interested in preventing its progress. By a political inadvertence scarcely credible, no previous notice was given, or permission requested, to pass a military force through these foreign territories; the officer commanding was merely furnished with a letter from the governor to Hyder's manager (as he is named) of the district, requesting that he would allow the troops to pass; a proceeding undignified, as it regarded the governor, and insulting as it related to Hyder, subversive of all intelligible relations, and only shewing that the governor was aware of the necessity of some sort of permission. Colonel Harper, the officer commanding, was allowed to proceed without molestation, until the whole body was fairly entangled in a deep winding rugged vale, between two precipitous hills; when a breast-work of felled trees, lined with musquetry, was seen in front; troops were observed to be in motion in the hills on both flanks, and a larger force to close up the rear; when Colonel Harper, perceiving the perilous snare into which he was advancing, prudently determined on an immediate retreat, which was permitted without serious hostility. The Government, on receiving this report, determined to reinforce the detachment, and remonstrate with Hyder, assuming in their letter, as an axiom in the law of nations, that friendly states were always at liberty to march troops through each other's territories. Hyder not only resisted this
novel doctrine, but announced to Basâlut Jung his fixed determination, not to suffer an English corps to pass to Adwâni, nor the district of Guntoor to pass into the hands of his most inveterate enemy; (for the Government had already unveiled the secret mover of the scene, by sub-renting the district to Mahommed Ali.) Hyder's declaration was quickly followed by a body of light troops, who laid waste the territory of Adwâni up to the gates of the capital; and by the time that Colonel Harper was reinforced, and had recommenced his march, he was stopped by letters from Basâlut Jung, stating that he was threatened with destruction, both by Hyder, and Nizam Ali, if he should continue his connexion with the English; and requesting that for the present the Colonel should desist from the attempt to advance. Another letter, to the Government of Madras, implored their restoration of Guntoor, as the only means of saving him from the vengeance of his enemies. But that Government determined to keep possession of the territory, in conformity to the treaty, and to announce that the troops which they had agreed to maintain for his service, were ready to perform their part of the stipulation. Nizam Ali resented, as an act of hostility against himself, the stipulation of the English, for the unconditional defence of his brother, and most formidable rival; and entered with the utmost zeal into the confederacy of the other states.

Such were the formidable combinations which encouraged Hyder to persevere in his part of the general plan, which had for its avowed object the extermination of the British power in India. But in order that our future narrative may not be interrupted by a reference to the subsequent negotiations with Nizam Ali, it
CHAP. XXI.
1779.

may be a convenient anticipation to state in this place, that all these transactions were veiled by an unlawful mystery from the Government-General of Bengal, to whom the treaty with Basálut Jung, concluded in April, 1779, was not communicated until the 18th of February, 1780; and when disapproved, and restitution ordered to be made, those orders were evaded and disobeyed, under the pretext of awaiting the concurrence of Mahommed Ali; that the Governor, Mr. Whitehill, was in consequence suspended from his office, in October, 1780; and the prompt restitution of Guntoor immediately effected; and that by these and other judicious and conciliatory measures, the Supreme Government succeeded in detaching from this powerful confederacy Nizam Ali Khán, who professed himself to have been its original adviser. But it is of importance to add, that the Government-General were materially aided in their negotiations by the effect produced on the mind of Nizam Ali by certain intelligence recently received, of one of the mandates or grants from the Mogul, so often discussed, having been procured by Hyder, conferring on him the whole of the possessions then held by Nizam Ali himself.

We return from a digression, necessary for explaining the condition of the British power, which Hyder was about to assail, to resume the narrative of his own direct communications with that Government.

On the departure of Mahommed Ali's ambassadors in 1775, Hyder reluctantly, but finally, dismissed from his mind all expectation of an alliance with the English; and turned his earnest attention to their European rivals, the French; who received his advances with marked encouragement; a vakeel, or political
agent, continued to reside at Madras, for the purpose of intelligence; but his intercourse with the Government was limited to those formal communications, which are made as a matter of routine, to all powers not in actual hostility on the occurrence of any important event. On the occasion of his victory and pursuit of Hurry Punt Purkia, he addressed one of these letters to the Governor, in January, 1778; which was answered by a letter of congratulation in the following month, from Sir T. Rumbold, who had recently succeeded to the government, and expressed a desire for farther amicable communications. Hyder was engaged in an arduous service (namely the reduction of the Mahratta territory between the rivers) which rendered it necessary that he should temporize, and he returned to this communication a letter of great civility accompanied by some presents. The same causes which would for a time prevent his aiding the French, in that rupture with the English, which he knew to be impending, induced him to attempt amusing them with other schemes; and in pursuance of this design, his agent submitted to the Governor the project of a joint operation for replacing Ragoba, in the Pêshwaship of Poona. This advance was met by the proposal of a personal conference, to discuss the details of a permanent alliance; and Hyder replied, by objecting to the great distance of his present situation, and by suggesting that an envoy should be sent to him for that purpose, as soon as his arrangements should be in sufficient forwardness. In the mean while, the urgency to his own affairs of the service in which he was engaged, prevented him from moving to the support of the French, at Pondicherry, during a siege protracted from the 8th of August till the 18th of October.
Although the Government of Madras had recently expressed their conviction to the Supreme Government that Mahommed Ali would never consent to the alliance with Hyder; yet on announcing to that chief the fall of Pondicherry, they pressed its conclusion, by desiring an explicit declaration of his sentiments regarding the proposed treaty. But the period had passed away for the realization of such a project. Hyder had reluctantly engaged in other connexions; and was persuaded, that the secret impediments to a sincere alliance with the English, continued to be insurmountable; although, therefore, he replied in terms of cold and formal congratulation, on the success of the English arms, he evaded the explicit declaration which was required, by saying that he would write on the subject of a personal interview with the Governor, as soon as he should have finished an expedition on which he was then engaged. The Governor, however, persevered in his desire of farther communication, by proposing to send a resident to his court; and concluded with announcing to him, his intention of sending an expedition for the reduction of Mâhê.

Although Hyder had heard with regret of the capture of Pondicherry, his immediate convenience was not materially affected by that event; but if the fortress and port of Mâhê should fall into the possession of the English, he would lose the direct source of military supply, and his allies their last remaining point of co-operation: he therefore replied to this intimation, that he considered the various settlements of the Dutch, French, and English, on the coast of Malabar to be equally entitled to his protection as being erected on his territory, and that he should certainly oppose the designs of any one of those powers against
the settlements of another; he at the same time directed his agent to announce to the Governor, in the most explicit terms, that in the event of an attack on Mâhê, he should not only aid in its direct defence, but retaliate, by detaching a body of troops to lay waste the province of Arcot. That forts and harbours, possessed by European powers, long before Hyder's existence, should pass under his sovereignty, in consequence of a subsequent conquest of the adjoining territory, was a political assumption of sufficient absurdity, and the English government would have sacrificed all pretensions to dignity and independence, by yielding to a determination founded on such futile pretences. Mahommed Ali was of a different opinion, he recommended that the expedition to Mâhê, already arrived on the coast of Malabar, should be postponed; and reverted to the policy so often repudiated, of strengthening themselves against Hyder, by an alliance with the Mahrattas; the service went on, and although Hyder's troops assisted in the defence of the place, and his colours were hoisted with those of the French to indicate his protection, it fell in the month of March. The Nairs in the neighbourhood immediately rose in rebellion against Hyder's Government, in the hope of being supported by the English; but Colonel Brathwaite, who commanded the expedition, did not consider himself justified, under the equivocal aspect of Hyder's policy, to engage in any act of direct aggression; the Nairs were consequently subdued by Hyder's provincial troops, and were afterwards stimulated to attack the English, not only at Mâhê, but at their ancient settlement of Tellicherry.

If Hyder did not put into immediate execution his threat of
invading the territory of Arcot, he was restrained by motives of a prudential and temporary nature, and he certainly cannot be accused of disguising his intention. In a letter written in the succeeding month, after complaining of incessant impropriety of conduct, on the part of Mahommed Ali’s officers on the frontier, he adds, that out of respect to the King of England, and the gentlemen of the council at Madras, he had as yet taken no step to retaliate, reminds the Governor of the notice he had given regarding Māhē; and concludes with the significant observation, that the Governor was the best judge of his own conduct. The reply of the Governor, after expressing surprise at Hyder’s partiality to the French, in preference to the English, somewhat awkwardly, complains for the first time, of Hyder’s conquest in 1776, of the territories of Morari Row, who was included as an ally, in the treaty of 1769; and also of the conquest of Kurpa, which Mahommed Ali with literal truth, but political deception had represented to be an ancient dependency* of Carnatic. The tone of Hyder’s last communication was certainly calculated to excite alarm: and the Governor determined to adopt the best means in his power for disposing him to more amicable councils; or at least to ascertain the actual extent of his designs.

Among the Danish missionaries patronized by the English society for promoting Christian knowledge, was a German clergy-

* He intended to represent it as a dependency of Dravveda, now named Carnatic Payen Ghaut, on which it never had depended. It was an ancient portion of Telingana, (see vol. i. p. 5 and 6,) when the Mahommedan conquerors made the artificial division of Carnatic Vijeyapoor and Carnatic Hyderabad, (vol. i. p. 218;) Kurpa was included in the conquests of the latter, but on no occasion was a dependency of the Payen Ghaut.
man, named Swartz, who had his principal residence at Tanjouër, but frequently travelled in the exercise of his religious functions, to various parts of the peninsula. He was a man of considerable information, of amiable demeanour, and of a purity of manners, and simplicity of deportment, which emulated the Apostolic character. To this respectable person, the Governor intrusted the secret mission of proceeding to the court of Hyder, to "sound" his disposition; to assure him of the amicable designs of the English Government; and if he should appear to be peaceably disposed, to inform him that a deputation of some principal members of the council would be sent to him, to adjust the terms of a lasting alliance. By the most unhappy coincidence of events, Mr. Swartz arrived at Seringapatam, a few days after Hyder had received the intelligence of Colonel Harper's hostile attempt (as it was there considered) to pass without permission through the province of Kurpa, towards Adwânee: this event was not calculated to compose Hyder's resentment on other accounts; but he assured Mr. Swartz, that "if the English offered the hand of peace and concord, he would not withdraw his," provided ** ** ** *, but of these mysterious provisos, nothing can now be ascertained. * Hyder was gracious and condescending to the envoy; but his two letters to the Governor, the first delivered by Mr. Swartz, and the second transmitted in the succeeding

* The arrival of a private traveller was so little calculated to excite attention, that few persons of Hyder's court could recollect any thing of him, excepting that Hyder, who conversed with the teachers of all religions, had about this period some conversations with a Christian priest, who came to instruct some of his European soldiers.
month, spoke daggers to the most torpid apprehension. He took a review of the conduct of the English, as connected with Mahommed Ali, from the fraud of Trichinopoly in 1752, to their violation of the treaty of 1769; he enumerated their hostile conduct at Mâhè, the attempt to march troops through his territories to those of Basalut Jung; the conduct of Mahommed Ali's officers on the frontiers; and of the Company's servants at Tellicherry, in furnishing protection and aid to his rebellious subjects, as so many evidences of their determination to break with him at all events, and added, "I have not yet taken revenge; it is no matter. But if you henceforth, forgetting all treaties and engagements of the Company, still are intent on breaking with me, what advantage can attend writing to you? When such improper conduct is pursued, what engagements will remain inviolate? I leave you to judge on whose part engagements and promises have been broken. You are acquainted with every thing, it is right to act in all things with prudence and foresight." On the return of Mr. Swartz, the Governor communicated for the first time to his council, the result of a mission which had been undertaken without their knowledge: the only documents recorded on the occasion, are the Governor's letter to Hyder, which merely stated the amicable objects of the mission, and Hyder's answers, already adverted to, which add, that "Mr. Swartz would inform him, (the Governor) with several matters he had charged him with;" but no entry was made on the records of the information from Mr. Swartz, thus directly and officially referred to; nor a single line of report, or journal, or communication, in any form, from a person who had been charged with a political mission
of the greatest importance. In a period abounding with themes of wonder, it is impossible to repress our astonishment, that no individual charged with public authority in India or in England, ever suggested the examination of Mr. Swartz on these points; or called for a journal or report of his proceedings. A committee of the House of Commons, subsequently charged with the investigation of these transactions, simply reports the fact of no such entry having been made; but adds no suggestion regarding the obvious means of supplying the defect. Although I had the pleasure of Mr. Swartz’s acquaintance many years afterwards, and have heard him narrate many facts connected with the subject of this mission, he died long before my attention was directed to historical pursuits; but I had hoped that a journal might be found among his papers; and his worthy successors kindly complied with my request* to examine them for that purpose; no such document was found; but extracts were made from his correspondence, which unfortunately interposes a mysterious † blank at the very point on which our information is defective. The whole of these extracts are subjoined ‡ for the purpose of exhibiting the amount of the lights which they afford regarding the nature of the mission, and of furnishing a curious and interesting picture of the mind of this venerable Christian, who seems to have deemed the political mission no

* Through my friend, Colonel Blackburn, political resident at Tanjour.
† “The Nabob, (Mahonmed Ali, at Madras,) and others, frustrated all hopes of peace,” says Mr. Swartz; this may afford a clue to conjecture, which conversations between Mr. Swartz and his most intimate friends would render sufficiently explicit, if it were permitted to found on the recollection of such conversations, after a long interval, the narrative of an historical fact, of more than ordinary delicacy, involving the reputations of the dead.
‡ Appendix, No. 2. end of this volume.
CHAP. XXI.

farther worthy of notice, than as it tended to promote a particular object of spiritual pursuit.

1779. A point of secret history seems to be connected with the mission of Mr. Swartz, which is not explained by another which immediately succeeded it. Six English gentlemen and a lady had proceeded from Europe to Alexandria, and traversing Egypt to Suez, had there embarked on board a Danish ship bound to Calicut on the coast of Malabar, where both ship and cargo were seized for having English property on board; and all the passengers were plundered and sent as prisoners to Seringapatam. Hyder on their arrival directed the governor* of Calicut, who accompanied them to the capital, to ascertain how many of them were fit for gunners, but on discovering that there was not one military man among them, he gave an early order for their release: there was some hope that their property would also be restored, but unfortunately some of the articles attracted Hyder’s fancy, others were probably intercepted in his name without his authority, and the prisoners were dismissed with a very slender wardrobe. On the first intelligence of this capture, the governor of Madras determined on the mission of an envoy to demand the release of the English subjects, and to embrace the same opportunity of resuming an attempt at amicable alliance. The person selected for this service was Mr. Gray, formerly of the civil service in Bengal. He met at Amboor on the English frontier (where he had waited a few days for his passport from Hyder) the prisoners, whose release formed the first object of his mission, but he determined to proceed in prosecution of the second, al-

* Sirdar Khan.
though limited by the terms of his passports to a retinue which scarcely allowed him the conveniences of a private traveller. On his arrival near the capital, quarters were assigned to him at the distance of two miles, in a miserable shed half filled with artillery ropes, where (according to his journal) "one of Hyder's chobdârs* came and squatted himself by his side and asked a variety of impertinent questions." His own attendants of the same order were not permitted to go with a message to Hyder, according to ordinary etiquette, and not one of his people stirred from the shed without being openly attended by a spy, to prevent his having any communications, excepting for the purpose of purchasing what he required in the market. He was however admitted to an audience on the succeeding evening, "after (as he reports) being kept in an open veranda two hours to be stared at," and delivered his letter and presents. Of course no business was transacted in this first audience: but on the ensuing morning the presents † were returned, with an intimation that hostility was not to be inferred from that circumstance. It was Hyder's intention to shew that the presents were not suited to the dignity of the giver or the receiver, and adverting to customs of which the Governor and his envoy ought not to have been ignorant, they had fairly subjected themselves

* Attendants with silver or gold staffs, who act as a sort of subordinate marshals and messengers; the attempt of one of these persons to sit down in the presence of a man of rank, would every where in India be deemed a broad and deliberate insult.

† A saddle and a gun constituted their whole amount; the saddle, (of English make, N.B. of hogskin to a Mussulman,) seemed intended to try, not assist the seat; the gun, (a rifle which loaded at the breech,) was charged at the wrong end; such is the verbal account I have received of the messages which attended their return; Mr. Gray's journal is to the same effect, but somewhat softened.
to this rude retort. A few days afterwards Mr. Gray proceeded to
the private audience which he had requested: and after being in-
troduced to the public durbar, and waiting about half an hour,
without being spoken to by Hyder, a person came to announce
that if he wished a private audience, a person in Hyder's confi-
dence would retire with him into an adjoining apartment, report
the result to Hyder, and bring his answer. Mr. Gray expressed a
wish for a personal audience, but on being informed that this was
not customary, he retired with Mahommed Osmân * who brought
him the intimation; and who frequently passed to the durbar
to refer to Hyder, and bring his replies. Mr. Gray announced
the main object of his mission to be a closer union of interests,
to which Hyder replied, that he would be glad of the friendship
of the English; but of what avail were treaties? of the treaty
of 1769, they had broken every article: his affairs had been
reduced to the brink of ruin, by their refusal to aid him against
the Mahrattas: that was the time for friendship, if friendship
had existed: after such an example, it was unnecessary to
enumerate minor grievances.† Mr. Gray adroitly replied, that
he had not come to speak of grievances under former govern-
ments, but to propose a remedy against new ones; and a treaty
which should ensure the aid of troops when necessary. To this,
Mahommed Osmân replied from himself, "that Hyder did not
want them, the time was, when he would have been thankful
for them, but now he was strong enough to take care of him-

* He was attended also by Mahommed Ghyâss.
† Among other observations, he stated, that the English had conquered Tanjour,
which was guaranteed by the treaty. This was intended to retort the Governor's
observation regarding his own conquest of Gooty; but Tanjour was taken in 1773,
and restored in April 1775; and Gooty was not taken till 1776, and never restored.
self and do without them. I have been at Madras," said Osmân, "and have observed how your allies are treated: Mahommed Ali shewed me several letters from the king of England, but complained of the lacs of pagodas which each of those letters cost him." To this observation, Mr. Gray gave the turn of expressing his satisfaction that Mahommed Ali had friends at Seringapatam; he desired to be understood, that the wish for Hyder's friendship did not proceed from weakness; as the English Government was not in a state to solicit alliances; that he had so far executed his commission; and would either immediately return with the ungracious answer he had received; or wait for orders in reply to his report, as Hyder might think fit. That chief had now given abundant, repeated, and most explicit proofs of his intentions, but he did not wish to precipitate hostility before he was perfectly ready: he therefore carelessly answered that the gentleman might write; but although it had been agreed that his letters were to be sent by Hyder's post, he found himself obliged, after numerous evasions, to send them by special messengers, and during the whole period of waiting for a reply Hyder was inaccessible to all his advances. At length, when Hyder knew that he had received his answer, without desiring or waiting for a communication of its contents, he notified to the envoy, that he would on that evening give him his audience of leave. Under these circumstances, Mr. Gray determined, that if Hyder should make no enquiry regarding the answer, he would not give him the opportunity of insulting him in public durbar, by speaking on the subject himself. Under ordinary circumstances this would certainly have been the most dignified course of proceeding;
but as the Government of Madras had not chosen to believe the hostility so frequently professed, and had allowed this mission to proceed with no remaining object, but to be more distinctly informed of Hyder's determinations; it would seem to have been more consistent with that object, to have brought those determinations to the most open and public issue. The envoy sat an hour in silence, when beetel and ottar of roses, the usual indications of dismissal, were offered, and presents of the customary description * and value were offered and accepted; apparently because the envoy was glad to escape on any terms, from a country in which he was treated so inhospitably: where, (according to his own description,) "he had been received and treated as a spy, rather than an ambassador; rather confined than lodged; and in which the trifling civilities of fruits and flowers were delivered by chobdars, who were uncivil, insolent, greedy, and clamorous."

We have entered into circumstances of more than usual detail, for the purpose of enabling the reader to form his own judgment regarding the conduct which might have been expected in consequence, from men † governed by the ordinary degree of intellect, and swayed by the usual impulses that actuate mankind. It must be stated to the credit of Mahommed Ali, that he recommended, in the strongest terms, the most vigorous preparations for the reception of the enemy; and continued from day to day to report the progress of Hyder's

* Gold cloths, shawls, and two bags, of 500 rupees each.
† Mr. Gray arrived at Madras on the 30th March, 1780; Mr. Whitehill succeeded to the government on the departure of Sir T. Rumbold, a few days afterwards.
preparations, and the certainty of immediate invasion; but he had become a Cassandra, without the interposition of Apollo, his predictions were all discredited; in every successive year since the peace of 1769 he had continued to announce the same event, till his prophecies became the theme of ridicule, and tended only to confirm the torpor and imbecility of this unhappy government. His warnings were moreover unaccompanied by the means of following his counsel; from the period of the restitution of Tanjore, the noble corps of troops which he had embodied were constantly mutinous for want of pay, and continued to go off, full of grief and indignation, in large bodies, to the service of Hyder. While thus paying no one, Mahommed Ali borrowed from every one who would lend; and repaid these loans, and the imaginary services by which he was still deluded, chiefly by bonds; some payable at stated, some at indefinite periods; all eventually charged on the revenues of the country, while the gold was hoarded as it was received, in his secret coffers. The Government at Madras were incessant in their complaints of “the great difficulty they had, to obtain the least assistance from the nabob, or any part of the large balances remaining due, though it is beyond a doubt that money to a large amount is now* hoarded up in his coffers at Chepauk.† This backwardness is not the complaint of a day; the records are filled with the distress which the Company’s affairs have been exposed to, by the trifling and nugatory conduct of the nabob, whenever money has been demanded of him;” and again, “no

* Dated July, 1778, the very time when his troops were in the greatest distress for pay.
† His residence near Madras.
sense of the common danger, in case of a war, can prevail on him to furnish the Company with what is absolutely necessary to assemble an army.” Of this person, whom it once became the fashion to designate as the most faithful ally of the English Company, our judgment would be more unqualified, if the most mournful palliations were not everywhere discernible in the conduct of those Englishmen by whom he was plundered and deluded. But with regard to the Government of Madras, as no language can convey an adequate impression of conduct, which no ordinary amount of evidence would render credible to succeeding ages, we shall be satisfied with a bare enunciation of facts. In their letter to England, of the 12th of February, they express a hope (whence derived it is difficult to conjecture) that “as the season is so far advanced, they should preserve the peace of the Carnatic that year.” On the 3d of April, after inveighing against the conduct of Bombay, stigmatizing the Mahratta war as the source of Hyder’s increased strength, and proposing a Mahratta peace as their best security against his designs, they seem to infer, that notwithstanding his hostile demonstrations, he was unwilling or unable to act openly against them, although he had himself told them, in the most distinct terms, that he was both able and willing; and after adverting to the late correspondence, and the mission of Mr. Gray, instead of entering into any consideration, immediate or remote, of the practical measures of state which such conduct could not fail to suggest to men of ordinary intellect, they close their observations with the following puerile remark, “your Honours will be able to judge clearly of Hyder’s disposition towards us: this unfriendly, not to say insolent conduct, could only have been encouraged by
our present troubles with the Mahrattas, in which he finds so much advantage as we have already explained;” but of anything in the shape of a measure no trace is to be found on the records, unless we are to class as such a letter to Bengal, of similar import, which added a description of their total helplessness. No measure of precaution was adopted regarding supplies of food, a branch of the science of war not only the most difficult, but requiring the earliest combinations: no provision was made for the defence of places, or the formation of a field force; not one soldier was moved from his ordinary cantonment, nor a single indication afforded of being awake to the perception of facts notorious to all India, and in Mysoor not attempted to be concealed. “I have tried them already (said Hyder) and I know them well, they have no conduct; and even now, when I have assembled my whole force to enter the country, they have not shewn the least glimmering of ability.”* On his own part every branch of preparation was arranged with the most scrupulous care; no department escaped his personal inspection; and although ample provision was made for the military occupation of all the posts, in every part of his dominions, he moved from his capital in the month of June, with a force which had probably not been equalled, and certainly not surpassed, in strength and efficiency, by any native army that had ever been assembled in the south † of India: prayers for the success of the

* The very words of a paper of intelligence from Hyder’s army, delivered by Mahommed Ali on the 25th July, 1780; the intelligence was perfectly correct, it was Hyder’s ordinary topic of conversation at this time.

† The following is a correct return of the force actually mustered at Bangalore, which is exclusive of Meer Saheb’s corps, still at Kurpa, altogether about 6000 horse and foot,
CHAP. expedition, were ordered to be offered up in the mosques; and the jebbum* to be performed in the Hindoo temples. His 1780.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stable horse</th>
<th>14,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Silledar ditto</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savanoor ditto</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry regularly armed and disciplined</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Select and veteran peons in regular pay</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto, assembled from the local establishments, subject to relief, and kept constantly complete</td>
<td>18,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peons of tributary Poligars, exclusively of their small contingents of cavalry</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>83,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Besides about 2000 rocket men; a corps of unarmed pioneers, of near 5000 men, well instructed and equipped; and a commissariat admirably organized, under the direction of a bramin, named Poonia, one of his ministers of finance.

The detachments made for the occupation of his conquests, and the accession of recruits and whole corps after the invasion, may, I think, be computed as nearly balancing each other; so that his disposable force, during the greater period of the war, may be taken with probable accuracy at about ninety thousand men. Of the Poligars of Calastry, Bomrauz, &c. who joined him near Arcot, it would be difficult to determine how they should be estimated; with his army they were a dead incum-brance; but if not with him, they might have been against him.

* Jебbum; a Hindoo ceremony for the attainment of a desired object; must, (according to Butcherow, an intelligent bramin,) be performed during four successive periods, of twelve days each, until the object be attained, or its attainment indicated by some certain prognostic; the number twelve being a quarter mundul, (orbit, &c. see p. 7. vol.i.) which, in its application to time, is a mystical period of 48 days. The Jебbum is of various kinds, the most common is that, in which from ten to an hundred bramins, under the direction of an expert Gooroo, (high priest,) abstain during the whole period from salt, and all other condiments which promote digestion, and confine themselves to simple milk and rice, a diet which none but the strongest constitutions can sustain. Thus prepared, a detachment of the corps frequently relieved, stand in a tank up to their chests in water, beating it incessantly with their hands, and bawling out their mantrams, or incantations.

This is nearly the form of the Jебbum which is always performed during a drought in Mysoor, for procuring rain. That Hyder, himself, half a Hindoo, should sanction these ceremonies, is in the ordinary course of human action; but that Tippoo, the most bigotted of Mahommedans, professing an open abhorrence
progress to the frontier was slow and circumspect; his purchase of a considerable portion of Mahommed Ali's kelledars (gover-

and contempt for the Hindoo religion, and the bramins its teachers, destroying their temples, and polluting their sanctuaries, should never fail to enjoin the performance of the jebbum when alarmed by imminent danger, is, indeed, an extraordinary combination of arrogant bigotry and trembling superstition; of general intolerance, mingled with occasional respect for the object of persecution. The form above stated, is nearly that which, as the bramins continue to affirm, succeeded in causing Lord Cornwallis's first and second return from Seringapatam, and failed in saving it from General Harris, because the Goroo was not expert in the mysteries, or because some of the bramins had tasted of salt.

The belief in the magical powers of braminical incantations, is not uncommon among the Mahommedans. All the particulars are familiarly detailed, of the jebbum paid for by Mahommed Ali, at the expense of 5000l. and performed under the auspices of Achen Pundit, at the temple of Petchee Teert, S. of Madras, which killed Lord Pigot; and of a second, which, after several failures, succeeded in killing Hyder Ali. This jebbum, for killing a particular person, is described to me to be performed by suspending a nac or naga snake, (the Cobra Capella of the Portuguese,) by the tail, from the roof of an apartment, proper incense being burned on a fire immediately below. This jebbum, my bramin informant tells me, is named Sera Yag, the former word signifying snake, the latter, fire.

The Mahommedans themselves, are sometimes initiated in these rites. I have seen, in the possession of a Hájee, (a person who has performed the pilgrimage to Mecca,) at Madras, a bond of the late Omdat-ul Omra, eldest son of Mahommed Ali, promising to pay a lac of rupees for carrying off his younger brother, Ameer-ul-Omra by these means, at the period when he had supplanted his elder brother. It is cautiously worded, stating, only, that he had agreed to the terms "one lac of rupees." Shortly after the execution of the bond, a mutiny of the troops occurred, in which Ameer-ul Omra was wounded in the hand, and the Hájee demanded and obtained a part of his reward, for this incipient operation of the charm; but its completion was slow, and when he actually died, about twelve years afterwards, the Omdat denied the efficacy of the charm, in producing that event; and the Hájee continued to be loud and forward, to tell every person who would listen to him, that he had performed the service, and that the Omdat had cheated him out of his reward, and forgotten his obligations as soon as he was delivered of his fears.

I also procured at Madras, and have now in my possession, a copy of the claim with which the Hájee actually presented this very bond to the commissioners appointed under authority of Parliament, for investigating the Carnatic debts, with no other reserve, than that the condition of payment was "placing Omdat-ul-Omrah
nors of forts) had long been completed; but the corps of spies whom he had sent to obtain employment as guides at the English head-quarters, were still expectants of place, the military councils of that nation were not sufficiently alert, even for the purposes of their enemy; there was no plan to divulge, no project to frustrate, no movement to anticipate. The routes of Hyder's columns were deliberately calculated, and combined, without the necessity of adverting to contingent impediments; the corps moved to their appointed stations, on the crest of the hills; every where the blow was only suspended, until it was everywhere prepared; and the alarm of an invasion from Mysoor, although long and distinctly announced by two members of the Government, continued at Madras, to be the topic of stupid ridicule, until the conflagration of the surrounding country, and the actual exhibition of the bleeding fugitives, roused this most extraordinary conclave from a slumber which has no example in the history of the world.

in the administration of affairs," which condition he had fulfilled by his skill in the occult sciences.

This most impudent of impostors lived as a Chevalier d'Industrie when I left Madras, chiefly by obtaining money from the ignorant for pretended services, by his assumed influence with European gentlemen; the appearance of which he was enabled to support, by the access which his literary taste had afforded to him among the amateurs of Persian literature; unsuspicious of the sinister purposes for which it was cultivated.

* Messrs. Johnson and Smith,
CHAPTER XXII.

Erroneous impression of Hyder's general devastation — English attempt to assemble an army — and defend the fortresses — Warriapollam Ginjee — Carnatickghur — Wandewash — Distinguished character of Flint — State of parties at Madras — Military opinion of Lord M'Leod — of Sir Hector Munro — the latter takes the field — Bad combinations — Route of Baillie — Hyder raises the siege of Arcot — on the day Sir H. Munro arrives at Conjeveram — Want of food at the commencement of the campaign — Baillie stopped by the river Cortelaour — crosses it — attacked by Tippoo — reciprocally discouraged — Sir H. Munro reinforces Baillie — Hyder attacks and destroys him — Observations — Anecdotes — Mr. Lang — Twigg — Mahommed Booden — Measures of Hyder — Retreat of Sir H. Munro — Chingleput and Madras — Emergency reported to Bengal — Character and measures of Mr. Hastings — calls on Sir Eyre Coote to vindicate the honour of the British arms — he arrives at Madras — Suspension of the last Governor, and appointment of Mr. Smith — Council of War — Hyder takes Arcot — Sir Eyre Coote takes the field — Capture of Carangooyl — Flint's distinguished defence of Wandewash — relieved by Sir Eyre Coote — Promotion of Lieutenant Flint — rendered nugatory — his admirable arrangements for supply — Arrival of the French fleet — Sir Eyre Coote relieves Permacoil — moves to Pondicherry — Hyder appears — Sir Eyre Coote moves to Cuddalore — Cannonade by night — French fleet at Pondicherry — Critical and desperate situation of Sir Eyre Coote — relieved by its departure — Hyder moves to Tanjour — Sir Eyre Coote reinforced with troops — but distressed for provisions — Military criticisms of the government of Madras — treated with asperity by Sir Eyre Coote — who himself condemns, on views equally limited, the continuance of the Mahratta war — Just and manly views of Mr. Hastings — Sir Eyre Coote attacks Chillumbrum — is repulsed — Arrival of the fleet — Lord Macartney governor of Madras — Dutch war — Hyder
appears — Battle — Imperfect consequences of the victory — Fall of Tia- 
gar — Second relief of Wandewash — Sir Eyre Coote forms a junction 
with the division from Bengal — at Pulicat — Military prudence of 
Sir Eyre Coote — Faults of Hyder.

CHAP. XXII. 1780.

The prevalent impression is erroneous, although fairly deducible 
from the records of Madras, that Hyder, on his first descent, 
perpetrated the wanton and indiscriminate destruction of the 
whole country; a measure directly subversive of his ultimate 
views of permanent conquest. He calculated on the lapse of a 
long interval, before the operations of war, and the aid of a 
French corps, should put him in possession of Fort St. George; 
and around that centre of the British power, and its maritime 
communications, he certainly drew a line of merciless desolation, 
marked by the continuous blaze of flaming towns and villages. 
He directed the indiscriminate mutilation of every human being 
who should linger near the ashes, in disobedience of the man-
date for instant emigration, accompanied by their flocks and 
herds; thus consigning to the exclusive dominion of the beasts 
of the forest, the desert which he interposed between himself 
and his enemies. This line extended inland, from thirty to 
fifty-five miles, according to circumstances, and from the head 
of the lake of Paliacate in the north, to a southern limit, within 
a few miles of Pondicherry, which of course was included within 
the scope of his immediate protection. Round Vellore, of which 
he expected an earlier surrender, he drew a similar circle, not 
exceeding a radius of thirteen miles. With these exceptions, 
and the operations necessary for the siege of the few places 
which did not immediately surrender, and for impeding the 
subsequent movements of British troops, the whole of the
country occupied by the invader, was as well protected, as his possessions above the ghauts.

Black columns of smoke were every where in view, from St. Thomas’s Mount, distant only nine miles from Madras, before an order was issued for the movement of a single soldier. The corps under Colonel Harper in Guntoor, afterwards commanded by Colonel Baillie, was directed to move southwards by the route of Calastry and Tripetti, an order founded in dangerous error, which the superior knowledge of its commandant induced him to disobey, and to pursue a more easterly course to which we must presently return. Colonel Brathwaite who commanded at Pondicherry, was ordered to move northwards to Chingleput, a fort within two marches of Madras, and ultimately to the latter place; and a select corps of nineteen chosen companies of sepoys, two regiments of Mahommed Ali’s cavalry, and two light guns from Trichinopoly under Colonel Cosby, was destined to act on the enemy’s communications through the passes, but was afterwards ordered to join the main army. The description of minor preparations, or the complex results of treachery in the officers commanding forts, or mutiny in the troops of Mahommed Ali, when it was attempted to organize them for field service, would perplex without informing the reader. Such only as mark peculiar character, or aid in a distinctive picture of the times shall be selected for notice. Mahommed Ali had as usual no money for public purposes; an excellent regiment of cavalry at St. Thomas’s Mount mutinied, if mutiny it might be called, to withhold their services in the field, while their families must perish in consequence of an arrear of nearly two years pay. Mahommed Ali’s favorite son came on the ground to affect the employment of his
influence, but professing inability to pay any portion of their arrears. To save the horses the regiment was disbanded; eighty of the men adhered to their European officers without pay; but the same person who had no money to expedite the public service, had abundance to reinlist all the remainder as his own personal guard, on the very next day. The little corps of excellent cavalry afterwards received into the service of the Company was embodied by the patriotism of their English officers, who found the means of satisfying the troops from their own resources and private credit.

It was a proposition too familiar to require discussion, that not one native officer intrusted by Mahommed Ali with the defence of a fortress, would be faithful to the general cause, and it became an urgent consideration to commit them to English officers. A reinforcement from Vellore was sent to Arcot, the reputed capital of Mahommed Ali's dominions; and the scope of our design requires the notice of four other places, to each of which an officer was sent, either alone, or with one or two companies as a guard of example, and a rallying point to the disorderly rabble of Mahommed Ali.

To Warriapollam, 60 miles south-west from Cuddalore, a fort in the centre of an extensive and nearly impenetrable forest, the seat of a dispossessed poligar, still occupying the woods in hostility to Mahommed Ali, Ensign Allan was sent with one company; the fort was commanded by an European in the service of Mahommed Ali, who made no unnecessary difficulty in transferring the command of his mutinous charge. Ensign Allan, a youth of seventeen, left to the unaided resources of his own mind, reclaimed this disorderly and unpaid rabble to obe-
dience and energy; and in a varied defence of six months against the efforts of the poligar, exhibited all the vigour and enterprize of manly youth, guided by the prudence and wisdom of age; and when ordered, at the expiration of that period, to evacuate the place, made good his retreat to Tanjore, in February 1781. Although this interesting youth continued in a short and brilliant career to justify and augment these first impressions of extraordinary talent, exertions disproportioned to his strength in the campaign of 1783 produced a dangerous disease, and he did not live to fulfil the promise of his early excellence.

Ensign Macaulay had a similar mission to Gingee. The lower fortress was carried by assault, a Monsieur Burette in Mahommed Ali's service, having given up his post, without firing a shot. Ensign Macaulay deliberately retired to the upper and impregnable rock, assigning to his own company the post of honour nearest the line of ascent. In visiting the upper guards, his mutinous garrison demanded that he should instantly surrender the place, and while attempting to persuade them to a better spirit, they made a direct attempt to assassinate him. He escaped to the protection of his own company; but being out-numbered by the mutineers, was compelled to capitulate, on the condition of being sent to Madras. This condition was violated, and he was sent a prisoner to Seringapatam, and according to my manuscript (the journal of a Serjeant, afterwards Captain Smith,) "they did not leave him a shirt."

Lieutenant Parr was sent to Carnatic Ghurr, but could neither obtain from Mahommed Ali's kelledar, the command of the place, nor even a decent lodging. The fort was sold, and some
decorous observances remained previously to its surrender. He had reached the place from Wandewash, through a country occupied by the enemy, singly, blackened and disguised as a native: he left it at the expiration of a month, in the same garb, and had only descended three hundred yards by the western face of the rock, when Hyder’s troops entering by the eastern gate, appeared upon the rampart above him. After four nights and three days concealment in the woods, attended by a faithful native servant, he arrived at Vellore, with his feet bleeding and swoln, a beard of ample growth, an aspect scarcely human, and nearly famished for want of food.

An officer was detached by Colonel Brathwaite, when at Carnagooly on his march from Pondicherry to Chingleput to take the command of Wandewash.

Hyder was known to be in force in the neighbourhood of that place: its surrender was probable; the distance was thirty miles; and a body of four thousand horse was stated to be interposed: but the great importance of the enterprise justified the attempt under these slender chances of success. Lieutenant Flint was selected for this service, and after a fatiguing march on the morning of the 10th of August, he moved at eleven on the same night, with one hundred firelocks. By deviating to unfrequented paths, he arrived without interruption in the vicinity of Wandewash, late in the forenoon of the 11th. After ascertaining that the place was still in the possession of Mahommed Ali’s troops, he sent a message to the kelledar announcing his approach; but was answered, that he would be fired at, if he attempted to come within range of the guns; and met a picket sent to stop him at the verge of the esplanade. He had the address to persuade the
officer that he had misapprehended his orders; which could only have been to stop the party till he was satisfied they were friends, of which fact he could entertain no doubts; and during the remaining parley, continued to advance, persuading every successive messenger to return with another reference, until within musquet shot of the ramparts, which were manned with troops, and the gates distinctly seen to be shut. Here he halted; announced that he had a letter from the nabob Mahommed Ali to the kelledar, which he was ordered to deliver into his own hands, and demanded admission for that purpose with a few attendants. With this demand the kelledar positively refused to comply, but at length agreed to receive the letter in the space between the gate and the barrier of the sortie. Lieutenant Flint was admitted with four attendants, faithful and well instructed sepoys, and found the kelledar seated on a carpet, attended by several men of rank, thirty swordsmen, his usual personal guard, and one hundred sepoys, drawn up to protect him. After the first compliments, Lieutenant Flint avowed that he had no letter from Mahommed Ali, but possessed that which in the exigency of the times ought to be deemed equivalent; the order of his own government written in communication with Mahommed Ali; this order the kelledar treated with the utmost contempt, and his arguments with derision; desired him to return to the place from whence he came; and to the proposition of impossibility from the increased distance of the corps from which he was detached, and the country being in possession of the enemy, he was answered with fresh sarcasm. He mildly replied, that he was placed in a desperate situation, and as the kelledar rose to
depart, he suddenly seized him, and announced his instant death if any person should move a hand for his rescue; the bayonets of the four sepoys were in the same instant at his breast, and their countenances announced a firm decision to share the fate of their officer. The consternation of the moment afforded time for the remainder of the little detachment to rush in at the concerted signal and effectually secure the kelledar. Lieutenant Flint then addressed the troops in the language of conciliation, explained the conditions on which the kelledar should retain all the honours of command, while he himself should provide for effectual defence: and finally the gates were opened, and the whole party entered together as friends.

The act of surrendering the place to Hyder, had been prepared to receive the seal of the kelledar on that very day; and during the interval in which Lieutenant Flint waited the authority of his government to exclude him from the fort, his efforts at incessant counteraction were foiled, by the address of the new commandant, who found means gradually and rapidly to secure the attachment of the better portion of the garrison.

Strange as in these days the proposition may sound, this lieutenant was an officer of very considerable experience. To a scientific knowledge of the theory, he added some practical acquaintance with the business of a siege; and to military talents of no ordinary rank, a mind fertile in resources, and a mild confidence of manner, which, as his troops were wont to say, rendered it impossible to feel alarm in his presence. He found the place in a ruinous state, furnished with abundance of cannon, but no carriages, and little powder; he repaired the works, constructed carriages, and manufactured powder. He had not
one artilleryman, but he prevailed on the silversmiths, who, according to the routine of Hindoo warfare, are the apology for cannoneers, not only to attend regularly to be instructed in the exercise, but in the subsequent siege to perform their duties in a respectable manner. From the 12th of August 1780 until the 12th of February 1783, an eventful period, during which the flower of Hyder’s army were before the place, seventy-eight days of open trenches, and after being foiled in open force, made repeated attempts to seize it by stratagem, or starve it into surrender, this officer, never once casting off his clothes at the uncertain periods of repose, not only provided the means of internal defence, but raised a little corps of cavalry for exterior enterprize; and during a protracted period of famine and diversified misery elsewhere, not only fed his own garrison, but procured important supplies for the use of the main army, for which he was justly deemed to be the centre of all correct intelligence. The model proposed by the experienced, for the imitation of the young and aspiring; the theme of general applause; honourable in private life, as he was distinguished in public conduct; the barren glory has remained to him, of preserving the letters on service, written in Sir Eyre Coote’s own hand, full of affectionate attachment and admiration. Colonel Flint is living, and in London. Fancy would associate with the retirement of such a man, marks of public approbation and dignified competency: but human affairs too often reflect an inverted copy of the pictures of imagination.

With the exception of such other places as must necessarily occupy a place in our future narrative, every fort opened its
gates, and the whole country, north of the Coleroon, submitted at once to the conqueror.

Hyder had descended through the pass of Changama on the 20th of July, and from thence detached a select corps of five thousand horse, under his second son Kurreem Saheb, to plunder Porto Novo, a sea-port, about forty miles south of Pondicherry: a larger body of cavalry was allotted to the work of desolation which has already been described, and the advance of the main army was only retarded by the embarrassing number of places to be occupied. It was not before the 21st of August that he invested Arcot, and on the 29th moved from thence in consequence of intelligence that the English army had made its first march from the neighbourhood of Madras on the 26th.

From the state of party in the unhappy counsels of that day, the Governor found it impossible, by the ordinary constitution of the government, to secure a majority, without requiring the aid of the Commander-in-chief, Sir Hector Munro, in council, while the command of the field army should devolve on Lord Macleod, who had recently arrived from England in command of one of His Majesty’s regiments. No local experience was necessary to demonstrate, that the order which he received to assemble the army at Conjeveram, an open town forty miles in advance, through a country every where occupied by the enemy, was contrary to the ordinary suggestions of military prudence, as risking, without an adequate object, the safety of all its detachments and equipments; and in a judicious letter, almost prophetic of the fate of Baillie, this officer recommended the vicinity of Madras as the only safe point of junction until the
army should be in sufficient force by the union of its detach-
ments to meet the enemy in the field. The Commander-in-chief
was of a different opinion: he pledged himself to form the
junction at the place originally proposed, and accordingly
assumed the command of the army, a majority in the council
being secured by the appointment of an additional member, a
measure against which the minority protested as unlawful.

The important corps from Guntoo, under Colonel Baillie,
had on the 24th of August arrived without interruption, at an
encampment six miles to the southward of the village of Goom-
rapoondy, a situation within twenty-eight miles of the General’s
encampment at St. Thomas’s Mount, and rather a shorter dis-
tance from Madras. Admitting the absolute necessity, which,
however, is not apparent, of moving the army precisely on the
26th, there was no probable impediment to the junction of
Colonel Baillie by one forced march on the 25th, or by two easy
marches at the General’s encampment near Connitoor on the
26th; the force under Sir Hector Munro being 5,209 strong,
that under Baillie, 2,813. These obvious means of placing
beyond the reach of accident the immediate formation of a res-
pectable army, were wantonly abandoned, by directing that officer
to pursue an independent route of upwards of fifty miles to Con-
jeveram, a measure not recommended by any speculative advan-
tage that has ever been stated, and inexplicable by any conjecture,
excepting that of attempting practically to justify an erroneous
opinion.

Sir Hector Munro arrived at Conjeveram on the 29th, the day
on which Hyder broke up from Arcot, after having, on the first
intelligence of the deviation to the south-east of Baillie’s corps,
detached a select corps of 5000 infantry, 6000 horse, 12 light, and six heavy guns, with a large body of irregulars, under his son, Tippoo Sultaun, to intercept its approach, and endeavour to destroy it. Sir Hector Munro marched from St. Thomas’s Mount with eight days’ provisions for his own corps only, with the view of raising the siege of Arcot, distant seven ordinary marches. On his arrival at Conjeeveram, as the remaining four days’ stock for his own corps would furnish little more than two for the army which he expected to unite at that place, he applied to the Mahommedan gentleman deputed to provide for all his wants by Mahommed Ali, a name for ever associated with recollections of disgust at his own character, and of indignation and contempt for those who could still continue to trust him. This deputed non-descript gravely answered Sir Hector Munro* “that he was ordered by Mahommed Ali to attend him; but had no powers given him to procure either provisions or intelligence,” and the General was left on the fourth day of the campaign to live by the contingencies of the day, and continued fixed to the spot, gradually collecting from this large but ruined town, a small supply of food, which he deposited within the walls of the Hindoo temple, a place capable of being rendered in two days defensible against a coup-de-main.

Aug. 25. On the 25th, Colonel Baillie arrived on the bank of the river Cortelaur, then nearly dry, but liable to be swoln by the mountain rains, and committed the great military fault of encamping on the northern instead of the southern bank: the floods descended on the night of the 25th, and prevented his crossing until the

* “As I wanted neither a valet nor a cook,” said the General, “I told the gentleman I would dispense with his services.”
4th of September. On the 1st of that month perceiving by the usual indications that the river would not soon fall, he proposed in a letter to the Government to descend to its mouth and be ferried over to Ennore, thirteen miles to the north of Madras, as the most expeditious, though the most circuitous route; but to this letter he appears to have received no reply. He crossed the river on the 4th of September, with a corps consisting of 207 Europeans, 2,606 sepoys, six six-pounders, and four three-pounder guns. The vicinity of the fort of Trippasore rendered it imprudent for Tippoo on either that or the following day to attempt any operation beyond the customary annoyances during the march; on the 6th, in the morning, he appeared making dispositions for an immediate attack on Colonel Baillie, who took post in the vicinity of Perambaucum, distant fourteen miles * from the ground occupied by Sir Hector Munro on the same day near to Conjeveram. The action is described in a short note from Colonel Baillie to have lasted from eleven to two; “near 100 Europeans and sepoys were killed and wounded by the guns of the enemy, who never came near enough for musquetry †;” and on the same evening he wrote to Sir Hector Munro, that on a review ‡ of his corps after the action, he found it was not in his power to join, but hoped to see the General at Perambaucum; while on the other hand Tippoo, who had suffered much more severely in the cannonade, reported to Hyder that he could make no impression on Baillie without a farther reinforcement.

During this day (6th September) Hyder who had occupied

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* Sir Hector Munro's official letter.
† Manuscript journal of one of the survivors.
‡ Sir Hector Munro's official letter.
CHAP. an encampment strengthened with redoubts, about six miles to
the westward of Sir Hector Munro, made a demonstration of
turning his right, with the view of covering the operation against
Baillie, and this movement induced a change of position in
the English army, which now fronted the north on the road
by which Colonel Baillie was expected. The hostile armies
remained during that day drawn up in order of battle opposite
to each other, at the distance of about two miles, without an
effort on either part. About noon a heavy firing was heard,
which from a change of wind, soon became inaudible. It was
evident that Baillie was attacked, and equally plain that Hyder
had interposed his whole army to prevent the junction.
Either the detachment was expected to fight its way through
the troops allotted for its destruction, and afterwards through
the united force of the enemy, or it was necessary to make an
effort for its relief. But the pagoda at Conjeveram, which
contained the provisions, the heavy guns, and most of the bag-
gage of the army, had not been made capable (in Sir Hector
Munro's opinion) of maintaining itself for one day. The army
lay on its arms without an effort during the 6th, 7th, and 8th.
On the latter day the note from Colonel Baillie written after
the affair of the 6th, was received. Sir Hector Munro, still
adhering to the vital importance of protecting his provisions
and stores in the pagoda, which in the event he was compelled
to abandon, adopted the determination (in concurrence * with
the opinion of his principal officers) of detaching the flank
companies of the army on the night of the 8th, to unite with

* Sir Hector Munro's official letter.
Colonel Baillie, and enable him to form the junction. The original and needless error of any disunion, was thus aggravated by the farther risk of a third division, subjecting 1007 men, the flower of the army, to be cut off in detail, and leaving the main army itself in a state of dangerous weakness. Contrary to all reasonable calculation, Colonel Fletcher, the officer in command of the detachment, by changing his route during the march, and thus deceiving his own guides, who were all in Hyder’s pay, passed unperceived by the numerous troops interposed, and joined Colonel Baillie at Perambaucoma early on the morning of the 9th. The arrival of this reinforcement increasing the strength to 3,720* men (allowing a deduction of 100 for the casualties of the 6th), “inspired the greatest confidence in Baillie’s troops; no doubt was entertained of his being able to make his way good to Conjeveram, and he marched agreeably to the orders he had received, about eight o’clock on the night of the 9th.”

Hyder was full of indignation at the strange negligence by which the detachment had been permitted to pass, without observation, across a country covered with his light troops. The French officers in his service, deemed it to be a profound and skilful manoeuvre, by which Hyder’s army was to be entangled between two powerful bodies, by a joint operation on the night of the 9th, and strongly urged him to move from the dangerous position which he occupied. Hyder forming a more correct es-

* The manuscript journal makes the strength about 3,500. The number stated in the text, is taken from Sir Hector Munro’s official statement, and of course from the last returns. The numbers sufficiently correspond, allowing for the sick, and supposing the manuscript to reckon the firelocks only, the returns of course including artillery men.
timate of the actual operation, maintained his ground, but yielded so far to the suggestions of his advisers, as to make dispositions, and even prepare the roads for each column to retire to the westward, in the event of their conjectures being verified. Both armies continued immovable on the 9th, and, towards the close of the day, Hyder having ascertained from his spies that the English army were not preparing to march, sent off immediately after dark, in the direction of Baillie, the great body of his infantry and guns, remaining himself on the ground, ready to move at a moment's warning, with a few light guns and the whole of the cavalry, if his camp should be attacked, and with the same means to harass and impede the march, if a movement should be made in the direction of Baillie. At four o'clock, finding the same torpor still to prevail in the English camp, he silently followed his infantry.

Colonel Baillie had not proceeded half a mile from his position at Perambaucum, before he was challenged by the enemy's videttes, and as no order had been given to avoid firing, a platoon from the advanced guard, announced to the enemy that all was in motion. The rocket men and irregulars opposed no more than a teasing impediment for five or six miles. The baggage being on the left of the column of march, and a heavy body of horse approaching in that direction from the rear, the officer commanding the rear guard unlimbered his guns, and a halt was ordered for the purpose of making a disposition to place the baggage on the right. This being effected, and the troops resuming their order of march, the halt was unaccountably continued, and some guns which had been covered by the Mysorean cavalry on the left, soon afterwards opened on the centre of the
British troops. A detachment sent to seize them were stopped by an impediment peculiar to that vicinity, although occasionally found in other parts of the south. Water is found at the depth of from five to ten feet below the surface of these extensive sandy plains: and the industrious husbandmen, taking advantage of the slightest deviation from the horizontal line, cut trenches for an extent of several miles to the requisite depth of a stratum impermeable by water, along which the produce of a succession of springs gradually augmented to a streamlet is conducted to a reservoir, or led at once to the fields for the purposes of irrigation. The bank formed by the excavation, added to the depth of the ditch, renders the impediment in many places insurmountable for troops, and presents a cover of the greatest importance to military operations. The whole route of the British troops had been every where previously examined by the enemy, and where the trench was nearest the road occasional openings had been cut in the bank: the whole thus affording an excellent ditch with parapet and embrasures for the cover of Tippoo's troops and guns. From one of these impediments the detachment returned with some loss, and not in good order; but the guns, although frequently shifting their position to avoid becoming a mark for the aim of their opponents, were soon silenced by the superior skill and steadiness of the English artillery: a body of infantry, in ambuscade behind a winding of the same work near the head of the column, was soon afterwards discovered and dislodged: all annoyance was removed, the guns were again limbered, and every thing was prepared to continue the march in the most perfect order; but Colonel Baillie, contrary to the declared and earnest opinion of Colonel
Fletcher was his second in command, and with no other motive that has ever been conjectured, excepting the expected distinction of exhibiting in the morning the junction of his corps without the loss of any of its equipments, a credit of which he might be deprived by errors inseparable from the obscurity of the night, adopted the fatal resolution of remaining where he was until daylight, and a disposition being made for that purpose, the troops actually lay upon their arms during the remainder of the night, without the slightest molestation from the enemy. This ground was distant no more than eight or nine miles from Sir Hector Munro, and had the precious time thus unhappily wasted, been employed in pursuing the march, although every part of the road had been reconnoitred, and impediments every where prepared, there can be no ground of reasonable doubt, that superiority of discipline, always most decided in operations by night, would have enabled him to surmount all opposition, or at least to have continued his march to a point so near to the main army, as to compel the Commander-in-chief, by placing the enemy between two fires, to realize the apprehensions of the French officers.

Sept. 10. At daylight on the morning of the 10th, the detachment marched, the enemy was soon perceived on the left moving in nearly a parallel direction, and after advancing about two miles through an avenue of trees to a spot where the road inclined to the left on the plain, four or five guns were opened by the enemy in that quarter from a considerable distance. A village was in sight three quarters of a mile in front, which presented a good post with no impediment to its immediate occupation: but instead of seizing this position, or quickening his pace to approach the guns, the line again halted and formed, and this
distant cannonade was returned. "The troops remained in crowded order, partly in the avenue, and partly under cover of some banks and a hollow way at the entrance of the plain, the rocket men and irregulars advancing as usual, and the main body keeping at a great distance among some trees and jungul in the rear of their guns."

Shortly afterwards, ten companies of sepoy grenadiers under Captains Rumley and Gowdie were ordered to storm these guns, and three were accordingly carried with the utmost gallantry, when large bodies of horse threatened to cut off the return of the grenadiers: and the cavalry of Hyder's whole army was seen rapidly approaching from the right, almost as near to the main body as was this its detachment. A hurried retreat caused by these appearances had an ill effect on the remainder of the troops, but with the exception of casualties not very numerous, the sepoys resumed their former stations in the position. The demonstration of Hyder's main body of cavalry to charge the line, only masked, as was usual, the movement of his infantry and guns, which by the recession of the cavalry soon became apparent fast approaching from the right: "but although a considerable period intervened during which there was no cannonade, nor body of horse on the plain to prevent it, no manœuvre was undertaken, no attempt to seize the village, nor any other disposition, but the detachment remained crowded up just as it had entered the plain. Colonel Baillie himself not being on horseback, by running about and over fatigue, rendered himself incapable of deliberate thinking or cool action; and not only the occupation of the village, but a tolerably strong position, which might have supported the left by an adjacent bank and ditch, and the
right by a thick part of the avenue, were equally unobserved or neglected. Hyder's guns opened as they got within distance, aided by those which Tippoo had re-taken, until upwards of fifty from different quarters directed a cross fire on this devoted corps, whilst it remained in a helpless posture, presenting the fairest mark: the ten field pieces indeed returned this unequal fire with powerful effect, until their ammunition was exhausted, an event which was hastened by the blowing up of two tumbrils which stood exposed to the enemy's shot. The impression seemed to prevail among the troops of being subjected to destruction without an effort for defence or retaliation. An audible murmur ran through the ranks, many of the grenadiers crying out to be led on. The cannonade had by this time done considerable execution, the enemy's guns drawing nearer and nearer until almost every shot told. The pressure on the rear appeared to be most serious, and Colonel Fletcher caused a company of European grenadiers to move to its support. The whole of the troops had been previously ordered to lie down in their ranks, and as the grenadiers rose to obey the order, the sepoys rose also, and crowded to the rear."

In Hyder's stable horse was an officer named Biccajee Sindia, commanding a dusta, (or 1,000 cavalry,) who had been placed in command of a larger division of troops, to the northward of the English army, under Sir Hector Munro, to watch its movements, on the night on which Colonel Fletcher had marched without molestation to join Baillie; and Hyder had personally and publicly reprobated this misconduct with his usual coarseness and contumely. Biccajee Sindia, stung by this public disgrace, resolved to wipe off the opprobrium, or die in the attempt.
On observing the crowding of the sepoys, which has been stated, without waiting for orders, he made a desperate charge at the head of his dusta. Himself, fifteen of his family, and a large portion of his corps fell; but the example, supposed to be the result of an order, was instantly followed by the rest of the cavalry. The European companies of the British corps still preserved their order, but the residue of the sepoys, not destroyed in the charge, became mixed in irretrievable confusion with the carts and other baggage, and either stripped for flight, or kept up a straggling fire without an object, the strange but ordinary effect of panic. "Colonel Baillie, after ordering this fire to cease, went forwards to ask for quarter, by waving his handkerchief, and supposing acquiescence to be signified, he ordered the Europeans, who to the last moment preserved an undaunted aspect and compact order, to lay down their arms. The enemy, although they at first paused, and received him as a prisoner, after being slightly wounded, perceiving the same unauthorized straggling fire to continue, rushed forwards to an unresisted slaughter. Of 86 officers, 36 were killed, or died of their wounds, 34 were wounded and taken; and sixteen were taken not wounded; the carnage among the soldiers, being nearly in the same proportion." Hyder’s young soldiers in particular amused themselves with fleshing their swords, and exhibiting their skill on men already most inhumanly mangled; on the sick and wounded in the doolies; and even on women and children; and the lower order of horsemen plundered their victims of the last remnant of clothing: none escaped this brutal treatment, excepting the few who were saved by the humane interposition of the French officers, and particularly Monsieur Pimorin, of the regular French line, who had
joined with a small detachment from Mahé, a short time previous to its capture in 1779; and Monsieur Lally, who has already been introduced to the reader's notice. It is scarcely necessary to add that the whole corps, with all its equipments of every description, was irretrievably and totally lost.

The fatal influence of this disaster on the subsequent events of the war, has induced a more detailed description than accords with the general plan of this work. In the respectable publications which have narrated this transaction, and in the first of that class the historical branch of the Annual Register for 1782, the conduct of Colonel Baillie has been the theme of nearly unqualified applause. Obeying, with painful reluctance, the duties of historical truth, I have transcribed from the journal of one of the survivors, the passages marked by inverted commas, with no other alteration than the merely verbal adaptations which were necessary to connect them with the text; and these quotations correspond in the most material facts, with the oral information of others. It may be added, that Colonel Baillie, an officer hitherto of high reputation, but now exercising for the first time an independent command, had appeared from the moment of his receiving orders to deviate to the westward, to be under the influence of some anticipation of disaster, which disturbed his usual faculties: he loitered three days in advancing the distance of fourteen miles, to the bank of the river, by which his progress was arrested. Even on the 26th, that river, although swollen, was reported by the officer commanding the artillery, to be still passable for his guns; but the passage was delayed till on the next day it became altogether impracticable.

The distance of Sir Hector Munro from this detachment on
the morning of the 9th was, according to his own statement, fourteen miles. At daylight on the 10th, when he discovered that Hyder had departed, he moved also in the direction of Perambaucum. After marching about four miles he fired three signal guns, saw the smoke of the action and moved to the left in a direct line towards it; after marching one mile and a half more he repeated the signals, but had no return; saw a great smoke (the explosion of the tumbrils), and suddenly the firing ceased, but according to the manuscript journal which has been quoted, a considerable period of time would seem to have intervened between the explosion and the ultimate massacre.

Assuming however these measurements to be correct, and taking those in the manuscript journal at the lowest of the estimate, the distance of Sir Hector Munro at the time of the ultimate disaster, was two miles at the most. The facts have been purposely related with a minuteness which renders comment nearly superfluous. But without recurring to prior errors, if any doubt should exist, that during a period of several days, in which the smaller body was in danger from superior numbers, the larger ought to have moved for its preservation; it will probably be inferred by most of my readers, that if the commander of either of these bodies had on the night of the 9th been guided by the ordinary dictates of military experience, both bodies would probably have been saved, and if both had acted aright, that the Mysoreans instead of the English might have suffered discomfiture.

The movements of Sir Hector Munro had been correctly and incessantly reported to Hyder during the action. At its close he distinctly saw the head of an approaching column, and was
to order the accustomed manœuvre of threatening it with large bodies of horse to cover the retreat of his infantry, guns, booty and prisoners, when he had the satisfaction to see it point in nearly an opposite direction* to the east, and soon afterwards to the south towards Conjeveram. Without attempting to molest these movements, he directed his tents to be pitched about six miles to the westward of the field of action, and sat in state to distribute rewards for the production of captives, and the heads of the slain which were presented before him, “although, to say the truth, he seemed to take no great pleasure in this horrid spectacle, but rather shewed disgust when prisoners were brought in mangled and covered with wounds.”† Such surgical aid as his French establishments enabled him to afford, was chiefly the result of their own spontaneous humanity; tolerated rather than commanded.

The barbarism of Hyder’s mind, and his strange ignorance of the practical effects of civilization, are evinced in the following incident. Among the prisoners was a son of Colonel Lang, who commanded Vellore, a child rather than a youth, born in India, who was serving as a volunteer. He sent for the boy, and ordered him instantly to write a letter to his father, offering him a splendid establishment, on the condition of surrendering the place, and announcing that his own death would be the result of refusal. The boy at first received the proposition with a cool rejection; but on being pressed with direct threats, he

* Sir H. Munro’s official letter states that he had moved to the left, in the direction of the smoke; when the firing ceased he moved to the right, towards the Trepasore road, and then to Conjeveram, which corresponds with the statement in the text, taken from the Mysorean narratives.

† Manuscript journal,
burst into tears, and addressing Hyder in his own language, "If you consider me (said he) base enough to write such a letter; on what ground can you think so meanly of my father? It is in your power to present me before the ramparts of Vellore, and cut me into a thousand pieces in my father's presence; but it is out of your power to make him a traitor." The threats were however renewed by the attendants in a separate tent; but being found ineffectual, the child was remanded to the quarters of the other prisoners.

Among the wounded of this unhappy day were two cases, in the British, and in Hyder's army, the one remarkable from mere fact, the other from characteristic imagination; both individuals were well known to the author upwards of twenty years afterwards, and the facts were confirmed by the testimony of numerous observers. An English artillery man† had received a sabre wound in the back of the neck, which separated the muscles destined to support the head, and it fell accordingly on his chest ‡; on being roused by threats and other wounds, this extraordinary man raised his head to its proper position with the aid of his hands, and supporting it in this manner actually performed the march of six miles, and was perfectly cured.

The other was Mahommed Booden, commandant of Hyder's artillery. A cannon shot had grazed the back of the occiput, and numerous exfoliations of the skull, which he describes to

* The present Major General Lang; I give the words as stated by the Mysorean officers present.
† Named Twig, well known afterwards as ordnance serjeant at Amboor.
‡ A medical friend explains, that the Cucullaris and Splintii capitis must have been cut through, and the biventre had also probably received a gash.
have afterwards occurred, seem to evince that the contact was severe. He fell, and was supposed to be killed, but almost instantly arose, put on his turban and mounted his horse*, and was found to have received no other apparent injury than a small contusion surmounted by a tumour. The escape of this man became a subject of general conversation in Hyder's army; there could be no doubt of his possessing a charm to avert cannon-balls, and the secret must be invaluable. Tippoo sent for him some days afterwards, and questioned him regarding the charm. He replied (as he always continued to believe) that it was the root of a small plant, which he had purchased from a travelling Hindoo mendicant, to be worn at all times wrapped up in his turban, as an infallible protection to the head. Tippoo desired to see this precious treasure, and after a deliberate scrutiny, very coolly wrapped it up in his own turban for the future defence of his own head, regardless of the fate of Mahommed Booden's, who was perfectly aware, that serious remonstrance would put his head in greater danger than the cannon-balls of the next battle.

Hyder, before day-light on the ensuing morning, moved into his former fortified camp at Mooserwauk, where he was advantageously placed for every event that might occur. He found that his losses, from the resistance of a detachment, did not leave his troops in temper to renew the conflict with the larger body, a measure which every military consideration would otherwise have dictated: the retreat of that body from Conjeveram

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* He describes the great inconvenience he sustained from seeing objects double, for some time after he mounted.
at the same hour, left him free to the choice of other measures, and detaching a considerable corps to annoy its march, he remained for several days in his fixed camp, making arrangements for the disposal of his prisoners and for resuming the siege of Arcot.

Sir Hector Munro, as we have seen, after the cessation of the firing to the left, had moved to the right, with the expectation (whence derived he does not state) of meeting Colonel Baillie; but a short interval only elapsed before a wounded sepoy unfolded the fatal truth: "the security of the army determined him to return to Conjeveram," where he arrived about six o'clock. He found that the grain, which had so long bound him to this fatal spot, now amounted to barely one day's consumption, and that he must starve if he remained. At three o'clock in the morning of the 11th, after throwing his heavy guns and stores into the great tank, he commenced his retreat to Chingleput, where, in consequence of incessant annoyance on the march, involving the loss of a large portion of the stores and baggage, the rear guard did not arrive until nine in the morning of the 12th. At this place he expected provisions stored by Mahommed Ali, and, as usual, found none; but was fortunately joined, on the same day, by the important detachment from the south, under Lieutenant Colonel Cosby.

This judicious and enterprising officer, on receiving orders to join the army, had in his route, made a gallant but unsuccessful attempt, on the morning of the 7th, to recover the strong and important fort of Chittapet, which had been one of the first to open its gates to the enemy: and on approaching Conjeveram, had timely intelligence by his spies, which in-
duced him to deviate to his right, and join his commander-in-chief, a few hours after his arrival at Chingleput. This place is distant thirty-six miles S. W. from Madras, and twenty-seven from St. Thomas's Mount. The Dutch fort of Sadras, on the coast of Coromandel, is distant one easy march along or near to the left bank of the Palâr, in a direction to the southward of east: a movement to this place, would necessarily increase the distance from Madras, and must have been suggested by considerations connected with eventual embarkation. However this may be, the Commander-in-chief could not determine on the 12th*, by which of these two routes he should move, and requested rice in boats, to be sent to the latter place, and to be ready by other conveyance to meet him at St. Thomas’s Mount. Happily he adopted the latter alternative: two days food were collected with difficulty from the adjacent villages; and at six in the evening of the 13th, after depositing his sick in the fort of Chingleput, he marched in the direction of St. Thomas’s Mount, which he reached at two p. m. on the 14th; and the English army retired in the morning of the 15th, to a more secure position at Marmalong, with a river covering its front (while Hyder remained in his fortified camp, distant upwards of forty miles); thus terminating a campaign of twenty-one days, of which, even at this distance of time, every recollection is associated with sorrow.

A vessel dispatched for the express purpose, conveyed to Bengal this melancholy picture of disaster and dismay. The Governor-general, as we have already seen, had motives of displeasure

* Official letter to Government.
and distrust, exclusive of the mere imbecility of this subordinate
government, and on the first intelligence of the invasion, waited
for further information, before he should offer aid where he could
not possibly repose confidence.

In the ordinary routine of public business, the mind of Mr.
Hastings, elegant, mild, and enlightened, exhibited merely a
clear simplicity of means adapted to their end; it was only in
the face of overwhelming danger, that, spurning the puny impe-
diments of faction, he burst through the trammels of vulgar re-
source, and shewed a master spirit, fitted to grapple with every
emergency, and equally capable of saving or creating an empire.
The saviour of India, (a title conferred on this great man, by the
general voice of civilized Europe,) became the convenient sacrifice
to political manœuvre; a trial of seven years' duration, terminated
in his honourable acquittal, at the bar of his country, of every ac-
cusation with which his character had been blackened. To the
charge of oppression, an universal people made answer with
their astonishment, their blessings, and their prayers. To the
crime of receiving corrupt presents, and clandestine extor-
tions, equal to the price of a kingdom, he answered with po-
verty; and to the accusation of violating his duty to the East India
Company and his country, was opposed the simple fact of pre-
serving unimpaired, the territories committed to his charge,
during a period, which elsewhere exhibited nothing but national
humiliation. The dregs of calumny and prejudice remained
unexhausted for eighteen years, for such was the interval, after
an honourable acquittal, before the tardy verdict of truth and
justice, brought his wisdom and venerable age to aid in the
councils of his country. Recollections too strong and too recent
to be easily suppressed, must be the apology, if any be required, for this digressive anticipation of subsequent events.

To the financial pressure resulting from the extensive military operations of the Mahratta war on the establishments of Bengal and Bombay, was now added the still more serious weight of a new war in Coromandel, and a general confederacy of the principal states for the final extermination of the British power in India. The emergency was met by corresponding energies and new resources, but Mr. Hastings declared his deliberate opinion, that there was no hope of the proper application of these means, "unless Sir Eyre Coote would at this crisis stand forth and vindicate in his own person the rights and honour of the British arms." That officer occupied at this period the situation of Commander-in-chief in India, and member of the Supreme Council. He was advanced in years, and oppressed by precarious health; but he obeyed, with what remained of life, this honourable summons to the scene of his early glory. Age and sickness had impaired, in a certain degree, the physical strength and mental energy of this distinguished veteran; but enough remained of both to place him in a high rank among the first generals of his age. He arrived at Madras on the fifth

Nov. 5. of November, accompanied by such reinforcement of European troops as could be immediately spared; a considerable body of native infantry was ordered to proceed by land, through the territories of Moodajee Bhounsla, one of the Mahratta confederates whom Mr. Hastings found means to neutralize. Sir Eyre Coote was charged with the exclusive direction of the treasure transmitted for the prosecution of the war, and above all he was furnished with orders for the suspension of the governor,
Mr. Whitehill, who was succeeded by Mr. Smith, the senior member of council, the same person who had at an early period before the invasion, remonstrated against the apathy of the government in neglecting every branch of military preparation.

This new administration gave an early pledge of zealous cooperation with the measures of Bengal, by investing Sir Eyre Coote with the sole direction of the war. A spirit of hope, vigour, and emulation, succeeded to torpor and despondency; and the season of the periodical monsoon, when nearly the whole country is inundated by rains, of which the inhabitants of Europe can scarcely form an adequate conception, afforded leisure for equipment, without exhibiting to the enemy the lamentable defects in every department, which remained to be palliated or cured, before the army could move from the cantonments to which they were ostensibly confined by the severity of the season: and during this period, Sir Eyre Coote took the precaution of assembling a council of war, who were unanimous in their opinion "that the army was so far from being properly equipped for a campaign, that the utmost to be expected from taking the field, was the relief of some of the garrisons invested by the enemy; and this effected, that it ought to return for the security of Madras, the grand national object."

It was the 19th of September before Hyder's arrangements admitted of his moving from his fortified camp near Conjeeveram, to resume his ground before Arcot. Mahommed Ali had expended a considerable treasure in surrounding this populous and extensive town with a regular rampart, bastions, and ditch, some miles in circuit, constructed under the direction of an European engineer, according to the most approved principles of modern
science, but still destitute of the essential addition of ravelins and lunettes. Hyder's approaches and batteries were formed under the guidance of French officers; and after six weeks' open trenches, having effected two practicable breaches, he ordered a simultaneous assault by two columns, one under the direction of his son Tippoo, and the other under Maha Mirza Khan. The former was repulsed with considerable loss, but the latter penetrated, and enabled Tippoo's column to rally, and succeed in a second attempt. The entrance of the enemy at two separate and distant points, made it necessary for the European troops to retire to the citadel, the same spot, and in nearly the same condition, as when defended for fifty days by the great Clive, with a garrison numerically inferior to that by which it was now occupied: but Hyder's political address was ever superior to his military skill. Mahommed Ali's bramin governor, and viceroy of the province, Raja Beerbur*, was taken prisoner in the assault; and instead of experiencing the brutality exhibited towards the English prisoners, this governor, and all the Hindoo and Mahommedan prisoners of rank, were treated with distinguished consideration; most of them were restored to their former rank, and Raja Beerbur to the same elevated and confidential office under Hyder, which a few days before he had held under his enemy. These measures were infinitely more efficient than open force; and, through the direct influence of Raja Beerbur himself, a spirit was excited in the native troops of the citadel which left Nov. 3. to the European officers no alternative but a capitulation on

* A title given by Mahommed Ali, his former name being Achena Pundit.
favourable terms, which the same policy induced Hyder to execute with fidelity.

It was the 17th of January before Sir Eyre Coote was enabled to move, with an equipment necessarily crippled, and inefficient, from the difficulty of obtaining draught and carriage cattle through a country everywhere overspread by hostile cavalry. A partial resource against these essential defects was provided by small vessels, with provisions and stores, to accompany the movements of the army, which, by confining its operations within certain limits, might, at this season of the year, move, in the event of necessity, to its resources at any point on the coast to which the vessels should be directed to repair.

Hyder was engaged at one and the same time, in the siege or the investment of five different fortresses, commanded by English officers, Amboor, Vellore, Wandewash, Permacoil, and Chingleput. The first of these had surrendered on the 13th, the others were still unsubdued. On the 19th, Sir Eyre Coote relieved Chingleput, in which only fifteen days' provisions remained, and on the same day, contrary to general anticipation, crossed the broad and sandy bed of the river Palâr, unmolested by the enemy. About thirteen miles south-west of Chingleput, is the fort of Carrangooly, in the centre of a fertile country: the works of this place had been improved by Hyder, and furnished with a garrison of 700 men: erroneous intelligence had been conveyed to Sir Eyre Coote that the enemy was in the act of removing the provisions and the garrison; and for the purpose of securing the largest possible portion of the former precious article, he made a detachment at midnight of the 20th, of 1000 men, under Captain Davis, and followed with
the army at the usual hour of marching. Instead of a dismanted post, Captain Davis found, on approaching it, about five in the morning, an adequate garrison perfectly prepared for his reception. He pushed on however in obedience to his orders, and the place being unprovided with a draw-bridge; a twelve pounder was rapidly run up to the first gate, which was blown open at the second discharge, so as to admit a single man; after clearing this impediment, a second and a third gate presented themselves, and were forced with augmented difficulty, in a similar manner; the assailants in the traverses of the gate, being, during the whole period exposed to the enemy's musquetry from above. With the exception of about one hundred killed, most of the enemy escaped on the opposite side, by ladders previously provided for such an event; a precaution which probably weakened the energy of defence. The loss of the assailants was comparatively heavy, but the effect produced on the English army, by this opening of the campaign, was highly useful after the late disasters; and a respectable quantity of grain found in the place tended farther to improve the impressions arising from this first enterprise.

The next object was Wandewash, distant twenty-three miles, in a direction nearly west, the actual condition of which it will be necessary to describe. On the first preparation for the investment of the place early in December, the wives and families of the sepoys had, contrary to Lieutenant Flint's wishes and remonstrances, departed with the hope of being permitted to reside without molestation among their friends in the villages of the protected part of the country. Hyder caused all these unhappy persons to be collected, and (the approaches having been previ-
ously carried to within fifty yards of the ditch) at daylight in the
morning of the 30th December, this motley crowd, surrounded
by guards, and preceded by a flag of truce, were perceived ap-
proaching the place, the women and children screaming, and the
old men imploring the troops to deliver up the place as the only
means of preserving them from the most barbarous treatment.
The moment was critical: besides the commandant there was
only one European in garrison; every other man had either a
wife or some other object of affection in the groupe; the few who
were on that face of the works strongly objected to the use of
cannon, which were all loaded, and whatever should be done was
to be effected by the single hand of the commandant. Fortu-
nately the bearer of the flag was considerably advanced, and in a
direction which admitted of pointing at him clear of the crowd:
after due notice, Lieutenant Flint, regardless of the remonstrances
of his sepoys, fired and had the satisfaction to see the flag fall,
and a few additional discharges close over the heads of the crowd,
caused the whole to retire with the utmost precipitation. All
this was effected, and the whole had disappeared, before the prin-
cipal part of the garrison, resting from the fatigues of the night,
were apprized of the circumstance: their presence would proba-
bly have caused it to terminate in a different manner.

The subsequent operations were in the ordinary routine of a
siege, and of sorties, planned and executed with such skill and
coolness, as to be always successful without material loss. On the
16th of January the enemy had entered the ditch by galleries in
Jan. 16.
two places on the west face, and another gallery from the south was
nearly ready for the same operation; but in the course of this
day great bustle appeared among the besiegers, a large pro-
portion of the tents were struck and many of the troops marched.

At two o'clock on the morning of the 17th, a heavy fire of mus-quetry and cannon was heard in the direction of the expected relief, and was continued with every indication of a severe action until day break, when a column of about 3000 infantry, dressed and accoutred like British sepoys, approached with English colours flying, drew up behind a village near to the east face, and discharged their cannon at bodies of horse making demonstra-
tions of preparing to charge. At the same moment the troops in the two attacks abandoned their trenches with pre-
cipitation, and marched off in the direction of Arcot. Every individual in the garrison was deceived with the single exception of the commandant; one part of the operation was performed in a manner which could not escape his scrutinizing and experienced eye. The cannon shot discharged at the approaching bodies of horse were seen to graze in directions clear of their object, and were fired at distances not belonging to the practice of British artillery. He had the greatest difficulty in undeceiving his gar-
rison and keeping them at their posts; but they were ultimately convinced by the evident hesitation of the pretended relief; at this moment Lieutenant Flint ventured to detach a large portion of his little garrison unperceived into the works of the western at-
tack; the galleries into the ditch were destroyed, the materials for filling the ditch set on fire, and the smoke arising from this ope-
ration was the first indication to large bodies of the enemy who were in ambush in every direction, and pushed for the recovery of their works. The signal for the return of the sortie was promptly observed, their prescribed route was by the southern attack, the trenches of which they scoured, killing or making
prisoners every man who had been left concealed in both attacks. All this was effected without the loss of a man; but a small guard which had been sent to watch the pretended friends on being accosted by men whom they personally knew, were in spite of previous warning completely deceived and prevailed on to enter the village where they were made prisoners. Two of the number were sent back with proposals for a capitulation, an answer was returned from the cannon of the place, and the enemy hastened to re-occupy their cover. The five succeeding days were employed in repairing the damages resulting from this abortive attempt; but on the 22d, movements were observed evidently of a serious nature occasioned by intelligence then unknown to the garrison of the capture of Carangooly by assault on the preceding morning; the batteries and trenches were evacuated on this day, and the tents and baggage sent off in the direction of Arcott. On the 23d, the enemy disappeared, and on the succeeding day Sir Eyre Coote had the satisfaction of seeing the British colours still flying on the ramparts while only one day’s ammunition remained to the garrison.

The admiration of this experienced soldier was unbounded, at all he saw of the resources which had been employed, and at the little which he heard in the modest recital of Lieutenant Flint: the interest of the scene was heightened, by a coincidence which this veteran deemed worthy of notice in his public dispatches, that the siege had been raised on the 22d of January, the same day of the same month, on which, twenty-one years before, he had raised the siege of the same place by a memorable battle: and to complete the association of ideas, he encamped upon the same field. Sir Eyre Coote recommended the imme-
mediate promotion of Lieutenant Flint to the rank of captain, which was acceded to by his government; but this distinction was rendered nugatory by a subsequent determination* of the Court of Directors, as an inconvenient deviation from the established routine of their service—the rise by seniority alone: a rule upon the whole, perhaps, wisely adapted to actual circumstances, but at best productive of negative good; repressing, without question, the vice of partiality and favoritism, but crushing the legitimate excitements to military enterprise. It is true, that some highly distinguished branches of the royal army, are governed by this rule: but it is relieved by particular brevets for distinguished service; similar to that of which the benefit was most unwisely denied to Captain Flint, and the same unqualified rule of seniority alone continues its depressing influence over the Indian army to the present day.

As the course of our narrative will not again lead to any detailed notice of Wandewash, it may be interesting to explain one of the modes by which grain was obtained for the consumption of the garrison, and an occasional aid to the supplies of the army; the villages under Hyder’s protection, and in full culture, were sufficiently near to admit of occasional enterprise by night, but instead of desultory success which would dry up the source of supply, Lieutenant Flint conceived, and absolutely executed the idea, of laying them all under a secret, but regular contribution, on the condition of leaving them unmolested; these contributions were faithfully and punctually delivered by night, and were managed with such address, as completely to

* Lieutenant Bishop, commanding Permacoil, and Ensign Moore, the only officer with Lieutenant Flint, were in the same predicament.
elude the knowledge or the suspicion of Hyder during the whole course of the war.

Before Sir Eyre Coote left Wandewash, he ascertained that Hyder had raised the sieges of Permacoil, and even of Vellore, indicating the intention of a general action, which circumstances induced him to postpone.

On the 25th, a French fleet appeared off Madras, the intelligence was rapidly conveyed to Hyder, who anticipated with confidence the arrival of the expected co-operation, and a farther interval elapsed before he was apprized that no land forces were on board. The appearance of this fleet was announced to Sir Eyre Coote on the day of his departure from Wandewash for the relief of Permacoil. He instantly retraced his steps towards Madras, but on farther intelligence relieved Permacoil, and from thence moved towards Pondicherry with the view of destroying the boats, an operation which was eminently useful in impeding the communications of the hostile fleet through a surf nearly impassable by boats of European construction, and for the necessary purpose of demolishing what remained of military resources, which had been employed in a manner inconsistent with the terms of the capitulation, the political condition of the place, and the peculiar indulgence which had been extended to the inhabitants, for such is the character involved in the levy and equipment of troops for the service of the enemy.

These services were still imperfectly accomplished, when Hyder’s army appeared in great force. On receiving intelligence of the appearance of the French fleet, and of Sir Eyre Coote having in consequence commenced his march to Madras, Hyder,
with the view of throwing himself by forced marches between
the General and that place, moved rapidly to Conjeveram; but
on his arrival learning that Sir Eyre Coote, instead of pursuing
his march in the direction of the capital, had resumed a southern
route, he followed, by forced marches, with his cavalry, select
infantry, and all his lighter equipments. The presence of the
enemy’s fleet had frustrated the project of supplying the English
army by sea; and in moving to Pondicherry Sir Eyre Coote had
calculated, from intelligence doubly defective, not only on finding
a few days’ provisions in that populous town, but from Hyder’s
reported position, on being enabled to reach the fertile countries
south of the Coleroon before him, and thereby to obviate every
risk of want. There was but one day’s rice in camp, it was im-
possible, with this stock, to attempt a movement to the north-
ward: the direction of Hyder’s march pointed south towards
Cuddalore, and nothing remained but the desperate alternative
of moving still farther from the main source of supply at Madras
to cover Cuddalore, which it was of main importance either to
dismantle or protect, to prevent its becoming a dépôt and point
of support for the future operations of the land forces expected
from France. The supplies at that place were known not to
exceed three days’ food, but in any other direction he could
have found none. Sir Eyre Coote accordingly moved in a
direction parallel to that of the enemy about two p.m.; while
day-light continued he experienced little annoyance, and a heavy
and continued cannonade throughout the night neither materially
impeded his march, nor produced any serious casualties, ex-
cepting the loss of some stores. Arrived at Cuddalore (the
French fleet being still at Pondicherry) his situation became
critical, and may most suitably be described in his own words. “I cannot command rice enough to move either to the northward or the southward. I offered him (Hyder) battle yesterday, but I no sooner shewed myself, than he moved off, and has taken possession of and strengthened all the roads leading to the southward. I have written to Nagore in the most pressing terms for supplies—I depend upon every effort in your power—every thing must be risked to assist me—my difficulties are great indeed. I need say no more to induce you to take such steps as will speedily enable me to act as becomes a soldier.”

Hyder perfectly apprized of these facts had made detachments to the southward to lay waste the country round Nagore, and cut off its communications with the sources of supply in the interior, and he depended on the services of the French fleet to augment the difficulties of the British army. Without possessing the means of forming a correct judgment regarding the motives which may have influenced the measures of the French admiral, Monsieur d’Orves, the proposition is unquestionable, that had he continued his co-operation in these measures by preventing supplies in any direction by sea, the campaign and the existence of the British army must in the opinion of its commander-in-chief, and according to all human calculation, have soon been brought to a fatal close. The sudden elation at an unexpected relief from these gloomy forebodings is strongly depicted in the following brief dispatch. “The French fleet under sail standing to the eastward: there is not a moment to be lost in sending me provisions—that supplied, I will answer for the rest.”

The intermediate days before the arrival of supplies, like many of the preceding, were passed in a precarious dependence for
food on the skill and industry of the persons employed to discover subterranean hoards of grain*, and when these difficulties were in some degree relieved by the arrival of supplies by sea from Madras and Nagore, the reduced state of the draught and carriage cattle, rendered it impracticable to carry even one day’s provisions, and fixed the army to the ground which it occupied. Hyder deemed it imprudent to attempt a decisive attack on an army, which, in the event of discomfiture, could retire on a fortress in its rear. Contemplating also the hilly and confined space which must bound his own rear in any attack, as unfavourable to the precaution which he uniformly adopted, of preparing, as the first preliminary to an action, clear, open, and well-finished roads for the retreat of his guns; he determined to leave in the vicinity of Cuddalore, such a body as was sufficient to prevent its deriving any supplies from the interior. He reduced and occupied in force all the intermediate posts between the English army and the southern provinces, and proceeded with the main army to the northern bank of the Coleroon, from whence he made large detachments into the territory of Tanjore. Without attempting the capital of that country, he occupied such posts as commanded its territorial revenues, and enabled him to apply its resources to the support of his own army, and still farther to augment the difficulties of his enemy in any operation to be attempted in that direction. Sir Eyre Coote had no prospect of relief from the embarrassments of his situation, excepting from the opportunity of a general action, which it was highly improbable that the enemy would afford. His force, originally insufficient, had been reduced

* See page the 10th of this volume.
by casualties and by detachments to garrison Carangooaly, and reinforce Wandewash. Some native troops from the south had been prepared to join by land, but were effectually prevented by the dispositions which have been stated. Mr. Huddleston, of the civil service, had, however, managed with energy and skill the collection and embarkation of grain and other supplies at Nagore; and an arrangement was made for embarking the detachment at this place, to be conveyed by sea to join the main army. The vicinity had previously been laid waste by Hyder, to prevent communication with the interior; and a small redoubt, hastily constructed for the purpose, was the sole protection of the factory, and the only cover to eventual embarkation.

Immediately after the embarkation of this detachment, consisting of two battalions, a considerable force of infantry and guns under Mons. Lally entered the town, but the previous dispositions had been made with such care, that not only the troops on shore were saved, but all the public and private property was embarked without loss. A detachment which had been serving under Colonel Goddard in the Mahratta war, consisting of a battalion and a half of native troops and two companies of Europeans also accompanied Admiral Hughes's fleet on his return from the western coast of the peninsula, and farther strengthened the army. But numerical force without the means of movement tended little to relieve its complicated embarrassments. All that vigilance and energy could accomplish was incessantly attempted to procure immediate supply or the means of future equipment; and among the losses sustained by the enemy, was that of Sidee Hellâl the commandant, an Abyssinian, and an officer of distinguished reputation. From
the 8th of February till the 16th of June, the army was certainly stationary, with the exception of one ineffectual demonstration of a single march to relieve Tiagar, a hill fort fifty miles to the westward, commanded by Lieutenant Roberts, which fell on the 7th of June for want of ammunition; but during the whole of that period few nights elapsed in which detachments were not abroad, supported on the ensuing day by the whole or various portions of the line, which, by varying their directions and modes of proceeding, frequently succeeded in procuring from distances supposed to be too great for a forced march, flocks of sheep and droves of cattle, which not only furnished food for the troops, but gradually, although slowly, added a few oxen of a proper description for the departments of ordnance, stores, and provisions.

During this long and mortifying delay, the government of Madras naturally regretting a state of apparent inaction, which consumed the resources of the state as rapidly as an active campaign, transmitted to Sir Eyre Coote an elaborate exposition of his present military situation, disclaiming however any intention of interfering with the conduct of the war, which they had committed to his guidance, and meaning to aid his decisions, by submitting to his judgment the result of their own deliberations on the actual state of public affairs, and the reasoning which might affect his adoption of a northern or a southern movement. Among the most perceptible changes superinduced by years and ill health, was a defect in that admirable serenity of temper which had strengthened and embellished his earlier military virtues. Surrounded by difficulties, which appeared to be insuperable, he had frequently seemed to ascribe to the Government
impediments which they were strenuously labouring to remove: and as suddenly acknowledged their zeal on the receipt of any unexpected supply. This exposition was treated, justly perhaps, but with unnecessary asperity, as a covert attack on his military character, by persons unqualified to form a military opinion. Nothing, he said, but his zeal for the interests of his country could have originally induced him to undertake the charge of an army so miserably equipped, as to be pronounced unfit for service before it had moved. After reciting the motives and results of the few measures he had been enabled to risk, and the utility of his present position with reference to the expected French forces, and preventing Hyder from undertaking the sieges of either Trichinopoly or Tanjour, he intimates that if he had been invested with any powers besides those which he derived from his commission as Commander-in-chief of the British forces in India, such powers had only loaded him with labour and anxiety foreign to his duties, and appertaining to themselves. "Having stated, (he adds,) the circumstances which proved the impossibility of marching this army at all, it does not seem immediately necessary that I should enter upon an enquiry, whether a southern or a northern movement is to be preferred." If a movement of necessity should be made, (and by the non-arrival of supplies which ought to have been sent, that necessity appeared to be approaching,) he must move northwards, which he adds "I am happy in thinking I shall do without apprehending any material danger from even a more formidable enemy than a body of horse, which you have, with so much precision, pointed out as the only impediment I am likely to meet with in taking a northern route. In justice to both myself and the service,
I promise you that the army I now command, shall not remain a moment unemployed, if you will only supply me with provisions and the means of carrying them.” While thus animadverting on opinions drawn from crude and partial views, it is instructive to observe this respectable veteran, uniting with the Government whose suggestions he condemns, in the most decisive inferences with regard to the general policy of the British state in India, drawn from the insulated application of that policy to the affairs of Fort St. George alone, while the interests of the other establishments, and the difficulty of adopting the measures proposed, were either overlooked or treated as points of minor consideration. The Government of Bombay deprecated the war with Hyder. The Government of Fort St. George, uniformly affected to consider the Mahratta war as the efficient cause of Hyder’s invasion. Sir Eyre Coote dissented from this opinion, but anxiously concurred in the positive necessity of a Mahratta peace. He severely arraigned the conduct of Colonel Goddard, his military inferior, on the western side of India, who was invested with diplomatic powers from the Government-general, for not employing those powers to terminate the Mahratta war, a criticism which, if their relative situations had admitted the retort, might have formed a pretty exact parallel in recommending to Sir Eyre Coote an immediate peace with Hyder, who, like the Mahrattas, and most other powers, would be averse to peace in the direct ratio of his success in war; a proposition which the conduct of the Mahratta nation had made familiar at Bombay.

Colonel Goddard had in effect made very strenuous efforts for the termination of the Mahratta war. On receiving his diplo-
matic instructions towards the close of 1780, he had offered to the consideration of that state reasonable terms to serve as the basis of a treaty, and proposed a general cessation of hostilities: these propositions were treated with silence and contempt, exactly because the affairs of the English were deemed to be in an unprosperous state. Colonel Goddard concentrated every possible means at his disposal to remove that impression; and in February 1781 made a demonstration of attacking the enemy's capital by ascending the Bore ghaut, when he hoped to treat with better effect. He was permitted to ascend, but the whole force of the state was prepared, if he should advance, to prevent his return. He was in greater force than the army which surrendered at Worgaum in 1779; and the Mahrattas, deeming it possible that he would be able to reach Poona, deliberately prepared to set the capital on fire, together with every thing intermediate that could furnish forage or subsistence, in order that they might insure his unconditional surrender. The experience of 1779; the unexpected numbers and quality of the troops by which he perceived himself to be opposed; the utter hopelessness of advance to any useful purpose, and the determined rejection of negotiation, except on terms which it was impossible to admit; all combined to convince Colonel Goddard of the expediency of retracing his steps. His first retrograde movement was the signal for determined attack, and he effected his retreat with the utmost difficulty. Having practically ascertained that the resources at his disposal, were not sufficient for an effective diversion into the interior, he reserved such troops as were necessary for the operations on the coast, and returned those of the Madras establishment, which at the period
in question, were actually on their voyage to join Sir Eyre Coote. Of the local and subordinate authorities, Colonel Goddard thus appears to have taken the most impartial view of the general interests of the state.

Each presidency seemed to attach a paramount importance to its own local objects; and the Government of Madras seconding the opinions of the Commander-in-chief, reiterated their condemnation of the origin, the continuance, and the consequences of the Mahratta war, and stated to the Government-general the urgent necessity of its termination; as if the case had no parallel to the war in which they were themselves engaged, or could be terminated by different measures, or by an opposite consideration of the motives which influence human conduct. Mr. Hastings, placed in a situation which gave him a more enlarged view, and possessing a scope of mind adapted to the high and perilous station which he occupied, answered to the propositions which accompanied this recommendation. "We (viz. the Governor-general and council) wish for peace with the Mahratta state, but we will not make it on terms dishonourable to ourselves; we will not disgrace the English name, by submitting to conditions which cannot be complied with, without a sacrifice both of our honour and our interest: yet such are the conditions prescribed in the paper before us (prepared by Mahommed Ali). The distress which the Company’s arms had suffered, and their belief of our consequent inability to support the war against them, has raised their presumption, and induced them to insist on terms which the worst state of our affairs would not warrant us in yielding to. We are now morally convinced, that nothing but a vigorous and successful prosecution of the war, will
prevail on them to make peace, or overcome their present disinclination to it. Peace is our object, and we are determined to pursue the only means which appear to us to lead to its honourable accomplishment.”

The wretched equipment of Sir Eyre Coote’s army kept him stationary in the neighbourhood of Cuddalore until the middle of June: its march to any distance from the sea was literally impracticable; and along the coast was only possible, with the substitution of ships for an ordinary commissariat. Every movement to be attempted, was consequently dependent on the co-operation of the British admiral, for the protection of the transports; and for the more awful purpose which entered into the cool calculations of this interesting veteran, of saving the wreck of his army, in the event of total discomfiture in that general action, which it was the uniform object of all his measures to force upon the enemy.

The village of Porto Novo (or Feringepet) is situated on the north bank of the river Vellaar close to the sea. The fortified pagoda of Chillumbrum is three miles south of that river, and about twenty-six miles in the same direction from Cuddalore. This pagoda was one of the posts materially strengthened by Hyder, for the double purpose of arresting his enemy’s progress to the southward, and serving as a depot for provisions for the eventual use of his own army, and that of his French allies; purposes which rendered it of corresponding importance to Sir Eyre Coote, that he should attempt its reduction. He moved on the 16th June, and on the 18th at noon, crossed the Vellaar. Finding that the enemy was nowhere near it in considerable force, and being greatly misinformed regarding its garrison,
which was reported to be but a few hundred irregulars, and actually consisted of nearly three thousand men, partly regulars, and the remainder the distinguished peons of Chittledroog under Jehan Khan*, an officer of reputation; he determined in pursuance of this defective information, to attempt carrying it on the same night by a coup de main. Four battalions of sepoys with eight ¶ pieces of ordnance, moved under his own immediate direction at dusk; they carried the pettah or town without difficulty, and pushed on with rapidity to a second line of defence, which surrounded the place at the distance of about one hundred yards: the gate of this line of works was forced by a twelve pounder, and the troops advanced under a heavy fire, with the greatest spirit to the body of the place, the entrance into which was protected by the usual Indian apparatus of winding traverses, and three successive gates, built up behind with a few feet of masonry to prevent their being blown open. The first gate was forced after some difficulty, and the outer area between the first and second, being as usual inadequately flanked or commanded, the troops succeeded in forcing the second gate also; but for the area between the second and third gates, commanded by the rampart of the body of the place, and lined with thatched huts, where a portion of the garrison usually resided, a better preparation was arranged. Exclusively of the ordinary means of defence, bundles of straw had been placed on the rampart in reserve, with vessels of oil ready to moisten them and encrease the combustion: a few

* The officer mentioned in page xix. of the preface, and from whom I received the details, which relate to his own measures.

¶ Two 12 pounders, four 6 pounders, and two howitzers.
lighted port-fires dropped down on the straw roofs, gave a commencement to the flame, and the bundles of oiled straw successively thrown down, converted into a mass of flame nearly the whole area to be passed: as a farther defence, if even the third gate should be forced, a select body of Chittledroog spearmen were placed in reserve on each side of the interior of the gate. But the retreat of the assailants rendered this reserve unnecessary; nothing could prevail on the sepoys to rally, and the officers and artillery-men compelled to abandon one gun drew off the remainder with great difficulty and serious loss. The small amount of the European troops, and a desire of reserving them for greater emergencies, had prevented their employment in this enterprise; but on being thus foiled, Sir Eyre Coote ordered up the grenadiers of the army with the intention of resuming the assault; but before their arrival, being better informed of the actual means of defence possessed by the garrison, he drew off the whole in the course of the night, carrying with him a small supply of grain which had been found in the pettah; and after the lapse of four days re-crossed the river, and encamped near the village of Porto Novo.

Admiral Sir Edward Hughes in the Superb, arrived from Madras on the 24th, and was visited by the General on the ensuing day. He brought intelligence of the arrival of Lord Macartney to assume the government of Madras; and of his being charged with orders for the immediate commencement of hostilities against the Dutch possessions in India. On proceeding to consult regarding the measures which became requisite in consequence of this important intelligence, the admiral’s first suggestion was a descent on Negapatam, aided by a detachment
CHAP. XXII. from the army; but on examining their resources, it was found that exclusively of the danger of detaching from a body already too small, if the object should not be accomplished within twelve days, the army would be left without food. It was therefore resolved, that the united efforts of the fleet and army should be directed to the early reduction of Chillumbrum; and the preparation of fascines and gabions having already commenced with this view, arrangements were immediately ordered for landing the battering train. Sir Eyre Coote had however scarcely returned to camp, when he received intelligence of the presence of Hyder's whole army within the distance of a few miles.

During the four months in which Sir Eyre Coote had necessarily been fixed at Cuddalore, Hyder, expecting to draw him from that position by his proceedings to the southward, had abstained from the regular siege of Tanjore or Trichinopoly, as an operation which might embarrass the rapid movements essential to his future plans. Exclusively of minor interprizes, in which he was generally successful, he considered his time to be not unprofitably employed in the occupation of every tenable post, and the means of realizing the revenues of the whole country, the collection of an enormous booty in money and merchandize, and the transmission to the upper country of all that was moveable, including immense herds of cattle. The human race was made the unrelenting object of similar calculation; weavers and their families were collected and forcibly sent to people the island of Seringapatam. Captive boys destined to the exterior honour of Islam, were driven to the same place with equal numbers of females, the associates of
the present, and the mothers of a future race of military slaves. On receiving from Jehan Khan the intelligence of what had occurred at Chillumbrum, a forced movement of one hundred miles in two days and a half, placed him between the English army and Cuddalore, and he immediately began to fortify a position scarcely three miles from the English encampment, covering the whole country with cavalry, to prevent the possibility of intelligence, regarding either its strength or situation, and thus rendering the camp guards "the boundary and limited extent of their knowledge."* This position was taken with the view not only of frustrating the intended operations against Chillumbrum, but of covering his own against the fort of Cuddalore, the destined depôt of his French allies, while his position should render it impracticable for the English army to move in any direction, or receive any supply, excepting from the sea.

In these critical circumstances, Sir Eyre Coote had recourse to the opinion of a council of war. The preparations for the siege were discontinued; the battering guns, and every possible impediment embarked, and four days' rice, to be carried on the soldiers' backs, was landed for the purpose of enabling the army to manœuvre for turning or forcing the enemy's position, or bringing on a general action. Sir Edward Hughes being requested to cover Cuddalore with a portion of the squadron, and with the remainder to watch over the operations of the army, or the embarkation of its wreck during the few ensuing days which were to determine its eventual triumph or possible annihilation.

By seven o'clock on the 1st of July, the British army had

* Sir Eyre Coote's words.
drawn out of its ground of encampment. The direction of the road to Cuddalore pointed north north-west, leaving on its left the termination of a lagoon.* Considerable bodies of cavalry, with this lagoon in the rear of their right and centre, appeared covering the plain, but were destined to retreat, as the English army should advance. Hyder's select cavalry, accompanied by some light artillery, was drawn up behind this lagoon, fronting the north, ready to operate on the British army in flank, when it should have passed the end of the lagoon, and be embarrassed by the batteries in front. Sir Eyre Coote, utterly uninformed of the nature and position of the enemy's works, could only reconnoitre at the head of his little army, which he formed into two lines fronting north a little west, and advanced in order of battle over the plain, his numbers being necessarily diminished by a strong baggage-guard which moved between his right and the sea. After marching in this order little more than a mile and a half, the position of the enemy's works was clearly distinguished. The ground which they occupied was strengthened with great judgment and skill, by front and flanking batteries, in a line which crossing the road to Cuddalore, extended from commanding grounds on the right, to a point on the left, where the sand hills of the shore were thought to oppose sufficient difficulties, and form a support to that flank. An hour was passed by Sir Eyre Coote, in examining with his accustomed coolness and penetration, the critical circumstances in which he was placed, the army being during that period, exposed to a distant but incessant cannonade on their front, from the batteries and guns

* Noticed in the Mysorean, but not in the English narratives, although inserted in Pringle's topographical manuscript map.
advanced from that position, and on the left flank from the guns which had been moved from behind the lagoon; but in order that their limited store of ammunition might be reserved for more decisive purposes, the English artillery was strictly prohibited from returning a single shot.

At nine o'clock Sir Eyre Coote had determined on his measures; and without any previous movement among the troops that should indicate a change of disposition, he ordered both his lines to break into column, by the simple tactic of that day, of facing to the right, a battalion from the left of each line changing their front, for the purpose of protecting that most exposed flank, and covering the whole interval between the lines. In this order he moved with rapidity and precision to the right, to the eastward of the range of sand hills which follow the direction of the coast, at the distance of about eleven hundred yards from the sea, and which covered the greater portion of this movement, until he reached an opening in that range, where it was discovered that a practicable road had been made by Hyder, for far other purposes than the approach of his enemy: a commanding sand hill close to this opening was also fortunately unoccupied. The British general penetrated this pass with the first line; and after clearing it of a strong corps charged with its defence, deployed again into order of battle, with his front to the west, and waiting with impatience under a heavy fire until the sand hill should be effectually possessed by the artillery of his second line, he moved on with the first, as fast as order and an advancing fire of artillery would admit; a long and thick caldera * hedge covering his right, and his left

* Pandanus odoratissima. Ainslie, page 145.
being protected by a corps and some guns in column. The artillery in Hyder's batteries had already been withdrawn to a new line at right angles with the first, formed with considerable promptitude, and defended with great obstinacy. After a long and tremendous cannonade, the British line still slowly and gradually advancing, and availing themselves, with the greatest military address, of every successive advantage of ground; an attempt was made to break and overwhelm it by a general charge of cavalry, directed diagonally on the angle of the left: this also failed by the superior fire and steadiness of the British troops; and it was not until four o'clock that Sir Eyre Coote succeeded in forcing the enemy's line and compelling it to a precipitate retreat.

In the mean while, the advantage of the judicious position so promptly and ably assigned to the second line became eminently conspicuous. A strong body of infantry with their guns, and a very large mass of cavalry were detached to fall upon the rear of the British army. A close and severe contest ensued between this body and the second line, which obstinately disputed every point, drove them from the contiguous heights which they attempted to seize, and foiled all their efforts to charge and force this most important position; the occupation of which enabled the first line to advance, not only without apprehension for their rear, but with the most important aid from the artillery which occupied the heights; and the same position enabled the baggage guard to take post without molestation between the northern extremity of this range and the sea. The success of these efforts, in which the select corps of Hyder's army were employed, was necessary to the developement of a more general
operation, and Hyder becoming impatient at this obstinate resistance, and the consequent progress of the first line, ordered a simultaneous and desperate charge of the whole cavalry upon both lines. The stable horse under Hyder’s immediate direction was destined to act against the first line, and Meer Saheb against the second. The stable horse advanced with a good countenance, but were repelled as we have already seen. Their standard elephant, on approaching, received a slight wound, took fright, and fled with precipitation off the field, and the horsemen suffering severely from the English grape, which probably would in every event have foiled their efforts, were furnished with the convenient apology of following their colours. The general charge on the second line was observed by Hyder to be prepared but suspended, and a floating to take place along the whole mass; impatient at this want of concert, he sent successive messages to Meer Sabeb, and all his commanders, ordering them, as they valued their heads, instantly to charge; and some interval elapsed before the fall of Meer Saheb by a mortal wound was added to the report of other causes of delay. A small *schooner from the British squadron approaching the shore as near as soundings would admit, opportunely and judiciously opened her fire upon this mass of cavalry; the loss of their commander, and a considerable number of men from the broadside of one little vessel, was magnified in the imaginations of men unsuspicous of annoyance from another element, into a dreadful fire from the whole squadron; which is to this day represented as a fact, by some of those who witnessed the transaction.

* The Intelligence.
But this flanking fire, highly important and effective, without any exaggeration, disposed the second in command to seek the cover of a sand bank, from whence he reported this new impediment.

This double disappointment in the efforts of his cavalry, added to the very near approach of Sir Eyre Coote's first line to his own person, induced Hyder to listen to the suggestions of some of his officers, and to order the successive retreat, first of his guns, and afterwards of his infantry and cavalry. Men who have witnessed similar scenes, as well as those who are indebted to the artist for a pictured representation, will figure to themselves an image of this oriental chief seated on an elephant, for the advantage of surveying the operations of the field, on horseback, for the convenience of closer inspection; or peradventure on foot, to lead and animate the efforts of his infantry. Hyder, from the commencement to the close of this action, was seated cross-legged, on a choukee (a portable stool about nine inches high, covered with a carpet), and placed on a gentle eminence in the rear of the centre of his line of works, and now a little to the southward of the line of fire. When in the course of the operations of the day, he could scarcely believe the evidence of his senses which indicated the danger of this situation; he received, with that torrent of obscene abuse which formed the character of his eloquence, the first suggestions to move, and obstinately stupid with vexation, continued in his seat, until a groom who had long served him, and was in some sort a privileged man, had the audacity to seize his legs one after the other, and put on his slippers. "We will beat them tomorrow," (said he,) "in the meanwhile mount your horse,"
and he was quickly out of sight, leaving his attendant chiefs, (whom oriental etiquette would not admit of being on horseback while their Sovereign was dismounted; and whose grooms and horses had disappeared, on the near approach of the English line,) to the unaccustomed effort of a long and hurried pedestrian march.

Sir Eyre Coote's first line rested for the present on the ground which the enemy had abandoned, and it was not until midnight that a due attention to the casualties of the day admitted of its being joined by the second, when the whole moved on by the road by which the enemy had retired, and after crossing without molestation a strong pass formed by a ravine, most injudiciously unoccupied by the enemy, took up their ground near to the village of Mootypolliam, the name by which the Mysoreans distinguish this day's action, as Porto Novo, the village from the vicinity of which the opposing army marched in the morning, is made to designate the same battle in the English narratives. If the accident had not intervened, of a heavy rain, which rendered it impossible for the miserable cattle of the English army to move their tents, this action would have been fought on the 30th June, and happily the same circumstances did not postpone it to the 2d of July. The road which facilitated the able manœuvre of the British general, had been prepared by Hyder, for the purpose of drawing his guns to a large work for the reception of twenty guns, lined out on the best principles of European science, situated within three hundred and fifty yards of the sea, and commanding every part of the ground on which Sir Eyre Coote's masterly movement had been made. The work was so far advanced as to require but a day more for its completion; and had it been finished and occupied, the
The artillery brought into action by Hyder on this day, was no more than 47 pieces, chiefly long guns, of heavy calibre, and well served: the English guns of lighter metal, were 55, served with an energy and precision beyond all praise. The most moderate computation of comparative numbers* will make the force of Hyder eight times greater than that of his opponent, although a large corps under the command of his son Tippoo was absent on another service.

Sir Hector Munro, who commanded the first line, deserved and obtained the praise of his general, for "conduct equally spirited and active." Brigadier General Stuart's determined occupation and defence of the heights with the second line, was declared to have been highly meritorious. "Every individual (says Sir Eyre Coote) of this little army; seemed to feel the critical situation of our national concerns: our falling interests required uncommon exertions for their support, and to the honour of this army, every nerve was exerted to the very extent of possibility."

The loss of the English army, lessened by the peculiar skill with which the operations were conducted, was comparatively trifling, being 306 killed and wounded, exceeding not much above one-fourth the loss sustained in the unfortunate attempt

* English force.

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on Chillumbrum. It is at all times difficult to ascertain the casualties of an Indian army; but, on a comparison of statements, I am disposed to estimate the lowest amount of Hyder's loss on this day, at ten thousand men killed and wounded; the density of the masses, and the immense extent occupied by irregulars in the rear, giving certain repetition of effect to the flight of every shot.

The physical means of the English army had been in no respect augmented by the events of this extraordinary day; the same difficulties with regard to money, provisions, and equipment, and the same impossibility of following the enemy continued without diminution, and are described with peculiar force in the dispatch which announced the victory, (an achievement calculated to exalt the imagination and disturb the judgment of an ordinary mind), and are closed with the following modest and appropriate reflection: "If Hyder Ali, buoyed up with former success, had not come down to seek us, I could not have moved the army to follow him; and this is a situation so trying to the responsible military commander, that an officer of character shudders at the idea of being placed in such a predicament." But the moral energies of the troops exhibited the most lively contrast to their former despondency, and had increased in an incalculable ratio, means far more efficacious than physical force for sustaining difficulties, which it was impossible to surmount.

During the period of Hyder's operations to the southward, Tiagar had surrendered to his son Tippoo Sultaun, who had now been ordered to resume the siege of Wandewash, with an equipment of thirteen battering cannon, supported by an ade-
quate force, and he invested the place on the 22d June. The respectable detachment from Bengal had arrived at Vellore on its route to Madras, and the importance of covering its junction, added to the danger of Wandewash, induced Sir Eyre Coote to move in a northerly direction, receiving his food from the ships. On every successive day's march by Cuddalore and Pondicherry, he had reason to conclude that the enemy was preparing for another general action, and from the vicinity of the latter place he made a movement which placed him in view of Hyder's encampment, for the purpose of inviting and ascertaining that issue. Hyder however struck his tents and moved off to the westward, without attempting any operation of consequence: and Sir Eyre Coote, quitting the sea-side, moved in the direction of Permacoil and Carangooly, into the former of which places a small store of provisions had been thrown by the unremitting zeal of Captain Flint, while Hyder was occupied to the southward, and Tippoo at Tiagar, and into the latter from the resources almost under the protection of its guns. At Carangooly Sir Eyre Coote received intelligence that Tippoo, largely reinforced, had moved to intercept the approach of the detachment from Bengal, having raised the siege of Wandewash. With the aid of requisitions on the villages of the whole surrounding country, Tippoo had formed round that place a line of nearly complete circumvallation, and batteries were in readiness to have opened, when he received from his father the new destination which has been stated, with positive orders first to attempt the place by an escalade at all accessible points, of which the number was considerable. The construction of ladders was not only reported, but their dis-
tribution to every corps distinctly seen, and Captain Flint had intelligence of the exact hour of the night of the 16th of July at which he was to expect the escalade. Every post listened in silence, and all heard a low murmuring noise gradually approaching: at the proper period every column was received with a discharge of grape: the noise was for a time exceedingly increased, but it gradually diminished until all was silence. The moral influence of Hyder's late defeat, and the evidence of perfect preparation in the garrison, rendered it impracticable to retrieve the confusion occasioned by this timely check. Attempts to compel the resumption of the escalade on that and the ensuing day produced indications approaching to mutiny, and on the same day that Sir Eyre Coote arrived at Carangooly, Tippoo decamped from Wandewash, leaving to Captain Flint the laborious care of demolishing his batteries and approaches, together with an extensive line of circumvallation. The event was reported to his Commander-in-chief in an unassuming letter of eight lines, five more being allotted to an unaffected congratulation on the late victory and its consequences. The relief of a place, rendered interesting by so many recollections, was announced by Sir Eyre Coote to the Government of Madras, in the following terms. "Wandewash is safe, being the third time in my life I have had the honour to relieve it." Nothing now remaining to detain him from prosecuting his union with the detachment from Bengal, he moved by Chingleput, to St. Thomas's Mount.

The lake of Pulicat, nearly forty miles in length from north to south, and six in its greatest breadth, is an inlet of the sea,
formed by a narrow insulated stripe of land, separated from the
continent by small openings at each extremity, which form the
communication between the lake and the sea. The small fort of
Pulicat, recently captured from the Dutch, is situated on the
southern bank of the southern strait, and is distant about thirty
miles from Madras. The ordinary road from Nellore to Madras
passes to the westward of this lake, at the distance of from fifteen
to twenty miles from the sea; but travellers lightly equipped,
sometimes prefer the shorter route along the shore, and are fer-
ried over these openings. It had not entered into Tippoo's cal-
culations, that the latter route was practicable for troops and
military equipments, and while he was preparing impediments
and ambush on the upper road, the detachment had crossed the
northern opening, distant nearly seventy miles from Madras,
into the insulated spot which has been described, and were suc-
cessively transported across the strait at Pulicat, without the
necessity of firing a shot. Sir Eyre Coote, however, would not
even risk the separate movement of this corps for the remaining
thirty miles: he made two marches, in that direction, from St.
Thomas's Mount, and on the third day had the satisfaction of
inspecting at Pulicat, this important reinforcement, which added
nearly one third to his numerical strength.

It is difficult to contemplate these cautious operations without
reverting to the unhappy fate of Baillie, whom, in advancing
from the same quarter, a very inferior degree of military pru-
dence would have placed in equal security. The faults of Hyder
in permitting the unmolested march of Sir Eyre Coote one hun-
dred and fifty one miles from Porto Novo to Pulicat with a
crippled equipment, with numbers daily and rapidly diminishing from sickness, to form a junction so important in its consequences, when in each of sixteen successive marches he might have offered serious annoyance without the risk of material loss, can only be explained by his imperfect knowledge of facts, and by the necessity of consulting the temper of his army.
CHAPTER XXIII.

Wretched state of military equipment — Sir Eyre Coote turns his attention to Tripassore — Hyder attempts to relieve it — without success — The place falls — Negotiation regarding prisoners — shewed Sir Eyre Coote's imperfect knowledge of Hyder's character — Fights Hyder on ground chosen by himself — Battle of Polliloor described — Dubious victory — does not improve the aspect of English affairs — New means of carrying grain — Western and Chittoor poligars — promise supplies — Sir Eyre Coote determines to relinquish the command — but is prevailed on by Lord Macartney to resume it on the faith of these promises — disappointed — perseveres — Battle of Sholinghur — Poligars come over from Hyder to Sir Eyre Coote — enters the Pollams — erroneously supposed to be inexhausted and abundant — reason — Hyder sends a detachment to ruin the Pollams — defeated and dispersed by Sir Eyre Coote in person — Detaches Colonel Owen — Hyder attacks him in person — dangerous retreat — junction of Sir Eyre Coote — Distress of Vellore — relieved — Retrospective account of Hyder's operations against that place — and its gallant defence — Sir Eyre Coote returns to the Pollams — takes Chittoor — Defective intelligence — Loses his depot in the Pollams — distress — necessity of returning to Tripassore — Serious loss from the monsoon — Misconduct of Mahommed Ali — Assigns the country for the support of the war — Strange misinformation regarding Chanderghery and Mahommed Ali's brother — Facts related — Hyder's brutal outrage — Affairs of Tanjour during this campaign — Hyder's treaty with the Dutch at Negapatam — Colonel Brathwaite's assault of two successive posts — wounded — succeeded by Colonel Nixon — more successful — Colonel Brathwaite resumes the command — defeats Hyder's provincial field force — Sir Hector Munro besieges Negapatam — Effective co-operation of the fleet — Capture of the place — Monsoon — Critical situation of the fleet — Capture of Trincomalee — Renewed distress of Vellore — Sir Eyre Coote marches to relieve it — Alarm for his
life — recovers and effects the service — Cannonaded on his approach and return. — Ineffective attempt to pursue Hyder — who makes a fresh demonstration near Sholingur — the English army returns to Madras.

The detachment from Bengal had moved through a country untouched by the enemy, and was expected to be accompanied by the requisite number of draught and carriage oxen to complete the deficiencies of the army; but owing to the difficulties of the times, added to the most serious defects in the whole system of the commissariat, the supplies were not only lamentably defective in number, but every animal, wild from the pastures, was still to be trained before his services could be of value. Of the cattle officially reported to have been collected at Madras during the absence of the army, not one half was forthcoming; and after a plain calculation it was discovered, that exclusively of what the men could carry on their backs, the actual means provided from all these sources was capable of carrying no more than one and a half day's rice for the consumption of the army. It was not only impracticable to attempt either of the great objects of the campaign, the relief of Vellore or the siege of Arcot, but with an army of 12,000 men, capable with proper equipments of achieving any service, and drawn together from the most distant quarters, it did not seem very obvious by what possible means it was to accomplish any thing. Under circumstances thus "heart breaking," as Sir Eyre Coote emphatically designates them, he turned his attention to Tripassore, a fortress important from position but defective in strength, situated about thirty-three miles to the westward on one of the roads leading to Arcot and Vellore. This place was in the occupation of the enemy, but the intermediate post of Poonamalee was still possessed by the English.
By encamping between Madras and Poonamalee, and subsequently between the latter place and Tripassore, he was enabled to employ the cattle of all his departments to bring successively into advance a sufficiency of grain to attempt Tripassore.

Aug. 19. On the 19th of August he arrived before the place, which had been much improved, and was garrisoned by fifteen hundred men, but inadequately provided with cannon. On the morning of the 22d a good breach having been effected, and preparations made for the assault, a flag of truce appeared, offering to surrender the place on terms previously offered but now rejected, with a demand that they should surrender unconditionally within a quarter of an hour, or await the consequences of the assault. In the instant after dispatching this answer, intelligence was brought of large bodies of the enemy being in sight, and Sir Eyre Coote, on going to an eminence to reconnoitre, perceived the advanced guard of Hyder’s whole army in full approach: there was not a moment to lose; he sent orders to storm instantly, and the troops had just emerged from the trenches when the flag of truce returned with the declaration of surrender, and left the assailants to ascend the breach without opposition, Hyder drawing off as soon as he discovered the event. With only one day’s provisions in camp, Sir Eyre Coote had risked the consequences of an assault, in all cases a doubtful operation, on the single question whether the garrison should or should not be prisoners of war, and was so ill apprized of Hyder’s character as to expect his assent to an exchange of these prisoners for an equal number of British troops in his custody. “The men taken at Tripassore (said Hyder in reply) are faithless and unworthy; they know that they dare not approach me; they are your
prisoners, and I advise you to put every one of them to death speedily.” To feed 1,400 prisoners did not accord with the state of the English commissariat; and Sir Eyre Coote, instructed by this feature of barbarous policy in his future estimation of the value of prisoners, had no alternative but to release them on parole, an obligation to which he could scarcely have ascribed any real force. The store of grain found in the fort was so trifling, that it became necessary, on the night of its capture, to send a convoy for a fresh supply to Poonamallee; and having, by the 25th, obtained a sufficiency of rice for a few days to be carried on the men’s backs, the English general marched on the 26th, with the view of bringing Hyder to action on ground selected by himself.

During the period in which Sir Eyre Coote had been employed in forming the junction so judiciously effected, Hyder had moved into the fortunate encampment of Mooserwauck which he had occupied in the preceding year, when opposed by Sir Hector Munro. He examined with renewed care, and made himself more completely master of the fortunate ground on which Baillie had been defeated; and in determining to offer battle to Sir Eyre Coote on the same spot, and if possible on the same auspicious day of the same lunar month, the 11th of Ramzan; (coinciding in this year with the 31st of August, as it had done in the preceding with the 10th of September) his military judgment was supported by the concurring predictions of all the astrologers, whose prognostics were favourable for every day, but were deemed certain for the 11th. Had an invitation been conveyed to his opponent for that particular day, there can be no doubt that Sir Eyre Coote, to whom all days were indifferent, provided he could obtain close action,
would cheerfully have indulged him in every coincidence required by every astrologer; for on the particular scene of Hyder's former triumph, he was most anxious to obliterate the remembrance of that unfortunate event.

His first day's march brought him to the vicinity of Perambauccum, where large bodies of cavalry to the south-west indicated the presence of the enemy on the expected ground. On the 27th he was again in motion, and about nine o'clock the advanced guard, on reaching the precise spot on which Colonel Baillie had taken the fatal resolution of passing the night of the 9th of September, 1780, perceived the enemy's army in force in front, and extending towards both flanks. The column of march was pointing nearly west. A strong land-wind raised clouds of dust which rendered distant objects imperceptible, but a small thick grove on a gentle eminence, with a water course encompassing its front and right, about 800 yards to the left of the advanced guard, appeared to be a position of so much importance, that it was immediately occupied by a battalion of native troops and its guns: the first line being directed to form in order of battle, fronting what then appeared to be the chief mass of the enemy's force, to the south-west, to the right of the great avenue of banyan trees by which the English army had approached, and at about an angle of forty-five degrees with that avenue; the second line being destined to support the first, and to reinforce the post at the grove. This formation, necessarily slow from being made over broken ground, and among patches of underwood, had been scarcely completed, when a heavy but rather distant cannonade from a grove and village on the right, was found nearly to enfilade the first line, by a troublesome ri-
cochet along its whole extent, and a rapid manœuvre became necessary for throwing back the right, and changing front. A jungul or underwood was interposed between the new position, and this division of the enemy's army commanded by Tippoo; and the cannonade was returned until it could be discovered whether the intervening jungul were penetrable: this point being ascertained in the affirmative, the British troops moved through in columns, after considerable delay in removing impediments, and formed fronting the west, on the opposite side, where a commanding bank gave such superiority to their cannonade, that the enemy's guns drew off, and seemed, by a circuitous movement, in a southern direction, to be joining the main body.

In the meanwhile, the grove first occupied on the left, had been cannonaded by an increasing number of guns, from a position of great strength and extent, formed by the occupation of a bank and water-course, previously prepared with embrazures, receding on its left, towards the pagoda and village of Pollilore, which formed the support of that flank; the right resting on another village, with vast masses of troops extending in the rear beyond the right of that cover. Every corps of the second line, together with an entire brigade from the first, had successively been ordered to strengthen and extend the position at the grove, against which, as the day cleared, the main force of the enemy was found to be directing its principal efforts. These operations varying their aspect according to the points successively occupied on either side were certainly wearing an appearance far from cheering to the British army; a battalion of native troops lately raised, had been ordered to dislodge the enemy from a village, which galled with musquetry the left of
the position at the grove, and returned in disgraceful confusion, in spite of the efforts of their officers; but this disaster was repaired by the veteran 20th * , which effected the object with the precision of a parade movement, and the steadiness of the best European troops.

It was three o'clock when Sir Eyre Coote, after the movements on the right which have been described, came to the left, for the purpose of examining the whole of his situation, and ascertaining whether any mode could be devised, of extricating himself from a formation disjointed in all its parts. He had hitherto been foiled by cross or enfilading fires, in every successive movement undertaken throughout the day, and, with the single exception of the grove, every point successively seized, was found to be within range of more commanding ground. The village of Pollilore, that which, according to the manuscript journal of Colonel Baillie’s operations, ought to have been occupied by that officer, was now evidently the support of the enemy’s left; but before attempting to carry that point, it was necessary to have a connected line of sufficient extent, to take advantage of the success of a flank movement. The first line had by its efforts against Tippoo’s division, been drawn off from the real point of attack, and had become separated by a considerable interval, from the troops which were most severely pressed. It was now therefore directed, to form a third change of position, which brought its front to face the south, the line being drawn up in the avenue with its left about 1300 yards farther to the west, than the point from which it had issued for the first formation, and its right exactly opposite the village of Pollilore. The post at the grove

* Sepoys.
was consequently about 1,400 yards in a diagonal direction in front of its extreme left, and the same post formed a support to the right of the second line, which extended to the left of that post, nearly opposite to the enemy's right. These formations being effected, a brigade from the right of the first line moved in compact order, and with a rapid step, under cover of an animated cannonade from every gun along both lines, to seize the village of Polliore, and turn the enemy's left; and the success of this movement, which was soon determined, was the signal for the second line, by a similar operation, to force the right, supported by a forward movement of the remainder of the army, preceded by their guns, with the exception of three battalions left at the grove to cover the rear while advancing, and to command the ground occupied by the baggage guard, which was so posted as to give and receive reciprocal support.

Upwards of eight hours had elapsed from the commencement of the action before the decisive movement of the right brigade was completed; the direct advance of the first line to support and unite with that brigade, led them over the unburied remains of their comrades, who had perished on the same ground in the preceding year; but this movement on the right, drew the enemy's attention from the second line, which ultimately succeeded in forcing their right, and attaining an eminence from which it was enabled about sunset, to cannonade the retreating columns of the enemy. The impediments, however, which had been prepared, against the advance of every portion of the English troops throughout the day, had been such as merely to admit of their occupying before dusk, the ground
Sir Eyre Coote's varied experience had never placed him in embarrasments so serious, and had never excited in his mind the gloomy forebodings, which for the first and last time in his military life, were distinctly depicted on his countenance when in the presence of an enemy, and from which he was ultimately relieved, contrary to his best expectations. The Mysorean manuscripts invariably admit the action of Porto Novo to have been a severe defeat; that of Pollilore is as invariably claimed as a drawn battle. The losses on either side were prevented from being so considerable as might be anticipated from the length of the action, in consequence of the nature of the ground, and particularly the cover afforded by the intersection of the watercourses and banks, which have already been described. The English army, which went into action eleven thousand strong, lost no more than 421 killed, wounded, and missing; among them were Captain Hislop, the General's aid-de-camp, an officer of much promise, killed, and Brigadier-General Stuart, and Colonel Brown, officers of approved merit and long experience, who by a singular coincidence, each lost a leg from the same cannon shot; the former recovered, but the latter died on the same night. The force under Hyder's command had been augmented by the division under his son, and comprised his whole disposable force. He had on this day fired from 80 pieces of cannon, but had found no opportunity of employing with effect the services of his numerous cavalry. The loss of the Mysoreans probably did not exceed two thousand; the general impression was far from that of defeat; and the effect upon their minds was, to re-
cover in a considerable degree from the humiliating sense of inferiority which had followed the events of the 1st of July. A portion of the 28th was employed not only in due attention to the casualties of the preceding day, but in the melancholy task of gathering together and interring the remains of Colonel Baillie's detachment; and on the 29th, Sir Eyre Coote returned to Tripassore, not having a single day's provision left for the fighting men, and the natives attached to the public departments, having been without food for the two preceding days.

This dubious victory had in no respect improved the aspect of English affairs; and, in the necessity of having recourse to some untried expedient, the active mind of Lord Macartney suggested to him the possibility of employing some portion of the fugitive population which had taken refuge at Madras, in carrying loads of grain on their heads for the use of the army. Considerable numbers were easily found to engage their services, but in the scarcity of food which prevailed at Madras, the temptation of such a load was too powerful to be resisted; numbers disappeared on the road, and of the remainder who arrived with loads uniformly diminished, a very large proportion took alarm at what they saw and heard of their new situation, and absconded in the night; but by occupying a position between Tripassore and Poonamallee, and throwing grain forward into the former place, it became practicable by all these united means, at length to move from Tripassore.

To the north-west of the road leading from Madras to Arcot, is situated the strong country usually denominated that of the western and Chittoor poligars, placed between the range of hills which bound the Balaghaut, and a second chain, which ap-
proaching within a few miles of the sea, near the lake of Pulicat, forms an irregularly indented concave sweep of varied elevation until its south-western extremity overlooks, at the distance of a few miles, the town of Arcot.

The chiefs or poligars of these countries, varying in strength and extent of territory, had sought to conciliate the belligerents, to extend their possessions at the expense of their neighbours, or by neutrality to save their countries from devastation, as suited their respective views of their own relative strength and interest. The poligars of Vencatigherry, Calastry, and Bomrauze, were the most powerful of these chieftains; the spearmen of the former had joined Sir Eyre Coote, and had formed a portion of his baggage guard in the late action; but their expenditure of provision much outweighed their utility. Calastry and Bomrauze were both with Hyder; but had, with a very pardonable prudence, assured his adversary that the junction was of mere necessity, to save their countries from devastation, and that they awaited the opportunity when they might safely change sides; and place their resources at his disposal. The numerous minor chieftains had also, after the first symptoms of a favourable change, sent deputations of similar character, and all were profuse of assurances that the English army would find abundance of provisions by moving in that direction. Sir Eyre Coote, feeling the conviction, that he was wasting his large store of character, and what little remained of life, by continuing in command of troops unprovided with all but arms, that really constitutes an army, had gone down to Madras to confer with the Government, to resign his charge, and to declare the inutility of
keeping together a nominal army, incapable of movement: but had been prevailed upon by Lord Macartney's representation of these prospects to make one further trial.

On the 21st of September he moved from Tripassore, two days march, to Tritany, through the skirts of these countries; where he sought in vain for the realization of any one promise, made by men, who were actuated chiefly by fear, in making and in breaking their engagements. In the vicinity of his encampment was the little fort of Poloor, which he captured, with two hundred prisoners to be liberated; and with the aid of a small store found in this place, but more from the skill of his searchers for subterranean hoards, he continued to subsist from day to day, constantly receiving fresh promises, and reiterated disappointments. On this ground, he received from Colonel Lang the commandant at Vellore, an account of the reduced state of his provisions and the necessity of an early surrender of the place, if not relieved. Hyder was also reported to be distant only ten or twelve miles, near to the hill of Sholingur, and to be strengthening a position to obstruct the farther approach of the English army towards Vellore. Sir Eyre Coote reckoning on exactly a sufficiency of provisions to carry him back to Tripassore, determined to try the effect of another action, and wrote to the Government, describing his situation, and requesting that at least one day's rice should, if possible, be advanced to Tripassore, to provide for the event of the enemy declining the meeting, or of its result not opening such unlooked for prospects as might afford the hope of relieving Vellore.

Throwing his heavy guns and every impediment with a small garrison into Poloor, he made a short movement of seven miles
on the evening of the 26th. The night proved tempestuous; and with his miserable cattle, it was impracticable in the ensuing morning to move the tents, drenched and doubled in weight by rain. Hyder, whose encampment was near, and considerably in advance of the position which he was preparing, being accurately apprized of every circumstance, announced to his army that there would be no movement on that day; all the cattle of the army were in consequence sent to a better pasture at the distance of some miles, and many of the troops, together with most of the drivers and followers, dispersed, as was usual on such intimations, to seek for grain, or to supply their other wants in the adjacent villages; for the want of cavalry in the English army left them free to wander at large without the apprehension of danger.

Sir Eyre Coote, lightly escorted, went out in the morning to examine the country in his front, and from an eminence which he ascended, a long ridge of rocks was observed possessed by the enemy's troops; being desirous of farther examination, he ordered a brigade from camp, and proceeded to dislodge the troops from the ridge, on ascending which Hyder's whole army was clearly discovered in a southern direction, distant about three miles, with some strong corps a mile in front, and an advanced encampment of cavalry close under the ridge, who struck their tents on the first appearance of the brigade. Orders were immediately dispatched for the army to join without delay; the camp was struck and the troops were in motion with all practicable dispatch, the baggage under cover of two battalions with their guns skirted the hills, and was conducted to an eligible spot on the right of the ridge described, where it remained secure during
the operations of the day. The army told off as usual for forming into two lines, but marching by files in one column, moved after doubling the left extremity of the ridge, in a direction parallel to the line of the enemy's encampment, until the centre of the first line, when faced to the front, should be opposite the main body of the enemy, distant about two miles, and drawn up in front of their encampment then in the act of being struck: a small rock in front of the right, and a grove and eminence on the future left of the first line, offered supports for each flank, while a ridge advantageously placed in the direction of the baggage-guard would protect the rear; the oblique direction of this position would in some degree turn the enemy's left, and might thus offer an opportunity of taking advantage of any awkward movement: the second line forming an extension of the first when the movement commenced, successively broke into echelon of corps, partly in consequence of previous orders, but with increased intervals from the difficulty of the ground: a disposition which was necessary for the double purpose of watching powerful bodies of cavalry on the left flank, and observing and supporting the baggage-guard.

While the troops were in motion to take up these positions, Sir Eyre Coote, with a small escort, advanced midway between the two armies, more thoroughly to reconnoitre. The country was comparatively open, but ridges and groupes of rocks, irregularly scattered over the plain, and emerging to unequal heights, admitted of each party availing itself of the advantages of ground. Hyder's main force was judiciously drawn up behind the crest of a long ridge, not rocky; its front, covered with swampy rice fields, while his guns were placed on the summit of this ridge,
or on commanding positions among the more advanced groups of rocks. Exclusively of the advanced corps in position, several detached bodies, exceeding in numerical strength the whole of the English army, were seen in motion towards each flank, and large masses of cavalry were collected on various points, evidently prepared to charge on an appointed signal. In fact the whole movement had operated as a surprise on Hyder; he had reckoned with certainty on the impossibility of Sir Eyre Coote’s marching on that day. The movement of the brigade he treated merely as a reconnaissance; and it was not until intelligence was brought of the English army having struck their encampment, that he ordered horsemen to be dispatched in every direction to recall his cattle, drivers, and followers; and they had but just begun to strike the tents, when the head of the English column had reached a point nearly opposite the centre of his encampment.

Thus circumstanced, it was Hyder’s design to act on the defensive as long as possible, and to make such demonstrations as should delay the movements of his adversary, and give time for repairing the confusion of this unexpected event; and above all, for yoking the cattle to the limbers, with a view to the leading principle of all his tactics, never to risk a gun. The day was far spent; the English army had not yet completed the formation which has been described; nor had Hyder shewn the least indication of changing his front. The two leading brigades of the English army had, in preparing to take up their ground, extended farther to the right than ordered, and an interval was thus opened between them and the remainder of the line. Hyder, on perceiving this error, opened a general cannonade along his whole front, and from the advanced positions; and Sir Eyre Coote, deeming
the moment too critical, to suffer the enemy’s posted guns to annoy him, while performing any thing but a forward movement, ordered the whole line instantly to front and advance, the divided corps being ordered to bring forward its right, as it moved on. The enemy’s guns were ill pointed, during a steady but not rapid advance of both lines, which, as they approached, are described to have had the appearance of diminutive corps almost surrounded by several separate armies. The necessity of defiling to pass the groups of rocks, had at one time caused several temporary openings in different parts of the line, and at this moment the two principal masses of the enemy’s cavalry charged these points with a determination hitherto unexhibited; each mass as it reached the opening, wheeling to the right and left, to overturn the naked flanks, but no flank was found exposed, the very act of defiling had provided the required protection, which was formed with the greatest coolness and precision at obtuse angles with the line, and received the masses with a cross fire. These masses had sensibly thinned in their approach, from the havoc effected by grape and musquetry in the front, and by the consequent hesitation of the rear, and when, on reaching their object, they found the fresh and unexpected annoyance of a cross fire: one of these masses fairly galloped through, and went off to the rear, sustaining additional loss from the fire of the rear rank of the line, everywhere faced about for the purpose. The other mass sustained a direct repulse with still severer loss. The charges had been ordered, with the double view of direct and complete success, or in the event of failure, they would cover the retreat of the guns, which were ordered to limber up at the moment of the charge, and to retire the
instant it was found to have failed; and the unavoidable sus-
pension thus produced in the advance of the English army,
enabled them to draw off the whole excepting one 6 pounder.
The right brigades had by the movement described, gained the
left flank of the enemy's position, and were enabled to bring
their guns to bear with considerable effect on the retreating
columns from the ridge abandoned by the enemy; the re-
mainder of the first line, adapting its movements to that of
the detached brigades, by gradually bringing forward its right,
and forming an extension of their line of front.

During these operations of the first line, the second making
little advance on its left, was also gradually bringing up its
right, as the movements of the enemy threatened the left,
which in the course of a severe struggle, and several charges
of cavalry, was at one time nearly turned, but on completing
a partial change of front with celerity and precision, the enemy,
not equally expert in the corresponding movement, suffered
severely from the English guns, and finally drew off about the
same period as their main body; an attempt on the baggage-
guard, consisting of two battalions and four guns, by a large
body of infantry and cavalry with twelve guns, having proved
equally abortive from the judicious dispositions of that guard
and of the second line. It was midnight before the English
army was re-united on the ground occupied by the advanced
brigade. The acquisitions of the day were three cavalry
standards and one gun; but as Sir Eyre Coote states in a note
written from the field of battle, he would willingly have ex-
changed these trophies, together with the credit of the victory,
for five days' rice. The strength of the British army in this
day's action, was 11,500 men, and their loss no more than 100 men killed and wounded; the unexpected events of the day, had even left many of the enemy's bazar tents still standing, and the shopkeepers actually ignorant of the result, were selling their wares to the English followers, who mistook them for their own people, for some time before the error was reciprocally discovered. Hyder's whole force was in the field, with the exception of ten guns, for he fired only from seventy. The Mysoreans uniformly describe the battle of Sholingur as a surprize, and admit it to have been a severe defeat, in which their loss probably exceeded 5,000 men.

The poligars of Calastry and Vencatigherry, weary of military dangers which promised them little advantage, and ascribing to this victory consequences which their defection from the enemy might render decisive, agreed to avail themselves of the events of the evening. A thick mass of spears was observed going off towards the hills at the close of the action, and in the morning messengers arrived in camp to announce the event. With a sufficiency of rice barely to carry back the army to Tripassore, Sir Eyre Coote on this intelligence incurred the risk of increasing his distance from that post, and moved through a pass to the westward of Sholingur, into a country supposed to be unexhausted and abundant. These expectations were found in Sept. the event to have been greatly exaggerated; the market of the Mysorean army had furnished a certain and ready vent for surplus produce; and prices sufficient to tempt the more provident husbandmen to spare even a portion of their secret hoards. The English army therefore found a precarious subsistence from day to day, and the hopes of throwing a scanty supply into
Vellore depended on the actual crop. Hyder full of indignation at the defection of these chiefs, detached a select and experienced corps of six thousand men, without guns, who, by forcing another pass, commenced the devastation of the rich intermediate vales, and the conflagration of every village. This unfortunate event produced most unfavourable impressions, seriously affecting all Sir Eyre Coote’s prospects of supply; and the animated veteran, although suffering from severe illness, feeling the importance of counteracting these effects, placed himself at the head of a light corps, and after an absence of thirty-eight hours, during thirty-two of which he had never dismounted from his horse, returned to camp, having completely surprised, discomfited, and dispersed the enemy, and compelled them to leave behind, not only the whole of their plunder, but the few tents and light equipments with which they had entered the woods.

The extreme urgency of the relief of Vellore, induced the English general, to risk a detachment under Colonel Owen, consisting of five battalions with their guns, two flank companies of an European regiment of the Bengal establishment, and a portion of his small corps of cavalry, twenty miles in advance; for the purpose of commanding the resources of a greater extent of country, and affording the chance of intercepting some of the convoys of grain, frequently descending the pass of Damalcher-ry, for the supply of the enemy’s army. On the 23d of October, about eleven o’clock, he received intelligence from Colonel Owen of the enemy’s first appearance. About two o’clock, (being as soon as circumstances would admit,) he moved forward with a select body, ordering the remainder of the army to follow as soon
as possible. After marching about four miles, he met a few of his own irregular horse, who had fled from the field of battle, and reported the detachment to be entirely destroyed. The impressions excited by such intelligence, may easily be imagined; judging however, from experience, of the credit due to the reports of early fugitives, he quickened his pace, and sent corresponding orders to the army; and, after a further advance of two miles, he had the happiness to receive a note from Colonel Owen, intimating his safety in a strong position, where the army joined him on the same night.

This detachment encamped considerably in advance of a strong pass, situated between it and the main army, had at daylight been attacked at all points by Hyder in person, at the head of nearly his whole regular infantry, and light guns, and all his select cavalry, who made the most vigorous efforts for the destruction of this corps before it could reach the pass, or be relieved by the army. Although the position of the encampment would appear to have been selected with too much confidence, the exertions of Colonel Owen, and the excellent conduct of the troops, extricated him from a perilous predicament, and enabled him to gain the pass between one and two o'clock in the afternoon, with the loss of all his camp equipage and baggage. In the course of his retreat, one gun had fallen into the possession of the enemy, by a furious attack on the native corps which protected it: but this disaster was instantly repaired by the promptitude and decision of Captain Moore, who, at the head of his two flank companies of Europeans, supported by a veteran corps of sepoys, forced his way with the bayonet, through the masses which were bearing
it away, and brought it back in triumph to the protection of
the detachment. The services of the artillery under Captain
Moorehouse, an officer eminently distinguished on every occa-
sion, had essentially contributed to the success of this arduous
day, by the uncommon judgment, coolness, and decision evinced
in taking up the great variety of points successively destined to
cover the retreat of the troops; and although the casualties of
the detachment amounted to three hundred and seventeen men,
the loss of the enemy was computed by themselves, to have
exceeded three thousand.

The distresses of Vellore had by this time approached their
last crisis. During all the difficulties of the times, faithful ses-
poys had been found, who made good their way in disguise,
with small sums of money entrusted to their care at Madras; and
throughout the whole of this eventful war, not one example oc-
curred, either in this case, or the more arduous service of con-
veying aid to the English prisoners in Mysoor, of one individual
having betrayed his trust. The garrison of Vellore had for
some time past subsisted on grain purchased in the distant vil-
lages, and carried in by stealth, on dark nights. Not one
day’s grain was in store: the approaching moon-light nights,
and the expected filling of the river, would decide their fate,
and the commandant stated to Sir Eyre Coote, the inevitable
alternative of immediately throwing in a supply, or making a
movement to cover the escape of the garrison, from the only
remaining fortress which could favour the eventual hope of re-
covering the possession of the country. The exertions for
collecting grain in the Pollams, had procured a small surplus,
the whole of which was destined to the relief of this impor-
tant garrison; and on the 3d of November, Sir Eyre Coote had by three marches from his encampment among the hills, thrown in six weeks’ rice; Hyder having, on his approach, retired to the opposite side of the river Palár, a weak determination, ascribed by Sir Eyre Coote to the discouragement of having recently been foiled with great loss, in an attempt on a detachment only.

The situation of Vellore since the commencement of the war had been critical and highly interesting. Hyder had, after the capture of Arcot in the preceding year, allotted the largest portion of his army and his best battering train for the siege of Vellore. This fortress, nearly an exact square, still exhibiting in its antique battlements, for match-locks, and bows and arrows, the evidence of no modern date*, was built, according to the ideas of strength which prevailed at the period of its erection, when the use of cannon was little understood, close to a range of hills, to favour the introduction of supplies, or the eventual escape of the garrison; and thus situated, it is also commanded by those hills; a defect, which its Mahratta and Mahommedan conquerors † remedied in part, by fortifying the points which overlooked it. These points, as the use of artillery came to determine the defence of places, became accordingly the keys of the fort below; for, although surrounded by a rampart of masonry which might be deemed Cyclopean, and a wet ditch of great breadth, the possession of these points command in flank and

* Vide vol. i. page 15.
† The evidence of the names by which they are distinguished, shews that two points were fortified by the Mahrattas, and one by the Mahommedans. See vol. i. page 83.
reverse (although at too great a distance for certain effect), three faces of the fort, and leave but one face affording good cover. The arrangements of the siege, directed by French officers, were judiciously directed to two simultaneous operations, the principal hill-fort being the primary object, while approaches and batteries from the west were pushed on to the proper positions for breaching the south-western face of the lower fort, and enfilading that next to the hill, which in the event of success in the primary object, would alone afford adequate cover to the garrison from the fire of the hill.

The operations against the principal hill fort were conducted with great skill, overwhelming numbers, and an abundant artillery, for five weeks. The post was commanded by Lieutenant Champness, and his second in command Lieutenant Parr, whose adventures at Carnatickghur have already been recited, officiated as his engineer. The greater portion of two faces, of a rather extensive post, were razed to the foundation by the enemy’s fire, and the breaches were completely accessible; approaches over the bare rock, were carried on by means of wooden frames filled with fascines; and on the 13th January, about nine at night, the assailants issued from points distant only twenty yards from the breaches: but every thing had been completely retrenched with infinite labour and skill; and, on ascending the breach, and almost filling the place with assailants, up to the ditches of the retrenchment, the impediments in every direction, and the masked fire which had been prepared, and well reserved, drove them back with great slaughter: a second, and third attempt was made, with the aid of ladders, and repelled with the same steadiness and gallantry; the imperfect con-
struction of the place gave the defenders no flanking command over the foot of the breaches, where the enemy remained completely covered, and they now began to form lodgements on the breaches and successively to fill the ditches of the retrenchments with fascines. Lieutenant Parr, perceiving that all was lost, if this work was permitted to proceed, obtained the permission of his commanding officer to attempt to dislodge them: and descending about two o'clock by the very ladders which had been placed by the enemy to ascend the retrenchment, commenced a close encounter with the bayonet, which terminated in the entire expulsion of the assailants; and a powerful sortie of European and native troops from the lower fort, a few nights afterwards succeeded in entering the flank of the enemy's parallel, spiking his guns and damaging his approaches. This extraordinary energy of native troops (for there were no other on the hill) induced Hyder to proceed from Arcot, for the purpose of personally examining the state of the siege, and giving his own directions, accompanied by several French officers: but the intelligence of Sir Eyre Coote's march from Madras at that exact period, determined him, as we have already seen, to raise the siege, which from that period had been converted into a blockade. Colonel Lang the commandant (together with a portion of the garrison for the purpose of reducing the expenditure of provisions) joined the army, and the command devolved on Captain Cuppage, Sir Eyre marching off on the day succeeding his arrival to seek for subsistence for his own army.

His first object on returning to the Pollams, was the fort of Chittoor, situated N.W. of the spot lately occupied by Colonel Owen, reported to be the intermediate dépôt of provisions de-
Chap. XXIII. ascending the pass of Damalcherry; and it fell after a siege of four days on the 11th of November. But no character of the war was more conspicuous, than the almost invariable defects of Sir Eyre Coote’s intelligence, with the exception of that received through Lieutenant Flint, or by means of sepoys disguised for specific purposes. This defect is frequently stated in his official correspondence, but he does not appear to have suspected, that all his guides and spies were in the service of the enemy. There was no grain in Chittoor; it was a weak place; and Sir Eyre Coote seemed to be acting in opposition to his own principles of military conduct, in throwing into it a battalion which was eventually sacrificed, as were the heavy guns which he had thrown into Polloor previously to the action of Sholinghur; the garrison however of the latter place, having in conformity to provisional orders, made good their retreat into the woods. Before moving to the relief of Vellore, Sir Eyre Coote had left a battalion, with some guns, in a good position near to his former encampment at Polipet, to protect his sick and cover the collection of grain. On the second day after the capture of Chittoor, he had the mortification to learn, that this battalion had been obliged to retreat to the woods with severe loss, and the capture of its cannon and stores, including the important article of grain, not without suspicion of treachery on the part of the officers of Bomrauze.

There was now no hope of being able to subsist the army in these countries during the monsoon, if indeed it had been prudent to expose the troops to the usual inclemency of that season. Two rivers daily expected to be impassable were interposed between the army and Tripassore. Intelligence of the
investment of that place, communicated in an express from its commandant, was audibly confirmed by the firing of the siege. On the 22d of November, he crossed the Cortelaur (which had so long stopped the progress of Colonel Baillie in the preceding year), and encamped on the same day in the neighbourhood of Tripassore, after a forced march over an incipient inundation. His whole march from Chittoor had been a series of difficulties, surmounted from day to day, by one half of the army being alternately without food, and these distresses were aggravated by the bursting of the monsoon on the latter days of the march; not only cattle and their loads were lost, but the excellent little corps of cavalry, formed from the ruins of those in Mahommed Ali's service, was deprived of nearly half its numbers; and a considerable proportion of human beings, chiefly followers, were destroyed by the united effects of flood and famine. The Commander-in-chief had for many days been confined to his bed*, and had announced to the Government the necessity of appointing a successor: and thus, after a campaign interspersed with the most dazzling triumphs, the English army entered into cantonments in the neighbourhood of Madras, with prospects for the ensuing year, which offered little of cheerful expectation to the most sanguine observer.

One prominent topic pervades the official correspondence of Sir Eyre Coote throughout the whole of this campaign, namely, "the duplicity and iniquity of the nabob Mahommed Ali's government." The few remaining resources of the country, placed beyond the control of the power which directed the war,

* Palankeen in marching.
were employed not to support but to counteract the general cause. To the ordinary misrule of a wretched native government was now added, in all cases to which the power extended, the clandestine sale of the grain, which might have mitigated the distresses of the army, and the remittance of the pecuniary amount to the privy coffers of Mahommed Ali. Not one soldier paid by this sovereign prince accompanied, as a mere demonstration, the army which was now fighting for his nominal sovereignty; and while this army was actually sustaining the severest privations, Mahommed Ali, with an audacity of falsehood, and ingratitude to a great and early benefactor, destined as Sir Eyre Coote supposes to mislead the English* cabinet, addressed a letter to Lord Macartney, announcing his having supplied the army with an abundant store; and intimating that nothing but unnecessary delay prevented the expulsion of the enemy. Sir Eyre Coote had reiterated, and the Governor-general had strongly impressed on Lord Macartney the necessity of assuming the direct management of what remained of this misgoverned country; and Mahommed Ali skilfully anticipated the event about the close of the year, by most graciously assigning a country which, if assumed on undisguised grounds, might not have been so easily restored by the baneful influence so often deplored.

In perusing the voluminous correspondence of Sir Eyre Coote from these woods, it is not a little remarkable, that he seems to have been entirely uninformed regarding the locality or strength of Chandergherry, a fortress situated in the centre of those

* Letter 29th October, 1781.
resources whose fragments had subsisted his army for nearly two months, and enabled him to relieve Vellore; one cursory mention is made of the kelledar of Chandergherry, as concurring with the aumil of Tripety, in counteracting his collection of supplies; but without any indication of being aware that this kelledar was Abd-ul-Wahab Khân, Mahommed Ali’s brother, or that the place was nearly impregnable, and calculated, if placed at his disposal, to have a material influence over his future operations. The Government at Madras seemed to have been unaccountably kept in the same ignorance: they received the account of its surrender from Sir Eyre Coote, and notice it in their narrative of transactions, merely as “a fort garrisoned by the nabob’s troops.” Hyder’s more than half-Hindoo propensities had induced him to grant unqualified indemnity to the sacred temple of Tripety, only nine miles distant from Chandergherry, to the extent of not even interfering with the payment of a tribute to Mahommed Ali for similar indemnity; but his connection with Abd-ul-Wahab is involved in some obscurity. It can only be ascertained with certainty, that before the invasion, this person had corresponded with Hyder; that his vakeel, Mahommed Secunder, was seen in camp on the first day of the invasion; and having soon afterwards, in public durbar, communicated his master’s answer to a letter he had written by Hyder’s desire, (probably to demand his presence in camp at the head of his troops,) Hyder, after hearing the contents in a low tone, flew into a passion, and exclaimed aloud, “Is this the end of your invitations? and have I expended crores for the purpose of feed-
ing a fat, lazy fakeer?* Return to your worthless master, and tell him to expect me at his mokan.”† Immediately after the return of Mahommed Secunder, Abd-ul-Wahab, who usually resided at Chittoor, suddenly retired to the droog of Chandergherry, which he prepared for defence. Hyder was not at leisure to undertake the siege until January, 1782, when Abd-ul-Wahab Khan, possessing a superabundant store of grain, capitulated without the most remote necessity, on the condition ‡ of being permitted to retire with his property to Madras. A previous breach of faith (of what nature we can now only conjecture,) was Hyder’s apology for disregarding his own; and he ordered the whole family to be sent to Seringapatam, with the exception of two grand-daughters, who were detained at Arcot for his own future pleasures. This brutal outrage was, however, not accomplished by Hyder. The children were of too early an age, and the consummation meditated by the father, remained to be exacted as an hereditary claim.

During the operations which had occupied Hyder’s personal attention to the army of Sir Eyre Coote, his troops in the southern provinces of Trichinopoly and Tanjour had not been inactive. After his departure from these countries in June, considerable exertions had been made to collect a field force at Tanjour, whether Colonel Brathwaite had been sent to command. Hyder had drawn his accustomed circle of desolation about twelve miles

* A religious mendicant.
† The residence of a religious mendicant. It also means a place of importance.
‡ The author saw this person on his return from prison in 1784, and heard him relate Hyder’s breach of the capitulation, but not its alleged cause.
round that fort; but with the exception of the capital, the whole country was in his undisturbed possession; the revenues were collected with the greatest regularity; every fort was well garrisoned, almost every pagoda fortified, and a well equipped field corps was prepared to act as circumstances might require. On the commencement of hostilities against the Dutch, a defensive treaty was concluded between Hyder and the Governor of Negapatam, by which the English district of Nagore and other places were ceded to the Dutch, and measures of reciprocal co-operation were concerted — on the one part, for the security of Negapatam; and on the other, to procure for Hyder any aid from that garrison which might be necessary for maintaining his ground in the province, or eventually for the reduction of the capital. So soon as the forces under Colonel Brathwaite had become, by successive reinforcements, sufficiently strong to leave the protection of the capital, his first object was to attempt the extension of his resources, by the capture of the nearest posts, but his troops being exclusively native, and those of the enemy chiefly select spearmen, peculiarly adapted to the defence of places, he failed in two successive attempts at carrying by assault two different places, the first having been dismantled and the garrison removed after the assault to the second. In the latter of these operations, he had himself been wounded, and had ordered Colonel Nixon from Trichinopoly, to assume the intermediate command of the troops, which had been recently augmented by the arrival of two corps from the more southern districts, to about 3,500 men. The first efforts of this officer were more successful. He besieged and took two places, by placing his officers and serjeants at the head of the forlorn hope, losing in the latter of these ope-
rations upwards of three hundred officers and men; and it is remarkable, that he assigns as a reason for not besieging another place, that it was defended by the "famous Papinairoo" of Chittledroog, who, with his own hardy irregulars, had defended both the places from which Colonel Brathwaite had been repulsed.

Colonel Brathwaite was soon afterwards sufficiently recovered to resume the command, and proceeded towards the enemy's field force, which was strongly posted at the village of Mahadapatam, an insulated spot, covered by field works, and surrounded by rice swamps: the attack was judiciously planned and well executed, with only 2,500 men and eight guns, against nearly double the number of men, and six guns strongly posted. After a close encounter of several hours, in which every street was defended, Hyder's forces retreated in disorder, with great loss, and leaving behind them two guns.

Sir Hector Munro's health had been so much impaired, that soon after the battle of Polilore, he was advised by his medical friends to proceed to England for its re-establishment; and Sir Eyre Coote, who had uniformly found him an excellent second in command, assented with great reluctance, to the necessity of his departure.* While waiting at Madras for an opportunity to embark, he had yielded to the wishes of Lord Macartney, that he should assume the direction of the siege of Negapatam; for which the requisite equipments were embarked on the fleet under Sir Edward Hughes, and arrived off Nagore, situated a few miles to the northward of Negapatam, about the 20th of

* His departure is said to have been influenced by a harsh reply, to a suggestion offered during the battle of Polilore.
October. The English field corps, which had been operating in the province of Tanjore, and had, as we have seen, established its superiority over that of the enemy, was destined to form a large numerical portion of the besieging force; and Colonel Brathwaite, returning to the charge of the capital of the province, detached all his disposable troops, under the command of Colonel Nixon, who arrived at Nagore on the 21st, and in view of the fleet, made a spirited and eminently successful attack on the enemy’s troops, in the act of their evacuating Nagore. Sir Hector Munro went immediately on shore for the purpose of concerting the requisite measures: the marines of the fleet, and a large detachment of seamen were landed, and the engineer and senior officer of artillery commenced the preparations necessary in their respective departments. A chain of five redoubts, connected by lines to the northward of Negapatam must necessarily be forced before trenches could be opened before the place; and this operation having been effected by a combined attack, planned and executed in a masterly manner, and with little comparative loss, on the 29th of October; trenches were opened on the 3d of November, and the place surrendered by capitulation on the 12th. In this very remarkable service, the numbers of the besieged doubled those of the besiegers, who at no time exceeded 4000 men; while the besieged, including Hyder’s troops, who had joined according to treaty, amounted to full 8000. The rapid success of this operation is chiefly to be ascribed to the impression produced by the peculiar energy and intrepidity of the seamen and marines, in the assault of the redoubts; and the immoveable steadiness with which they repelled two determined sorties made with the whole disposable force of the garrison.
The result of this invaluable co-operation of the fleet, was not only the possession of a place intended to be a principal depot for the expected French forces, but the evacuation by Hyder's troops of all the posts in that part of the country, and the consequent command of considerable resources.

The monsoon set in with such violence, immediately after the surrender of the place, that the Admiral was for upwards of three weeks unable to embark the seamen and marines, who had performed these valuable services; and the ships were during the same period placed in the most critical situation, from the fury of an incessant storm, and the absence of a considerable portion of their crews. Towards the close of the year, the moderate weather admitted of embarking a detachment of volunteer sepoys, and artillery-men, to aid in the reduction of Trincomalee and fort Ostenburgh, in the island of Ceylon; forts which command the harbour of the former name, deemed of essential importance to naval operations, by enabling the power which possessed it to remain, during the tempestuous season in the vicinity of that scene, on which the national interests in India were about to be contested: and in this operation the Admiral was successful.

The period to which the garrison of Vellore was provisioned expired on the 15th of December, but some reliance was placed on a scanty addition to this store by the means which have already been described. Sir Eyre Coote had, as already noticed, made his arrangements for embarking to proceed to Bengal, partly to concert with the Governor-general the possibility of some remedy, for the succession of wretched expedients, which served as apologies for equipment; but chiefly because his health had sunk under the pressure of bodily fatigue and mental anxiety,
to a degree that had induced his medical advisers to protest against the fatal consequences of his continuing in the field. The public importance which the Government attached to his presence, added to reports of serious urgency from the commandant at Vellore, induced him to acquiesce in their desire: and although the Government, from a solicitude for his health, rather wished that the immediate relief of that place should be committed to subordinate hands, the General conceived it a service of such paramount importance, that he resolved to incur all risks and every mortification to ensure its accomplishment, and joined the army for that purpose on the 2d of January.

On the morning of the 5th, a little before the break of day, when the army had struck their encampment, then about a mile west from Tripassore, Sir Eyre Coote's valet, on entering his tent to awake his master, found him senseless; medical assistance was instantly called, and he was found to be in a fit of apoplexy. For nearly two hours, during which little hope was entertained of his recovery, the despondency painted on every countenance, and particularly on those of the native troops, whose attachment and confidence exceeded the bounds of human veneration, and who could with difficulty be restrained from transgressing the limits of decorum, to satisfy their anxiety, presented altogether a scene of mournful interest. Expresses to Madras, excited a corresponding degree of apprehension: an earnest intreaty from the Government urged his immediate return, "for the preservation of a life so valuable to the state," and Colonel Lang was ordered to take eventual charge of the army. While the Government waited with impatience for the return of the general, intelligence was brought, that he had marched on the next morning for the relief
of Vellore, so far recovered, as to admit of his being carried in a palanquin. Nothing material occurred until the 9th, when about to cross the dry bed of the river Poony, the enemy appeared in force, on the opposite bank. The confluence of this the Palâr, which flows from the west, is immediately opposite to Arcot. Vellore is situated on the same bank of the Palâr, about fifteen miles farther to the westward, and the course of the Poony being from the north-west, the English army was now at nearly the same distance from Vellore and Arcot. The arrangements of Sir Eyre Coote, for passing the river, were made with so much caution and skill, that Hyder desisted from his intended attack, but on the ensuing day, after marching about five miles, his army appeared in two powerful columns, pointing towards the left and the rear, just as the convoy were entering a swamp of rice grounds, which must necessarily be passed. Sir Eyre Coote, directing his exclusive attention to the preservation of the convoy, caused each brigade to take separate but connected positions, to keep the enemy in check, at a suitable distance, and scarcely condescending to notice a distant but incessant cannonade of four hours, which produced few casualties, passed over the whole in safety, encamping on the same evening, about four miles from Vellore, and close under its walls on the 11th, being the precise day on which the commandant had announced by express, that he must necessarily surrender, if not relieved, and the general had the satisfaction to deposit unimpaired, a store of provisions equal to three months’ consumption.

On the 13th he commenced his return towards Madras, and Hyder appeared in full force, to dispute his passage over the same swamp, one division of his army making a disposition to
oppose the head of the principal column of march, while another was in rapid motion to fall on the rear, while it should still be entangled in the morass; there was now less of impediment than had been experienced on the 10th, and the leading corps were enabled to cross with rapidity, and occupy a position beyond the morass, which checked the enemy in front, and covered the passage of the rear. The troops sustained a heavy but distant cannonade, with little comparative loss, (the casualties of both days not exceeding 120 men,) for about three hours, when the whole having passed to the firm ground, formed and advanced on the enemy, about four o'clock in the afternoon. Hyder's line of infantry stood until the advancing fire of the English artillery did some execution; but Sir Eyre Coote had the mortification to see the cannon already far retired before the infantry gave way: the pursuit was continued until dark, but the guns kept encreasing their distance; and it was midnight before the English army reached the encampment to which the position of the baggage obliged them to return. On the 16th in the morning, the army having on the preceding night occupied the same encampment from which it moved to the action of Sholingur, Hyder appeared in full force, with an apparent intention of offering battle on the same ground. The invitation was not declined, but after ten hours spent in unavailing manœuvres, the army pursued its march to Tritany, and the remainder of the route to Tripassore, was without incident.
CHAPTER XXIV.

Affairs of Malabar — Siege of Tellicherry — from 1780 to 1782 — relieved — Besieging army defeated and taken — Peculiar plan of the siege — Defeat and capture of Colonel Brathwaite’s corps in Tanjore — Despondency of each belligerent from causes unknown to the other — Stated — Sindea detached from the Mahratta confederacy — Nature of the influence of this event on the connexion between Hyder and the Mahrattas, concealed from the English — explained — Digressive illustration of Sindea’s mixed character of dependency and superiority, in a sketch of the Mahratta constitution — Origin of Choute, &c. — Return from the digression — Hyder seriously reviews his actual situation — determines to concentrate his force and move to the westward —Commences the destruction of the posts and the desolation of the country — Speech to Poornea — Detaches to Malabar — Coorg and Bullam — Spoliation of Coromandel in full progress — Unexpected arrival of the French at Porto Novo, and difficulty of supplies in consequence — Efforts of the French and English nations in India — Bussy — capture of his first division by Admiral Kempensfeldt in 1781 — of a second in 1782 — arrives at the Isle of France — troops sent to India before his arrival — Suffrein — Sir Edward Hughes — First naval action off Madras, 17th February — English equipments — Commodore Johnson, and General Medows — Naval action at Porto Praya — Capture of the Dutch merchantmen in Saldanha bay — Commodore Johnson returns with the frigates — Remainder of the expedition proceed to India — and had joined before the above action — Dissentions between Sir Eyre Coote and Lord Macartney — explained — discussed — Second naval action, 12th April — French take Cuddalore — Appear with Hyder before Permacoil — March of Sir Eyre Coote for its relief — dreadful storm — Permacoil falls — Enemy advance to Wandewash — relieved by Sir Eyre Coote, who offers them battle — moves to Arnee — Battle of Arnee — Question of the baggage of an Indian army, discussed and
The commencement of the year, unpropitious to Hyder in Coromandel, was attended with events still more unfavourable to his interests on the coast of Malabar. At an early period of the war, in 1780, an adequate force had been allotted and successively increased for the reduction of Tellicherry, the only possession of the English on that coast, a mere mercantile factory fortified according to the early practice of European nations, against the ordinary insults of banditti. But as the population had increased from the superior protection experienced by the inhabitants, an extensive but indefensible line surrounded the limits of the town. The English troops were entirely inadequate in numbers to furnish even sentinels for such a line; but a timely reinforcement conveyed from Bombay by Sir Edward Hughes, and the zeal of the inhabitants and adjacent chiefs, who detested the Mysorean rule, enabled them to continue a protracted and highly meritorious defence, deserving a more ample description than the records afford, until the early part of this year; when the arrival of reinforcements under Major Abington, enabled them by
CHAP. a determined sortie to raise the siege, by the capture of all the enemy's cannon, amounting to sixty pieces, with the whole of their baggage equipments. The Mysorean general, Sirdar Khân, was wounded and taken prisoner, with about 1,200 men who failed in effecting their retreat; and in a few days afterwards the remaining fugitives who had taken post at the dismantled French settlement of Mâhê, surrendered at discretion.

Sirdar Khân, whose conduct at Nidgegul* in 1770, has already introduced him to the reader's notice, had no acquaintance with the European science of attack and defence, but after failing in several assaults which were repelled by the bravery of the defenders, and finding every ordinary battery opposed by corresponding and more skilful defensive means, or destroyed by sorties; adopted a species of offensive work, which from its height should enable him to see and counteract the designs of the besieged, and from its construction be exempt from the dangers of assault. An immense extent of base served as the foundation for several successive stories, constructed of the trunks of trees, in successive layers crossing each other, and compacted by earth rammed between the intervals; the contrivances in the rear for raising the guns were removed when the erection was complete, and enormous inaccessible towers rearing up their summits by the successive addition of another story, as the besieged covered themselves from the proceeding, exhibited a system of attack too curious to be dismissed in silence, but too imperfectly impressed by distant recollection† to be well described. Hyder distinctly perceived the danger to which his affairs on that coast

* Vol. ii. page 137.
† From the relation of the late Sir Barry Close, one of the besieged.
would be exposed by the ruin of this corps, and the necessity which might ensue for detaching a large portion of his army, or moving the whole, if the English should sufficiently augment their force on his western frontier: and his anxiety on this and other accounts, although softened, was not relieved by the success of his son against Colonel Brathwaite, who since the capture of Negapatam had been enabled to re-establish the Rajah's government over the territory of Tanjore. This officer, encamped in a plain with about 2000 men, and trusting to a system of intelligence actually conducted by Hyder's agency, continued to disbelieve the approach of an enemy as announced to him by an intelligent native*, until he perceived himself to be surrounded by superior numbers. The attempt to retreat was found to be unavailing, and the highest efforts of gallantry, skill, and perseverance in the commander and his troops could not avert a fate similar in most respects to that of Baillie. Mons. Lally, who as usual, attended Tippoo with his corps, establishing in a still more distinguished manner, by his endeavours to arrest an unavailing carnage, and by such attentions to the wounded as he was permitted to extend, a character too amiable for the savage scene in which he was doomed to participate.

Although the behaviour of all the English officers in this unfortunate affair was highly creditable to the national character, one coincidence is too remarkable to be overlooked. Lieutenant Sampson, who commanded the little corps of cavalry with Colonel Brathwaite, had so peculiarly distinguished himself, as to cause his name to be united by the enemy with that

* This native, an opulent man, after solemnly protesting against the Colonel's incredulity, mounted his horse and escaped to Tanjore.
of his chief; and to this day the Mysoreans, in narrating the campaign of Tanjourt, continue thus to associate the name of this gallant young man, Brathwaite Sampson, as if it were one name.

The temporary exultation produced by this intelligence, and his consequent command over a large portion of the Tanjorean territory, could not remove the settled dejection of Hyder's mind. He and his English opponents reciprocally apprized of events unknown to the other, and each ignorant of facts which the other knew, were severally disposed to gloomy anticipations. The English knew of the powerful body of French troops which might be soon expected on the coast, and feared an indefinite protraction of the Mahratta war: Hyder, whose original plan of conquest essentially depended on French co-operation, ascribed to insincerity and evasion, delays, which had arisen from causes which that people could not control, and certainly from no disinclination to aid in the destruction of the English power. Added to this distrust of the French, he had reasons too unequivocal, for knowing, that he was immediately to lose the co-operation of the Poona Mahrattas, as he had already been disappointed of the aid of Nizam Ali, and two branches of the Mahratta confederacy, Moodajee Bhoomla and Sindea, by the commanding talents of Mr. Hastings. The first and second of these had been neutralized by means to which we have already adverted, and Sindea had been converted into a friend, by the influence of the same great mind. While that chief continued to give the weight of his talents and military force, to the Mahratta operations on the western side of the peninsula, the efforts of Colonel Goddard, although conducted with skill and energy, had led to no decisive result; and Mr. Hastings, while
pressed for exertions on the eastern and western coasts, of a magnitude which would have appalled an ordinary mind, conceived the masterly design of detaching this chief also from the Mahratta confederacy, by attacking from the side of Bengal, the seat of his resources in the centre of the peninsula. A respectable detachment, under Colonel Carnac, conducted the service in a manner worthy of its original conception: and the junction of an additional force under Colonel Muir, having placed the latter officer in command, he concluded a treaty of peace with Sindea, on the 13th October 1781, by which that chief "agreed, if it should be deemed advisable, that he would endeavour to mediate a peace between the English and Hyder, and also between them and the Peshwa, but if these objects should not be effected, he engaged not to assist or oppose either party."

The importance of detaching Sindea from the alliance, by weakening the power of the Mahratta confederacy, was sufficiently obvious; and the influence of this secession in determining the Poona Mahrattas to pacific views was merely probable; but the exact nature of the influence of these preliminary events on the connexion between Hyder and the Mahrattas appears to have been known to themselves alone, and so dexterously concealed by both, as apparently to have escaped the observation of the English diplomatic agents. The nature of the treaty with Sindea was soon discovered by Noor-u-Deen the Mysorean vakeel at Poona, and late in the preceding year Hyder had become apprized of all its intended bearings. It will be recollected, that as a preliminary to the war, the territories formerly Mahratta, north of the river Toombuddra, occupied by Hyder in consequence of his connexion with Ragoba, had, in 1779, been
confirmed to him, on certain conditions, by the existing government at Poona, and when Noor-u-Deen requested an explanation of the views of the minister Nana Furnavese, consequent on the treaty concluded between Sindea and the English, he was distinctly informed of Nana’s intention to accept the mediation in its fullest extent; and to unite with the English in compelling Hyder to make a reasonable peace: but it was added, that Hyder had still one method left of averting an arrangement, rendered necessary by the interests of the Mahratta state. If he would immediately evacuate the territories north of the Toombuddra, and abandon his claims on the poligars south of that river, which had also been the subject of negotiation in 1779, the Poona Mahrattas would not only continue the English war with renewed vigor, but find means of regaining the co-operation of Sindea; and before concluding any treaty, time would be given for Noor-u-Deen to receive his master’s instructions on this overture. Hyder’s answer was of course of a nature to protract the negotiations, but the treaty of Salbey between the English and Mahratta states was concluded on the 17th of May, 1782; and by one of the stipulations, the Mahrattas cautiously avoiding any notice of the territories abovementioned, engaged that within six months after the ratification, Hyder should be obliged to relinquish to the English and to their allies all territories taken from them since the date of his treaty with the Pêshwa (Madoo Row) on the 10th of February, 1767. The diplomatic oversight was committed of not limiting a time for the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty: that of the Governor-general is dated on the 7th of June, 1782. The delay of Nana Furnavese, the Poona minister, at that period the topic
of various conjecture, is now for the first time developed by the facts above recited: the date of his ratification being the 20th Dec. 1782, immediately after he had been secretly apprized of the death of Hyder on the 7th of the same month.

The treaty of Salbey was negotiated with great ability, by Mr. David Anderson, as English plenipotentiary on one part, with Sindea, ostensibly a military chief, and subordinate member of the Mahratta confederacy, in the strange and anomalous capacity, not only of plenipotentiary on behalf of the Pêshwa, as head of the Mahratta state, but also of guarantee, mutually chosen by both parties, and bound by this treaty to unite with either against the other, in the event of its infraction. An attempt to unravel these complex relations, so often represented as unintelligible*, may be acceptable to some of my readers, and will afford the opportunity of endeavouring to trace from its source the true character of those relations between the various branches of the Mahratta state, which have sometimes been dignified with the name of Constitution.

When the results of the early predatory habits of Sevajee began to assume the character of importance which pointed him out to the Mahratta people, as the deliverer predicted in their numerous prophecies; the force which he acquired from their re-union, from the gorgeous improvidence of the kings of De-can, which compelled them to disband their means of safety; and subsequently from the false policy of Aurengzebe, who transferred the remnants of subdued armies into the most formi-

* See particularly the very able historical branch of the Annual Register, on this subject.
CHAP. XXIV. 1782.

Dable enemies the of state*; these united means enabled Sevajee to seize an extensive portion of territory both above and below the western ghauts, which, as his power assumed a more solid consistence, he converted into a sort of national domain, a new and enlarged centre, for a more widely extended plan of universal plunder. A range of forts erected or improved along the summits of the lofty granite mountains, composing the various chains, which issue from the great range of western ghauts, served as depositories for spoil, and of security for the families of the chiefs. These chiefs almost exclusively arose from among the agricultural or pastoral tribes; and during the periods unfavourable for military operation, on the original pursuits of their forefathers was engrafted the care of military equipment, and chiefly of rearing among the mountains, that hardy race of horses, which, mounted by a more iron race of men, carried from the abodes of peace, and of a simplicity of manners still not extinct, the horrors of indiscriminate desolation and murder over the other portions of India. Such were the Mahratta horse; and the infantry, which could even outstrip them, in a rapid course of several hundred miles, was composed of a lower class, named Malhouees, the inhabitants of the more elevated hills, hardy as they were poor.

The successive adventures of the followers of Sevajee, led them to consider this hilly tract as their place of refuge, and their home; and more distant countries in the single light of a fund, on which they might draw at pleasure. These primitive ideas, of simple,

* The reader is requested to consider the application of these observations, and of the early history of Sevajee, sketched in the 1st vol. p. 67, and 94 et seq.: to the condition, in 1817, of the Pindareers of Mālwa and Candeish.
unqualified, and unlimited rapine, gradually led to a policy un-
exemplified in the history of the world, and interesting, as it ex-
plains the claim of choute, to which modern Mahrattas have
ascribed a fictitious origin. Experience enabled them to dis-
cover, that a regulated portion of plunder from another country,
was ultimately more profitable than an inconsiderate system of
occasional rapine; which, by letting loose the instruments of
destruction for the extinction of the capital stock, should disqua-
lify it for many years from administering to their future rapacity.
A fourth part of the crop was the portion*, which the sovereign,
in conformity to the Hindoo law, was entitled to demand from
his subjects, in time of public distress. The heaven-inspired
sovereign of all India, fixed upon this fourth, or choute, as the
regular amount of his demand, a war-tax in preference to the
peaceful sixth; and we find him forcibly levying this fourth by
means of officers regularly appointed, on countries as regularly
occupied by the revenue establishments of Aurengzebe; and even
on the property of mercantile travellers, passing the Mahratta for-
tresses. Every year, Sevajee and his immediate successors, issued
forth to levy this contribution, to the utmost extent that the na-
ture of the resistance, and the physical strength of his troops en-
abled him to travel; resistance being always deemed to justify
the largest attainable booty. At a late period of the most suc-
cessful efforts of Aurengzebe, when he had obtained possession
of the person of Sahoo, the Mahratta Raja, that captive attempted,
but failed, in a negotiation for the submission of his people, on the
condition of allowing to them the deshmookee (tenth handful), the
most antient Hindoo assessment, as a sort of national quit-rent.

* Menu, and Digest passim.
On the death of Aurungzebe, Zulfeear Khân, who had possession of the person of the prisoner, released him, on obtaining a considerable ransom, and the services of a body of Mahrattas to aid his own party in the wars of the succession, (from 1707 to 1713) and the Raja, restored to liberty, spurned at the proposed déshmookee, and exacted the choute of Decan without opposition. In the still weaker reign of Furrucksere, when the two Seyeds of Barah had usurped nearly the whole powers of the state; the younger brother, as governor of Decan, not only acquiesced in the choute, but when proceeding to Delhi (A. D. 1719) for the dethronement of his sovereign, this rebel conceded to Sahoo, the double tax of choute and déshmookee, as a reward for the services of a Mahratta army, under the command of Balajee Visoonauth, the first pêshwa, not by the authority of the sovereign, but to purchase the means of dethroning the sovereign. Such is the true history of the corrupt transaction on which the Mahrattas have, in all subsequent times, affected to found their claims to the choute, as a royal grant of the Mogul emperor, abandoning the original ground of national exaction. *

According to the hereditary tendency of all Hindoo institutions, Balajee was succeeded in the office of pêshwa (or head of the administration) by his son Bâjee Row, who, under the weak government of Mahommed Shâh, after burning the very suburbs of Delhi, was not only bought off by that feeble prince

* This explanation, founded on a variety of manuscript authorities, will be found confirmed in all its principal facts, by reference to Scott's Ferishta, vol. ii. page 150 to 153; and in the passages quoted from that publication, in the first volume of this work.
by a confirmation of the ignominious stipulation of the choute of Decan, but was even appointed the imperial governor of that province, in the vain hope of terminating the depredations of his countrymen (1735). Subsequently to the invasion of Nadir Shah, (1739) Bâjee Row employed his increased power and influence to terrify the unhappy Mahommed Shah into an extension over the whole of Hindostan of the double grant of choute and deshmokee; but these regions being too far removed from the original centre of the Mahratta state to admit of an annual enforcement of the demand, Bâjee Row found it expedient to establish his nation, by conquest or connivance, in the provinces of Gujjerat and Mâlwa. Goandwana and Berar were seized for the same purpose by a branch of the house of Sevajee, and these possessions served as new centres of new orbits, moving in harmony and correspondence with the original system. Gooty formed a new centre farther south; and the little states of Tanjore on the east, and Colapoor* on the western coast, branches of the house of Shahjee, maintained pretensions, sometimes subordinate and sometimes independent of the Poona state, but generally concurring in its national objects. From these new centres new armies issued forth to perform their annual circuits of exaction: Gujjerat extended its demands from the mouths of the Nerbudda to those of the

* The origin of the house of Tanjore has been already explained; that of Colapoor is more complex. Sevajee had two sons, Sambha and Rama; the first of these had two sons, Sahoo and Sambha; Sahoo died without issue; Sambha adopted a son, from whom is descended the family of Colapoor, and according to Hindoo law, the present Raja of that place is unquestionably the lineal heir of Sevajee in the elder branch; the line of pageant Rajas still kept in Sittâra, being as unquestionably descended from Rama, the second son of Sevajee.
Indus: Málwa stretched to the north, until ultimately, under Ragoba, a Mahratta army established a Mahratta post at Lahore, the capital of Penjab*. Goandwana took the circuit of Berar to the south-west, and looking to the north-eastward, extended its depredations across the Hoogly to the capital of Bengal.

These expeditions originally miscalled *mulk geeree, territorial conquest*, came in process of time to justify the name; and this people, by seeking for the permanent occupation of territory, subverted the original principle of Mahratta domination, by absorbing in establishments which seldom leave a surplus, that abundant fund which had been cheaply realized at the expense of others, and served to keep the army in a state of constant and active efficiency. So long as the old and new centres preserved their primitive destinations, the national domains of each flourished by the accumulation of the wealth of the surrounding states: but in proportion as the appetite for fixed territory was indulged, the hardy habits of the people gradually declined, the growth of the English power, and the severe defeats sustained from the Abdalli Afghâns of the north at length began to limit the extension of the choutê; the chiefs of the new centres of plunder began to forget their subordinate character; the Pêshwa himself had usurped the power of the head of the state, which had become hereditary in his family; and at the period of the treaty of Salbey, this hereditary usurper was an infant; a minister (Nana Furnavese) acting in his name even before his birth†, himself founded a second hereditary usurpation, by rendering the Pêshwa a pageant, and assuming the title and pretension of hereditary Dewan,

* Literally five waters; the country watered by the five branches of the Indus.
† See Hyder's curious comments on this event, page 210, of this volume.
or minister. This old man did not till the last relinquish the hope of heirs from his own body, and left a virgin widow* who was to have fulfilled his vows; if these hopes had been realized, the infant minister must have had his guardian; that guardian must necessarily have been himself the minister, and would have been embarrassed with the custody, 1st, of the hereditary Raja, 2d, the hereditary Peshwa, 3d, the hereditary Dewan; and would without much doubt have been himself prepared to add another link to the chain of usurpation. In such a conflict of pretensions every way defective, the chiefs were embarrassed in the choice of par-

* This lady continued to hold possession of the impregnable rock of Loughur, (the iron fort,) until she surrendered after a lapse of upwards of twenty years, to the Duke of Wellington, on obtaining the English protection for her person and treasures.

It may here be observed, with reference to subsequent transactions, that the Peshwa, continuing to be the acknowledged head of the Mahratta empire, was nevertheless, from this period forward, sometimes actually, but always virtually a prisoner, in the hands of successive parties of his subjects, and never felt himself to be really liberated from that degrading and perilous thraldom, until restored, if not to imperial dominion, at least to liberty and free agency; and to the enjoyment of a more moderate, but a safer power than that of his predecessors, by the consequences of the treaty of Bassein, concluded on the 31st December, 1802. A short abstract is annexed of the fate of the Peshwas subsequent to Madoo Row. Narain Row fell by the consequences of intestine commotion. Sevai Madoo Row, the infant above described, from the miseries of his situation, was guilty of suicide: the present Peshwa, alternately a prisoner and pageant, lived from his infancy in the hourly dread of assassination; and after being tossed about as the prize of combatants and intriguers, he finally escaped in 1802, to the protection of the English, from a pitched battle fought by the troops of Dowlut Row Sindea, and Holcar, for the possession of his person. It was the national character of the English, and the known treachery of his countrymen, that determined his preference; those who may doubt the policy, are at least not entitled to question the humanity of this arrangement. The author has the most unquestionable grounds to know, that the feeling which determined his choice, had, up to the departure of the late Sir B. Close from that court, continued daily to increase, and from the character of his successor, there is no reason to doubt of its continuance.
ties; and each, as was natural, thought himself as well entitled as Nana, to the custody of the pageant, and the office of usurper. The character therefore of political independence, and the quality of guarantee, engrafted by Sindea on his military and diplomatic powers, in the treaty of Salbey, was not so much an assumption of authority over his acknowledged superior the Pêshwa, as over the person who governed in the name of that infant, and whom Sindea, as a soldier possessed of substantial power, thought himself qualified at any time to supplant.

We return from this digressive illustration of the treaty of Salbey, to the military operations of the Mysoreans and the English.

Hyder, in reviewing his actual situation, felt himself foiled in every battle with Sir Eyre Coote. Disappointed, and as he thought, deceived by the French; assailed in a vulnerable part of his western territories, where a detached army was destroyed, and farther reinforcements threatened more extensive operations; a general insurrection of the Nairs over the whole province of Malabar, aggravated by a rebellion in Bullum and Coorg, two districts on the summit of the hills which overlook that province, might be deemed in the ordinary course of Indian warfare; but in addition to all these misfortunes, he was now openly threatened with the more embarrassing danger of a Mahratta invasion from the north. Deeply reflecting on this unprosperous aspect of affairs, he determined to concentrate his force, to abandon his scheme of conquest in Coromandel, and to direct his undivided efforts, first, for the expulsion of the English from the western coast, and afterwards for the preservation of his dominions, and for watching the course of events. With these views, he commenced
in December 1781, the destruction of most of the minor posts of Coromandel in his possession, mined the fortifications of Arcot, preparatory to its demolition; sent off by large convoys all the heavy guns and stores, and compelled the population of the country, hitherto well protected, to emigrate, with their flocks and herds to Mysoor.

It was about this period that Hyder being much indisposed, was either by accident or design, left entirely alone with his minister Poornea: after being for some time apparently immersed in deep thought, he addressed himself to Poornea, in the following words: *

"I have committed a great error, I have purchased a draught of Seandee, at the price of a lac of pagodas:" (Seandee, the fermented juice of the wild date tree†, produces the most frantic species of intoxication, and a draught of it is sold for the smallest copper coin;) he intended to intimate by this forcible idiom, that the war was an act of intoxication; and that its advantages and disadvantages bore to each other, the relation of a farthing and a lac of pagodas, (40,000l.) "I shall pay dearly for my arrogance; between me and the English there were perhaps mutual grounds of dissatisfaction, but no sufficient cause for war, and I might have made them my friends in spite of Mahommed Ali the most treacherous of men. The defeat of many Baillies and Brathwaites will not destroy them. I can ruin their resources by land, but I cannot dry up the sea; and I must be first weary of a war in which I can gain nothing by fighting. I ought to have reflected that no man of common

* Related to the author by Poornea.
† Elate Sylvestris. Ainslie.
sense will trust a Mahratta, and that they themselves do not expect to be trusted. I have been amused by idle expectations of a French force from Europe, but supposing it to arrive, and to be successful here, I must go alone against the Mahrattas, and incur the reproach of the French for distrusting them; for I dare not admit them in force to Mysoor.”

Preparatory to his own ultimate movement, a force under Muckdooom Ali was appointed for the restoration of his affairs in Malabar, and another under Woffadar (a Chêla) to Coorg, while a still more remarkable Chêla, Sheick Ayâz, (Vol. ii. page 188, and Appendix to chap. 18.), was ordered from Bednore for the recovery of Bullum. The spoliation of every moveable property in Coromandel was in rapid progress, and a few days only remained before he should have completed his arrangements for springing the mines at Arcot and evacuating the country; when intelligence was received of the actual arrival and landing at Porto Novo of the long expected succours from France, amounting to about 3000* men including a regiment of Africans. Tippoo, whose corps still operated in the southern countries, was immediately ordered to proceed thither, and confer with the chiefs. Hyder had soon afterwards a personal interview with Monsieur Cossigny and Admiral Suffrein, and being entirely satisfied of the expected arrival of Monsieur Bussy at the head of a larger division, it was agreed that while waiting the junction of these troops, the fort of Cuddalore should be reduced and prepared as a French dépôt, and that on the arrival of Monsieur Bussy, the united forces should seek a decisive action with the English army. In the mean while, the difficulty of

* Histoire de la dernière guerre, page 297.
providing supplies consequent on his late arrangements for desolating the country, aggravated the ordinary causes for mutual distrust, and prevented that cordial intercourse so indispensable to the success of conjoint operations.

The French and English nations had severally made the greatest exertions to obtain that pre-eminence in Coromandel, which in two successive wars, continued to be a main object of national policy; and the French government had wisely committed the supreme direction of their affairs in the East to the able and experienced hands of Monsieur Bussy. The first impediment to the execution of his plans arose from the capture, by Admiral Kempenfelt, of a convoy, on which was embarked the first division of his troops, in December 1781, and a second convoy experienced a similar fate in April 1782. Monsieur Bussy arrived at the Isle of France, in June of the same year, and found that the governor, unapprized of these disasters, had already, in the preceding December, before it was possible to have received the consequent orders dispatched by Monsieur Bussy from the Cape of Good Hope, embarked the first division of the troops destined for Coromandel, on the fleet under Monsieur D’Orves, by whose death on the passage, the command devolved on Admiral Suffrein, an officer for activity, enterprize, and resource, not exceeded by any of his cotemporaries. He made the coast with 12 ships of the line, and 18 other ships, chiefly transports, considerably to the northward of Pulicate, on the same day that Sir Edward Hughes, after the capture of Trincomalee, had returned to anchor at Madras with six; but by a fortunate coincidence, he was on the very next day joined by three ships of the
line from England, and ventured with these unequal numbers to encounter the French fleet. Mons. Suffrein, whose intelligence indicated only six ships of the line, hoped by a decisive blow, to have destroyed the English squadron in the open roads of Fort St. George, and thus to have been in a condition for the complete investment of the place by sea and land; but on approaching the roads in this confidence, and perceiving the unexpected reinforcement of three ships, he hesitated in his manoeuvres, and ultimately stood away to the southward, followed without any hesitation by the British fleet: the action terminated without the capture on either side of a ship of war; but the masterly conduct of Admiral Hughes, who commenced the battle, by bearing down upon the transports, left him in possession of six vessels, five being merely re-captures; but the sixth, a transport laden with troops, which operated as a farther reduction of the means possessed by Mons. Bussy. The French fleet after this action, proceeded to land at Porto Novo the troops already adverted to, and afterwards to the rendezvous of the scattered convoy at Point de Galle, while Admiral Sir E. Hughes, whose ships had suffered severely, repaired his damages at Trincomalee, and returned to Madras early in March.

Although similar disasters did not befall the reinforcements of troops dispatched by the English government, a variety of causes contributed to render them ineffective. About the same time that Admiral Suffrein left France with a naval reinforcement for Mons. d’Orves, carrying also a division of the troops to be employed under Mons. Bussy, a similar expedition under Commodore Johnson and General Medows sailed from England. The intermediate object of both, was the Dutch settlement of the
Cape of Good Hope; of the French to secure it to their new allies; of the English to wrest it from both. The English expedition watering at Porto Praya, in one of the Cape de Verd Islands, was actually surprised on the 16th of April 1781, by the squadron of Mons. Suffrein, who by a precipitate confidence in the facility of success against a state of defective preparation, failed by the same disregard of careful disposition, and retired after a confused and irregular action without the capture of any vessel on either side. It was late in June before the British squadron, after the repair of their damages, obtained by the capture of a Dutch ship as they approached the latitude of the Cape of Good Hope, the requisite information for their future guidance. In the winter of the southern hemisphere, Table Bay, or the port of Cape Town, the capital of the colony, situated to the westward of that promontory is an unsafe anchorage; while Simon’s Bay, at the bottom of False Bay, to the eastward of the Cape, affords a secure harbour. Admiral Suffrein had anticipated the English by repairing to the latter port; but the homeward bound merchant ships of the Dutch, who always considered Simon’s Bay a hazardous inlet for unwieldy vessels, preferred to encounter the dangers of an hostile squadron by anchoring in the eminently secure, but ill watered and nearly uninhabited haven of Saldanha bay, on the western coast, and there, in consequence of the intelligence obtained from the prize, they were captured by Commodore Johnstone. The prior arrival of Mons. Suffrein at the Cape having disconcerted the first part of the English plan, Commodore Johnstone returned with his prizes and three frigates to England, while the remainder of the squadron prosecuted their voyage to Bombay: an arrangement to
CHAP. XXIV. 1782.

which the French * attributed much of their own success, and the want of frigates with the British squadron in India was equally unfortunate to the national commerce as unfavourable to its maritime and military operations. A fifty gun ship, accidentally separated, was captured by the French, and occupied a place in their line on the 17th February, 1782, while the three ships already mentioned of the same squadron joined Sir Edward Hughes a few days previous to that engagement. A portion of the troops with General Medows arrived in these ships; and by a singular determination, that general officer continued to serve on ship-board, instead of occupying his proper place in the army, which Sir Eyre Coote had declared his intention of resigning to his charge.† The remaining troops of this expedition intended by Sir Eyre Coote to reinforce the army under his own command, had, in consequence of an open rupture between him and Lord Macartney, been employed on operations on the western coast, to which our narrative will return.

Sir Eyre Coote, Commander-in-chief of all the King's and Company's troops in India, and member of the Supreme Council of Bengal, was, when acting within the territories of Fort St.

* Histoire de la derniere guerre, note to page 313.
† "It is not with me," (said the General, in a private letter to a friend at Bengal,) "as it was with the Duke of Marlborough after the battle of Blenheim, who, seeing a French soldier fall wounded, after bravely defending himself, rode up to him, and said, 'my brave fellow, had all the French been like you;' — 'no General,' (said the soldier,) 'it is not many like me that were wanting, but one like you;' and it is not one like me that you now want, but many like those I have brought; but to be plain with you, I have so little information respecting Indian warfare, being altogether without experience in it, that I should do much more harm in learning my trade, than I could ever compensate for having learnt it. I must, therefore, decline the honour you intend me." This passage, although given from memory, is believed to be literally correct.
George, a member of that council, and considered by them to be constitutionally subject to the orders of its majority. Although Lord Macartney professed to follow the example of his predecessors, in committing to Sir Eyre Coote the military conduct of the war, it was argued, that the cession by a Government of all control over its military measures, would, with the extinction of its powers, involve a dereliction of its duties; and the very orders requisite for the remedy of those defects of supply, of which they received such incessant complaints, necessarily involved operations not alone collaterally, but directly of a military nature. The arrangements for the capture of the Dutch settlements had been made without the participation of Sir Eyre Coote, and during his absence in the field. The abstract propriety of these measures was justified by their success; and military instructions to the distant provinces, (when the absence of the Commander-in-chief rendered it impracticable to consult him,) was not deemed to be an undue interference with the conduct of the army under the immediate orders of Sir Eyre Coote. On the part of the Commander-in-chief, it was argued, that all interference in military command, was an invasion of his constitutional authority as Commander-in-chief of the troops of all the Presidencies; and that every such interference of the local Government had a direct tendency to obstruct and defeat military plans of a wider range, of which that local Government had neither information nor control. Although for some time after the arrival of Lord Macartney, an intercourse prevailed, full of reciprocal courtesy and respect, these indications of confidence and co-operation had gradually diminished, and ultimately disappeared. On the last return of Sir Eyre
Coote from Vellore, he complained with the greatest asperity of the neglect of the department of supply during his absence; declared, that experience had shewn he could place no reliance on the proper attention being paid to the wants of the army; formally absolved himself from all responsibility; announced his intention of immediately resigning a command which his honour and reputation would no longer allow him to retain, and in a subsequent dispatch, intimated that he waited for that purpose the arrival of General Medows, from Bombay.

He had applied to the Supreme Government of Bengal to restore his authority, without having previously noticed to that of Madras, the points in which he considered it to be invaded, and did not even condescend to explain, when after an admonition from Bengal, that Government requested information; the interposition of the Supreme Government, first, by temperate advice, and ultimately by command, led to a farther distraction in public councils, where unanimity was so urgently required. The employment on the western coast (contrary to the wishes of the general) of the troops to which we have adverted, was a consequence of these dissensions. Mr. Sullivan, political resident at Tanjore, and charged with a general superintendence of all the southern provinces, had from his central situation, and the confidence reposed in his talents, been made the medium of communication between the two coasts, and was authorized by Lord Macartney to open all his dispatches, and make all the communications in duplicate which their contents should require. In the exercise of this discretionary power, which he inferred to extend to every thing connected with the public service, he was induced by his public
zeal to open dispatches addressed to the naval and military commanders-in-chief at Madras; from the officers commanding these reinforcements: and unsuspicious of the existing disunion among the higher authorities, officially knowing from his own Government the importance which they, as well as the Governor-general attached to strengthening the diversion on the western coast, already commenced at Tillicherry, and naturally concluding, that the views of his Government could not be different from those of the Commander-in-chief; ventured to address letters to the naval and military officers on the western coast, unfolding these views, expressing his confidence that they would receive corresponding orders, and communicating such information as he possessed, and such opinions as he had formed, regarding the most advisable plan of operations in that quarter.

Although Sir Edward Hughes, on first receiving from Lord Macartney the dispatches of Mr. Sullivan, expressed his approbation of the whole proceeding and its consequences; yet on communicating with Sir Eyre Coote, they addressed a joint* letter to Lord Macartney, treating the conduct of Mr. Sullivan as an unauthorized violation of their official dispatches, and an illegal assumption of authority which they had not delegated and could not transfer to any man, and much less to a man who must necessarily be uninformed of their intentions and plans: and this unfortunate incident was considered by Sir Eyre Coote as an aggravated invasion of his lawful authority, branching from the head of the Government to its subordinates, although he must have

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* 13th March 1782.
been at the time distinctly aware that from the intermediate
country being covered with the enemy’s horse, the dispatches them-
selves could not possibly have been sent; and that the extracts in
a diminutive hand rolled up to the size of a quill, and successively
transmitted by Mr. Sullivan’s spies, constituted his only informa-
tion of his own dispatches, the originals of which he probably
did not receive for many months afterwards. Without farther
observation on the effects of this unhappy controversy, the reader
will probably be disposed to concur in the opinion, that it result-
ed infinitely more from the defective system of the government,
than from the eminent men who were entrusted with its execu-
tion; and although this estimable veteran could not fail to dis-
cover through the fullest drapery of Lord Macartney’s compli-
ments, many intelligible insinuations, that much more might
have been done, than was actually accomplished by the army; it
must, with whatever reluctance, be allowed that the temper
evinced by Sir Eyre Coote on this and other occasions, exhibited
mournful evidence of his having outlived some of the most at-
tractive qualities of his earlier character.

March. The serious importance which was attached to the preser-
vation of Trincomalee, had induced the admiral, late in March,
to sail for that place, with a reinforcement of troops, and a
supply of military stores. On the 30th of that month, he was
joined on his passage by two ships of the line from England,
whose crews were extremely reduced by the scurvy; but the
importance of his immediate object, and the farther view of
covering and receiving a convoy with troops and stores from
England, at an appointed rendezvous, induced him to keep on
his course, with the determination of neither seeking nor shun-
ning the enemy. But the same object, though with different views, which affected the conduct of the English admiral, had a corresponding influence over that of Monsieur Suffrein; for he also knew of the approaching convoy, and the future fate of the campaign made it equally important to the French, that it should be cut off; as to the English, that it should be preserved. The hostile fleets came in sight of each other on the 8th of April, fifteen leagues from Trincomalee, the English line consisting of eleven ships, carrying 732 guns, and the French, of twelve, carrying 770. A sanguinary contest, which, after a variety of manœuvres, took place on the 12th, terminated as before, without any decisive result, and both fleets, crippled to the extent of being unable to renew the contest, continued at anchor, in sight of each other, until the 19th; when the French fleet, after an ineffective demonstration, made sail and disappeared, for the purpose of repairing its damages at Baticolo, a port in Ceylon, while the English proceeded for a similar purpose to Trincomalee, in the same island.

Every hope of decisive measures by land was necessarily dependent on naval co-operation. Although the embarrassment of a convoy with the French fleet had induced Sir Edward Hughes in the first action to meet it with inferior numbers; the same inferiority of nine to twelve when he left Madras, precluded the attempt to cover the transports necessary for the conjunct operations to the southward, which, with a decided naval superiority, Sir Eyre Coote would have been inclined to propose. The result of these naval contests, therefore, although uniformly honourable to the British character, and productive of the highly important but negative consequence of preventing the contrasted
effect of a conjunct operation against Fort St. George, had in the mean while limited the plans of Sir Eyre to movements purely of a defensive nature. On leaving Cuddalore, in the preceding year, he abstained from the effectual demolition of that weak place, in the hope that the naval superiority of the English would preserve its great convenience to his own operations, without risking its being seized and strengthened as an important depôt for the French. The precaution even of mining the place appears to have been omitted; and although two ships had been dispatched from Madras with a reinforcement, it capitulated without even the show of resistance on the 8th of April, before their arrival; the whole garrison of this extensive town not having exceeded four hundred sepoys and five artillerymen. While the operations of the army were suspended in anxious expectation of the result of the naval action of the 12th of April, of which rumour had conveyed various and contradictory accounts, the united forces of Hyder and the French on the 11th of May suddenly appeared before Permacoil, a hill fort situated about twenty miles N. W. from Pondicherry.

Sir Eyre Coote, on receiving this intelligence, instantly marched for its relief; but one of those violent storms, accompanied by the descent of torrents of rain by night, followed by suffocating heat in the day, which at this season of the year sometimes precede the change of the monsoon, not only arrested his progress, but was eminently destructive to his equipments and his troops; and while witnessing a scene of distress which no human means could relieve, he had the mortification to hear that Permacoil had capitulated on the 16th, and that the united forces were advancing towards Wandewash. Sir Eyre Coote, on
the first intelligence of the landing of the French, had ordered this place to be mined preparatory to its eventual demolition, if that measure should become necessary; but although in his public dispatches of this date he describes the aspect of public affairs, in consequence of the destruction of the southern corps under Colonel Brathwaite; the junction of the French forces; the capture of Cuddalore and Permacoil, and the indecisive nature of the last naval combat to be, not only embarrassing, but desperate; he determined to present himself before these united forces, and to trust for the rest to the tried valour of his troops, and their confidence in the skill and fortune of their commander. The united armies had been for four days in sight of Wandewash, when on the approach of the English, they withdrew towards Pondicherry.

The importance of Wandewash, or rather the inestimable value of its commandant, may be conceived from the enumeration of one thousand head of cattle and four hundred sheep, among the supplies which waited the acceptance of his general, while his post was invested, and immediately after the whole country had been desolated, preparatory to its evacuation.

Finding that the enemy declined to wait the encounter in the neighbourhood of Wandewash, as from their superior numbers he expected, Sir Eyre Coote marched in the direction of Pondicherry, and came in sight of the united army encamped in a strong position, deliberately prepared, in the neighbourhood of Kellinoor. Reasons of a powerful nature, of which Sir Eyre Coote was very imperfectly informed, had induced the allies severally to concur in the propriety of avoiding a general action on equal terms. Hyder, as we have seen, had been under the necessity of detaching largely from his best troops for three separate objects.
The French, reduced by sickness, and the occupation of Cuddalore and Permacoil, had in the field probably not twelve hundred Europeans; and Monsieur Bussy's directions were imperative, to risk no general action until his own arrival with the last of the reinforcements. It was to be expected from the tried prudence of Sir Eyre Coote, that he would not commit the last stake of his nation in India on the desperate hazard of attacking an enemy eminently superior in numbers, and every way formidable, in a position chosen by themselves, in the vicinity of their resources, and at a distance from his own. It was his practice, on questions of great difficulty, to consult the opinions of his principal officers; and his present situation appeared to be one of the most critical importance. To try the fate of battle on the enemy's chosen ground; to attempt a movement which should draw them from this ground, and compel them to fight on more equal terms, but at a still greater distance from the English resources, was the alternative of active measures; and if both were rejected, it only remained to retire towards Madras, destroying Wandewash, or still risking its occupation.

Arnee, from its central situation relatively to the scene of Hyder's operations, the sources of his supply, and the destination of his plunder, had at this period become the principal depot of all that remained to him in the lower countries. From the absence of all apprehension of danger, it was loosely garrisoned, and Captain Flint had for some time been in secret treaty with its commandant for the purchase of the place, and obtained from him the most complete and minute information (verified by subsequent inspection after the peace) of the means of carrying the place by surprise. The completion of
this conditional arrangement furnished but a collateral prospect of success, liable to be disturbed and anticipated by any alarm which should suggest a reinforcement of the garrison; but it was an object of more certain calculation, that a movement threatening this depot, and intercepting the enemy’s supplies, would draw them from their strong position, and afford the chance of engaging on more favourable terms. In conformity to these views, Sir Eyre Coote marched on the 30th in that direction, and Hyder on the same evening detached Tippoo, with orders to proceed by forced marches, and throw a strong reinforcement into the place, following himself on the ensuing day, without his allies, whose instructions would not admit of their accompanying his march; and it is a curious illustration of character, that in retaliation for a refusal, the grounds of which he would not understand, the supplies of provisions which he had made to depend on his own daily will and pleasure, were during his absence ordered to be entirely suspended. *

On the 2d of June, about eight o’clock, when Sir Eyre Coote, after a short march, was preparing to encamp near to the fort of Arnee, a brisk but distant cannonade opened on his rear; and from a variety of distinct points, previously selected by Tippoo, and Monsieur Lally, on his front. A day of severe fatigue and varied cannonade, rather than of battle, and a succession of skilful manoeuvres, to combine with the essential protection of the baggage, the means of closing with the enemy, were performed by the troops with a degree of confident steadiness and alacrity, which were deemed even to

* Intercepted letter from a French officer, confirmed by the oral information of the Mysoreans.
surpass all that their veteran commander had before witnessed in their conduct; and the operations terminated a little before sunset, with the capture of one gun and eleven tumbrils, and ammunition carts, secured by a spirited and judicious push of the European grenadiers, supported by a Bengal battalion, at the corps of Monsieur Lally, when covering the retreat of its artillery across the dry bed of a river. A loss of this nature, to which Hyder always attached an importance beyond its value, was ascribed to the misconduct of Lutf Aly Beg, who at this critical juncture, had been ordered to make a desperate charge, with a large and select body of cavalry, on the enemy’s rear, but suffered himself to be checked by an active and well-directed fire from the horse artillery attached to the English cavalry. The reader may be prepared to hear of decapitation, or public disgrace, as the consequence of Hyder’s rage at this imputed misconduct, which was really that of the troops and not of their leader. Lutf Aly Beg* was committed to the custody of Jehan Khan †, then in the temporary command of Chittapet, with orders to inflict on him a corporal punishment prescribed, and after exhibiting the marks to certain witnesses named, to transmit their attestation of the infliction of the sentence: the united wealth of these two most improvident Mahommedan officers could not furnish a bribe for the bramin witnesses named. Jehan Khan approached the prison of his friend, threw himself at his feet, and declared that he would rather die than obey the order. Lutf Aly Beg, a man of wit and resource, devised a

* The person mentioned in p. xix. of the preface.
† The person mentioned in p. xix. of the preface.
better alternative: procure, said he, some milk-hedge*, shut the door, draw the proper number of lines across my back, I shall hollow most dramatically, and to-morrow with only a little smarting pain, my back will be in a state to exhibit to your witnesses. The separate personal narration of the two individuals who have been named is the sole authority on which I should have ventured to relate an incident so little according with ordinary credibility.

The usual necessity of allotting the greater portion of the small but efficient corps of English cavalry for the protection of the baggage, deprived Sir Eyre Coote of the opportunity presented by the discomfiture of Lally's corps, of securing a long train of retreating artillery; and the want of depôts, or of any means of commanding food for a few weeks, left him the usual mortification of being unable by a series of active operations to profit by his success. The loss of Europeans and natives, including the wounded, amounted on this day to no more than seventy-four, among whom were seventeen who died of fatigue, chiefly of the 78th regiment. The example of this corps, which joined the army on the 25th of April, furnished a memorable proof of the inexpediency of appointing for field service European troops not habituated to the climate, nor instructed in the arrangements for subsistence peculiar to the country. With no other casualties from the enemy than the few which had occurred on this day, its effective strength was found at the expiration of thirty-eight days to be exactly one-third of its amount at the commencement of that period.

* Euphorbia Tiraculli; the milky juice of which is a caustic familiarly employed by the palanquin bearers, in raising blisters, as a remedy for local pains.
In closing our narrative of the last general action in which either of these eminent commanders were destined to engage, it may be proper to observe with reference to the general character of the tactics of Sir Eyre Coote that one of the obstructions to active operation which has so often been described, as arising from attention to the baggage, may appear to those who have not experienced an Indian campaign, to involve the opprobrium of a too curious attention to the comfort, perhaps the luxury of the troops; terms which certainly had no appropriate existence in these campaigns. These *impedimenta*, (the significant Roman term) consist chiefly of three articles; military stores, camp equipage, and provisions; the first requires no comment; but a short observation on each of the other two may tend to render more intelligible the degree in which these impediments are necessary. Such observations as the author has had an opportunity of making, incline him to the opinion, that a more expensive, but not therefore a more cumbrous camp equipage, than has ever yet been provided for the European soldier in India, would be equally promotive of efficiency, and true economy; and the example of the 78th, who would unquestionably have suffered less under better cover, may tend to illustrate the grounds of this opinion. With regard to the article of provisions, it is necessary to recollect, that the modern system of supply, reduced to a science in the commissariat of European armies; has no application to a country whose resources were uniformly destroyed in every direction approached by the English army; which was thus necessarily dependent on the few depôts it possessed, and primarily on Madras. A ship provisioned for a voyage, or a caravan preparing to traverse the great
desert of Arabia, are the most appropriate emblems of the army of Sir Eyre Coote. Stored for the period calculated to elapse from quitting port, until its return to port, it is scarcely a figure to affirm, that in its first march it was at sea, or more literally, in the desert; with the additional feature of being incessantly surrounded by swarms of irregular horse, presenting individual incidents too remarkable to be entirely excluded from the picture. To approach within speaking distance of the flanking parties, was known by the enemy from experience to be safe for an individual horseman; as the soldiers were expressly prohibited from throwing away their fire: the conversation always assumed the character of contemptuous abuse, of a mode of warfare, which they stigmatised as unmanly, by excluding the exercise of individual prowess and skill; and not unfrequently would terminate in a general challenge to single combat. There was in Sir Eyre Coote’s body-guard, a young cavalry officer, distinguished for superior military address; on ordinary service, always foremost, to the very verge of prudence, but never beyond it; of physical strength, seldom equalled; on foot, a figure for a sculptor; when mounted —

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“he grew unto his seat,
And to such wondrous doing brought his horse
As he had been incorpored and demi-natured
With the brave beast.”

In common with the rest of the army, this officer had smiled at the recital of these absurd challenges; but while reconnoitring on the flank of the column of march, one of them was personally addressed to himself by a horseman, who from dress and appearance, seemed to be of some distinction. He accepted the
invitation, and the requisite precautions were mutually acceded to: they fought; and he slew his antagonist. After this incident, the challenges were frequently addressed, not as formerly to the whole army, but to Dallas, whose name became speedily known to them: and whenever his duty admitted, and his favorite horse* was sufficiently fresh, the invitations were accepted, until the Mysoreans became weary of repetition. With a single exception, the result was uniform. On that one occasion, the combatants, after several rounds, feeling a respect for each other, made a significant pause, mutually saluted, and retired. As a fashion among the aspiring young officers, these adventures were not calculated for general adoption; it was found, that in single combat, the address of a native horseman is seldom equalled by an European.

We return from this digressive matter to the operations of the 2d June:

June 2. Sir Eyre Coote encamped at the close of day on the ground which he had prepared to occupy in the morning, and on the ensuing day, made demonstrations of besieging the place, with the hope of adding the influence of his success to the other motives of the kelledar; but the presence of a powerful garrison, and the vicinity of Hyder, rendered the attempt even to communicate, too dangerous to be hazarded by an individual traitor; and as no mes-

* This singular animal, besides the common duty of carrying his rider, exercised, when required, and sometimes spontaneously, all the aggressive force with which he was furnished by nature; and the Mysoreans, whose imaginations had added to the evidence of sight, would make inquiry regarding the extraordinary phenomenon of a gigantic figure mounted on a furious black horse of enormous size and destructive powers; the stature of the man being just six feet, and that of the horse fourteen hands three inches and a half.
sage was received, and the vigilance of the garrison precluded the hope of surprise, under present circumstances, the object was abandoned, and Sir Eyre Coote moved against the enemy on the 4th, in a south-western direction: Hyder retreated as he advanced, and he returned to Arnee. On the 6th, Hyder having moved to the eastward, Sir Eyre Coote again pursued on that day, and on the 7th, but without any other effect than the tantalizing view of an easy retreat, and the capture of some stragglers. The army halted on the 8th, to refresh the cattle and troops, and Hyder, anxious to obliterate in some degree the impression of so many defeats, prepared in person an ambuscade which effectually succeeded. Some camels and elephants, insufficiently guarded, were made to pass within a short distance of the grand guard, and the officer commanding, with more zeal than prudence, attempted to carry them off, sending a message to the field officer of the day, Lieutenant Colonel James Stuart, of the 78th, to inform him of the circumstance: that officer instantly mounted, proceeded at speed to stop the imprudence of the young officer, and approached in time to see the guard charged on all sides by clouds of cavalry, within the skirts of which he was himself enveloped: seeing that all was lost, he trusted to the goodness of his horse, and singly escaped, by leaping a ravine, over which none of the enemy could follow him. The loss of the English was 166 men, 54 horses, and two guns: Hyder's, about 60 horses, and as many men, but the achievement was deemed of sufficient importance to justify a salute, on his return to camp, as a demonstration of victory. Sir Eyre Coote mounted on the first alarm, and at the head of his cavalry, proceeded as quickly as possible to the spot, but
arrived only in time to direct the interment of the mangled remains of his troops, having the melancholy consolation to observe, that the artillerymen had fallen at the muzzles of their guns, and the infantry in their unbroken ranks. The influence of the climate, and of fatigue, having increased the number of European sick to an alarming degree, he moved by Wandewash, where the never-failing energies of its commandant, enabled him to remain four days, to refresh, and afterwards returned to the vicinity of Madras.

The distresses of the garrison of Vellore had again assumed a serious aspect, and the commandant had named the 1st of July as the latest period to which the place could be maintained. During the operations which have just been described, Sir Eyre Coote had apprized the Government of the impossibility of affording any succour from the army, and Lord Macartney devised a mode of relief, which was calculated to succeed from its extreme improbability. While Hyder's attention was closely occupied by the movements subsequent to the action of the 2d of June, one hundred irregular sepoys under the command of an ensign *, escorting five hundred bullocks, twenty-four carts, and two thousand coolies † loaded with provisions, moved on the 6th of June to the skirts of the hills, a detachment of one thousand five hundred poligars there joined them, and by forced marches the whole was deposited in Vellore before the movement was suspected by Hyder. But the feeble escort of this most opportune relief was intercepted in its return, and compelled to surrender at discretion.

* Burn.
† Men who make it a trade to carry loads on their heads, or to perform ordinary labour.
The importance already described of acquiring the fort of Negapatam, as a depot for the future operations of the French, induced Admiral Suffrein to avail himself of the earliest possible opportunity for attempting that enterprize; and Admiral Sir E. Hughes on the first intelligence of his being anchored in that vicinity sailed from Madras to prevent its execution. The number of ships engaged in the naval action which ensued were on each side precisely equal, with a small superiority in favour of the English in the number of guns *, but like all the encounters which occurred between these distinguished officers, it terminated without a capture, but not without results; for the French were in consequence, avowedly compelled to abandon † the design of attempting Negapatam, which the Government of Madras, with a more than doubtful policy, ordered to be destroyed in the following January, during the absence of Sir Eyre Coote, and without his sanction. The next object of Admiral Hughes, was the revictualling of Trincomalee, but in this purpose he was anticipated by the activity of Monsieur Suffrein, who after receiving at an appointed rendezvous off Ceylon, a reinforcement of two ships of the line, a frigate, and eight transports full of troops, aware of the probability of the early arrival of the English fleet, suddenly appeared before Trincomalee, landed two thousand four hundred men, and pushed the siege with such vigour as to induce the commandant to surrender at a much earlier period than had been anticipated by Sir Eyre Coote. Suffrein had scarcely occupied the forts with the garrison intended for their defence, when

* French ships - 11 - 706 guns.
English ditto - 11 - 732 ditto.
† Histoire de la derniere guerre.
a signal was made announcing the appearance of the hostile fleet. The English were prevented from descrying their opponents, by the back ground of the land intercepting the light of the horizon, while through the same light their own ships formed opaque objects distinctly visible to the French; they accordingly stood on with easy sail during the night, and in the morning had the mortification to see the French colours flying on shore as well as in the anchorage. During the interval since the last combat, the French force had been augmented to fifteen ships of the line, while the English was no more than twelve; an action notwithstanding ensued, which terminated as before, without capture, and the fleets respectively returned to Cuddalore and to Madras; the French to deposit at the former place the military stores, and troops received in the transports, and the English to concert measures preparatory to their departure to refit at Bombay. But it is worthy of particular remark, that the port of Trincomalee, considered and contested by both nations as the key of all their naval and military operations in the bay of Bengal and the coast of Coromandel, was found to be so utterly destitute of every resource, that Admiral Suffrein was under the necessity of seeking at Acheen, in the island of

* I am not acquainted with any terms in ordinary use, to describe these phenomena so familiar to every person who has made a voyage. A seaman would say, that the French fleet was not visible, because it was under the land. If Humboldt's terms were in familiar use, they would be sufficiently expressive. He distinguishes between distant objects seen in a positive and in a negative manner. In the first case, the light is reflected from the object; in the second, the object intercepts the light. According to this distinction, the English fleet was seen by the French in a negative manner; and in conformity to Humboldt's doctrine and observations, a much nearer approach was necessary before the French fleet could be seen in a positive manner.
Sumatra, in the port of an uncivilized chief, those aids during
the monsoon, which a conquest of reputed importance achieved
for that special purpose was found unfit to supply. Whether in
addition to these well known defects, Monsieur Suffrein may have
been influenced in his choice of Acheen, by having previously
made it the rendezvous of the Pourvoyeuse frigate laden with
teach-wood from Pegue, and a store-ship from the Isle of France
which joined him there, the French author does not enable us
to determine. The Annual Register of that year has fallen into
the error (apparently derived from the public records) of sup-
posing Monsieur Suffrein to have wintered at Trincomalee, but
the very accurate author of *Histoire de la derniere guerre*, who
appears from internal evidence to have been a naval officer
serving under that admiral, not only places the fact beyond
doubt, but enables us to state the singular coincidence of Mon-
sieur Suffrein having sailed from Cuddalore in fair weather on
the 15th of October, the same day that the English fleet was
driven in the utmost danger from the roads at Madras by a
hurricane, which, as usual, soon changing its direction, strewed
the shore for several miles with the wreck of country ships, and
the dead bodies of their mariners; a loss the more afflicting
from their containing a store of grain intended to avert the
impending famine.

The hope of each army had for several months been incessantly
and anxiously fixed on the consequences of each successive naval
combat, and the indecision of each result necessarily extended its
influence to the military operations. The views of Hyder were
chiefly directed to his distant detachments on the western
hills of the peninsula and in Malabar, and to some ineffi-
cient operations in Tanjour, which were defeated with very superior means by the distinguished energy and perseverance of Colonel Nixon. Positive orders, as well as insufficient strength, kept the French on the defensive, and Sir Eyre Coote, estimating the united force opposed to him in Coromandel at higher numbers than their actual amount, gave to his movements a more cautious and defensive character than he might possibly have adopted, had his intelligence been more correct. After, however, depositing in Vellore, in the month of August, a sufficiency of provisions to last until the 1st of March, 1783; and accomplishing that object without the slightest molestation from the enemy, he was induced, from this and other circumstances, to avail himself of the interval between the two last naval actions, and the absence of both fleets from the coast, to concert the means of attempting the re-capture of Cuddalore, if on approaching that place he should find the aspect of affairs and of the opposing force to be favourable to the enterprize. The absence of the fleets afforded the advantage of embarking at Madras on transports escorted by a frigate left for that special purpose, the requisite military stores and battering train; but the precarious nature of naval co-operation was never more manifest than on this occasion. On arriving on the high ground above Pondicherry, he was astonished to find that the ships expected to be there waiting his arrival, were still invisible. The insufficient store of provisions with the army, rendered him dependent on their arrival, and ultimately compelled him to return to Madras without an effort, having first however ascertained that Trincomalee had fallen; that Admiral Sir E. Hughes had returned to Madras after the action of the 3d of September, and that all
hope of attacking Cuddalore must for the present be suspended. This mortification was farther aggravated, on the return of Sir Eyre Coote to Madras, by learning that the transports had arrived at Pondicherry on the day succeeding the departure of the army, a disappointment eventually fortunate in its consequences, as from the unexpected return of the French fleet to Cuddalore, the English expedition, if more successful in its early combinations, must have terminated in failure and considerable loss.

The ships of the English fleet had kept the sea during the monsoon of 1781, and from the injuries sustained through the want of periodical repair, and from four subsequent general actions, were in so defective a state, as to render their refitment at Bombay indispensible in the opinion of their commander-in-chief. Lord Macartney, justly apprehensive for even the safety of Madras, if the hostile fleet should winter at Trincomalee, and be thus on the spot, not only to co-operate with the expected army under Monsieur Bussy; but to intercept the supplies of grain from Bengal, which constituted the sole hope of averting the miseries of famine at Madras, solicited the admiral, in several successive conferences, to risk the English fleet, for the purpose of covering a decisive attempt to reduce Cuddalore, and thus decide the war before the arrival of Monsieur Bussy; and his Lordship ineffectually, and somewhat indecorously, continued to press this measure, and to animadvert on the refusal, after the admiral had more than once declared his professional conviction of the absolute necessity of repairing to Bombay. Sir Edward Hughes accordingly sailed, as we have seen, for Bombay on the 15th of October: about twelve days after his departure, a respectable and long expected armament from
England, under Sir R. Bickerton, anchored in the roads: the ships, of course, proceeded to form a junction with their commander-in-chief at Bombay, after having landed at Madras the troops intended to reinforce the army at that presidency.

During this campaign some advances to negotiation through Colonel Brathwaite a prisoner in Hyder's camp, were no otherwise remarkable than in assuming as the grounds of the present war, the fraud practised by Mahommed Ali on the state of Mysoor, in 1752, without noticing the treaty of 1769, which terminated all preceding differences: these advances were followed by the mission of an envoy to the English camp, charged with no definite proposals, and instructed merely to feel the dispositions and probable demands of that nation upon Hyder, in the event of his finding it expedient to abandon his French allies: and the dissensions among the English authorities were in no case more prominent, than in Sir Eyre Coote's declining to satisfy the official enquiries of Lord Macartney with regard to the nature of these communications.

The praise of friends and enemies extorted by the eminent talents and unrivalled energy of Monsieur Suffrein, was tarnished in the course of these operations, by an occurrence which must leave an indelible stain on the memory of that distinguished officer. He had proposed to the English Government, through Monsieur du Chemin, commandant of the troops, a cartel for the exchange of prisoners; the dissensions of the time held Lord Macartney to the etiquette of referring the proposition to the commander-in-chief, then absent with the army; and Sir Eyre Coote, on receiving the reference, expressed his ready concurrence; desiring however to include in the exchange, the English prisoners in
the custody of Hyder, as a member of the allied hostile force, to which he was actually opposed; which conditions seem to have been rejected by Monsieur Suffrein. Hostile operations rendered the communications extremely precarious, and those relating to the subject of the exchange could not have been conducted through the medium of a flag of truce, as the first letter of Monsieur Du Chemin to Lord Macartney, on that subject, appears never to have reached its destination, and others may have shared a similar fate. However this may be, it is certain that Monsieur Suffrein, shortly before his departure from Cuddalore, on the 1st of August, caused his English prisoners to be delivered to Hyder *, by whom they were marched, chained two and two together, to Mysoor: that Monsieur Mottè, the intendant, and several respectable officers and inhabitants of Pondicherry, distinctly announced to Monsieur Suffrein, and earnestly deprecated, the inhuman treatment to which these unhappy prisoners were destined; and that this Admiral defended the measure on the ground of his having declared to the English Admiral, "that if no exchange took place he should be obliged to keep his prisoners in one of Hyder's forts," or in language more correctly describing the state of the fact, that he would transfer them to the custody of that ally, whose prisoners he refused to include in the exchange: but it is on far other grounds, than a questionable construction of the customary laws of war, among civilized nations, or the imputation of political error, or even the reciprocal accusation of diplomatic subterfuge, that the whole civilized world must unite in its abhorrence,

* They were landed at Cuddalore on the 30th June, and commenced their march as prisoners on the 12th August.
CHAP. of delivering to the custody of a barbarian, notorious for his contempt of those laws, prisoners of war entitled to honourable treatment from an honourable enemy.

The daily declining health of Sir Eyre Coote, had compelled him, before his return from the southward, to commit the command of the army to the next in seniority of His Majesty's, as well as the Company's troops, Major-General Stuart*; and in compliance with medical advice, he embarked for the benefit of the sea air, and proceeded to Bengal. The hostile fleets wintered in the ports already noticed; the English army cantoned for the rains, in the neighbourhood of Madras, the French in Cuddalore and its vicinity, and Hyder selected for the same purpose, an elevated ground on the left bank of the river Poni, about sixteen miles to the northward of Arcot.

* The same officer who had lost a leg in the battle of Polliloor.
CHAPTER XXV.

Affairs of Malabar — since the defeat and destruction of the besieging army at Tellicherry — Reduction of Calicut — Arrival of Colonel Hum-berstone — lands and assumes the command — defeats Hyder's corps under Muckdoom Ali — Plan for the attack of Palghat — Destruction of his stores — Moves to Paniani — Mysoreans rally — Second defeat — Colonel Humberstone moves for better cover to Calicut — his mea-sures contrary to the views of the Government of Bombay — and of Sir Eyre Coote — The latter, however, disappointed, directs Colonel Humberstone to remain under the orders of Bombay — and recommends a concentrated effort — Before the communication of these views, was again in motion against Palghat — Extreme peril of the attempt — Driven back to Paniani with precipitation, by Tippoo and Lally — Ar-rival of Colonel Macleod — Circumstances which led to this attack — Co-lonel Macleod strengthens his position at Paniani — Tippoo attacks it — is repulsed — retires to await the arrival of his heavy guns — disapp-ears in consequence of the death of Hyder — Interesting circumstances attending that event — Concealment of his death — His army marches towards the point of Tippoo's approach — Tippoo's first measures — for Malabar — New Governor of Seringapatam — arrives in camp — Succession acknowledged — Resources to which he succeeded — French connexion — Tippoo obliged to depart to the west, before the arrival of Bussy — Dissensions in Madras, consequent on Hyder's death — An-imadversions of Mr. Hastings — Madras army at length takes the field — Lord Macartney assumes the direction of military measures — their character — General Stuart's conduct — Demolition of Carangoly and Wandewash — Offers battle to the French and Mysoreans — Revictuals Vellore — Change of opinion consequent on the departure of Tippoo — Suffrein's early appearance in the upper part of the bay of Bengal, 1783 — rendezvous with Bussy at Trincomalee — lands him and his troops at Cuddalore — his grievous disappointment at the departure of
The operations in Coromandel, during the year 1782, deeply important in their aspect, but inconsequent in their effects, have been described without much reference to cotemporary events in Malabar, in order that we may resume, with greater perspicuity, the narrative of occurrences on that coast, subsequent to the relief of Tellicherry, and the destruction of the Mysorean army under Sirdar Khân, in January 1782.

That event had been followed by the early reduction of Calicut, and by the arrival at that place from Bombay of a portion of the armament originally placed under the orders of General Meadows, consisting of about a thousand men under Colonel Humberstone, who states the force to be now "so scattered and dispersed, that it is hardly possible it can ever be assembled, and so diminished in numbers, from disorders incident to a long voyage; that were it assembled, it would not, without reinforcement, be equal to the plan proposed for it;" which appears to have been a conjunct operation with Sir Edward Hughes's squadron, against the Dutch possessions in Ceylon. The naval and military officers commanding this portion of the armament, having received the communication from Mr. Sullivan which has been described, and deeming the attempt to reach the opposite coast, while the French were understood to have the superiority at sea, as a precarious undertaking, determined that the troops should be landed at Calicut, in aid of the proposed diversion, and that the ships should return to Bombay, in furtherance of the same design. Colonel Humberstone, as senior officer, as-
sumed also the command of the troops which had hitherto served under Major Abington, and being joined by a body of Nairs, anxious to emerge from a long and cruel subjugation, he moved about twenty miles to the southward, and close to Tricalore, came in contact with Hyder's detachment under Muckdoom Ali, already adverted to.* That officer, confident in superior numbers, estimated at seven thousand, waited the result of an action, in a strong but most injudicious position, with a deep and difficult river in the rear of his right: from this position he was dislodged, and the retreat by the left being interrupted by a judicious movement of the English troops, a large portion of the Mysorean right was driven into the river, with a loss in killed alone, estimated by Colonel Humberstone, at between three and four hundred men; and among that number, Muckdoom Ali, their commander: 200 prisoners, and 150 horses were secured; and the total loss, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, may thus be estimated at from 1,500 to 2,000 men, while that of the English was inconsiderable.

Colonel Humberstone followed the route of the fugitives as far as Andicota, but finding pursuit unavailing, he resumed his plan of proceeding to the attack of Palgautcherry, by the river Paniani, which passing near to that fort, discharges itself into the sea at a town of the same name with the river, distant about sixty miles; and is navigable for boats to distances fluctuating with the season, but sometimes for 30 miles. While moving southward for that purpose, and waiting the arrival of the boats which conveyed his stores, a violent gale of wind,

* Page 374.
attended with five days incessant rain, dispersed the boats, spoiled the provisions, and damaged the ammunition; and the soldiers from exposure to the inclemency of the season becoming sickly, he was induced, as soon as the violence of the weather would allow, to march his troops to the towns of Tanoor, and Paniani. During these events, the Mysoreans rallied at Ramgerry, a place situated about half way from the coast to Palgautcherry, whence detachments of cavalry were advanced for the usual purposes of annoyance. Colonel Humberstone, being himself seriously indisposed, directed Major Campbell in an interval of fair weather, to advance towards the enemy, who again waited the attack in an injudicious position, and were defeated with the loss of two guns. Experience of the nature of the season already commenced, compelled Colonel Humberstone to seek for better cover to shelter his troops during the monsoon, and he availed himself of the first favourable interval to return to Calicut, after a short course of operations, highly creditable to his energies as an executive military officer, but founded on views neither sufficiently matured nor combined by the Governments who were to supply the means necessary to the execution of the service, and finally undertaken at an improper season.

In contemplating the policy of such diversions, the Government of Bombay were wisely of opinion, that no middle course was expedient between measures purely defensive on that coast, and an armament capable not only of penetrating into the interior, but maintaining its communications. Previously to the departure of Colonel Humberstone from Bombay, the Government had distinctly objected to a project which he had suggested
for employing the troops under his command in the reduction of Mangalore or Cochin, and urged his proceeding to Madras where the reinforcement was expected. The operations which have been described are therefore to be viewed as resulting from a coincidence of circumstances, and not the effect of digested measures, for we shall hereafter have occasion to see that the combinations which might have rendered them safe and efficient were never practically adopted. On receiving intelligence however of his landing at Calicut and sending back the ships, although the Government of Bombay state this determination to have "disconcerted their measures," they nevertheless resolved "to take the proper means to assist him;" afterwards however expressing their regret that "while General Coote is July 2. in want of every European we can collect, as appears by the Madras letter received the 13th ultimo, the force under Colonel Humberstone should be shut up at Calicut in the utmost distress for many necessary articles; in no situation to render any service to the public; and out of the reach of support or supply from hence at this season of the year."

Sir Eyre Coote, however, judiciously converting his own disappointment with regard to this reinforcement, into the means of effecting a secure diversion, placed Colonel Humberstone under the orders of the Government of Bombay, recommending to them such a concentrated and powerful attack on Hyder's western possessions, as should have the effect of compelling him to return for their defence, and thus leave his French allies in Coromandel to their own separate resources. Before, however, these measures could be matured, or the season could admit of conveying to Colonel Humberstone the requisite orders for his guidance,
that officer was again in motion for the prosecution of his original design. The river Paniani afforded conveyance for his stores, as far as the post of Tirtalla 30 miles inland, and he soon afterwards obtained possession of Ramgerry, a place of some capability five miles farther up the river. Fortunately the extreme peril of the expedition was here tempered by the consequences of local inexperience, and apparently inadequate means of communication with the natives; he describes himself to be "ignorant of the road and situation of the country, and could place little dependence on the information of the Nairs," natives of that part of the country, and deeply interested in his success: he consequently determined to leave under the protection of a battalion of sepoys at Ramgerry, the whole of his battering train and heavy equipments, and marched with six six-pounders, two one-pounders, and the remainder of his force "to reconnoitre the country and fortress of Palgautcherry, before he should undertake to attack it." The remains of the Mysorean troops appeared to make a stand in a position not far from the place, but suffered themselves to be easily dislodged, and retreated into the fort. The Colonel proceeded under cover of his troops, to reconnoitre the southern and western works; he moved on the ensuing day to the northward of the fort, and after finding by a complete examination, that it was "every where much stronger than he had reason to appre-
thick fog. On the ensuing day he fell back to a little place named Mangaricota, eight miles distant, where he had left some provisions. An attack in force upon his rear repelled with judgment and spirit, was of less importance than the distress sustained by rains, which fell from the 21st to the 24th, with as great violence, as during any period of the monsoon, and rendered, impassable, for several hours, a rivulet in his rear. It appears by letters, not officially recorded, that on the 10th Nov. he received at Mangaricota, orders from Bombay to return to the coast: he commenced his march for that purpose on the 12th. On the 14th, he was at Ramgerry, about half way from Palgaut to the coast. A chasm occurs in the materials which the* public records afford from the 30th of October till the 19th of November, when Colonel Macleod, who had been sent by Sir Eyre Coote to assume the command, landed at Paniani. "On the 20th, Colonel Humberstone †, with his whole force came in, having made a rapid retreat before Tippoo and Lally, who followed him by forced marches with a very superior force;" the last march being from Tirtalla 30 miles. The public dispatches are silent with regard to his numbers, and the fate of the battering train; but the circumstances which led to this attack are better ascertained.

After the defeat of Muckdoom Ali, Hyder had made all the requisite arrangements for endeavouring to repair that misfortune as soon as the season should permit. Tippoo's usual command, including the corps of Monsieur Lally, had been reinforced and improved, and towards the close of the rains in

* The intermediate dates are derived from unofficial letters.
† Letter from Colonel Macleod, 29th November.
Malabar, affected to be meditating some blow in the neighbourhood of Trichinopoly, in order that when the state of the season and of the roads should be reported favourable, and above all when Colonel Humberstone should have advanced a sufficient distance from the coast, Tippoo might be enabled, by a few forced marches to come unexpectedly upon him. The receipt of orders from Bombay for his return to the coast, considered by himself as a public misfortune, may be deemed the efficient cause of the preservation of the troops under his command. Tippoo commenced his forced march from the vicinity of Caroor, in the confidence of finding Colonel Humberstone at Mangaricota, advancing his stores for the siege of Palgaut. Tippoo arrived at the latter place on the 16th*, when his enemy had receded to Ramgerry: it was not however until the 18th, at night, that he had any intelligence which satisfied him of the necessity of retreat at four o'clock on the ensuing morning; but from an official neglect to send the order to a picquet of one hundred and fifty men, stationed at the extraordinary distance of three miles, five hours were lost; incessantly harrassed and cannonaded throughout the day, he attempted, without success, to pursue his route on the right bank of the river, which was not fordable, but found himself stopped by impenetrable swamps. The early part of the night was passed in anxious search for a practicable ford, and at length one was found so deep as to take ordinary men to the chin; yet by clinging together in silence, the tall assisting the short, the whole got across without the loss of a man. Tippoo, supposing

* The dates are given on the authority mentioned in the preceding page, and do not exactly correspond with those of Memoirs of the War in Asia.
the river to be everywhere impassable, employed the night in making dispositions for destroying his enemy in the snare in which he supposed him to be entrapped; but by day-light on the 20th the detachment had performed the largest portion of the march, and was only overtaken within two miles of Paniani. The hope of intercepting him was thus frustrated by an unexpected event, but Tippoo determined to persevere in the attack.

Colonel Macleod, on examining his position at Paniani, began to strengthen it by some field works, and on the 25th attempted to surprise Tippoo’s camp by night, an enterprise from which he desisted, on forcing a picquet, and discovering regular military arrangements and a strong position. On the morning of the 29th, before day, the field works being still unfinished, Tippoo attempted the strong, but weakly occupied position of Colonel Macleod, by a well designed attack in four columns, one of them headed by Lally’s corps; but such was the vigilance, discipline, and energy of the English troops, that the more advanced picquets were merely driven in on the outposts, not one of which was actually forced, support to the most vulnerable having been skilfully provided, and Monsieur Lally’s corps having fortunately been met by the strongest, each column, before it could penetrate farther, was impetuously charged with the bayonet. The errors incident to operations by night divided the columns, but the English tactic was uniform. A single company of Europeans did not hesitate to charge with the bayonet a column of whatever weight, without knowing or calculating numbers. Monsieur Lally’s dispositions were excellent if the quality of the troops had been equal, a pretension which could only be claimed by a portion of one column out of
the four, and the attempt ended in total discomfiture and confusion, the Mysoreans leaving on the field two hundred men killed, and carrying off about a thousand wounded: the loss of the English was forty-one Europeans, and forty-seven sepoys killed and wounded, including eight officers.

Sir Edward Hughes proceeding with his squadron from Madras Nov. 30. to Bombay, came in sight of the place on the ensuing day; and on learning the circumstances in which the troops were placed, offered to Colonel Macleod the alternative of receiving them on board, or reinforcing him with 450 Europeans. He adopted the latter, from considering that while Tippoo should remain in his front, the small body under his command could not be better employed, than in occupying the attention of so large a portion of the enemy's army; and that while at Paniani, he was equally prepared as at any other part of the coast, to embark and join the concentrated force which he knew to be preparing at Bombay. The return furnished by Colonel Macleod, to the Commander-in-chief at Madras, of his total number, after receiving from Sir Edward Hughes the reinforcement of 450 men, was, Europeans 800, English sepoys 1000, Travancorean troops 1200, shewing that the number of Europeans engaged in the late encounter were fewer than 400 men; and as he had been accompanied in landing by 40 men, the number with which Colonel Humberstone returned to Paniani could not have exceeded 300 men, out of the thousand with which he had landed in the preceding February.

Tippoo, after this ineffectual attempt, retired to a farther distance, to wait the arrival of his heavy equipments, in order Dec. 12. to resume the attack on the position at Paniani: but on the 12th
of December, the swarm of light troops, which had continued to watch the English position, was invisible; and successive reports confirmed the intelligence, that the whole Mysorean force was proceeding by forced marches to the eastward, whither our narrative must return.

The health of Hyder during the course of this year, had begun perceptibly to decline, and in the month of November, symptoms appeared of a disease (unknown as far as I am informed in Europe) named by the Hindoos Raj-póra (or the royal sore or boil) from its being, or supposed to be, peculiar to persons of rank; and by the Mahommedans, Sertán or Khercheng, the crab, from the imaginary resemblance to that animal, of the swelling behind the neck, or the upper portion of the back, which is the first indication of this disorder. * The united efforts of Hindoo, Mahommedan, and French physicians, made no impression on this fatal disease, and he expired on the 7th of December. It is deemed by the Mahommedans a remarkable coincidence, that the numerical letters, composing the words Hyder Aly Khán Behauder, correspond with the year of his death (1197, Hej.) and the epitaph on his mausoleum, at the Lall Baug, on the island of Seringapatam, is founded on this coincidence, as are all Mahommedan epitaphs, on some particular words, whose numerical powers correspond with the date of decease.

The official situations of Poornea and Kishen Row, two bra-

* A surgeon, in performing the operation of opening one of these imposthumes, many years afterwards, happened to have a scratch on one of his fingers, which was accidentally touched by the virus of the wound; and the author had the opportunity of seeing the alarming livid swellings which for some time afterwards successively appeared and subsided, on his hands, arms, and forehead.
mins of opposite sects, but corresponding principles, who directed the measures of state on this important occasion, can scarcely be described by corresponding English terms. Hyder himself, being the head of every department, and signing the order for every disbursement, the business of the treasury and exchequer was conducted in two dusters or departments, independent of each other, and meant as a reciprocal check, but parallel and similar in their details, with little other difference, than that one was conducted in the Mahratta, and the other in the Canarese language, the latter under Poornea, the former under Kishen Row.

It was Poornea's suggestion, when the recovery of Hyder became improbable, that his death should be concealed, as the only possible means of exercising the authority necessary to keep the army together, until the arrival of Tippoo. This project was accordingly concerted with Kishen Row, and with the public officers and domestics, to whom the event must necessarily be known. Immediately after his decease, the body was deposited in a large chest, filled with abeer, (a powder composed of various fragrant substances,) and sent off from camp, in the same manner as valuable chests of plunder were usually dispatched, to Seringapatam; and the confidential persons directing the escort, were ordered to deposit their charge at the tomb of his father at Colar.* Successive couriers were at the same time dispatched

* It was afterwards removed by Tippoo's orders to the superb mausoleum, still endowed by the English at Seringapatam; and on that occasion 40,000 pagodas were disbursed in charity, and to the priesthood, for offering up prayers, with views similar to those of the Romish masses, for the souls of the deceased. The removal of the body furnishes an occasion for noticing a determined belief among Mahommedans of the south of India, (whether elsewhere the author has not ascertained,)
to Tippoo, to apprise him of the event, and of the consequent measures, and to recommend his joining with all possible dispatch.

The whole of the arrangements of the army, the weekly relief of the 2000 horse which constantly hung round Madras, the issue of pay, the adjustment of military accounts, the answers to letters received from the envoys of the different courts, and all the business of the state, went on as usual. The principal officers of the army, and the foreign envoys made their daily enquiries, and were answered that Hyder, although extremely weak, was in a state of slow, but progressive amendment. The French physicians, sent from Cuddalore to attend him, on the first serious symptoms, had, of course, conveyed to Monsieur Cossigny, who now commanded the troops, confidential intelligence of the whole proceeding. The first impression on that officer’s mind was that of immediately marching with all his force, to watch over the interests of his nation, and guard the succession, until Tippoo’s arrival; and it was with great difficulty, and after a pecuniary advance on account of subsidy, to prove the sincerity of the persons administering the provisional government, that he was prevailed on by the Mysorean envoy at Cuddalore to abandon a design which would have frustrated all their measures; and after moving a few marches by the route of Ginjee, he forbore to approach, but held his troops ready to march at a moment’s notice.

almost miraculous for its absurdity, in opposition to evidence equally accessible to the ignorant and the wise; that a body committed in due form to the charge of the earth, will, without any previous embalming, or other preparation, remain uncorrupted for any length of time, until re-assumed by the person who had deposited the charge.
The most trusty chiefs of the army were successively, and without any circumstances to excite suspicion, admitted into Hyder's tent, for the purpose of communicating the plan which had been adopted; all on their return to their respective corps made the concerted reports of the state of his health, and all were faithful to their trust, excepting *Mahommed Ameen*, the son of Ibraheem Saheb, and cousin-german to the deceased. This chief, who commanded 4,000 stable horse, formed a project with Shems-u-Deen (Buckshee) to cut off the persons provisionally exercising the powers of Government, to seize the treasury, and proclaim Abd-ul-Kerreem, Hyder's second son, a person of defective intellect, as a pageant who would permit them to exercise the Government in his name. It was necessary to the execution of this design, that it should be communicated to certain resaldars (officers commanding battalions), and a French officer named Boudenot, who commanded a troop of 100 French cavalry, attached as an honorary guard to head quarters, associated himself in their plans. The intelligence of this conspiracy was not long concealed from Poornea, who sent for the French officer to Hyder's tent, where being confronted with some of the resaldars who had spontaneously revealed the plot, he confessed the whole design on the previous promise of personal security. *Mahommed Ameen*, and Shems-u-Deen were then sent for, on pretence of consultation, and finding it in vain to equivocate, confessed the whole. The disposal of these persons was managed with corresponding address; they were put in irons, and sent off publicly under a strong guard, as if by Hyder's personal orders, for having entered into a conspiracy to overturn the Government in the expectation of his death.
On the 16th day after his decease, the army marched in the direction of Tippoo's approach. The closed palankeen of Hyder with the accustomed retinue, issued at the usual hour from the canvas enclosure of his tents; and the march was performed in the ordinary manner, observing of course the proper attentions, not to disturb the patient in the palankeen; and a few similar marches brought the army to the appointed rendezvous at Chuckmaloor, on the river Pennar; an intermediate situation between Cuddalore and the pass of Changama, for the convenience of communicating with the French, or of moving to the westward, if that determination should become necessary; and the junction of the French troops was effected in the same encampment a few days after Tippoo's arrival.

Suspicions of Hyder's death had from the first been whispered about the camp with various and fluctuating credit. But it soon became evident, as well to those who believed, as those who were inclined to discredit the report, that whatever might be the state of the fact, the Government was in vigorous hands, and that obedience was the safest course. Notwithstanding the appearances which have been stated, there were few persons in the army who were not now satisfied of Hyder's death; but the examples which had been made, restrained the disaffected within the bounds of order.

Tippoo received his first dispatches on the afternoon of the 11th, and abandoning for the present all operations in Malabar Dec. was in full march to the eastward on the morning of the 12th. At Coimbetoor he met Arshed Beg Khan, who a short time before Hyder's death had been sent, in the expectation of Tippoo's success and early return, to assume the Government of
Malabar; and that officer was ordered to remain on the defensive at Palgauctherry. At the same place he made a selection for the Government of the capital which seemed to afford a favourable earnest of steady gratitude and attachment; Seyed Mahommed the associate and protector of his youth who had saved his life in the battle of Chercoolee, and had up to this period, from the unaccountable jealousy of Hyder, continued to serve as a simple horseman in Tippoo's personal guard; and the battalion of Assud Khan, an experienced and trusty officer, was assigned as the escort of the new governor. Tippoo on considering his distance* from the capital and the army, avowed to Seyed Mahommed his despair of an unopposed succession, and gave him two distinct commissions, one to serve under the commandant of Seringapatam, the other to supersede him. The actual commandant was named Shitaub, a Chêla, (slave) a description of persons in whom Hyder, in conformity to the views already explained†, appears for some time past to have placed the most unlimited reliance; and it was not until a month had elapsed, and satisfactory intelligence had arrived from the army, that Seyed Mahommed‡ found it prudent to produce his second commission.

Tippoo's marches in the early part of his route were of course the longest that his troops could support. On his nearer approach to the army they became gradually shorter, for the purpose of sending confidential messengers and receiving re-

* The distance from his camp at Paniani, may, on a rough estimate, be stated at from 380 to 400 miles, and the dromedary courier, who brought the first intelligence, must have travelled about 100 miles a day, for four successive days.
† Vol. ii. p. 189.
‡ The personal information of Seyed Mahommed.
ports. He particularly prohibited the usual procession to go out in advance and receive him*; and declining even the compliment of turning out the line, entered the camp in a private manner after sunset.

Arrived at his father's tent, he made the most ample acknowledgments to the persons who had conducted during this most critical interval the charge of public affairs; and particularly to Poornea, who had first suggested the arrangement. On the same evening he gave audience to all the principal officers of his army, seated on a plain carpet; declining to ascend the musnud †, from an affectation of grief, by which no one was deceived.

The actual strength of the Mysorean armies in the field, at the time of Hyder's death, exclusively of garrisons and provincial troops, but including a new levy of 5000 horse raised on the northern frontier, subsequently to the intelligence of the Mahratta peace, was, according to the return of actual payments made by Poornea as treasurer, 88,000 ‡; it will be recollected that the strength with which he entered that country was 83,000, but the corps of Meer Saheb, then on its route from Kurpa was not included in the number: these authentic statements, so nearly corresponding to each other, are merely intended to correct the exaggerated estimates hitherto published: and it

* Technically designated by the Arabic term istekbāl, which is literally translated by the French idiom aller au devant; it is so common that every public officer of rank, on approaching a village, is met at some distance by an istekbāl of the villagers.

† The elevated seat, or cushion, occupied by the prince, or person in authority.

‡ The best military officers of Mysoor, estimate 120,000, but the difference between estimated and effective strength, is familiarly known.
may be added, for the purpose of illustrating the nature of the resources to which Tippoo succeeded, that the treasury at Seringapatam contained at this period, three crores of rupees, (three millions sterling) in cash, besides an accumulated booty of jewels and valuables, in Poornea’s language, to a countless amount.

The measures to be adopted by the united French and Mysorean armies, necessarily depended on an enlarged view of the probable events on the western, as well as on the eastern coast; of the latter, the early arrival of Monsieur Bussy was most important; and until that event, it was deemed most prudent to postpone any distant operations, which might interfere with his plan of the campaign. But before the occurrence of this long expected arrival, the alarming aspect of intelligence from the western coast, and the actual capture of Bednoor, was represented as imposing on Tippoo the absolute necessity of proceeding in person, for the preservation of his own dominions; in spite of the brilliant results which might be anticipated * from waiting with his main strength, the certain and early co-operation of Monsieur Bussy, and sending a respectable detachment, for the purpose of a defensive war in his western possessions. It was accordingly resolved, that Monsieur Cossigny, with a French regiment, should accompany the Mysorean army, to the westward, and that a respectable division † of Tippoo’s army, under Seyed Saheb, should be left to co-operate with Monsieur Bussy.

* Tippoo represents the proposition of first taking Madras, as a matter of course, and then Bednoor, as a gasconade, by which he was not to be deluded.

† Stated by Budr-u-Zemán Khan, who commanded the infantry, at 3000 horse, 4000 infantry, and 5000 peons.
The cotemporary events on either coast will perhaps be rendered most intelligible by continuing for the present the affairs of Coromandel, leaving the operations on the western coast, which terminated this eventful war, to be afterwards resumed in one unbroken narrative.

The rumour of Hyder’s death, prevalent in his own camp even before his actual decease, was circulated in every other direction with the same shades of fluctuating credit. But two days after the event, it was reported by the commandant of Vellore to the Government of Madras, as a fact on which he placed reliance; and from every other source of intelligence, the same impressions were received. The well-known condition of every Asiatic army on the death of the prince, aggravated in the present instance by the absence of the heir apparent, furnished an opportunity of presenting a point of support to the intriguing or disaffected, which seldom fails to effect the dismemberment of the army, and ought not to have been neglected by an enemy possessing common energy or wisdom. The immediate march of the English army, however defective its preparations, and however unfavourable the season, was earnestly and urgently pressed on General Stuart by the authority of his Government. He answered his immediate superiors, that he “did not believe that Hyder was dead, and if he were, the army would be ready for every action in proper time;” and on repeating, some days afterwards, their conviction of the fact, the undoubted intelligence of the consternation which prevailed in the enemy’s army, and the consequent importance of moving; he answered the same superiors that he “was astonished there could be so little reflection as to talk of undertakings against the enemy,” in
the actual state of the army and the country; although in a preceding controversy, on the 17th of November, a resolution of the council of which he was a member declared that "the army on its present establishment ought to be at all times ready to move," and the General assured the members, that "upon any real emergency, the army might and must move and would be ready to do so:" a pledge obviously lax and imprudent, under the circumstances of famine which divided the army and its equipments during the monsoon; but which either ought not to have been given, or ought to have been effectually redeemed on the real emergency of the death of Hyder. The unqualified condemnation of one party, in an unhappy controversy which embraced almost every point of military policy, must not be deemed to imply an unqualified approbation of the other party; of whose conduct and opinions it affords no favourable impression, that they complained of counteraction from all authorities with which they were in any way connected. "Records (say the Government of Bengal on this subject) of laborious altercation, invective, and mutual complaint, are no satisfaction to the public in compensation for a neglect that may cost millions, and upon a field where immense sums had been expended to maintain our footing*;" and in a subsequent letter.† "In reply to our desire of unambiguous explanation on a subject of such public concern (viz. the imputed counteraction) you favour us with a collected mass of complaint, and invective against this Government, against the nabob

* 11th March, 1783.
† 24th March, 1783, a performance of infinite force, and worthy of perusal, even as a specimen of literary talent.
of Arcot and his ministers; against the Commander-in-chief of all the forces in India, against the Commander-in-chief of His Majesty's fleet, against your own provincial Commander-in-chief, and again against this Government. Had you been pleased, in so general a charge of impeachment, to take cognizance of the co-operative support which was till of late withheld from you by the presidency of Bombay, your description of the universal misconduct of the managers of the public affairs in India (the President and Select Committee of Fort St. George excepted) would have been complete.” After a dignified reprobation of the temerity of persons in their situation, coming forward as censors of the state, to criminate a superior government, and the conduct of the naval and military commanders in chief: the letter proceeds: “Honours thus detracted, suit not the detractors, nor can they for a moment cover their mismanagement: no artifice of reasoning, no perversion of distorted quotation, no insinuations of delinquency, no stings covered with compliment, no mechanism of the arts of sophistry, can strip Sir Edward Hughes and Sir Eyre Coote, of the glory of having, in repeated and well fought days, defeated the powerful invaders of the Carnatic, on the ocean and the field:” and again, “the reputation which you would wish to ascribe to yourselves particularly, is not founded upon what you have done, but on what you are prevented from doing: your management from the time of Sir Eyre Coote's departure from the coast, at a crisis the most favourable for recovering the Carnatic, and when you had the unparticipated conduct of the war, with an increased army, and the most liberal supplies, your management at such a period, when your efforts have only produced the
destruction of three of your own forts,”* &c. &c. &c. These extracts are presented, for the purpose of enabling the reader to form his own reflections on the scene before him; and none shall at present be obtruded on his notice, except that, in so advanced a period of civilization and knowledge, the existence of a constitution of civil and military government, containing in its very structure the elements of discord, insubordination, and inefficiency, furnishes mournful evidence of the slow and difficult progress of practical wisdom.

In effect, the English army made its first march for the purpose of advancing provisions to its first intermediate deposit, (Tripassore,) exactly thirteen days after Tippoo’s arrival and succession had been quietly proclaimed, in the united camps; and did not make its first march of departure, for the attainment of any of the objects of the campaign, until thirty-four days after that event, and sixty days after the death of Hyder. After the departure of Sir Eyre Coote, Lord Macartney, assuming the direction of the ensuing campaign, and assigning only the execution to his provincial Commander-in-chief, repeatedly called on that officer, to submit a plan of operations, for the approval of Government, and successively complaining of reserve, and the absence of a specific project, proceeded to propose his own. Offensive operations were little in the contemplation of either, and the reserve of Major-General Stuart, might have been defended in the words ascribed to the greatest captain of this, or perhaps of any age, when pressed by the British cabinet for a plan of operations, “tell me what the enemy will do, and I will tell you what

* Negapatam, Carangoly, Wandewash.
I will do.” Of Lord Macartney’s political and military plans, it has been seen that his Superior Government expressed no appro-
bation. In policy it was imputed as an error, that he pressed ne-
gotiations for peace, with an anxiety which counteracted his own object, by impressing on the enemy his incapacity to continue
the war; an error peculiarly dangerous in India, but referable to
a principle so incontestably ascertained in all ages, and in all
countries, as to extend its operation, not alone to political mea-
sures, but to the ordinary transactions of life; for even in those
it is peculiarly known, that an urgent desire in any person to ob-
tain, what another has to bestow at an optional price, is the di-
rect means of raising the amount or conditions of that price. Of
his military plans, the demolition of three of his own forts, which
Sir Eyre Coote had anxiously desired to preserve, was considered
an erroneous branch; and of the remainder it was objected, that
they proposed a dangerous dispersion of force, into separate
expeditions, too weak to resist a powerful attack, and too distant
for reciprocal support.

General Stuart employed the greater part of the month of
February in the demolition of the forts of Carangoly and Wan-
dewash, and while in the vicinity of the latter place offered
battle to the united forces of the French and the Mysoreans, then
encamped within twelve miles of the place: the invitation was
not accepted, although Tippoo in his narrative of the transaction
expresses disappointment at the retirement of the English, when
he had concerted with the French the plan of an united attack.
A large portion of the month of March was occupied in con-
vveying to Vellore a fresh supply of provisions, an operation in
which the English army was not interrupted, because in the
first week of that month, Tippoo had already ascended the western passes in consequence of the intelligence of the capture of Bednore, having previously destroyed the works of Arcot, and every remaining post in that territory deemed worth the expense of demolition, with the exception of Arnee, which was still preserved as a depot for the division under Seyed Saheb, left to co-operate with the French at Cuddalore. It appears that General Stuart had concurred in the expediency of that part of Lord Macartney's plans which involved the demolition of Carangoly and Wandewash, but in less than three weeks after the accomplishment of that object, on the first and still doubtful intelligence of Tippoo's departure, and on recurring to their infinite importance in the scheme of warfare, which must consequently ensue, he had the candour to express his regret at that precipitate measure: and yet the departure of Tippoo either was not, or ought not to have been an unforeseen event, inasmuch as the diversion under General Matthews on the western coast, to which all the Governments had attached the greatest importance, was professedly undertaken for the purpose, (which seemed to have been forgotten), of drawing the Mysorean from his offensive operations in Coromandel, to the defence of his own dominions.

The operations now to be undertaken against the French force at Cuddalore, were necessarily dependent on the return of Sir Edward Hughes from Bombay: and the arrival of Monsieur Bussy, with the last reinforcements, considerably preceded that event. In the meanwhile, Monsieur Suffrein had appeared at the head of the bay of Bengal, and captured a considerable number of vessels, laden with rice, to supply the necessities of Madras.
The energy of Mr. Hastings, had however, in the intermediate time, enabled him to dispatch to that place, a store sufficient for all the exigencies of the army, but not for a crowded population, encreased by new fugitives, from the lately desolated countries. It became necessary, in consequence, to remove, under proper protection, the great mass of this population, to the provinces north of Madras, and chiefly to Nellore, where each successive journey northwards, afforded encreasing plenty: but after the adoption of this indispensables measure, a population still greatly exceeding the actual supply, presented on every successive morning the mournful spectacle, of numerous dead bodies, on the esplanade, and in the public roads and streets, to be removed for interment by the daily care of the police.

Monsieur Suffrein, having accomplished the chief purposes in his contemplation, on the northern coast, and having left some cruisers to pursue the same object; calculating on the arrival of Sir Edward Hughes at Madras, at a much earlier period than it actually occurred, and having objects in view to be accomplished before he should seek a naval action, proceeded to his rendezvous, with Monsieur Bussy, at Trincomalee, without looking into the roads at Madras, where he would have either captured or destroyed a considerable number of merchant ships. Monsieur Bussy, with the last reinforcements from the Isle of France, joined him at Trincomalee, whence he proceeded, without delay, to land the troops at their ultimate destination, while still uninterrupted by Sir Edward Hughes. The numerous disappointments and reverses have already been noticed, by which the able plans of Monsieur Bussy had hitherto been either frustrated or delayed. On reaching his ultimate
destination, with a force probably less than one-fourth of the number required by his original calculations; he had the farther mortification to learn that Hyder was no more; and that the army with which he expected to co-operate, had departed to a far distant country. Still the operations of that army were directed against the common enemy; and however mortifying the contrast of the actual and expected scene — of the existing combinations, and those which his eminent talents would have framed; he had no alternative, but to abide by the event, and make the best use in his power of the slender means remaining at his disposal. Monsieur Suffrein, having opportunely effected the operation of landing the troops and stores at Cuddalore, returned for farther refitment to Trincomalee; from which place, on the evening of the day he entered the harbour, he saw the English fleet pursuing their route to Madras.

All the requisite measures having been concerted with Sir Edward Hughes, the army* under General Stuart commenced its march from the second stage beyond Madras, towards Cuddalore, on the 21st of April; almost every individual anxiously expecting the arrival of their venerated Commander-in-chief, who had improved in health by his voyage to Bengal, and had announced his approaching return, accompanied by a large

* I find the following statement of its strength on the 29th January:—

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<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europeans</td>
<td>2945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natives</td>
<td>11,545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>14,490</strong></td>
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Part of a reinforcement from England, which arrived on the 15th of April, followed and joined him; I cannot ascertain the exact amount, but it probably did not make his effective force in Europeans before Cuddalore to exceed 3500 men,
supply of money, with the confidence of bringing to a speedy termination a war, which for the first time in its progress, opened a gleam of reasonable hope. Sir Eyre Coote embarked for this purpose in the armed ship Resolution, belonging to the Company, and, unfortunately, towards the close of the voyage, was chased for two days and nights by some French ships of the line. Justly conscious of the deep and irreparable wound which the country would sustain, in being deprived of his services at this critical juncture, the General's anxiety kept him constantly on deck. The influence of excessive heat by day, the dews of night, and above all, extreme agitation of mind during a long period, in which escape appeared improbable, produced a relapse of complaints, rather palliated than cured. The ship with its pecuniary treasure got safe to Madras; but its most precious freight was lost to the state. Sir Eyre Coote expired two days after his arrival.

Viewing the career of this great man as that of a soldier merely, his character may be deemed as faultless as any that history presents; and if the pressure of years and disease had latterly impaired his physical powers, and even disturbed that mental composure which gave so much of force, and of grace, and of moral influence, to the virtues of his mature life; still, in his last decline, the lowest comparative estimate would place him, with a measureless interval between, above any that the scene presented to supply his place. It may be inferred, from the most superficial observation of the conduct of states, that the degree in which a cabinet ought to direct the operations of the field, has not yet become a settled point in the military policy of nations; and among the various shades of opinion, arising from national
habits and constitutions of government, the question can never be totally independent of the personal character of those, who preside over the several branches of public administration. In ascribing therefore to Sir Eyre Coote the nearest imaginable approach to perfection as a soldier, we must be considered to speak of qualities exclusively military: for, if in the requisites of a great general, invested with the powers necessary for giving effect to great talents be included, as they ought, the highest attributes of the statesman, it were injurious to the memory of Sir Eyre Coote, to bring his character, however eminent, to a test from which it must recede.
CHAPTER XXVI.

Want of harmony between the Government of Madras and General Stuart — Description of the fort and vicinity of Cuddalore — General Stuart unexpectedly takes a position to the south — Monsieur Bussy assumes and fortifies a corresponding position — daily becoming more formidable — Attack of this position — Serious contest — and its results — The French retire into Cuddalore — Original misapprehension at Madras, regarding the nature and extent of this service — Reciprocal want of confidence regarding the junction of the southern army — French fleet under Suffrein, appears on the day of the action — Sir E. Hughes covers Cuddalore — quits his station, which is seized by Suffrein — who is reinforced by Bussy, and sails to meet the English fleet — Action — Ostensible superiority and real inferiority of the English — Fleet crippled — Suffrein attains his object — and resumes his station before Cuddalore — Lands a reinforcement of seamen — Monsieur Bussy makes a vigorous sortie — entirely unsuccessful, — Capture of the Crown Prince of Sweden — The force under General Stuart not equal to the service undertaken — Bussy, superior in numbers, determines to march out and attack his camp — General Stuart assuming the tone of being abandoned by his government, determines to abide the result — Crisis averted, by the intelligence of peace, and the arrival of a flag of truce — Commissioners from Madras settle a convention with Monsieur Bussy — Its relation to Tippoo — His intermediate operations.

From the specimen which has been presented of the reciprocal feeling of the government of Madras, and its provincial Commander-in-chief, much harmony will not be expected in the narrative of their measures. The General, sneering at theory, declared, that he was advancing, as fast as was practically com-
patible with the means of transport he possessed, and the Go-
vernment observe, that with carriage for twenty-four days’
provisions, he occupied forty days, at the average of less than
three miles a day in performing a distance of twelve ordinary
marches.

The fort of Cuddalore is a quadrangle of unequal sides, with
an indifferent rampart and ditch, and no out-works, excepting
one advanced from its north-eastern angle; a bastion covers each
of the other angles, and the curtains are furnished with the im-
perfect kind of flanking defence, obtainable by means of a suc-
cession of bastions, placed in a prolongation of one and the
same straight line. The ruins of Fort St. David, situated on a
peninsula at the mouth of the river Panââ, are about a mile
and a half to the north of Cuddalore, and a second river, of
smaller size, forming the peninsula, descends close to the fort,
and renders difficult the approach from the north. The Bandapollam hills, woody eminences of moderate height, embrace the
western face, and south-western angle, at distances varying from
two to four miles; the space directly between the hills and
the western face, being occupied by rice fields, this ac-
cess is also inconvenient: a little estuary, formed by the
sea, and the rivers, runs along the eastern face, and leaves
a narrow insular stripe of land opposite the fort, between
that water and the sea; and a continuation of the same estuary
to the south, inclining however inland, receives the branches of
some inconsiderable winter streams: the space between this
latter estuary and the Bandapollam hills, is firm ground, too
elevated for rice fields, and narrows in extent as it recedes from
the fort. General Stuart, approaching from the north, till within
an easy march of Cuddalore, made an unexpected circuit behind
the Bandapollam hills, and in two marches took up his ground
fronting the north, with his right to the estuary last described,
and his left resting on the Bandapollam hills: his force, when
in position, occupying the whole space, and leaving a respectable
second line. The French narrative*, states the force under
Monsieur Bussy, which, according to preceding details, ought,
including the garrison of Trincomalee, to have amounted to
10,000 Europeans and Caffres, exclusively of sepoys, to be re-
duced at this period, in effective men, to 2,300 Europeans and
5,000 sepoys; 3,500 Mysoreans are probably not intended to
be included in the latter number.

Monsieur Bussy, on perceiving the ground taken up by the
English army nearly two miles to the southward from the fort, as-
sumed an intermediate position, not exactly parallel; with his left
on the estuary, about half a mile from the fort; his right, thrown a
little back, rested on a gentle eminence where the rice fields com-
menced, not quite a mile from the nearest part of the fort. On
inspecting a plan of the works † thrown back en potence from a
salient work at this point, this angle was evidently the key of
the main position, which may be considered here to terminate;
and a line occupied by the Mysoreans, resting its left on nearly
the centre of this retired flank, and extending with its right
thrown considerably forwards, across the rice fields, now dry,
to the Bandapollam hills, appears to have been intended as a
subsidiary position, of great advantage while occupied, but

* Histoire de la derniere guerre, page 330.
† Of two plans before me, that which appears to be most correct, was drawn by
Captains Warsebe and Du Platt, of the Hanoverian regiments, then in India.
CHAP. XXVI.

1783.

which might be carried without endangering the main position. The English army encamped on the ground described, on the 7th of June, and continued until the 13th, employed in arrangements for landing stores and making the preparations which were deemed necessary before commencing serious operations. In the meanwhile Monsieur Bussy proceeded with the skill and rapid execution which distinguish his nation, in covering, with the most judicious field works, the position which he had assumed: every successive day the aspect of these works became more formidable, and on the 12th it was determined in a council of war to attack them on the ensuing morning.

June 13. A division under Colonel Kelly moved long before day-light to turn the extreme right of the subsidiary works on the Bandapollam hills, and arrived at the point of attack between four and five o'clock. The Mysoreans*, after a feeble resistance to an attack which they expected, and did not think themselves able to withstand, fled, and were no more seen in the course of the day; a portion of this subsidiary position, with seven guns, fell accordingly with little loss; Colonel Kelly proceeded to occupy with a detachment, for the purposes of farther reconnoissance, commanding ground farther to the north, which saw in reverse the whole main position, with the exception of the works en potence, partly masked among the mud-walls of a village, and his report from this situation induced the General to persevere in the original plan. A corps of grenadiers under Lieutenant-colonel Cathcart, with the picquets under Lieutenant-colonel Stuart of the 78th, who commanded this attack, was

* The information of the officer commanding.
ordered by a circuitous movement to turn the right of the main position, supported by the troops under Colonel Kelly. This division arrived at the intended point of attack about half past eight, and immediately advanced with great order: but they were received with so powerful a fire of grape and musquetry from the masqued works and troops en potence, that Colonel Stuart, after a heavy loss, judiciously desisted, replaced his troops in the cover from which he had made his dispositions for the attack, and made a minute report of the nature of this unexpected impediment, and the means by which it appeared practicable to surmount it. A battery of English guns brought to a proper point of the Bandapollam hills, now directed their fire against these works. A reserve under Colonel Gordon, and another column under Colonel Bruce, who commanded this third attack, was ordered at half past ten, to force with the bayonet the salient work on the right of the enemy’s main position, and the trenches immediately to its left, while Colonel Stuart was directed to avail himself of the proper moment to resume his attack. The resistance to this third attack was still more destructive than that experienced in the second by Colonel Stuart; and is described by the General as “the heaviest fire he had ever beheld;” the troops however pushed forward with the finest spirit; the head of one column consisting of a flank company of the 101st actually penetrated within the trenches; the Hanoverians of that column and a portion of the 20th Madras battalion of sepoys are mentioned with applause, and in the opinion of General Stuart if the remainder of the 101st had seconded the efforts of their flank company, the business of the day would have been decided;
"but (he adds) they did not." The usual consequences of a repulse under such circumstances produced the usual carnage, and the French, not satisfied with the effect of their batteries and musquetry, issued in considerable force from the trenches, and charging the fugitives with the greatest fury, continued the pursuit to a considerable distance, until checked by a reserve, and by the troops rallied by Colonel Bruce, who even attempted without success to cut off their retreat. Colonel Stuart in the meanwhile anxiously watching every change of circumstance, observed on the first movement of the two columns, a portion of the troops in the works before him to be drawn off to reinforce the points most seriously threatened; he was accordingly in motion fifteen minutes before the fire of the third attack commenced, and seizing the critical moment when the principal force of the enemy had been seduced to quit their works; by a determined attack in front, and a rapid flank movement round the extremity of the works en potence, carried everything before him, drove the French right upon its centre, compelled the troops who had rallied to take a circuitous route to regain their lines, and was in possession of nearly one-half of the line of works, when his progress was arrested by fresh troops and superior numbers. On the first moment of carrying a redoubt on the right, he had ordered it to be occupied, to be closed at the gorge, and its defences to be reversed: and now slowly retiring to a position strengthened by the works he had carried, the operations of the day relaxed, as if by mutual consent, and terminated about two o'clock. The French have uniformly ascribed to General Stuart the credit of a profound and able manœuvre, in the well-executed feint which drew them
from their works, and enabled Colonel Stuart to carry his point: but although the operation was somewhat too sanguinary for a feint, and none was really intended, (the failure of the attack being regretted in the public dispatch); the actual combination appears to be entitled to the success it obtained. The number was limited of the troops on each side, closely engaged in this important day, and bore an inconsiderable proportion to the whole: but comparing the actual loss with the numbers actually engaged, few actions have been more sanguinary. The English returns ascertain their loss to have been one thousand and sixteen. The French accounts * state theirs to have been four hundred and fifty, a number considerably below the English † computations. Thirteen guns, and the key of the contested position, remained in possession of the English army. The retirement of the French on the same night, within the walls of Cuddalore, evinced their sense of the operations of the day; but their being permitted during the night to draw off without molestation, all their heavy guns from the exterior position, furnished equal evidence of the impression made on the English, by a victory so dearly purchased.

The tone of opinion in the first circles at Madras, represented the expedition to Cuddalore rather as an operation requisite to satisfy the point of honour for Monsieur Bussy's surrender, than as one which depended for its success or failure on the numerous contingencies of war. General Stuart is represented by the Government before his departure for Madras, as avowing the army he commanded to be sufficient for the

* Histoire de la derniere guerre, page 332.
† The Annual Register makes it 610.
enemy he had to encounter, but requesting a discretionary authority over an army assembled to the south of the Coleroon, under the command of Colonel Fullarton, a power which was reluctantly granted on the express condition that it should be exercised only in the case of indispensable necessity. Distrust does not usually generate candour, and in the instant of his obtaining this almost extorted authority, he is represented as proceeding to its exercise without the knowledge of the Government, immediately after his departure from Madras; to the insufficient extent, however, in the first instance, of directing Colonel Fullarton to cross the Coleroon, and wait for farther instructions on its northern bank; and this alleged evasion and disobedience of the letter and spirit of his orders, was assigned as the principal cause of General Stuart's subsequent recall* from the command of the army in the field. Whether any and what portion of the necessity for now ordering up Colonel Fullarton, arose from mismanagement or delay, is not so obvious as the indisputable existence of that necessity after the action of the 13th of June; and General Stuart, in his communications to the Admiral, after that event, states seven weeks as the period during which he should require the co-operation of the fleet to cover the siege of the place.

* The dissensions terminated in his being placed in close arrest by Lord Macartney, and in that state sent to England. General Stuart was the officer employed as the instrument of the majority in council, who arrested Lord Pigot in 1776. His own arrest, on this occasion, produced many effusions of wit, and among the epigrams of the day, was the observation in broken English, of the second son of Mahommmed Ali, on his first hearing the event. General Stuart catch one Lord; one Lord catch General Stuart. There is reason to suppose, that the Lord apprehended his own arrest; his Lordship's suspension from the Government having been in the avowed contemplation of Mr. Hastings.
On the same day, and towards the close of this severe conflict, the French fleet, under Monsieur Suffrein, appeared in the of-
tting. Sir Edward Hughes, who was anchored nearly off Porto
Novo, about eleven miles to the southward, for the combined
purposes of obtaining water, forwarding supplies, and covering
the siege of Cuddalore, weighed to assume a nearer position, and
to interpose his force to any communication between the hostile
fleet and the besieged. The improvements, derived less perhaps
from a doubtful application of pneumatic chemistry, than from a
systematic attention to ventilation, to scrupulous cleanliness, to
dryness and regulated diet, which render not only the comparative,
but the positive healthfulness of the British navy, perhaps the most
remarkable fact in the history of modern discovery, leave us di-
vided between grief and astonishment, in finding the fleet under
Sir E. Hughes, in an easy cruize from the 2d May to the 7th
June, diminished in effective strength to the amount of eleven
hundred and twenty-five men, by the effects of the scurvy alone,
and after disposing of these in hospital, that in the short space of
another fortnight, near seventeen hundred* more became incap-
able of duty, from the same cause. It was obviously the great
remaining purpose of the war in India, to ensure the conclusive
operation against Cuddalore, but it were injurious to the memory
of a distinguished officer, if judging from the event alone, we
should pronounce the unqualified condemnation of Sir E. Hughes,
however weakened in numbers, because anchored for this pur-
pose with seventeen ships carrying twelve hundred and two guns,
he felt himself as a British Admiral, unable to refuse the daily

* "In the healthiest ships, 70 to 90 men a-piece, and others double that number." Annual Register, 1783.
challenge of Monsieur Suffrein, with fifteen ships carrying one thousand and eighteen guns. On the 16th he weighed anchor, with the expectation of bringing the enemy to close action, but such was the superior skill or fortune of Monsieur Suffrein, that on the same night at half-past eight *, he anchored abreast of the fort, and the dawn of morning presented to the English army, before Cuddalore, the mortifying spectacle of the French fleet in the exact position abandoned by their own on the preceding day, the English fleet being invisible, and its situation unknown. It was necessary, however, to the purposes of Monsieur Bussy and Suffrein, not only that the English fleet should be prevented from resuming its position, but that it should be sufficiently crippled, to prevent its disturbing the French Admiral in the debarkation which he contemplated, for the reinforcement of Monsieur Bussy. In the mean while, that General, calculating on a considerable interval before the regular approaches now commenced by the English army, should be sufficiently advanced to cause immediate apprehension, embarked on the 17th at night, a reinforcement of twelve hundred troops on board the fleet, thus augmenting the balance of numbers against Sir Edward Hughes, to the enormous amount of about four thousand men, compared with their relative numbers on the 2d of May; or admitting Monsieur Suffrein’s numbers to have diminished during the same period of time, in a degree far exceeding the ordinary proportion, we cannot estimate the comparative balance against the English Admiral, at less than three thousand men.

After a series of manœuvres, exhibiting much reciprocal skill,

* Histoire de la derniere guerre, page 383.
Suffrein succeeded on the 20th in bringing on the sort of action best suited to his designs. A distant cannonade of three hours cost the English fleet 532 men; and what was of more importance to Suffrein, a large proportion of their spars and rigging. Night terminated the combat, which on the ensuing day Sir E. Hughes anxiously sought to renew, and his adversary to avoid, except at his own distance; and the English Admiral, after receiving the detailed reports of the state of each ship, found the whole of his equipments so entirely crippled, his crews so lamentably reduced, and the want of water so extreme, that he deemed it indispensable to incur the mortification of bearing away for the roads of Madras, while Suffrein, wresting from his enemies the praise of superior address, and even the claim of victory, if victory belong to him who attains his object, resumed his position in the anchorage of Cuddalore, where he not only returned the 1,200 troops, but landed an aid of 2,400 men from the fleet.

Monsieur Bussy, thus reinforced, lost no time in making a vigorous sortie with his best troops. The attack commenced with the greatest vivacity before day-light in the morning, while it was still quite dark, and perhaps a short time earlier than was favourable to its success. The darkness afforded no opportunity for distinction of troops; the bayonets of the sepoys of Bengal mingled with eminent success among those of the French regiment of Aquitaine; and not one point of the English trenches, occupied as they were by every variety of troops, suffered itself to be forced. The loss of the French in this well-planned but ill-executed sally was estimated by General Stuart at 450 men; a number probably not exaggerated, when considering the circumstances of a mêlée of this nature; the prisoners actually
secured, were found to amount to 150*, including the Chevalier de Damas †, who led the attack. The loss of the English was surprisingly small. Major Cotgrave, who commanded the Madras sepoys in the trenches, was killed; three other officers wounded and missing; and twenty rank and file killed and wounded, chiefly sepoys. Among the wounded prisoners was a young French serjeant, who so particularly attracted the notice of Colonel Wangenheim, commandant of the Hanoverian troops in the English service, by his interesting appearance and manners, that he ordered the young man to be conveyed to his own tents, where he was treated with attention and kindness until his recovery and release. Many years afterwards, when the French army under Bernadotte entered Hanover, General Wangenheim, among others, attended the levee of the conqueror. You have served a great deal, said Bernadotte, on his being presented, and as I understand in India.—I have served there. At Cuddalore? I was there. Have you any recollection of a wounded serjeant whom you took under your protection in the course of that service? The circumstance was not immediately present to the General’s mind, but on recollection, he resumed. I do indeed remember the circumstance, and a very fine young man he was, I have entirely lost sight of him ever since, but it would give me pleasure to hear of his welfare. That young serjeant, said Bernadotte, was the person who has now the

* Histoire de la derniere guerre, page 339, states the prisoners at 80, and the killed at 20; the former is known to be erroneous, and that nation is not restricted, like the English, by the checks of their constitution, from mis-stating the amount of their losses.

† He was inconsolable at not being wounded.
honour to address you, who is happy in this public opportunity of acknowledging the obligation, and will omit no means within his power, of testifying his gratitude to General Wangenheim. It can scarcely be deemed digressive to have presented the sequel of an incident appertaining to our narrative, in illustration of a character since distinguished by a still more extraordinary elevation, and as an evidence of moral worth affording to the Crown Prince of Sweden an honourable claim on other nations for the respect which he is said to possess in his adoptive country.

According to the ordinary rules of war, the force under General Stuart could at no period have been deemed adequate to the siege of Cuddalore, defended by the land forces of Monsieur Bussy, and an equal numerical force of Mysorean auxiliaries; a body, which however unsuited, from discordant habits and defective discipline, to mix with regular troops in the more prominent duties of a siege, performed other essential services within the walls, and as light troops, were eminently useful without. In effect, General Stuart had never been able to attempt the first regular operation of a siege by investing the place. After the reinforcement received by Monsieur Bussy from the fleet, his troops outnumbered the besiegers, whose force was gradually wasting away by casualties and sickness, and by the performance of duties constantly increasing, with numbers as constantly and rapidly diminishing. Monsieur Bussy, fully aware of the physical and moral influence of such disproportioned exertions, maintaining a free communication with every part of the adjacent country, except the ground occupied by the English army, and considering his late sortie to have failed merely from
errors incident to operations in the dark, determined, after allowing to his enemies a few days more for the exhaustion of their strength, to march out in force by a circuitous route, and attack them in their camp.

General Stuart, in the meanwhile, fully aware of the critical circumstances in which he was placed, complaining in his official correspondence of the impenetrable silence of his Government on every subject; and above all, regarding the succours which he had repeatedly demanded from Madras, and from the south, while private correspondence announced these troops to have received counter orders, and a different destination, assumed the tone of being abandoned to his fate by his own Government, and determined to persevere under every difficulty, and to abide the result, whatever it might be. The retreat of the English army, with the loss of its battering train and equipments, is the most favourable result that could possibly have been anticipated from a continuation of hostilities, and a crisis honourable only to the army, and disgraceful to the character of our public councils, was terminated by the arrival of an English frigate bearing a flag of truce, and commissioners deputed by the Government of Madras to announce to Monsieur Bussy the certain intelligence of the conclusion of peace between their respective nations in Europe: perfectly aware of the condition of the army before Cuddalore, these commissioners were instructed to declare that they were charged with positive orders to that army to abstain from hostilities, whether Monsieur Bussy should accede to an armistice or decline it. Three days however intervened before the terms of a convention could be adjusted, and communication
being interdicted between the commissioners and the army, they had no other information than the apparent existence of a flag of truce, and hostilities did not finally cease until the 2d of July. The only difficulty which occurred in these negotiations, related not to the necessity of due notice to Tippoo Sultaun, as an ally of the French nation, and to the French troops serving in his army, in order that they might withdraw, but proceeded from an attempt to procure an anticipated cessation of hostile movements on the part of the English, before ascertaining whether Tippoo would reciprocally consent to the proposed armistice. This point being at length amicably adjusted, our narrative necessarily returns to the operations on the western coast, which had caused the separation of that prince from his French allies previously to the arrival of Monsieur Bussy at Cuddalore.
CHAPTER XXVII.

Resumption of the affairs of the western coast, from the disappearance of Tippoo at Paniani, in December 1782 — General Matthews sent from Bombay, to support the troops at that place — hearing of Tippoo's departure, lands at Rajnundroog — Reasons — Carries the place — Colonel Macleod ordered up from Paniani — Capture of Honâver (Onore) — and ships of war — Government of Bombay, hearing the death of Hyder, send positive orders to General Matthews, to quit all operations on the coast, and march to Bednore — Fatality of incessant contention — General Matthews protests and obeys — the letter, not the spirit of these inconsiderate orders — lands at Cundapoor — which he attacks and carries — violating the letter of his orders in the very act of obeying them — marches for the Ghauts — Colonel Macleod carries the works at their foot — Attack of the Ghaut — carried with Hyderghur at its summit — Bednore surrenders on terms — Extraordinary facility of this success — explained by the personal enmity of Tippoo, to the Governor Ayáž, and the design not only to supersede, but destroy him — Singular mode of discovering these designs — which determined the surrender — Lutf Aly, the successor of Ayáž, arrives in the vicinity — reinforces Anantpoor — which is carried by the English by assault — Cruelties imputed to the English on that occasion — disproved — Lutf Aly ordered to Mangalore — General Matthews relieved from the restraint of the positive orders — acts as if they were still in operation — and disperses instead of concentrating his force — Strange superstition regarding his past and future fortunes — Imputations of corruption and rapacity retorted — Illustrations — Approach of Tippoo — Flight of Ayáž — Tippoo takes Hyderghur — assaults and carries the exterior lines of Bednore — siege — capitulation — surrender — Infraction imputable to the English — garrison confined in irons — Tippoo descends for the recovery of Mangalore — Attack of an advanced position — Critical circumstances — The place summoned
— Preparations — Cavalry sent above the ghauts, overtaken by the monsoon — Kummer-u-Deen sent to Kurpa, in consequence of a diversion in that quarter ordered from Madras — Brief notice of this diversion — Siege of Mangalore — Excellent defence — Intelligence received by the garrison — Intimation from Tippoo, of the cessation of hostilities at Cuddalore, treacherously postponed — Armistice — Arrival of Brigadier-General Macleod — lands and is entertained and deceived by Tippoo — Disguised plan for gradually starving the garrison — Tippoo throws off the mask — but allows General Macleod to depart — The garrison subsists on short allowance, till November 22d, when General Macleod appears with a large armament for its relief — Extraordinary correspondence with Tippoo — General Macleod departs, having thrown in a nominal month's provision, but without being permitted to communicate with the garrison — Discussion of the reasons assigned for this erroneous conduct — Appears with another insufficient supply, on the 27th December, which is landed, but still no intercourse — Shocking extremities to which the garrison was reduced — Council of war — Capitulation — which was fulfilled — Death of Colonel Campbell — Reflections on Tippoo's conduct — Remarkable incident during the siege — Execution of the late Governor, and death of Mahommed Ali — Explanation of these events.

Our narrative of operations in Malabar was interrupted by the sudden disappearance of Tippoo's army from Paniani, in December 1782, in consequence of the death of Hyder. The intelligence received at Bombay, of the rapid retreat of Colonel Humberstone to Paniani, and the presence of Tippoo in full force before that place, determined the Government to send their provincial Commander-in-chief, Brigadier General Matthews, for its relief, with such a body of men as could be immediately embarked, and to reinforce him as speedily as possible with other troops, for the general purposes of the service. In his progress down the coast, that officer received intelligence at Goa of the circumstances, but not of the cause which had a few
days before removed the danger from Paniani, and consequently
determined on making a landing at Rajamundroog, in the
northern part of Canara, commanding the entrance into the
commodious estuary and navigable river of Mirjee, reputed to
afford the best, although not the shortest line of access to
Bednore; and when connected with the possession of the fort
and river of Honâver (Onore) a few miles to the southward, and
the fertile territory between those rivers, to furnish not only se-
curity to his rear, but an abundant supply of provisions for the
future necessities of the army. Rajamundroog was carried by
assault, and almost by surprize, with little loss; and the ships
were immediately dispatched to Colonel Macleod, at Paniani,
with orders to transport his force to Rajamundroog. Ho-
nâver soon fell, with all its dependent posts, and Colonel Macleod,
who had arrived, was preparing for the capture of Mirjee, or
Mirjân, higher up the river, which would have completed the
first part of the plan for the safe ascent to Bednore, by the
passes of Bilguy. The easy capture in these operations, of five
ships of war, from 50 to 64 guns, and many of smaller di-
mensions, evinced the extent of Hyder's ambition, rather than
the correctness of his political views.

In the meanwhile however the Government of Bombay having
received intelligence of the death of Hyder, and acting appa-
rently more on the impulse of the moment, than in the spirit of
a grave and deliberate political instruction, sent on the 31st
December 1782, *positive orders* to General Matthews, "if the
intelligence were confirmed, to relinquish all operations what-
ever upon the sea-coast, and make an immediate push to take
possession of Bednore." Without imputing too much to the
defective constitution of the Government at that period, a fatalist might find the most plausible illustrations of his doctrine in the universal tendency to contention between public authorities, which wasted and perverted all their energies, and to ordinary observation had infinitely more the aspect of an unhappy fatality than of the common infirmity of human irritation. General Matthews and all other persons, must on the 12th January, when he received these positive orders, have been well satisfied of the death of Hyder; but after weighing and combining intelligence and observation, he not only at this period, but even at the moment of his greatest subsequent success, declared his deliberate conviction, that the operations in which these orders found him engaged, of securing by a strong occupation of the country in his rear, a secure and easily defensible communication with the sea coast, constituted the only safe plan for the invasion of Bednore. On the receipt of these unconditional orders however, he instantly countermanded the operations which were destined to lead him to Bednore by the longer route of Bilguy, and prepared to obey his orders to their very letter; he remonstrated against the frustration of his plans; disclaimed all responsibility for consequences; upbraided the Government with neglecting the promised reinforcements and supplies; declared that the force at his disposal was utterly inadequate to the service he was ordered to execute; and finally requested, that if they “could not repose confidence in his military judgment, they would permit him to retire and save his own reputation.”

The reciprocal confidence which ought to subsist between a government and the military officer entrusted with the execution
of its measures, was most unwisely violated in the first instance, by a positive order to be executed under all circumstances, or rather, literally viewed, by an abandonment of the measures necessary to its safe execution: but the absurdity which its literal accomplishment involved, ought to have suggested to a temperate mind a compliance rather with its spirit, than its letter.* General Matthews, however, obeyed with precipitation: he landed at Cundapoor, the point of the coast nearest to Bednore, and in carrying the place experienced considerable resistance, not from the ordinary garrison, but from a field force of 500 horse, and 2,500 infantry; a part of the reinforcements which had been detached by Hyder from Coromandel, for the protection of his western possessions, and thus in the very act of obeying his orders to "relinquish all operations whatever on the sea coast;" he was obliged to undertake new operations on the sea coast, in the mere execution of these orders. Continuing to protest against the insufficiency of his means, and to disclaim all responsibility for consequences, he proceeded in the same spirit of precipitate obedience. Without any regular means of conveying provisions or stores, he was three days in marching 25 miles to the foot of the mountains, opposed every day by increasing numbers; not in any serious stand, but chiefly by light skirmishing, and the incessant annoyance of rockets. The ascent of the ghauts presented impediments of a more serious nature; the difficulties of a rugged acclivity of seven miles were increased by a succession of the most formidable works. Hussengherry, a place at the foot of the hill called a fort, and assuming that appearance,

* They were afterwards explained and rescinded at Bombay on the 6th of February, ten days after General Matthews was in possession of Bednore.
on approaching it, was in reality no more than a well-built ba-
rier with two flanks, but entirely open in the rear. About three
miles in front of this post, the enemy had felled trees across the
road, and lined the thick brushwood on each flank; and about
400 yards in front of this abbatis, another breastwork was lined
with between two and three thousand men. The 42d, led by
Colonel Macleod, and followed by a corps of sepoys attacked
these positions with the bayonet, and pursuing them like High-
landers, were in the breastwork before the enemy were aware of
it; four hundred were bayoneted and the remainder were pursued
close to the walls of the fort; preparations were made for attack-
ing it the next morning, but although furnished with 15 pieces
of excellent cannon, it was found abandoned; the first barrier,
mounting eleven pieces of cannon, was also evacuated without
attempting defence; the second, two miles farther up the hill,
mounting nine guns, was carried at the point of the bayonet with
a loss of only seven or eight men. “From the second fort, or
barrier to the top of the ghaut is almost one continuance of bat-
teries with cannon and breast-works; the firmness and intre-
pidity of the 15th battalion, who were foremost in the several
parts of the conflict, was rewarded with the honour of taking
the fort of Hyderghur, on the top of the ghaut, in which were
found twenty-five pieces of cannon, &c. &c.; this fort was well
constructed, had a good ditch, was extensive, and the
other works were defended by 17,000 men. My loss during
the day about fifty killed and wounded.” * The fort and

* The passages between inverted commas, are extracted from General Matthews's
official dispatch, dated 28th January, 1783.
the numerous bodies above described, are stated to have abandoned its defence; "Hyat Saheb having retired into the fort with no more than 1,350 men, of whom 350 were English sepoys taken in Coromandel, who had enlisted in the service of Hyder. Captain Donald Campbell, a prisoner in irons, was released on the preceding day, and sent to General Matthews, to propose terms, which were to deliver the fort and country, and to remain under the English, as he was under the nabob,"

Jan. 28. (Hyder); to which conditions General Matthews immediately assented. On the ensuing morning, although a division of the army under Colonel Macleod, detached from the foot of the ghaut, to endeavour by a circuitous route to turn the works, had not yet arrived, and the troops present for duty (who had not eaten the preceding day) amounted to no more than 360 Europeans and 600 sepoys, without a field gun; he moved forward, and was received without hesitation into the fort, and to the acknowledged command of the capital and territory of Bednore, without farther treaty or capitulation.

Such is in substance the whole amount of the facts already before the public connected with the capture of Bednore. "To what" says General Matthews, "can it be owing, but to the divine will, that my army, without provisions or musquet ammunition, should have our wants supplied as we advanced, for without the enemy's rice, and powder, and ball, we must have stopped until the army could be furnished." "Panic" is the secondary cause assigned by the General for these extraordinary effects, and there can be no question regarding the influence
of the attack on the breast work; but the reader will probably have anticipated some further explanation which we shall now endeavour to present.

The considerations have been already stated* which induced Hyder early in 1782, to make considerable detachments for the restoration of his affairs not only in Malabar, but in Coorg and Bullum, the two last under the command of two Chêlas, Qaffadar and Sheick Ayâz, the latter of whom was for this purpose appointed Governor of Bednore, the province adjoining Bullum on the north; and we have had occasion to notice† the early history and character of Sheick Ayâz. ‡ In the interval between the death of Hyder, and Tippoo’s arrival in camp, a letter arrived from Ayâz, reporting the invasion under General Matthews, the capture of Rajamandroog and Onore, and the intention of the Governor to withdraw his troops from Bullum, and march without delay to oppose the enemy. This letter had among others been opened by Poornea, and afterwards dispatched by express to Tippoo Sultaun.

Sheick Ayâz had, while a youth, and a common chêla of the palace, rendered himself unacceptable to Tippoo by the independence of his character, and had, in consequence, been treated by that prince with gross and repeated indignity. In mature age, Hyder’s extravagant praises of his valour and intellect, and the habit of publicly contrasting the qualities of his slave with those of the heir apparent, perpetually

* Chapter 24.
† Vol. ii. p. 189, and Appendix to Chapter 18.
‡ Ayâz Saheb, is readily corrupted into Hjad Saheb, the name by which he is designated in the records of that period.
embittered all the feelings of former enmity, and rendered the
death of Hyder a crisis which Ayâz must necessarily have con-
templated with alarm. Immediately after Tippoo's junction
with his army, after his father's death, he detached Lutf Aly
Beg, with a light corps of cavalry, by the shortest route, to
supersede Woffadar at Coorg; and after making the requisite
arrangements in that quarter to assume the government of Bed-
nore, with a larger and heavier corps detached about the same
time by the ordinary road. He had however considerable doubts
whether the fears and the ambition of Ayâz might not induce
him to resist, and had accordingly sent secret orders to the
officer next in authority to put him to death and assume the
government. Whatever may have been the ultimate intentions
of Ayâz at this period, it is certain that apprehensions of
treachery were mixed with all his deliberations: he had taken
the precaution of ordering that no letter of any description
from the eastward should be delivered without previous exami-
nation; and being entirely illiterate, this scrutiny always took
place, with no other person present than the reader and himself,
either in a private chamber, or if abroad, retired from hearing
and observation in the woods. On the day preceding that on
which the ghauts were attacked, and while Ayâz was occupied
near Hyderghur, in giving directions regarding their defence, the
fatal letter arrived, and was inspected with the usual pre-
cautions: the bramin who read it, and to whom the letter was
addressed as second in command, stands absolved from all sus-
picion of prior design by the very act of reading its contents;
but in the perilous condition of Ayâz he durst not confide in a
secrecy, at best precarious, even for a day: without a moment's
hesitation, he put the unfortunate bramin to death to prevent discovery; put the letter in his pocket, and returning to his attendants, instantly mounted, and without leaving any orders, went off at speed to the citadel, to make the arrangements for surrender which have been related. It may well be presumed, that this horrible scene could not have been enacted, without some intimation reaching the ears of the attendants; and the very act of abandoning the scene of danger contrary to his usual habits, spread abroad among the troops those rumours of undefined treachery which abundantly account for their dispersion and dismay.

On the arrival of Lutf Aly Beg at Sheemoga, (Simoga) about forty miles to the eastward of Bednore, he learned the disastrous issue of public affairs, and began to collect the scattered remains of the troops who had been abandoned by their leader. An English detachment was marching to take possession of Anantpoor, about 30 miles north-west of his position, this and most other dependencies of Bednore having surrendered on receiving the orders of Aydz to that effect, and the garrison and inhabitants had sent an agent to offer their submission. On receiving intelligence of these events, Lutf Aly sent a trusty officer with 300 Chittledroog peons to anticipate the arrival of the English detachment, and with positive orders to supersede the actual commandant, and to admit no farther communication of any kind with the enemy. On the approach of the troops, it was pretended by Lutf Aly, that repeated signs were made to them to withdraw, that on persisting to advance, the flag of truce was fired at. No disparagement to the accuracy of either representation is involved in the supposition, that the English confi-
dent of admission recognise only the second part of the state-
ment, in retaliation for which no quarter was given to the garrison
on the capture of the place by assault. Such is the amount of
fact involved in the atrocities imputed to the English on the
capture of Anantpoor. The touching tale descriptive of 400
beautiful women, "all bleeding with the wounds of the bayonet,
and either already dead, or expiring in each other's arms;" the
soldiers "stripping them of their jewels and committing every
outrage on their bodies, while others, rather than be torn from
their relations, threw themselves into large tanks and were
drowned," has long since been traced to its author, a silly
young man, whose amende honorable for dressing his adven-
tures into a romantic tale, is not so generally known as the
historical record of that supposed event in the respectable
pages of the Annual Register. Of a conduct so atrocious, if
true, the reprobation could not be too severe, and if unfounded,
the disproof could not be too anxiously established: the au-
thor of this work has therefore not neglected the ample means
within his reach, of ascertaining that the tale in all its parts
is destitute of every shadow of foundation in truth.*

The capture of Anantpoor occurred during the period that
Lutf Aly was waiting the slower approach of the infantry from
Coromandel, and on its arrival, he was arranging the means of
its recapture, when he received orders from Tippoo, to proceed
with all expedition by the pass of Soobramonee, to prevent if
possible the fall of Mangalore; but before he could arrive, the

* Without the fort, the body of one woman was some days afterwards found, who
had fallen into a well; but it was not known in what manner, or on what occasion,
the accident had occurred.
place had surrendered by capitulation, on the 9th of March. General Matthews, after descending to the coast to direct this operation, now prepared to return for the defence of Bednore. The unconditional orders had been revoked, which formed the apology for disclaiming responsibility, and he was now left to the guidance of the general instructions with which he left Bombay, on the 11th of December; a document as wise and judicious, as the subsequent order had been precipitate. The invasion of Bednore had been suggested in these instructions from the Government, as the plan of all those submitted to their consideration which seemed best adapted to the actual scope of their resources, and combined the most reasonable hope of success with the greatest facility of communication and support. Permanent conquest was excluded from their views of possible contingency; the plan of securing such a footing as could safely be held, and the view of alarming Hyder with the threat of relinquishing to the Mahrattas that country which they were known to covet, was expressly suggested as a probable means of disposing him to peace; and these temperate views concluded with the widest latitude of discretionary authority.

Thus circumstanced, General Matthews, incessantly reporting the approach of powerful bodies of troops from Coromandel, stated 400 Europeans and 1,200 sepoys to be the largest force with which he could meet the enemy in the field, and represented the indispensable necessity of large reinforcements, "without which it would be next to a miracle if he could preserve his footing." Instead, however, of concentrating at the point which he considered most defensible, the greatest possible number of his avowedly insufficient force, he continued up to the moment of
his last departure from the coast, to narrate with complacency that he was "in possession of the whole country westward of the range of mountains from Sedasheghur to Mangalore; beyond the passes, he possessed Bednore, Anantpoor, and the fort of Cowlydroog, 15 miles east" (more nearly south) "from Bednore, with their dependencies; and a detached body was seeking to obtain possession of the distant province of Soonda." The only explanation which has been attempted, of the blind confidence with which he frittered away his means of defence, relates to his hope of a simultaneous invasion of Mysoor, by the troops under Colonel Fullarton, from Coimbetoor, to whose operations we shall presently advert; but a hope better founded than any he possessed, would furnish a rational motive for concentration and certainly not for dispersion. The tenor of General Matthews's dispatch, written on the day of his first entrance into Bednore, is strongly tinctured throughout with the belief of supernatural interposition, in a success of which the true secondary causes do not appear to have reached his knowledge, or that of any of his officers; and it is difficult to account for the conduct which we have just stated, without supposing the existence of a similar superstition with reference to his future fortunes; a confidence in the divine protection, implying direct insanity, if the corrupt rapacity imputed to him before, and still more explicitly after the capture of Bednore, have the foundation which various circumstances seem to confirm. The charge, however supported, of insubordination, producing in the army a conduct "loose and unfeeling as that of the most licentious freebooters," retorted on his accusers; and the direct announcement of bringing them to military trial, cannot obliterate the
strong grounds of original accusation. The publicity given to this unhappy controversy in the Annual Register of 1783, had induced the author to examine all the documents with scrupulous care, and to prepare an abstract of the whole, which, on farther reflection, has been expunged: the subsequent unhappy fate of General Matthews, without the opportunity of defending his reputation, might seem to expose any such abstract to the imputation of an ex parte statement; and mourning over a large portion, at least of impropriety, which pervades the reciprocal discussion, we shall close the subject with observing, with reference to the countless treasures supposed to be found in Bednore, that Tippoo Sultaun, in narrating *, with the utmost bitterness the defection of Ayâz, states, that he carried along with him a large property in cash and valuables. The minister of finance, Poornea, ignorant of the contents of Tippoo's book, states, in his manuscript, the embezzlement at upwards of a lac, and the detailed account afterwards rendered by Ayâz to the Government of Bombay, of the amount and appropriation of his pecuniary possessions in Bednore, gives a total of one lac and forty-eight thousand pagodas †, the balance of which he claims from the justice of that government, as secured to him by the terms of capitulation: nor can the fact with propriety be suppressed, that General Matthews, in a testamentary memorandum delivered to his fellow prisoners, to be used only in the event of his death, declares that the public was indebted to him for

* Sultaun-û-Towarcekh.
† A considerable amount of valuables, constituting what is usually called the Tōsha Khana, or store of articles provided for public presents on occasions of ceremony, as stated both by Poornea and Ayâz, is exclusive of this pecuniary amount.
money advanced from his private fortune during his command, in the sum of 33,000 rupees, besides the arrears of his military allowances.

On the approach of Tippoo with the whole of his army, Ayâz had too much wisdom to await with General Matthews the supernatural aid which was to protect him from disaster; his flight to the coast was so precipitate that he lost the small remains of his property, and in a few months afterwards we find him soliciting the means of subsistence from the English Government. Tippoo Sultaun in narrating the flight of this person, affirms that the most explicit assurances of protection and encouragement had been conveyed to him on the occasion of his father's death, and amuses himself with the parallel and well known anecdote of that Ayâz * from whom he was named, the slave and unhallowed favourite † of Sultaun Mahmood. This Sultaun after exhausting his imagination in procuring for his favoured slave every gratification and convenience that empire can command, asked him one day if any one wish remained ungratified. Yes, said the slave, I have one remaining caprice, I think it would be pleasant to run away.

On approaching Bednore the army divided into two columns, one of which took the southern route of Cowlydroog and Hyderghur, which fell without material opposition, and cut off all communication with the coast; the other column proceeded by the

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* He quibbles very successfully, by naming him Ayâz-ê-na Mahmood, for the purpose of the double meaning, Ayâz, not he who belonged to Mahmood, or Ayâz, the unhallowed; or more literally unglorified.

† This part of the parallel certainly did not apply, and I do not impute to either Tippoo or his secretary, the intention of such insinuation, however obviously implied in the tale.
most direct north-eastern road, leaving a force to mask Anant-
poor, and completely invested the place. The English troops
were found in possession of the extensive lines which surround
Bednore, and after some skirmishing to ascertain the most vulner-
able points, a disposition was made for a general assault and esca-
lade in several columns, which completely succeeded; the English
troops who had attempted a defence to the extent of which their
numbers were altogether inadequate, retiring with great loss but
in excellent order to the citadel. The author has had no access to
accounts of this service written by any of the besieged; the work of
Tippoo Sultaun * gives ample details in which Monsieur Cossigny
is represented as an inexperienced officer, whose blunders were of
course corrected by the commanding genius and personal intrepi-
dity of the Sultaun himself; but in the most inflated exagger-
ation of his own exploits, and affected contempt of his enemy, an
unwilling homage is rendered to the energy, the spirit, and the
bravery of the besieged, until the place became a heap of ruins,
and farther resistance unavailing. Under these circumstances,
General Matthews, in conformity to the opinion of a council of
war, sent out a flag of truce, with proposals for a capitulation in
seven articles, detailed by Tippoo Sultaun, to which, however
unfavourable, he declares that he was induced to accede, from
considering the short interval which remained for the recovery of
Mangalore before the rains. The first of these articles
affords a fair specimen of the taste and veracity of the royal
author:—

"1. When the English garrison shall march out, the holy

* Sultaun-ú-Towareekh.
warriors of Islam shall not ridicule them, nor call them by abusive names, nor throw stones at them, nor spit at them."

Two other articles however, appear to be correctly stated, and provide for the safe conduct of the garrison to the coast, and for the security of private, and the surrender of public property. Neither the well-known fate of former prisoners, the precarious aspect of their own destiny, nor yet those principles which regulate, under the worst misfortunes, a sense of what is due to individual and national character, could restrain a predominant passion.* For the purpose of appropriating the remaining public treasure, which by capitulation was the property of Tippoo, the officers were desired to draw for whatever sums they pleased, to be accounted for on their return to Bombay. The garrison marched out in conformity to capitulation on the 3d of May. There is abundant reason to believe, that Tippoo had predetermined to seek some pretext for infringing its conditions; but, an empty treasury, together with the money (and as he states jewels public property) found on searching the prisoners, exempted him from the necessity of recurring to fictitious pleas; and it will not escape the reader's observation, that the probable sum so recovered reconciles in a satisfactory manner the apparent difference between the statement of treasure lost at Bednore, as furnished by Ayâz, the late governor, and by Tippoo's minister of finance. The breach of faith was speedily announced to the garrison, by their being marched off in irons to different destinations; and Tippoo, for the first time since his accession, gave public audience, seated on a musnud, and ordered a salute to be

* See Annual Register.
fired for this his first victory, after which he proceeded in person
and without delay, for the recovery of Mangalore.

Colonels Macleod and Humberstone, the two senior of His
Majesty's officers, had some time before departed to Bombay, in
consequence of the imputed malversations already adverted to,
and the command of Mangalore had devolved on Major, now
Colonel Campbell, of the 42d, whose memorable defence is
well recorded in a little volume* before the public, which
furnishes in a plain and unambitious journal of facts, an inte-
resting and instructive military lesson, and develops the rare
combination of professional talents and mental resource possessed
by this lamented officer.

Previously to the surrender of Bednore, Tippoo had dispatched
a respectabe force which was to appear before Mangalore with
the intelligence of that event, in the hope of rendering his own
approach unnecessary; this corps, however, was attacked and
defeated with the loss of its guns, at the distance of twelve miles
from the place, in consequence of which, Tippoo marched with
his whole army, in the expectation that the appearance of such
an overwhelming force would terrify the garrison into an early
surrender. An outpost on an eminence commanding the prin-
cipal access to the place, distant upwards of a mile, and although
of some strength, requiring two battalions for its occupation,
continued to be maintained three days after the place had been
invested, and after positions had been taken which enabled the
enemy to intercept the retreat of the troops. The consequences
of this first and only error, were perceived on the morning of the

* Published in 1786; the author is also in possession of a manuscript journal of
the siege, which accords with the printed narrative in all points of importance.
CHAP. 23d, when a sudden and simultaneous attack commenced, of several heavy columns of infantry, supported by batteries previously prepared, and the discharge of an incessant shower of rockets: the sepoys appointed for the defence of the post, broke in spite of the efforts of their officers, and were driven in the utmost disorder down the hill; a reinforcement consisting of the 42d, supported by a sepoy corps, was too late for the defence of the post, but arrested for a moment the progress of the enemy, and afforded time for the fugitives to escape; but the panic soon extended to the sepoys of the reinforcement also, and even the veteran 42d, did not altogether escape its influence. The casualties of this day amounted to four officers, ten European and two hundred native soldiers, including three officers, and two companies of sepoys, whose retreat was entirely cut off. All outposts not under the complete cover of the body of the place, were in consequence withdrawn, and all the arrangements adopted necessary for a long siege. Tippoo did not permit himself to doubt, that the impressions arising from this first success, would produce an immediate surrender; he had, however, the mortification to find opposed to him, a commander who viewed his mighty hosts with the most perfect composure, and considered the driving in of his outposts, however early and unfortunate in its circumstances, as an event in the ordinary course of the service. He dismissed, without condescending to give an answer, the flag of truce bearing a summons for the immediate surrender of the place as he valued his life; and Tippoo perceiving a regular siege to be indispensable, and the thunder storms preceding the monsoon to have already commenced, thought proper to send above the ghauts and beyond the influence of its greatest
severity, the whole of the stable horse; they were however overtaken at the bottom of the ghaut by its full violence, and not more than half the horses survived, to reach their eastern cantonments.

Kummer-û-Deen, with the troops composing the personal command of his late father Meer Saheb, was dispatched at the same time to his jageer at Kurpa, in consequence of one of the diversions in that quarter planned by the Government of Madras, under the command, first of Captain Edmonds, and afterward of Colonel Jones. On the capture of Kurpa in 1779, Seyed Mahommed, a son of one of the principal religious persons at the tomb of the celebrated Gesoo Deràz at Culburga, and married to a daughter of the vanquished Patan nabob, was among the prisoners; and Hyder, in examining and giving his orders for the disposal of his captives, ordered this fakeer, as he contemptuously named him, to be liberated. This person, however considering the death of Hyder to be a favourable crisis for adventure, collected a force in the vicinity, with which he had entered the province of Kurpa, supported by the English Government under the designation of the Nabob of Kurpa, and by an English corps which obtained possession of the fort of Cummum, and some minor posts. Kummer-û-Deen's cavalry had suffered considerably, though not in the same degree as the stable horse, whose riders had no direct interest in the preservation of the animals; he had therefore to encounter delay in recruiting his cavalry; but on commencing operations, the troops of Seyed Mahommed, a weak, inexperienced person, were totally discomfited, and an English battalion in advance, during a parley
to ascertain whether the enemy considered himself bound by the conditions of the armistice of Cuddalore, was treacherously charged and cut to pieces. The subsequent history of this diversion does not challenge much admiration of English diplomacy. Apajee Ram, charged with a mission to Madras, preparatory to a negotiation for general peace, had the countenance to propose, and the rare fortune to obtain, the intermediate exchange of the fort and fertile territory of Cummum, for Chittapet in Coromandel, which, on being occupied by an English detachment, was found to be a heap of ruins.

Meanwhile the siege of Mangalore was pressed with all the virulent energy of the Sultaun, regulated by the professional science and experience of Monsieur Cossigny. Three regular attacks embraced the faces of the fort, accessible by land: the excessive violence of the monsoon was unfavourable to rapid progress; but a proportion of the faces attacked, instead of a few breaches, rather exhibited masses of continuous ruin: mortars for projecting stones attached to plugs prepared for the purpose, although inferior in effect to a regular bombardment, produced constant annoyance and numerous casualties throughout the night; as operations advanced, a great extent of lodgement on the crest of the glacis, and of covered sap for filling the ditch, brought the assailants and defendants into incessant contact, and attempts to penetrate by assault were repeated and repelled in every quarter, until they became almost an affair of daily routine. It is remarkable, that although the conduct of the sepoys was unsatisfactory in the first operation, and daily desertions occurred in the first part of the siege, the firmness and gallantry
of the remainder was particularly prominent during its most trying periods, and was distinguished by the repeated and animated public thanks of their excellent commander.

On the 19th of July, after fifty-six days open trenches, Colonel Campbell having, on the preceding day, received advices which gave him reason to expect early relief, ordered at noon, guns well shotted and pointed, to fire a regular royal salute, and the garrison, paraded on such parts of the ramparts as still afforded any cover, were directed to conclude the ceremonial with three hearty huzzas. The intimation thus conveyed to the besiegers, of some acceptable information, having reached the garrison, produced, on the same day at four o’clock, a letter signed “Peveron de Morlay, envoy from France, to the nabob Tippoo Sultaun,” informing Colonel Campbell of the peace in Europe; the cessation of arms at Cuddalore, and his possessing a letter from the English commissioners to Colonel Campbell, which he had been enjoined by Tippoo to deliver in person. This letter from Messieurs Sadlier and Staunton had been delivered to Monsieur Bussy for transmission on the 2d of July; the commandant of Mysorean troops at Cuddalore was on the spot to transmit it at a moment’s warning, and the author will venture to state a probability, little short of conviction, founded on his knowledge of the routine of the Mysorean post, that these dispatches had been in the camp before Mangalore, at the least ten days before their existence was announced, during which ten days the most desperate efforts had been made to carry the place by assault, and were discontinued on finding that the garrison had obtained some
intelligence unfavourable to the hopes of the besiegers, and which they erroneously supposed to be no other than the stated intelligence from Cuddalore. Without venturing to conjecture at what time these dispatches had been delivered to Monsieur Peveron, or to question the inference that he might not have been at liberty to announce their arrival, it shall only be added, that no explanation appears to have been offered of any such impediment, and that the same Monsieur Peveron afterwards permitted himself to threaten Colonel Campbell with the continuance of the French aid to the besiegers, if he should persevere in certain conditions connected with the observance of the capitulation of Bednore, and this after he had been repeatedly admitted into the fort, not blindfolded, on his own positive requisition as an envoy, founded on the existence of a general peace, and after Monsieur Cossigny as a man of honour had quitted the posts which he occupied during the siege, and established himself in a separate encampment.

On first intimating the necessity of refraining from affording him any farther aid in the siege, nothing could exceed the Sultan's rage and astonishment, and when even Lally and Boude-not were compelled by Monsieur Cossigny to follow his example, Tippoo was incapable of understanding this conduct in any other light than that of base treachery, and an abandonment of the cause in which they were engaged. Boude-not well knowing the danger of continuing to serve a prince against whom he had conspired, resigned his command, and retired with Monsieur Cossigny, whose retreat would apparently have been cut off, as his subsistence was stopped, if he had not required and accepted the aid of his late enemy against his ally.
It is not intended to express surprise at the dark stupidity which could induce Tippoo Sultaun, however mortified and foiled, to think, that under such circumstances he could obtain an accession of military fame, by determining to persevere by whatever treachery, and whatever sacrifice of men, of time, and of honour, to obtain the fort of Mangalore, before concluding a peace, which would give it to him without an effort: and we can only explain this strange political suicide, by the miserable pride of attempting to shew that he could achieve by himself an exploit, which French troops could not accomplish. On all this political and moral darkness we have no astonishment to bestow. But it is mournful to observe the envoy of a civilized state lending * himself indirectly to such proceedings. Under cover of the arrangements made for the first reception of Monsieur Peveron, into the fort, troops were landed for the attack of a detached work which covered the entrance of the harbour, in consequence of which it was taken; every operation was continued with augmented vigour, under the reiterated simulation of abstaining from hostility; and the admission of the French envoy, as a mediator, was generally the occasion of springing a mine in a situation not conveniently accessible at other times, or some other profligate treachery followed by the most childish explanations. Tippoo however, apparently convinced of the utter hopelessness of farther efforts to reduce the place by force, agreed to an armistice for Man-

* The reader who may desire to examine the grounds of this inference, is referred to overt facts, from which it is drawn, as detailed in the published journal of the siege.
galore, Onore, and the English posts in Malabar, on the 2d of August. The only article (the 3d), which will require particular observation, provided for the establishment of a bazar, where the garrison might buy its provisions, to the limited extent of ten days' stock at a time, and stipulated that such articles as the bazar did not afford, might freely enter from other places, to an amount not exceeding one month's supply at one time; and the whole spirit of the article obviously provided for the garrison remaining during the armistice, with regard to provisions, as in all other respects, in the same state as at its commencement.

In an interview with Colonel Campbell, which Tippoo requested soon after the armistice, he paid that officer the most extravagant compliments on his defence of the place, which it must be added, he always continued to hold up with unqualified admiration and applause, as an example to his own officers: but, on the very day preceding this interview, he tried his first experiment, by the erection of a new work on the southern, as that which he had already treacherously obtained, covered the northern entrance of the harbour; an insolent and open violation of the 10th article of the armistice, which it is very remarkable that Colonel Campbell does not seem to have denounced. But this was less important than a systematic violation of the 3d article regarding provisions, which he commenced on the very first day of the armistice, and continued by a series of mean simulation and falsehood, which it would be disgusting to follow, and unnecessary to detail.
Fifteen days after this armistice, Brigadier-General Macleod, now invested with the chief command, on the coast of Malabar and Canara, arrived in the offing, and on the following day, appeared the Bristol and Isis from Madras, with a detachment of Hanoverians, destined to reinforce Mangalore; but as the design of starving the garrison into surrender, had not yet been sufficiently matured, to infuse into the minds of General Macleod or Colonel Campbell, any suspicion of the gross falsehoods which were adduced to explain the successive delays, this reinforcement was ordered to land at Tellicherry, about a degree to the southward. On the 20th, General Macleod landed and took up his residence in the town of Mangalore, where accommodations were prepared for him by Tippoo's desire. The record of some of his conversations with that personage, in the presence of Colonel Campbell, contains, among other matters, a prominent recurrence of the demand of reparation for the fraud at Trichinopoly in 1752, which, notwithstanding the peace of 1769, had also formed the basis of the last propositions made by his father. Tippoo, however, exhibited some knowledge of secret history, in adding that Mahommed Ali was the true cause of the war: that he had poisoned the minds of the English against his father and him, and had even deputed persons to England to injure them in the opinions of the king and people of that country; that he was equally false to the English and to him, and had even recently proposed to him a negotiation to unite for their expulsion from India: the French, he said, had mediated the armistice, but he would not have them or any other to mediate the peace: you shall make the peace, he added, and expressed surprize when General Macleod pleaded.
his want of powers. Why cannot the military officers make peace? they are the proper persons to do it. You shall go with me to Seringapatam; you shall send my propositions to Madras; you shall make the peace, and in the meanwhile I will gratify you and Colonel Campbell, by complying with your request for the release of all your prisoners; they shall be delivered into your own hands at Seringapatam. And all this was seriously believed by General Macleod and Colonel Campbell,

Aug. 23. to the extent of the latter, considering himself on the 23d, as having succeeded to the general command on the coast of Malabar, by the sudden departure of General Macleod, who, in the same confidence of immediate departure, had written to Bombay to avert this pretension.

Oct. 9. It was not, however, until the 9th of October that General Macleod appeared fully awake to the effects of the practice which had been in constant operation from the 2d of August, of affecting a liberal supply of certain articles, while of those essential to the native troops, the limitations were so managed as to compel Colonel Campbell to make frequent drafts on the garrison stores, the necessity for each of which was in itself a distinct violation of the terms of the armistice; and these stores were now so far reduced, that Tippoo, conceiving the object to be secured, of compelling the garrison to surrender for want of food, threw off the mask, openly avowed the deception of his professed departure for Seringapatam, declared that the garrison should not be supplied with provisions, and finally told the General that he was at liberty to depart: a permission which, under all the circumstances of the case, the General would have been entitled to consider as the most fortunate result
of his diplomacy. He accordingly sailed for Tellicherry to collect the means of relieving the garrison, which was now reduced to twenty days' stock. From this period forward, Tippoo was openly and actively employed in repairing his old works, and erecting new batteries in every direction, a proceeding which the garrison could not retaliate, on account, not only of their reduced numbers and declining health, but the necessity of employing as fuel, not only all the spare materials convertible to military uses, but even of demolishing, for the same purpose, the buildings which protected them from the inclemency of the weather.

By the simulation which Tippoo did not yet entirely abandon, and Colonel Campbell, in such extremity, did not think proper to reject, of permitting a few unimportant articles to enter the fort, the twenty days' stock had, by short allowance, been made to last forty-four days, when, on the 22d of November *, two fleets appeared, one from the northward, the other from the south, both standing into the roads. After some preparation, "the ships of war took their stations so as to cover, in the most effectual manner, the boats employed on this service; the garrison lay on their arms; the signal was made that the troops would land to the southward; they were discovered in the boats; every moment promised a speedy attack. Confidence and joy appeared in every countenance; even the poor, weak, emaciated convalescent, tottering under the weight of his firelock, boldly stood forth to offer what feeble aid his melancholy state admitted of.

* Stated in the published journal the 24th, which must be an error of the press, as the remarkable letters in the text are dated the 23d.
But how great the change!" * The correspondence between General Macleod and Tippoo Sultaun, which terminated in this change, if not the most interesting, is certainly among the most remarkable in the history of diplomacy. The General's first letter complained, among other violations of the truce, of the Sultaun having stopped the messengers with letters to and from himself and Colonel Campbell. To this accusation the Sultaun answers, (in English, it should seem, written by a Frenchman,) "It is a lie or mensonge, as I never see any letters from Bombay, Madras, or Tellicherry." The General, before noticing this part of the letter says,—"You say you have supplied them from your bazar; the signals from the fort say you have not; you will not permit an officer from the fort to inform me of its real situation; therefore I must believe Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell's signals, rather than your assertions." "You, or your interpreter, have said, in your letter to me, that I have lied, (or made a mensonge,) permit me to inform you, Prince, that this language is not good for you to give, or me to receive; and that if I was alone with you in the desert, you would not dare to say these words to me;" and again, "You have said that I lied or made a mensonge; this is an irreparable affront to an English warrior. I tell you our customs; if you have courage enough to meet me, take 100 of your bravest men on foot, meet me on the sea shore. I will fight you, and 100 of mine will fight with yours," &c. These extracts are made from General Macleod's official dispatches, entered on the records of Bombay, which furnish no continuation of

* Published narrative of the siege.
the chivalrous branch of this correspondence, nor have I been able, by other means, to trace its true termination.

The answer recorded in Tippoo’s memoirs written by himself, and given at length in the preface to the first volume of this work as a specimen of his style, ought probably to be deemed a fable, of subsequent and more elaborate fabrication, destined to transmit to his successors, together with the evidence of his romantic prowess, the record of his wonderful polemic talents. The military results of the negotiation are more distinctly unfolded: It does not appear that General Macleod succeeded in the indispensable object of receiving a personal report through an officer, of the real situation of the fort, to which in the commencement of the negotiation he attached such reasonable importance. “It was agreed” says the journal, “that the garrison should have a supply of one month’s provision, but on being examined, it was found to consist of no more than twenty day’s rice: no dholl, ghee, or salt, no refreshment for the officers allowed admittance; a great scarcity of fire wood, hospitals crowded, improper diet; and the whole of the troops in a weakly state.” “In this situation most of the ships and vessels got under way on the 1st of December, and made sail to the southward.” Dec. 1. “Every officer spoke mutiny; every soldier was outrageous *;” the author of these observations appears to ascribe this ungenerous treatment exclusively to the Government of Bombay; if he should still be alive and should happen to peruse this narrative, he may presently see cause to qualify that opinion. “On the day” says the General “that the squadron sailed from Mangalore, Colonel

* Published narrative of the siege.
Campbell was so impatient that he made the signal, 1st, that he wanted to be succoured, though he received the provisions only the day before; 2d, that he could hold out no longer, which I disregarded as proceeding from the peevishness of disappointment;” Dec. 2. and on the 2d, General Macleod’s ship alone remaining, he repeated the signal “that he had not a month’s provisions; this comforted me as much less desperate than his former signals;” “but these signals have planted a dagger in my breast.”

Before proceeding in our narrative, it will be necessary to examine the reasons officially assigned for not executing, with a force which all representations concur in stating to be sufficient, the effectual relief of Mangalore. The preliminary articles of peace between the French and English, had stipulated that a term of four months should be allowed to the belligerent powers of Hindostan to accede to that pacification, and the Government of Madras had notified to Tippoo’s political agent, that if within four months from his reception of the invitation to peace (which they think proper to date on the 2d of August, twenty-four days after Tippoo’s public acknowledgment of its reception, and thirty-four after its actual arrival), he should not have evacuated their territory, hostilities should recommence on the 2d of December, and the Government of Bombay had given corresponding instructions to their dependencies in Malabar: “though,” says General Macleod, “the 2d of December was so near, the ships and boats had not water to last: to wait for the 2d of December was impossible, to make the attack before it, after he had consented to receive provisions, appeared to me to be contrary to good faith, to your instructions, and to the interests of the Company, nevertheless, prompted by affection for the gar-
rison, I was tempted, till Captain Mitchell (the officer commanding His Majesty's squadron) assured me, that by the Admiral's instructions he did not think himself authorized to assist me in any hostile measures, after the nabob's offer, and would act accordingly." Combining the whole of these facts, and abstaining from remark on the unhappy combination by which water should be wanting on the precise day that it was deemed regular to commence operations, it is difficult, at this distance of time, to conceive on what grounds it could be deemed, by officers of rank and experience, that a general armistice offered and observed by one belligerent during a period allowed to the other for determining whether he would or would not accede to certain conditions for a general peace, but notoriously broken by the party to whom it was so offered, by the flagitious, flagrant, and contemptuous violation of a particular convention and consequently of the general truce, could, by any construction, be deemed binding on the other, or restrain it from relieving a place reduced to the last extremity by the direct consequences of that violation; and the grounds appear to be equally questionable of the impression conveyed by the tenor of this dispatch, that the spirit of a general instruction to avoid open hostility, has ever been promoted by a connivance at open insult. This reasoning has been purposely confined to the subject of our previous narrative, but there was another, and if possible a stronger, because a more unmixed act of undisguised hostility: of three hundred men who were coming from the northward to join Brigadier-General Macleod at Tellicherry, in the beginning of November, two hundred were caught in a storm, driven on
shore at Mangalore, and made prisoners by Tippoo, who
distinctly refused to release them; and the naval and military
officers thus openly insulted by a new, distinct and separate act
of hostility, assumed the merit of good faith in submissively
sailing away, although in retaliation for the similar detention of
one hundred of the same number at the same time at Cannanore,
the possession of a subject of Tippoo, that place was attacked
and carried by Brigadier-General Macleod in the very same
month, and his report to Lord Macartney of this achievement
contains, among other matter, the very curious admission, that
Tippoo, at Mangalore, had "broken the cessation of arms in
every possible manner."

Dec. 2. The General sailed from Mangalore on the 2d, with the signal
flying of "speedy succours arriving." In addition to the ordinary
consequences of a siege, the sea scurvy now began to make great
havoc among the troops, and the garrison was again on short
allowance from the 20th of December. "On the 27th a vessel,
with General Macleod's flag, with a snow and five boats, appeared
in the road. On the 31st a supply of provisions was permitted
to be landed, consisting nearly of the same quantity of rice and
biscuit as before, but less beef and arrack: no refreshments were
landed for the officers, nor the least intercourse allowed between
the vessels and the garrison, the provisions which were landed
being sent in Tippoo's boats, and under charge solely of his
own people, who attentively examined each article before its
admittance. The garrison, so far from conceiving this second
supply as an alleviation to their sufferings, were highly dis-
satisfied and clamorous, and looked upon it as a most glaring
In the night of the 1st of January, Brigadier-General Macleod’s vessel and boats went off. A very small part of the last supply of salt meat was eatable, and the biscuit was full of vermin. The scurvy continued to rage: many whose wounds had been healed, broke out afresh; and the hospital, notwithstanding the sad decrease in numbers, was more crowded than during the siege. On the 12th a vessel, with Brigadier-General Macleod’s pendant flying, came to anchor off the bar from the southward; on the return of a boat which she had dispatched on shore on the 10th, she weighed and made sail to the northward.” On the 23d the crisis seemed to have arrived: the hospitals were filled with two-thirds of the garrison; the deaths were from twelve to fifteen a day: a large portion of the sepoys doing duty were blind, a malady supposed to proceed from eating rice alone, without salt or any other condiment, and the remainder so exhausted as frequently to drop down on parade in the act of attempting to shoulder their arms. It were equally painful and unnecessary to describe the loathsome food and cadaverous countenance of the Europeans, and the mixed aspect of resentment and despair which preceded the ultimate measure of a council of war for the surrender of the place. The articles, honourable in all respects, for the garrison, were agreed to on the 26th, but not signed until the 30th. The intermediate arrival of Colonel Gordon, second in command, with another month’s provisions in two ships, made no change in conditions to which Colonel Campbell’s faith was already pledged, but probably had some influence regarding their performance; for strange to tell, they were all most faithfully
executed, and the remains* of the garrison reached Tellicherry; the fatigues of a tedious and harassing service had exhausted all that was mortal of this brave and interesting officer: he was compelled by illness to quit the associates of his sufferings on the 15th of February and died on the 23d of March.

A place of contemptible strength had thus for nearly nine months from the capture of Bednore, locked up the services of the Sultaun’s main army. He had, for nearly seven months of that time, wantonly and unnecessarily neutralized its efforts for the continuance of war, or the promotion of peace; he had, as we shall presently see, invited by the same means, the invasion of one of his richest provinces. The revenues of Canara, Malabar, and Coimbetoor, for the greater part of the year, were either totally lost, or suffered great defalcation; and all for the purpose of exhibiting himself to the world, foiled by a common country fort of the fourth or fifth order, and mending his military inferiority by the effects of famine. Such, it must be admitted, were the only inferences which an European reasoner would draw from these premises; but Tippoo appeared to propose to himself the further object, and that eventually was not a small one, of shewing to the powers of India, in those and further transactions to be narrated, that he could dare to treat the English power with open contempt and derision; and ultimately exhibit them as humble supplicants for peace, while suffering similar indignities, even in the persons of their ambassadors. The very

* The numbers for duty, including officers, were on the 24th May, 1783, after the outposts were driven in, 412 Europeans, and 1438 natives; and on the 30th January, 1784, 235 Europeans, and 619 natives.
respectable force collected at Tellicherry, after being withdrawn in the manner we have described, from the intended relief of Mangalore, had in the mean while been employed in the capture of Cannanore, the seat of an opulent Mahommedan chief, the acknowledged subject of Tippoo, in retaliation for the detention of some sepoys shipwrecked on the coast; an hostility at least as direct as the forcible relief of Mangalore could have been deemed, and in public opinion of very inferior public advantage; and General Macleod had proceeded to Bombay, having looked into Mangalore on the 12th, as already noticed.

An incident exhibiting much of character, which occurred during the siege, has for convenience of narrative, been suspended till its close. Rûstum Ali Beg, the officer who refused to give up Mangalore, to the order of Ayâz, his former superior surrendered it by a favourable capitulation, on the appearance of an adequate force under General Matthews; and the apology of its being an untenable post, against a regular siege, was admitted by a committee of investigation, and not rejected by his sovereign. When, however, that sovereign found himself and his French allies completely foiled by the garrison of this untenable post, he began, very logically, to question the fact on which the apology was founded, and to declare his suspicion of the treachery of the kelledar: but when, after the expiration of six months, the appearance of relief, under General Macleod, on the 22d of November, seemed to give further proof, that this strange garrison was neither to be starved nor beaten, it was evident, that either Rûstum Ali Beg had been a traitor, or himself but a bungling soldier; his rage exceeded all bounds,
and he ordered the unfortunate kelledar, with all his principal officers, to be led out to instant execution.

Mahommed Ali, the same person whose name is familiar to the reader by the massacre of his wounded, by a signal victory achieved over the Mahrattas, and a variety of important services, was the ancient and intimate friend of Rûstum Ali. He had presided at the investigation of his conduct in the capitulation, had made the most favourable report regarding its expediency, and had repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, interposed his good offices to effect his restoration to favour. Mahommed Ali was considered by Hyder as one of the best officers in his army: he was a man of abrupt manners, described by his associates with whom I have conversed, as resembling those of the Mahommedan bigots, who, under the title of religious mendicants, and the mask of spiritual sanctity, may well be designated as rude and sturdy beggars: he was considered as a sort of privileged person, whose requests or demands, however abruptly conveyed, had scarcely ever been refused by Hyder. He was not, however, exempt from the suspicion of duplicity; and in the war of Coromandel, he had certainly received some of the secret service-money of Sir Eyre Coote; and had on discovery been suspended from his command. "You know," said he to Hyder, "that I am an extravagant fellow; and as you won’t give me the money I want, I take it from your enemies. If I had told you beforehand, you have such an insatiable maw of your own, that I should never have seen a rupee of it." He was in arrest at the time of the battle of Pollilore; and after its close, while Hyder was seated to receive reports, came loaded with various
trophies, which he had picked up on the field, and throwing
them down, rather over Hyder than at his feet; “there,” said
he, “are the offerings of a traitor.” Hyder smiled, and ordered
his immediate restoration to command. He had with whatever
design been carrying on a secret intercourse with Colonel Camp-
bell for some time before the appearance of this relief; but this
fact was unknown to Tippoo. Mahommed Ali was nearly as
great a personal favourite with the son, as he had been with the
father; and had presumed in a few cases to take the same
liberties; and on the occasion of his friend being led out to execu-
tion, he adopted a mode which cannot be satisfactorily ex-
plained on the supposition of his having been serious in his ne-
gotiations with Colonel Campbell. Instead of marshalling his
whole command, he merely paraded a single battalion, rescued
the prisoner from the guard, and openly declaring that he would
not suffer him to be executed, remained on the spot, crying out
“justice, in the name of God!” instead of marching direct to
the fort, which he might suddenly and safely have effected.

Tippoo on receiving this intelligence instantly put himself at
the head of several battalions of Chêlas and proceeded to the
spot. Being unwilling on every account to proceed to extremi-
ties, he sent frequent messengers to Mahommed Ali to dissuade
him from so absurd a proceeding, and among them Booden Deen
the commandant of rocket men, one of his most intimate friends;
some accounts insinuate that this person was intoxicated at the
time; but it is certain, that instead of returning with the acqui-
escence of his friend, he remained with him: such is one of
the statements of actual spectators, while another, on the same
authority, represents Mahommed Ali as having casually met the
party proceeding to the place of execution; that Rûstum Ali threw himself at his feet; that Mahommed Ali, the senior General in camp, desired the guard to halt, until he should explain matters to his sovereign; that while conversing on the subject in his usual rough manner, some hundred soldiers gathered round him, and it was reported to Tippoo that he was collecting his troops. However this may be, it is certain that Tippoo made a disposition for surrounding them, that only seventy-two persons remained to be surrounded, and that they were secured without the least resistance. Booden Deen was led on with Rûstum Ali, and the other prisoners to public execution; which was distinctly seen from the English fleet. To execute Mahommed Ali in the presence of the army would have been too serious an experiment. Whatever may have been the amount of actual crime on this occasion, his eminent services pleaded for mercy, and almost every officer of reputation interposed the most earnest intreaties for the preservation of his life. Tippoo publicly declared his acquiescence in this request, and on the ensuing day he was sent off in irons to Seringapatam. Sheickh Hummeed, a young, ambitious, and expectant officer of cavalry was charged with the escort of the prisoner; and before his departure, was called into Tippoo’s tent of private audience, where he was furnished with a written order to dispatch Mahommed Ali on the road, and with verbal instructions for his farther guidance. On the second day he had the humanity to apprize Mahommed Ali of the order; and the victim, after a short period, employed in devotion, quietly acquiesced in the arrangements for strangling him without noise, by means of the common groom’s cord for leading a
horse. Sheickh Hummeed returned in conformity to orders, surrendered his credentials, and reported that Mahommed Ali had destroyed himself. Tippoo affected the most violent grief and indignation; accused Sheickh Hummeed of having connived at his taking poison, and ordered him into strict confinement, from which he was not released without the forms of powerful intercession after the lapse of some weeks. The latter part of the narrative is given on the personal authority in 1808, of a near relation of Sheickh Hummeed, who had died a short time before that period; and it affords some illustration of the state of moral feeling under a despot, that the narrator extolled the mildness and clemency of Tippoo in not having murdered his relation for the purpose of keeping his own secret. There was, however, a farther motive and a more important secret. Mahommed Ali had shortly before the invasion of Coromandel, conspired* with Tippoo himself for the dethronement of his father, and although their plans had not been sufficiently matured, and were frustrated by the activity of the subsequent campaigns, the preservation of such a secret was very necessary to his own security.

* Stated on the authority of one of the conspirators.
CHAPTER XXVIII.

Retrospect to the affairs of Malabar — Mr. Sullivan's communications with Colonel Humberstone — The talents with which he retrieved the affairs of the South — Extension of his views to an eventual invasion of Mysoor — frustrated by Sir Eyre Coote's disapproval of his plans — Consequent danger of Colonel Humberstone's operations — Mr. Sullivan opens a negotiation with Tremalrow, the supposed agent of the imprisoned Ránee of Mysoor — Character and history of that person — Opinion of the Governor and Council — of General Stuart — Treaty ratified — its conditions — delays — Colonel Lang, accompanied by Tremalrow, besieges and takes Caroor — Hoisting the Mysoor colours deemed inexpedient — Tremalrow fails in his first conditions — Discussion of his probable means — Aravacourchy — Dindigul — Supercession of Colonel Lang — Colonel Fullarton invested with the command receives contradictory orders from Government, and from the Commander-in-chief — takes a just view of the public interests, and risks the responsibility of disobeying the superior authority — marches on Cuddalore — On the cessation of arms ordered to return to the South — Financial difficulties — Receives intelligence of the treachery at Mangalore — moves west — takes Palgaut — communicates with General Macleod — Reasons for returning eastward — takes Coimbetoor — prepares to ascend the Ghauts — Confidence of disaffection in Tippoo's army, founded on the execution of Mahommed Ali, and a late conspiracy at Serin-gapatam — Account of that conspiracy — Shamia the reputed head — Defective communications — The plot discovered on the night prior to its intended execution — Punishment of the conspirators — Discussion of the facts of the case — Colonel Fullarton influenced by these supposed proofs of disaffection, to prepare for the ascent of the Ghauts — stopped by orders from the English plenipotentiaries, proceeding to the court of Tippoo.

**CHAP. XXVIII.** During the period of the wantonly protracted siege of Mangalore, a service which has occupied a more than usual portion
of detail, as well from its peculiar character as from its direct connection with other more important events, it has seemed most convenient to suspend the narrative of those corresponding transactions which now remain to be described. We have seen that in the early part of 1782, Mr. John Sullivan, political resident at Tanjour, charged with a general superintendence over the southern provinces, and unlimited powers of political communication with both coasts, had in the course of the confidential authority committed to him by his government, opened to Colonel Humberstone, recently arrived on the coast of Malabar, his views regarding that employment of the forces under his command which would best promote the general purposes of the war; and there is in the whole of his extensive correspondence at that period, a manly, energetic, and enlightened grasp of mind, which leads us incessantly to regret its limited sphere of operation, and the inadequacy of his means to the accomplishment of his conceptions. The recent defeat and capture of Colonel Brathwaite's corps in Tanjour had produced the greatest degree of despondency in the southern provinces, and even considerable alarm for the safety of the provincial capital: but the ample authorities committed to Mr. Sullivan, were exercised on this occasion with so much energy and address, as speedily to revive the public confidence; he had even found resources for raising and equipping troops, to replace, at least numerically, the losses of the late disaster, and had reason to hope for the early organization of that force, which afterwards took the field under Colonel Lang. The plan proposed in the first instance, involved little more than the general views of the Governments of Bengal and Madras, officially communicated to him, for an
efficient diversion on the coast of Malabar, which among benefits of a more general nature, would relieve the pressure and liberate the resources of the provinces committed to his charge: but on farther correspondence with Colonel Humberstone, these views extended to a combined operation by the route of Palgaut, to unite with Colonel Lang in Coimbetoor, and eventually to prosecute farther offensive operations. These ideas were approved by his own Government, and afterwards recommended to the adoption of that of Bombay, but the displeasure of Sir Eyre Coote, which has been already noticed, and his disappointment at Colonel Humberstone's landing in Malabar, gave to his opinions, if not an original bias unfavourable to the measure, at least the character of intemperate disapprobation; the landing therefore of Colonel Humberstone, approved by the Government of Madras, but disapproved as we have seen in the first instance, by that of Bombay, and by Sir Eyre Coote, instead of being, as it might have been, rendered an efficient branch of an important combination, was left to assume the character of an insulated and eminently dangerous diversion.

Mr. Sullivan, who in consequence of the difficulty of communication, long remained ignorant of the opinions of Sir Eyre Coote, and the dissensions at Madras, sought to strengthen a plan approved by his Government, by means of such political support as circumstances might admit. For about six years past, a bramin named Tremalrow, had been residing in Tanjour, who gave himself out as "the son* of the minister of that Raja.

* A genealogy, with which I am furnished, traces the family of Tremalrow up to Govind Acháree, the Gooroo, (high priest,) of the Kings of Vijeyanuggur: from him is said to have descended Tremalayangar, the minister of Chick Deo Raj. Vide
of Mysoor, who had been deposed by Hyder,” that he had been deputed on a secret mission, from the imprisoned Rânce* to Lord Pigot in 1776, and on hearing of his revolutionary succession, retired to Tanjour. In this situation he had ingratiated himself with the Raja, by whom he had been announced to Mr. Sullivan, through the medium of Mr. Swartz, whose knowledge of the languages, joined to his personal character, gave weight to every representation which he consented to convey. Tremalrow was a person of considerable talents and acquirement, and shewed himself to possess extensive information regarding the government and resources of Mysoor. It is known, that he had served in a subordinate capacity, in some of the departments of Hyder’s government, at first as a writer in the office of Assud Ali Khân, minister of finance, who died in 1772, and afterwards in the department of the post-office and police, under Timmapa, (the predecessor of Shâmia,) by whom he was patronized and employed on several missions; and it is understood in Mysoor, that while absent on one of these, he heard of the intended disgrace of his patron, and apprehensive of being involved in its consequences, fled from Mysoor. This person stated himself to possess political powers from his imprisoned mistress, and means of communication which enabled him to receive from her letters addressed to Lord Macartney, and Sir Eyre Coote, and political instructions for his own guidance. Original letters, addressed by Colonel Wood,

vol. i. page 90. the alleged ancestor of Tremalrow. I have the authority of the brother of Tremalrow, for stating, that he is entirely unconnected with either of these families, and that the second is not lineally descended from the first, and is of a distinct subdivision of cast; but it is right to add, that these brothers were at variance.

* The personage described in vol. i. page 378.
Colonel Smith, and Mahommed Ali, during the war of 1767, to Madana*, Hyder's governor of Coimbetoor and Malabar, produced to support the authenticity of his present communications, were scarcely conclusive to that extent, although affording evidence of confidential access either to the supposed conspirators of 1767, or to the records of Hyder's police; and after a voluminous correspondence, Mr. Sullivan was authorised to conclude a treaty with Tremalrow, in behalf of the imprisoned Rânee; the main purport of which was, on the one part, the eventual restoration of the ancient family; and on the other, the payment of stipulated contributions, as the army should advance into the provinces of Mysoor; with other ulterior considerations reciprocally advantageous, but cautiously guarding the English Government against any inconvenient pledge. This treaty was sent for ratification to the Government of Madras, every member of which had entire confidence in the authenticity of the powers, and the reasonable prospect of success. Sir Eyre Coote, although originally inimical to the plan, had, before his departure to Bengal, encouraged Mr. Sullivan to persevere. General Stuart alone, after the departure of Sir Eyre Coote, a member of the Select Committee of Government, not only stated his opinion that the whole was a delusion, but converted into a source of festive merriment at his public table, this official proceeding of the secret department of the Government. The treaty was however ratified on the 27th November, 1782, subject to the confirmation of the Government-General.

We have already seen, that the death of Hyder and the

* The person mentioned in page 61, &c, of this volume.
recession of Tippoo, from his attack on the corps of Colonel Humberstone, to join his army in Coromandel, followed in early succession the date of these arrangements, and left an open field for the operations of Colonel Lang. The difficulty of efficient equipment, and delays of doubtful necessity, protracted the movements of this officer; until, on receiving intelligence of the capture of Bednore, he was urged, by arguments drawn from that example, to contribute without delay to the farther distraction of the enemy's efforts: he accordingly marched, accompanied by Tremalrow, and on the 2d of April, 1783, obtained possession of the fort of Caroor, after a defence which cost about one hundred and thirty killed and wounded. The Hindoo colours of Mysoor were hoisted on the ramparts of this its frontier post in Coimbetoor, and the management of the district was committed to Tremalrow; measures which Mr. Sullivan deemed to be premature, not only on account of giving unnecessary publicity to the connection, and thereby risking disclosures at Seringapatam, but because it had been his intention to exact the corresponding stipulation of the payment of one lac of rupees, which it appears that Tremalrow was unable immediately to accomplish. His individual private fortune might perhaps have enabled him to make this first pecuniary advance; but independently of the evidence of this first failure, it is difficult to conceive the existence of those secret funds, which he affirmed to be at his disposal, sufficient for the payment of the larger successive contributions, except such as he should derive from the resources of the countries to be occupied, in consequence of the advance of the army. Avara-
courchy was carried by assault on the 16th of April, and Dindigul surrendered on the 4th of May.

At this period a promotion in His Majesty’s army placed Colonel Lang below the two next officers serving under his command; the announcement of this event was accompanied by orders for another destination, and the command was conferred on Colonel Fullarton, an officer who, although he had recently embraced the military life, exhibited an aptitude for that profession, which longer experience does not always confer, and political talents which had been improved by experience. His first operation after succeeding to the command was the capture of Daraporam on the 2d of June, the capture of Bednore on the 3d of May was still unknown; and the advance of Colonel Fullarton to draw off a part or the whole of the pressure on General Matthews, although with forces confessedly insufficient to encounter Tippoo’s main army, was deemed of such vital importance as to justify the risk. The Government accordingly repeated their injunctions to General Stuart, to issue no orders to Colonel Fullarton except in the case of some urgent necessity, the nature of which necessity he was to explain to them, either before issuing the order, or on the date of its issue. These instructions were dated the 27th May, and on the 31st, General Stuart addressed to Colonel Fullarton a positive order to march towards him at Cuddalore, with the utmost expedition; these orders obliged him to desist from farther operations and move in an opposite direction. At Trichinopoly, where the rivers were unfordable, some delay was incurred in the operation of crossing in basket boats. Arrived on the opposite
bank, he experienced the full force of that miserable state of dissension, which paralyzed the public weal, in the receipt on one and the same day of farther instructions from General Stuart to march without delay to Cuddalore; and orders no less explicit from Lord Macartney to recross the river and continue to the southward.* We have already noticed the tone of being abandoned by his own Government, which General Stuart assumed on the private receipt of this information, officially withheld from his knowledge; but it is highly creditable to the memory of Colonel Fullarton, the personal friend of Lord Macartney, and placed by his Lordship's patronage in this honourable separate command, that he ventured to disobey. Intelligence had reached him that "Suffrein had anchored at Cuddalore after the action of the 20th of June, and that a disembarkation of many thousand men was intended;" he inferred that "the public safety could have no existence if General Stuart's army was defeated †," and risked the responsibility of marching with every possible expedition towards Cuddalore. It is no disparagement to the merit of this public-spirited decision, that he would probably have been too late if the armistice had not intervened. On his arrival within three forced marches of the camp before Cuddalore, he received intelligence of the cessation of hostilities, the supercession of General Stuart, and his departure for Madras; and it must be added in justice to the Government whose orders he disobeyed, that they afterwards expressed their approbation of his conduct.

The termination of the French war, the absence of Tippoo's

* Fullarton's view, page 114.
† Ibid, page 115.
army from Coromandel, and the ostensible accession to an armistice preparatory to peace, rendered disposable a large portion of the army assembled at Cuddalore, and Colonel Fullarton was ordered to return to the southward, reinforced to an extent which nearly doubled his numbers. Some intermediate operations against dependent chiefs who had exhibited a refractory spirit, during a period of public pressure, occupied the force under his command for some months; and he had been ordered to abstain from farther hostility against Tippoo, unless a violation of the armistice or farther instructions should authorize the measure. The single fact of the native troops and their European officers under Colonel Fullarton, being at this time twelve months in arrear, and in other situations a still greater number, furnishes in itself the truest picture of public finance, and the allegiance of these troops received its highest eulogium, in the contrasted condition of His Majesty's regiments, whom an act of parliament required to be regularly paid: a ration of rice constituted the only means of subsistence to a sepoy, the very condiments necessary for rendering it fit for food, were procured on credit, from the native merchants of the camp bazârs; a class of men whose conduct during this trying war, was scarcely less meritorious than that of the troops. The personal responsibility of Mr. Sullivan, and the gentlemen charged with the superintendence of supply procured equipments not to be obtained on the broken credit of the Government; and Colonel Fullarton, after exhausting the provisions of our own districts, in keeping his army together for future contingencies, was induced by necessity to "solicit a latitude of purveyance, even in the enemy's country, in case his protractions should endanger the safety of
the troops so critically situated."* At this exact period, (the 16th of October,) an official letter from the members of the residency at Tellicherry informed him of the broad and insolent violation of the convention of Mangalore, which had induced General Macleod to depart from that place on the 9th of the same month, and determined him on moving to the westward. The topography of those countries was then imperfectly understood, and Colonel Fullarton, reducing the intermediate posts, moved on Palgaut, with the view of uniting his forces to those of General Macleod, and marching in force for the relief of Mangalore. After a difficult and tedious route, cut through the centre of a stately teak forest, which covers this immense break in the Alpine chain of the Peninsula, the army keeping close to the stupendous hills on their left, penetrated to Palgaut, and after a short but active and meritorious siege, carried the place on the 15th of November. The honourable Captain (now Sir Thomas) Maitland, being on duty in the trenches, had taken advantage of a heavy fall of rain, to drive the enemy from the covered way which was not palisaded, and pursuing the fugitives through the first and second gateway, struck such a panic into the garrison, as to cause its immediate surrender.

After communicating with Tellicherry, it was found that it was incapable of furnishing the expected provisions and stores, that the troops under General Macleod could not be provided with a field equipage in less than two months; and that the whole extent of 500 miles to be traversed, like every narrow stripe of low country, interposed between an elevated range of

* Fullarton's view, page 154.
mountains and the sea, was intersected by a succession of rivers, ravines, and other impediments, which rendered hopeless a rapid advance in that direction. The possession of a respectable post of communication between Malabar and Coimbetoor, was however in itself an important acquisition; provisions were furnished in profusion, by the zamorin and his Nairs, eager to be emancipated from Mahommedan tyranny; and not only on this account, but with reference to the alternative of ascending towards Seringapatam, by the pass of Gujelhetty, the occupation of Palgaut was, if not indispensable, at least of eminent utility: and, on a comparison of all the routes presented to Colonel Fullarton's choice, he assigned the preference to the last stated, and moved for that purpose to the capital of Coimbetoor, on the 26th of November. Independently of a respectable field force, comprizing a total of 13,636 men, Colonel Fullarton had motives of confidence in the success of his enterprise, founded on the supposed state of the enemy's troops. The death of Mahommed Ali, and the executions before Mangalore, were reported and considered as the result of an extensive disaffection, and a recent conspiracy had occurred at Seringapatam, which will require a separate recital.

Whatever doubts may have been entertained of the authenticity of the documents produced, and the communications reported by Tremalrow, in 1782, while Hyder was still alive, there can be none of his correspondence with the members of this conspiracy, and of the having aided in promoting a crisis, which if well combined, might have produced the most decisive results. To trace with any certainty the secret history of a combination, every member of which who was discovered, or even strongly
suspected, was put to death, and every subsequent mention of which was treason, would, in every instance, be an arduous attempt; and the difficulty in this case is augmented by other circumstances. On the restoration of the Hindoo dynasty in 1799, Tremalrow was one of two candidates for the office of minister, and the effects of rival pretension on the principals as well as their adherents, gave plain and abundant cause for distrusting the statements of each. Seyed Mahommed Khan, the kelledar of Seringapatam, who discovered the conspiracy, and directed the executions, became a pensioner of the India Company, and was totally independent of every influence but theirs. His written and personal narratives, the published journals, and oral information of English prisoners, and conversations with numerous witnesses of the overt facts, have been the principal checks on a secret narrative, obtained by the author under circumstances which precluded the ordinary means of scrutiny.

The advancement of Shâmia to be minister of the post-office and police in 1779 has been stated, and we have seen that the influence of this office had even a wider range, and more perfect organization than can readily be apprehended by the subject of a free state. The secret terrors of his active administration had even been felt by his colleagues, and produced a jealousy which sought for his removal. It was sufficient for this purpose to give obscure hints of the good fortune of his family, the means of accumulating wealth, and the power to expose every secret but their own; these insinuations were not long concealed from the emissaries of Shâmia; but at what period he began to contemplate revolutionary plans has not been ascer-
tained. Shortly after Hyder's death, he perceived the early certainty of ruin, and veiled his projects with augmented zeal in the service of his sovereign, whom he of course accompanied to Mangalore. His brother Rungeia was at the head of the department at Seringapatam, and the name of the relation is mentioned, whom he sent from Mangalore to concert with his brother, the plans of proceeding. At the period of his arrival Singeia the provincial head of the department at Coimbetoor, was on business at Seringapatam, and with Narsing Row (Choukee Nevees) a sort of muster-master, pay-master, and town-major, was called to the secret consultations. The Hindoo Raja was to be nominally restored, and Shûnia, Rungeia, and Narsing Row, were to form the administration; the last named person was included, on the ground of his undertaking the actual execution of the plot, for destroying the kelledar, with Assud Khan, and the whole of his faithful battalion, and seizing the gates and the treasury. The communications with the English army which was to ascend at the period agreed, was left to Rungeia, through the medium of Singeia at Coimbetoor; all the Hindoo, and a few Mahommedan commandants of corps were gained, and sworn to secrecy; the English prisoners were to be released, and placed under the command of General Matthews; and Rungeia had for the first time visited the English prison, about ten days before the intended explosion; had enquired into their wants, and desired them to be of good cheer. It was deemed necessary that an instrument should be prepared of sufficient authenticity to convince the English of the nature and extent of the conspiracy, and to this the seals and signatures were obtained of the persons already named, of the
commandants of corps, and of Souberaj, ostensibly the representa-
tive of the imprisoned royal family, but in fact a descendant, by the female line, of the late Dulway Deo Raj.* It is not clear from the narrative whether this instrument ever reached the English army, but intelligence from Singeia at Coimbei-toor gave assurances of that army being ready to advance at the concerted notice whenever it should be given. The narrative states the attempt to have been premature, but that Rungeia considered farther delay to be hazardous, on account of the number of persons entrusted with the secret, and the danger of treacherous or accidental discovery: he therefore pressed *Narsing Row to strike the blow, and every thing was prepared for nine o'clock on the 24th of July†, 1783. It was the pay-day of Assud Khân's and some other Mahommedan corps, he would be present to superintend its distribution to the corps in waiting and without arms at the Cutcherry, where the kelledar always attended before the appointed hour; the treasury attendants, the corps of pioneers employed in moving the treasure, a body of jetties who had the guard of that part of the palace, were all provided with daggers, to commence the work with the destruction of the kelledar, and his attendants; while large bodies of Hindoo peons were ready to fall, in every direction, on the unarmed Mahommedans. Matters being thus arranged, Seyed Mahommed Khân on returning from the hall of business to his house on the night of the 23d, was accosted in a whisper by an obscure

* Stated on the authority of Seyed Mahommed Khân.
† Seyed Mahommed states eight months, (lunar,) after his appointment, which would bring it to about the first week in August. I take the date in the text, from the journal published in " Memoirs of the War in Asia, 1789;" but adverting to the restraints under which that journal was kept, it may not be exact to a day.
individual, who said he had something of importance to communicate; and on hearing his tale, he was enabled in the course of the night to seize a dispatch prepared for transmission to the English army; to secure the principal conspirators, and to adopt measures for defeating the intended explosion. Narsing Row made a full disclosure, in the hope of pardon, which he did not receive; and all the minor agents confessed to the degree of their actual information. As an example to intimidate, a considerable number of the conspirators were immediately executed, by the horrible process of being loosely tied to an elephant's foot, and dragged in that state through the streets of the town. Tippoo's orders were required for the disposal of the heads of the conspiracy, and on the arrival of these orders, Narsing Row, Souberaj, and the heads of corps, and of the jetties, were executed. Shāmia was sent in irons from Mangalore, and with his brother Rungeia was exposed to every contumely in separate iron cages, where they are said to have persisted to the last in denying their participation in the crime; although the torture extracted considerable treasures. Many adherents of their family continue to this day to interpret all the overt facts, into a pretended conspiracy contrived by the other ministers; on which most improbable supposition, Narsing Row must be considered as the voluntary victim of the calumny. Shītaub, the former kelledar of Seringapatam, superseded by Seyed Mahommed, was seized on the first alarm, simply on conjecture; and was released at the close of the investigation on a perfect conviction of his innocence. Neither evidence, nor the unlimited use of the torture, had directed the slightest suspicion towards the imprisoned Rānee; it is just possible, that she
might afterwards have been induced by the political rivalry to which we have adverted, to assume a disguise in her confidential conversations with the late Sir Barry Close, and with the author; but the absence even of suspicion, when so strongly excited by circumstances, added to her uniform and consistent assurances, convinced them both, of her entire ignorance of every part of the correspondence conducted in her name. But that conviction must not be understood to impugn the reality of Tremalrow's projects for the subversion of the actual government. Long before the usurpation of Hyder, the Hindoo prince had been kept in ignorance of acts purporting to be his own, as profound as was the ignorance of the imprisoned Rânee in 1783; and simulated authority had been the familiar habit of the court.

On a fair consideration of all the authentic facts which have been disclosed, we must ascribe to the conspirators at Seringapatam, a precipitancy rendered necessary by circumstances; and a more confident assertion for the encouragement of their friends, than they were justified in making, regarding the immediate advance of the English army; for we cannot ascribe to Tremalrow, the imprudence and impolicy of having encouraged that expectation, at the particular period when he knew the English to be restrained from action by the armistice of Cuddalore, when Colonel Fullarton was preparing to march from Trichinopoly, (as he did on the 4th of August,) in the opposite direction of Sevagunga. In what manner the conflicting pretensions of Tremalrow and Shâmia, might in the event of success have been adjusted, it may not now be necessary to conjecture.

Such, however, were the two circumstances, namely the exe-
ution of Mahommed Ali, at Mangalore, and the detected conspira-
cacy at Seringapatam, which induced Colonel Fullarton to infer a
disaffection in Tippoo’s army favourable to the success of his en-
terprise; but there may be ground for questioning the accordance
of this inference with the opinion raised by some authorities to
the dignity of an axiom, that every detected conspiracy, instead
of weakening, has a direct tendency to strengthen the hands of a
despot; and exclusively of these two examples, there was cer-
tainly no sufficient ground for crediting the existence of defec-
tion, sufficient to form the ground of political action. The con-
fidence of Colonel Fullarton was better founded, in officers emi-
ently distinguished for talents and professional experience, and
troops of an excellent quality, although containing too large a
proportion of young soldiers. He had arrived as we have seen

Nov. 28. at Coimbetoor, on the 26th of November, and on the 28th, two
days before his intended advance, he received instructions from
plenipotentiaries, duly authorized, on their route to negotiate
at Tippoo’s court, directing him, not only to suspend his intended
operations, but unconditionally to abandon all his conquests and
to retire within the limits possessed by the English on the 26th
of the preceding July.
CHAPTER XXIX.

Preliminary events which had led to the appointment of these plenipotentiaries — Advances from Lord Macartney before Tippoo's departure from Coromandel — his messenger returns, accompanied by an envoy, at first without powers, and afterwards equivocally conferred — Conferences broken off — resumed in consequence of the peace in Europe, the armistice of Cuddalore, and the invitation of Monsieur Bussy — Tippoo sends Apajee Ram — His demand of Ayáz as the slave and property of Tippoo — Discussion of the conditions of a treaty — Apajee skilfully suggests the deputation of English ambassadors to Tippoo's court, to obviate the delays occasioned by reference — Real intention — Messrs. Staunton and Saddler named — Tippoo's pretended accession to the treaty of Salbey — Plenipotentiaries arrive at the camp of Seyed Saheb, at Arnee — Prompt order to Colonel Fullarton, to abandon his conquests and retire — Examination of its expediency — Colonel Fullarton, knowing the state of facts at Mangalore — waits further orders before retiring — Seyed Saheb professing to be in full march on his return, drops — Negotiations — Proposed conditions inconsistent with these hasty orders — Plenipotentiaries differ in opinion — a third added to the number, Mr. Huddlestone — Government of Madras review their situation — Erroneous conclusions — Direct Colonel Fullarton to obey the order of the plenipotentiaries, literally — he obeys at the moment that Tippoo's troops continued to occupy Coromandel — and furnishes Tippoo with direct excitements to persevere at Mangalore — Swartz the missionary — his acute observations — The troops scarcely in cantonment, before the Madras government sees its error, and countermands the order — Journey of the Commissioners Plenipotentiary — by dangerous routes to prevent the stipulated communication with the prisoners — Contemptuous deceptions — Arrive near Mangalore a few days after the evacuation — Gibbets erected in front of their tents — General Macleod arrives in the offing — Communication prohibited — He considers them as prisoners
Alleged intention to escape — Mysterious silence — discussed — The escape prevented by the officer commanding the escort — Reasons of Tippoo for a separate peace with the English, independently of the treaty of Salbey — Conditions — Cautionary retention of two places on each side — Cannanore, one of these places, restored by Brigadier-General Macleod, in violation of the treaty and the orders of the Commissioners — Prisoners detained contrary to the treaty — Interesting fate of the boys — Contrasted conduct of the officer commanding the escort, and of the Commissioners — Two examples — Treatment of the prisoners — by Hyder — by Tippoo — General description of their condition — Europeans — Sepoys — The good Seyed Ibrahim.

The preliminary communications which had led to the appointment of these plenipotentiaries, had commenced at so early a period as the 12th of February, before Tippoo's departure from Coromandel. Lord Macartney had, with the concurrence of his council, engaged a bramin, proceeding on his devotions to Conjeeveram, to communicate with some of his friends in the Mysorean service, and endeavour to obtain, through their means, a better treatment of the English prisoners, and through the same medium to sound Tippoo's dispositions regarding a separation from his French allies, and a treaty of peace with the English nation. It was obvious that nothing could divest this advance of that apparent anxiety for peace, so dangerous in Asiatic diplomacy, and so strongly deprecated by Mr. Hastings. The bramin (named Sambajee, an agent at Madras on the part of the raja of Tanjour,) was too full of self-importance to decline the consequent opportunity of appearing at Tippoo's durbar in the character of English envoy; and that prince, glad of an opportunity to provide against unfavourable contingencies, and to ascertain the grounds on which he could command peace, directed a person, named Sreenowasrow, to accompany Sambajee on
his return to Madras; at first without any written powers, but afterwards furnished with an equivocal letter, addressed to himself under Tippoo's seal, authorising him to confer on the subject of peace. The conferences were opened by this man with the demand of reparation for the everlasting grievance of the fraud at Trichinopoly, in 1752; and answered by reference to the subsequent treaty of 1769. The principle of mutual restitution seemed likely to be the basis to which each would ultimately assent. The difficulty of Tippoo's separation from the French, and abandoning them to be overwhelmed by the superior power of the English, was met by the proposition of returning them in safety to the Isle of France. In this state of the negotiation, Sreenowasrow returned to his master for further instructions; and these abortive advances were suffered by Tippoo to rest in contemptuous silence, until, on the occasion of the cessation of hostilities between the French and English at Cuddalore, on the 2d July, in consequence of the peace in Europe, Lord Macartney, in conformity to the tenor of his agreement with Monsieur De Bussy addressed a letter to Tippoo, inviting him to accede to the conditions provisionally fixed for his acceptance, and announcing a suspension of all hostility on the part of the English, until his answer should be obtained. The Sultaun's reply, received on the 5th of October, was full of amicable profession, at the very moment that he considered his plans for starving Mangalore, to be approaching maturity. Apajee Ram, whose diplomatic talents have been already noticed*, was the envoy charged with this letter, and the

* Vol. ii. page 11.
customary credentials. His demands were as usual, at first extravagant, but gradually sunk into an apparent assent to the principle of mutual restitution of prisoners and places. Of prisoners the English had actually none, but a strenuous attempt was made so to consider *Ayáz* the late governor of Bednore, who was specially demanded by the Sultaun not only as a prisoner, but as his domestic slave and private property. It would not have been difficult to satisfy the mind of such a man as Apajee Ram, that so gross a violation of faith and hospitality was a hopeless demand, but he could not decide, in opposition to official instructions, without reference. He next attempted the establishment of an offensive and defensive alliance, and this proposition was rejected on the ground of past experience, regarding the treaty of 1769, which was stated to have furnished to Hyder, a *pretence* for the present war. Difficulties purposely created, were made to prolong the time, until Apajee Ram suggested, with every appearance of frankness, that the frequent references which his master’s habits of distrust compelled him to make, would continue to protract the negotiations, and that he saw no mode so likely to accelerate the conclusion of peace, as the deputation to the Sultaun’s court of two gentlemen of character, sufficiently masters of the views of their government, to render reference unnecessary.

This proposition which the Government describe as “fully meeting their wishes” was certainly no less acceptable to the Sultaun, from whom it proceeded, and who had no object so much at heart, as to exhibit the English to the powers of Hindostan, in the posture studiously assigned to them in his work of *suppliants for peace*. Mr. Sadlier, second in council, and
Mr. Staunton, private secretary to Lord Macartney, were the commissioners named, and they departed from Madras on the 9th of November, with prospects of success materially improved, by information received immediately previous to their departure, of Tippoo’s declared accession to the treaty of Salbey, signified by himself in his letters to the Peshwa and Sindea. On the 19th, they arrived in the camp near Arnee, of Meer Saheb commanding the Sultaun’s forces still in Coromandel; and the order to Colonel Fullarton already described to abandon his conquests and retire within the limits possessed on the 26th of July, was promptly dated on the succeeding day. It might be reasonably concluded, that a British officer of some intellect would not recommence hostilities on doubtful information, but having commenced, it would seem to be sufficient for the purposes of amicable negotiation that they should simply cease; that their origin should be investigated, and if groundless that reparation should be promised; but unconditionally to abandon, without any investigation, the fruits of such hostilities, appeared like gratuitously throwing away, at the commencement of a negotiation, the best materials for bringing it to a successful conclusion. The commissioners however deemed themselves at liberty to act upon the assurances of Indian diplomatists, in opposition to the grounds of belief which have been stated, and assumed as the foundation of their orders “that the cessation of arms appeared to have been disturbed in partial instances by accidental circumstances, and without any authority from government on either side;” and these orders, so founded, reached Colonel Fullarton at a period (28th of November) when he was in possession of official advices from Brigadier-General Macleod, stating that he had
actually sailed, for the purpose of forcing his way, at all events, into Mangalore, in consequence of the infraction which he had personally witnessed of the armistice and convention with Colonel Campbell. Colonel Fullarton treated these orders with a wise combination of military feeling and political prudence: he knew that they were founded upon gross deception; and although he testified obedience by causing hostility to cease, he declared his determination to retain his conquests until he should be furnished with further orders. Meanwhile Seyed Saheb, who professed to be evacuating Coromandel, and to be in full march to Seringapatam, stopped ostensibly for the celebration of a festival, not twenty-five miles from the ground near Arnee, where the commissioners found him, at a place (Calispálk) which, although on the actual road to the pass of Changama, yet relatively to the provinces of Coromandel, is a more central position than that which he had left: a discussion intervened which it is difficult to reconcile with the hasty orders, of which we have ventured to question the propriety. The early release of the numerous English captives in the prisons of Mysoor was of course a main object of attainment; and the commissioners desired to stipulate, that all places to the eastward of the ghauts should first be reciprocally restored, and both parties be satisfied on these points before ascending into Mysoor: that the release of all the English prisoners should then ensue, and finally that on the English being satisfied regarding the execution of this condition, the restoration of all places taken by the English on the western coast should close the process of reciprocal restitution. To this last essential condition the plenipotentiaries of Tippoo Sultaun, raised a variety
of objections, they demanded that the surrender of Mangalore should precede the release of the prisoners, and offered "to pledge their faith that the delivery of the prisoners should immediately follow the evacuation of Mangalore." The first commissioner, Mr. Sadlier, declared his readiness to assent to this proposal, observing that he "deemed farther security to be unnecessary, beyond that pledge on which the commissioners themselves had committed their own persons, to the disposal of Tippoo Sultaun without hostage." The second commissioner, Mr. Staunton, feeling perhaps the improvidence of his first concession, and beginning more justly to appreciate this "pledge of faith," positively declined his assent to the surrender of Mangalore, and the other western conquests, until perfectly satisfied of the release of every prisoner, to be determined by the certificate of their existence by the first commissioner in the form of an official message to Seyed Saheb. These adverse opinions could no otherwise be decided, than by reference to their superiors, who determined in favour of Mr. Staunton, and to provide against their probable recurrence, a third member, Mr. Huddleston, was added to the commission. Under these circumstances, and with this degree of information before them, the Government of Madras proceeded, on the 8th of December, to review their actual condition. Ruined finances, broken credit, and a Supreme Government reposing no confidence, and supposed still to meditate their suspension, threw a gloom over all their deliberations: they had already determined that the release of prisoners should precede the restitution of Mangalore; and instead of considering whether an armistice had been violated,
and by whom; and whether a national insult had been received or repaired, or retaliated; they declared, that in the distressed condition of their affairs, it was not worth while continuing the war for the possession of Mangalore; that a peace ought to be made with Tippoo, on the ground of each party retaining their former possessions, and no more; (a point which had been decided long before the appointment of commissioners, and apparently constituting no part of the question before them) and they determined that Colonel Fullarton should be required to fulfil the order of unqualified restitution, enjoined by the commissioners; a conclusion apparently depending on the question which they had evaded, and not on that which they had considered. The Colonel, having received this determination, and the reiterated orders of the commissioners, evacuated the whole of his conquests, and retired within the prescribed limits, at the very time that Tippoo’s troops remained in force in Coromandel, occupying to the southward a line of posts, north of the Cole-roon, from Terriore to Arialore, and Palamcotta to the sea; and in the centre, the main body of Seyed Saheb, instead of a pretended departure with the commissioners, continued to occupy all that he held on their arrival, with the exception of the ruins of Chittapet, already adverted to, without any part of its district. It were difficult for human ingenuity to devise more direct excitements than were thus held forth to Tippoo Sultaun, to persevere in his barbarian conduct at Mangalore. On Colonel Fullarton’s first march from Coimbetoor, he was met by Mr. Swartz, the person whose mission to Hyder in 1779, has been related: he had consented to act as interpreter to the commissioners, and was proceeding for that purpose, by the route of
Gujellutty, with the view of joining them at Seringapatam; but in conformity to the system of universal insult which Tippoo deemed requisite to his views, Mr. Swartz was soon afterwards stopped at the bottom of the ghaut, and was never permitted to proceed. On meeting Colonel Fullarton, and learning the orders under which he was acting, this excellent and venerable preacher of peace and christian forbearance, in spite of a simplicity in the ordinary affairs of life sometimes amounting to weakness, thus describes his astonishment. “Alas! said I, is the peace so certain that you quit all before the negotiation is ended? The possession of these two rich countries would have kept Tippoo in awe, and inclined him to reasonable terms. But you quit the reins, and how will you manage that beast? The Colonel said, I cannot help it.” Such, indeed, was the general tone of humiliation, that even Colonel Fullarton a few days before, had submitted to have a Captain and a small advanced guard cut off, and to be satisfied with a lame explanation: “this affair,” says Mr. Swartz, “was quite designed to disperse the inhabitants, who came together to cut the crops, and to assist the English;” but Colonel Fullarton’s distribution of his troops into cantonments, in obedience to these reiterated orders, were not yet completed, before the Government pronounced the most unqualified sentence on their own precipitation and credulity by ordering him “not only to retain possession of Palgaut, should that fort not have been delivered, but likewise to hold fast every inch of ground of which he was in possession, till he should have received accounts of the result of the negotiation!!”

* See his praise of Hyder, for converting his young captives into slaves.
In the meanwhile, the commissioners had been proceeding on their journey in a style exactly corresponding to the general character of those transactions; all preliminary principles having been fixed before their departure from Madras, they were considered as proceeding to the Sultaun’s court, merely to adjust the definitive details; and conformably to this view, it was distinctly agreed, that in traversing Mysoor, they were to have personal intercourse with the English prisoners, and an opportunity of delivering to them, stores of clothing and other requisites, which were provided and carried for that special purpose; and arrangements were made for a regular and speedy transmission of letters, to and from the commissioners, in all directions. They had scarcely passed the frontiers, before they discovered all communication to be cut off. Partly with the intent of avoiding the common route within sight of Bangalore, containing a considerable depot of prisoners, and partly for the purpose of contemptuous exhibition, they were led over routes, impracticable to ordinary beasts of burden, in which several of the camels were destroyed. As they advanced farther, they were met by a letter from Tippoo Sultaun, assuring them that all the prisoners had, with a view to the arrangements for their liberation, been removed to the frontiers, from Seringapatam (from which place unhappily no prisoner had been removed, except for the purpose of assassination,) and inviting them to continue their route to his camp at Mangalore. Submitting to a violation of the preliminary evidence of sincerity, stipulated to be evinced in a free communication with the prisoners, they were permitted to proceed as fast and no faster than the progress of famine at Mangalore; when only twenty miles distant from that place, the evacuation took
place, and they were met by a letter from the Sultaun, informing them, that at the earnest desire of Colonel Campbell, he had agreed to take charge of the fort of Mangalore. Arrived and encamped near the place, every successive interview with Tippoo Sultaun or his ministers, presented such various and contradictory views of his sentiments and intentions, that no judgment could be formed of the probable result of their mission, excepting that in a character, hitherto held sacred by the most savage nations, they were destined to fill the measure of his barbarism, by secret assassination, or open murder. Three gibbets were erected, opposite to the tent doors of each of the commissioners, and every species of indignity was studiously practised; a post dependent on Honâver, (Onore,) was carried by surprise; another open hostility was committed, by cutting up a subaltern’s detachment from Colonel Fullarton’s army, and even refusing to release the officer, who was desperately wounded. Distinct intelligence was received of the murder of General Matthews, and several other officers in prison, and nothing seemed wanting to the catastrophe, but the practical employment of the gibbets.

Shortly after the arrival of the commissioners at Mangalore, two Company’s ships from Bombay, on one of which Brigadier-General Macleod was embarked, anchored in the roads, and the slight additional indignity was imposed, of interdicting all communication, with rare exceptions, so managed as to make the rule more insulting. General Macleod very reasonably declared, that until an unlimited intercourse was permitted, he would consider them as imprisoned men whose orders were of no force, and before his departure to assume the command of his troops, he
sent on shore a messenger with a letter addressed to the Sultan, and another to the commissioners, for the purpose of bringing this question to a decided issue: the messenger was detained—he had no answer, and he sailed. A letter dated Mar. 1. 1st of March from the commissioners to the commander of the Company’s ship has the following passage, “the circumstance (the difficulty of sending a boat) will be made known by the signal to be settled with the bearer, as in the former case, and on such signal being made, you will please to order one of the Patamar boats to anchor about four miles to the northward of your present station, and as much in-shore as possible, in the hope that some communication may be effected by that means from the beach. The Patamar must have an intelligent European on board, and one of the ship’s boats must accompany her, and must endeavour to come to the beach, on seeing a gentleman near it on horseback, holding as a signal a white handkerchief in his hand.” “The adventure of the white handkerchief,” says General Macleod in his observations on this letter written on the 9th of March, “was an intended escape of the commissioners from Tippoo, leaving behind them their baggage, retinue,” &c. It is remarkable that no intimation is to be found in the official record of the proceedings of the commissioners of the existence of an intention to escape, which is thus affirmed by General Macleod, who must have conversed with the bearer of the letter and the commander to whom it was addressed. It is not so much the question of propriety, as of apparent mystery, that has induced the author to institute farther enquiry, and the following narrative is founded on high and incontrovertible living authority.
It has been seen, that Mr. Swartz the interpreter provided for the commissioners, was forcibly prevented from joining them; neither they, nor any of their diplomatic suite, understood either of the country languages; and the native interpreter, Vencaty Rangia, was one day taken ill, and unable to officiate; under these circumstances, the commissioners had recourse to a menial servant of the officer commanding the escort, to be the medium between the two states in this important diplomacy. On the evening of the same day, this man came to his master's tent, in the greatest apparent alarm, said, that he had intelligence of the most urgent importance to communicate, and even begged that the candles might be extinguished, to prevent observation. These precautions being taken, he proceeded to relate, that after being kept standing for several hours, interpreting between the commissioners and Tippoo's ministers, finding himself much fatigued, he lay down without the tent wall; and after the discharge of strangers, and the retirement of the senior commissioner, he heard the two other commissioners discussing and arranging a plan for removing on board ship, where they would have at least the advantage of personal safety in conducting their negotiations; the arrangements for embarkation were to be conducted with the utmost secrecy, and to be adjusted on the ensuing day, by the surgeon, Mr. Falconer, by means of a pretext for getting on ship-board, which was also related; the first commissioner was only to be apprized of it, by their calling at his tent on their way to the boat, and giving him the option of accompanying them; the escort and attendants were to be left to their fate, and the only persons in the secret were to be the two commissioners, and Mr. Falconer, (the memory of the living narrator does not enable him to state
whether the secretary was also included). A faithful service of many years, and a considerable portion of sagacity, gave weight to the statement of the servant, and his master retired to rest, and to reflect on what was proper to be done. The next morning, at breakfast, Mr. Falconer appeared to be suddenly taken ill; it was necessary that he should be sent on shipboard to be bled. A boat was applied for and obtained for this special urgency, and he embarked. All this minutely accorded with the plan reported by the servant on the preceding night. The officer distinctly saw the first part of the project in operation, and immediately after breakfast assembled the military officers of the escort, consisting of four besides himself, including the aid-de-camp of the commissioners. He apprised them of all the facts with which he was acquainted; stated his own determination not to desert his men; but observed to them, that the case was peculiar, and nearly hopeless; that they were all bound by ties of affinity or of friendship to one or other of the commissioners; and that in circumstances so desperate, he should exact no military obedience, but leave to each the free option of acting as he should think expedient. All instantly declared their determination to adhere to their duty, and obey his orders, whatever they might be. He awaited the return of the surgeon in the evening, and the following conversation ensued:—

"Well, Falconer, how has the bleeding answered? I hope you feel better?—F. Very much better; I was so sea-sick going on board, that bleeding was found unnecessary.—Officer, I am glad to hear that you are so much recovered; but when does the boat come on shore to carry off the commissioners?—F. (turning pale) What boat?—Officer,
I could not have suspected you of active concurrence in a plan for deserting your friends. — F. In God's name how came you acquainted with it? — Officer, That is another affair; it is enough for you that I know it; (and then recited the particulars of the plan.) — F. It is too true, and I have arranged with Captain Scott, but I am not at liberty to tell you the particular time. — Officer, Then you may proceed, if you choose, to the commissioners, and report to them, as the sequel of your arrangement, that I am here to obey all their lawful orders; but also to do my duty to the troops committed to my protection. If there be any embarkation, I hope to see the last private into the boats; but my sentinels have orders to give me precise information, and I have a party saddled in the lines ready to seize as a deserter any and every person who shall attempt a clandestine escape. — The surgeon departed, and shortly afterwards the officer commanding the escort was sent for, and privately assured by the second commissioner, that "there was no intention of effecting an escape, or of any person going on board ship."

The negotiation, in the meanwhile, was assuming alternately every intermediate aspect from hope to despair. To the observations already noticed regarding the uniform impolicy of ostensible advances for peace to an Indian power, Mr. Hastings added the opinion, that the head of Colonel Fullarton's army would have been the proper station of the commissioners; and the same remark had, without communication, been made before their departure by Mr. Sullivan, whose public and private correspondence exhibits a steady and uniform reprobation of the whole course of these disgraceful negotiations. Tippoo perceived, by the active military preparations in every
quarter, that the Government of Madras had a poignant sense of the consequences of its errors. He knew, that in consequence of his feigned assent and practical rejection of the terms of the treaty of Salbey, arrangements between the English and Mahrattas, for a combined attack on his dominions were in forwardness, and, if commenced, could not terminate but in a joint peace; and even arrogance did not extinguish the reflection, that his designs against the Mahrattas would be most conveniently effected when they should be unaided. The terror of his name had been sufficiently established, by the submission of the English to every form of derision, humiliation and contempt; and at a period when imagination could scarcely picture an additional insult, he condescended, on the 11th of March, to sign the long pending treaty of peace.

Treachery and infamy had removed from the arena the object which divided the opinions of the ambassadors in the commencement of their mission. Tippoo had almost every thing to concede, because on his side, every thing had been treacherously held; and on the other, almost every thing had been gratuitously abandoned; and a postponement in the mutual delivery of two places on each side, until all the other restitutions should be completed, was treated by him as a shew of theoretical reciprocity, proceeding merely from his lenity and compassion. The two places retained by Tippoo were Amboor and Sautgur; by the English, Dindigul and Cannanore; and it was the professed object to hold them until all the prisoners should be released, and all the captive inhabitants of Coromandel permitted to return. Cannanore had been an object of some discussion during the negotiations. Brigadier-General
Macleod, had, without any powers, concluded a treaty with the Beebee (Dowager Chief,) and although the authority had been disavowed, and the instrument annulled, yet, as emancipation from Tippoo's authority, had been one of its provisions, it was deemed expedient to restore the place to the person from whom it had been taken, and Tippoo's scruples were satisfied, by stipulating, that the surrender should be made in the presence of one of his officers, without troops. A copy of the treaty was delivered to Brigadier-General Macleod for his information and guidance, and he was ordered to hold Cannanore, with a strong garrison, until he should receive information of the release of all the prisoners. On the 17th of April, however, without receiving any such information, and without complying with the express provisions of the treaty, the words "Cannanore is evacuated," is stated by the Government to be the only intelligence or explanation they ever received from Brigadier-General Macleod: the breach of faith was loudly represented by Tippoo, and the reparation was offered, of even recapturing the place, for the purpose of effecting its restitution in terms of the treaty: great importance was attached on this occasion, to the security which it afforded for the liberation of the prisoners and inhabitants; and the Government, on discovering abundant ill faith on this head, even announced to Tippoo Sultaun, that they would retain Dindigul, until the residue should be released. Exclusively of all artificers, without exception, and about two hundred other persons, who from terror or compulsion had submitted to be enrolled in his service, an account was officially rendered to Government of about fifty names, chiefly boys, who had been forcibly subjected to the
painful rite* of an abhorred religion, and many of them instructed to perform as singers and dancers for the future amusement of the tyrant. Some of these unhappy beings had been occasionally placed in situations to observe and be observed by the English prisoners in Seringapatam; the journal of an officer describes them as shedding a flood of tears, while attempting by gestures to describe their situation; and imagination may revert to the story of a more ancient people for the picture of their sorrows: “They that wasted us, required of us mirth; saying, sing us one of the songs of Zion: How shall we sing the Lord’s song in a strange land?” But neither the fate of these interesting captives, nor of the immense mass of a deported population, officially known to be forcibly detained, prevented the final humiliation of surrendering Dindigul.

Two of the commissioners returned to Madras by sea, the third by land, and the officer commanding the escort was officially charged with the arrangements for the reception of the prisoners to be released, in virtue of the provisions of the treaty. The spirit and decision of this officer obtained some liberations, and it is a relief from the prostration of spirit which has pervaded our late narrative, to record two incidents for contrast and for reflection. Before leaving Mangalore, he caused proclamation to be made even within Tippoo’s camp, that he was authorized to receive all inhabitants of Coromandel who chose to accompany him. The blacksmith of his troop discovered his son, long supposed to be dead, as the

* According to the usual practice with their own children, the boys were compelled to partake of a soporific electuary, and in that state the operation is performed.
slave of a horseman, who blustered and brought his comrades. The officer gave the requisite explanations, placed the boy under his own guard, with orders delivered in the presence of the horseman to put to death any one who should touch him, and he accordingly returned in safety. At the last barrier of Pedanaickdoorgum he knew that an attempt would be made to stop the return of the deported inhabitants; and he was aware that in great and ostensible masses they might find impediments on the intermediate road, he therefore suggested dispersion and re-assembling at the passage of the barrier. A guard of 100 men was drawn up at the gate, to prevent the passage of any individual excepting those of whom an account had been rendered, as formally released. After all these had passed, the escort followed: the two companies of native infantry were suddenly drawn up exactly opposite Tippoo's guard, the detachment of cavalry was suitably placed, and the officer announced that any person who should stop or touch an individual in his train should be instantly put to death. About two thousand inhabitants passed, but at least one hundred times that number remained in captivity.

On the release of the prisoners*, an opportunity was afforded to all of comparing with each other the history of their sufferings, but the reader whose attention has been too long detained on objects of horror and disgust, shall be spared the recital of details, and presented with the shortest possible abstract. Hyder had no scruples of delicacy regarding the safe and cheap custody of his

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* Officers - 180  
Soldiers - 900  
Sepoys - 1600  

European prisoners, and assigned as a reason for keeping them in irons, chained in pairs, that they were unruly beasts, not to be kept quiet in any other way. He had also little compunction in using severity, and sometimes direct force, to procure the services of gunners and artificers. But here terminated the sum of his barbarity; it was reserved for Tippoo Sultaun to destroy his prisoners by poison and assassination; and the infamy was heightened, by his selecting for this purpose all those who were observed or reported to have distinguished themselves in arms, and might hereafter become dangerous opponents: fortunately, his defective information spared many who were eminently entitled to this fatal honour. Colonel Baillie's death preceded Tippoo's accession. Captain Rumley who led the charge against Tippoo's guns on the morning of Baillie's tragedy, Lieutenant Fraser, one of that officer's staff, and Lieutenant Sampson, captured with Colonel Brathwaite, were the first victims of this policy of the new reign. Brigadier-General Matthews, and most of the captains taken at Bednore, were the next selections; and afterwards, at uncertain periods, other individuals in the several prisons were either carried away to Cabbal Droog, to be poisoned, or if that were deemed too troublesome, they were led out to the woods, and hacked to pieces; but with this savage exception, the treatment of the remainder was not materially changed. The prison fare was not exactly similar in different places of custody, nor even uniform in the same; in the best, it amounted to a bare subsistence; and in the worst, accelerated death: the bare earth was every where their bed, without distinction of rank; a seer of rice or ragee*, and a few small copper

* Cynosurus Coracanus. Ainslie.
coins, capriciously varying in number, without any assigned cause, was the general scale of allowance, and the number of the coins, combined with the relative avarice of the jailor, determined whether a meal could be procured sufficient for average sustenance. In answer to petitions for medicine or medical advice, they were generally informed that "they had not been sent thither to live;" no medicines were procurable excepting by stealth; and the spratts* nut, cassia fistula, jag-gery †, tamarinds, and a rude blue pill, formed by the tritu-ration of quicksilver with crude sugar, constituted the whole extent of their materia medica and pharmaceutical skill; and a periodical contribution of a copper coin from each to what was called the doctor's box, provided a little store for general use. Blows were inflicted on the most trivial pretences; individuals were selected to be freed from irons, and without explanation again shackled, for no other apparent reason than to excite conjectures and agonize the feelings. The Europeans were deemed too unmanageable to be worth the trouble of superintending their labour, in the description of irons thought necessary for their safe custody; the sepoys were kept at hard labour, and these faithful creatures, whenever they had an opportunity, sacrificed a portion of their own scanty pittance to mend the fare of their European fellow soldiers. A more cruel treatment was considered due, and was unfeelingly inflicted on those native officers who could league with strangers against their countrymen, and among them many sustained the

* Jatropha Curcas. Ainslie.
† The crude sugar, combined with the treacle, as it comes from the boiler, in which state it is most usually sold; it is procured, not only from sugar cane, but from the sap of the cocoa nut and palmyra, (borassus flabelliformis.) Ainslie.
severest trials with a fortitude which has never been surpassed in the history of any country: by an inexplicable caprice, the most respectable of these were, for a considerable time, confined at Seringapatam, in the same prison with the European officers; and the good commandant, Seyed Ibrahim, the theme of their prison songs *, and the object of their veneration, continued, till removed for farther torture, to animate the despondent, to restrain the rash, and to give an example to all, of cheerful resignation and ardent attachment. When removed from the prison he mildly bespoke attention to his family, if his fellow-prisoners should ever return, and some years elapsed after their release before accumulated sufferings brought him to the grave. On the extinction of the dynasty of Hyder, a mausoleum was erected over his remains, and endowed by Lord Clive on behalf of the East-India Company, with a view to perpetuate the remembrance of his virtues, and the benefit of his example.

* In most of the prisons, it was the custom to celebrate particular days, when the funds admitted, with the luxury of plantain fritters, a draught of sherbet, and a convivial song. On one occasion, the old Scotch ballad; "My wife has ta'en the gee;" was admirably sung, and loudly encored. The "haute police," had a particular cognizance of all that was said and sung, during these orgies; and it was reported to the kelledar, that the prisoners "had said and sung, throughout the night, of nothing but ghee," (clarified butter); this incident occurred but a short time previously to their release, and the kelledar certain that discoveries had been made regarding his malversations in that article of garrison store, determined to conciliate their secrecy, by causing an abundant supply of this unaccustomed luxury to be thenceforth placed within the reach of their farthing purchases.
CHAPTER XXX.

Tippoo's own account of his long detention at Mangalore — The defection of the French — Treachery of Mahommed Ali — Delicacy regarding his treaties with the Mahrattas and Nizam Ali — delayed the English vakeels on various pretences till his allies should declare themselves — Abjunct conduct of the Commissioners — Ridicule of the prisoners — Return to statements of fact — Horrible expatriation and forcible conversion of the Christians of Canara, related in his own words, highly characteristic — Army marches through Bullum into Coorg — State of that country during the war — Capture of the late Raja's family, and among them the future Raja — Tippoo's recital of his own adventures — His moral harangue to the inhabitants — Return — Progress to Bangalore, where he establishes his harem — New insurrection in Coorg, from the forcible violation of a woman — Zein-ul-abu-deen sent to command — his history and character — fails — Tippoo again enters Coorg — Plan for seizing all the inhabitants — succeeds in a great degree — Driven off to Seringapatam — and circumcised — Separation of the adscripti glebe — to be slaves to the new landholders — The design fails — Intermediate proceedings — Tippoo's views in the peace of Mangalore — Early pretensions of superiority over Nizam Ali, who tries to propitiate Tippoo, but leagues with the Mahrattas who have a separate ground of quarrel with Tippoo — Circumstances connected with Neergund — Interference of the Mahrattas resisted — Tippoo sends a force against the place under Burhan-u-Deen and Kummer-u-Deen — Opposed by Perseram Bhow — Raise the siege and defeat him — Carry the advanced post of Ramdroog, and resume the siege — Absurd distraction of authority — Tippoo's ferocious and unprincipled instructions — Premeditated infraction of the capitulation — Imprisonment of the Chief — Infamous violation of his daughter — Mahrattas and Tippoo each procrastinate — Force of Kummer-u-Deen destined to make a treacherous attack on Adwénée — countermanded to Seringapatam — Suspicious route and supposed connexion with Nizam Ali — Report of the Sultan's
Before proceeding to other matters, it may gratify the curiosity of many readers, to contemplate the colour assigned by the Sultaun himself to his long sojourn at Mangalore. In consequence of a peace treacherously concluded at Cuddalore, without the participation of his commander, between the English who had been uniformly victorious over the French alone, and the latter people, for whose preservation he had been induced to afford aid, at an enormous expence; Cossigny, who had been permitted as a favour to accompany him with 300 men, not as an aid, (for the addition of 300 men to his countless host, was as the load of an ant to the army of Solomon, but merely that the refusal might not break his heart,) this said Cossigny refused to fight, and still more strange to relate, the other French, who had been in the service twenty years, withdrew also from the trenches. In one page, this conduct is stated to have prevented the immediate capture of the place; and in another, the aid of the French is represented as contemptible and useless. He calls them into his presence; he reproaches them; and he philosophizes; and they have no reply to his unanswerable arguments, but downright refusal. He resumes the siege, and had made all his dispositions for a general assault, when at the repeated solicitation of Monsieur De Bussy, he spared the garrison out of pure mercy. Mahommed Ali had intrigued with General Macleod, while permitted to reside on shore, as he had formerly corresponded with Coote and the Christian*; the

* See preface, page xxii.
accursed Macleod went to Tellicherry, for troops to execute their treacherous designs, and on his return, finding the treason to be discovered, he retired in dissappointment and disgrace, after writing the recited challenge, and being confounded and alarmed at the Sultaun's answer. There was yet a longer delay to be accounted for. Although he knew that the Mahrattas had concluded a separate peace with the English, he declined, from a scrupulous and delicate observance of his own engagements, to withdraw from the triple confederacy, until he should receive from themselves, as well as from Nizam Ali, an official intimation of the fact. This detained him six months, during which time "he had delayed the English vakeels in their journey, on a variety of pretences." Considerable skill and flimsy ingenuity are displayed, in weaving together these several causes for his detention before Mangalore, which miserable post is described as an impregnable fortress, surrendered to the English by the treachery of its former commandant. He had been anxiously intreated by Colonel Campbell to take possession of Mangalore, and allow him to depart; and had long resisted, until the commissioners should arrive, from the same delicate attention to even the appearance of good faith, and the apprehension of injurios construction of his conduct; but at length he yielded to the entreaties of the garrison. On the occasion of the signature of the treaty, the English Commissioners stood with their heads uncovered, and the treaty in their hands, for two hours, using every form of flattery and supplication to induce his compliance. The vakeels of Poona and Hyderabad united in the most abject entreaties, and he at length was softened into assent. The prisoners, on being released, were found unable to march, and for
want of other conveyance, begged the asses of the salt merchants, and marched in this procession, to the great amusement of the people of Mysoor!!

From fiction we return to fact; and the first material fact in the history of the new reign, after the return of the army to the upper country, is so peculiar, and the narrative given by the Sultaun himself, contains so unusual a portion of truth, and where defective in that quality, is so full of character, that it shall be given nearly in his own words.*

"Among the memorable events of this wonderful year, was the making Mussulmans of the Nazarene Christians. Now, Christian, in the language of the Franks, is applied to designate a new convert to the religion of Jesus, (on whose race be benediction and peace;) and as a compound word, it is synonymous with Ecsovian, (persons of the religion of Jesus) for in the language of the Franks Chris — is a name of the Lord Jesus; but to proceed with our subject. The Portuguese Nazarenes, who for a long period have possessed factories on the sea coasts, obtained, about three hundred years ago, an establishment of this nature, on pretence of trade, on the coast of Soonda, at a place situated midway in the course of a large river and estuary; and in process of time, watching their opportunity, obtained from the raja, a country, yielding a revenue of three or four lacs of rupees. They then proceeded to prohibit the Mahommedan worship within these limits, and to expel its votaries: to the bramins and other Hindoos, they proclaimed a notice of three

* In his own work it is placed after the expedition to Coorg, in my other manuscripts before that event.
† Goa is intended.
days, within which time they were at liberty to depart, and in failure to be enrolled in the new religion. Some, alarmed at the proposition, abandoned their property and possessions; and others, deeming the whole to be an empty threat, ventured to remain; and on the appointed day, the Nazarenes enrolled them in their own foolish religion. In process of time, and by means of rare presents, and flattery, and pecuniary offerings, they prevailed on the senseless rajas of Nuggur, Courial, (Mangalore), and Soonda, to tolerate their farther proceedings, and began gradually to erect shrines and chapels, (Keleesha—eclesia), and in each of these idol temples, established one or two padrès, that is to say monks, who, deluding the weak and pliant populace, by a fluency of tongue, alternately soothing and severe; and by liberal and munificent gifts, led the way to their * abolished religion; and in this manner made a multitude of Christians, and continued to that day the same practices. When His Majesty, the shadow of God, was informed of these circumstances, the rage of Islam began to boil in his breast: he first gave orders, that a special enumeration and description should be made and transmitted, of the houses of the Christians in each district: detachments, under trusty officers, were then distributed in the proper places, with sealed orders, to be opened and executed, on one and the same day, after the first devotions of the morning: and in conformity to these instructions, sixty thousand persons, great and small of both sexes, were seized, and carried to the resplendent presence: whence, being placed under proper guardians, and provided with every thing needful,

* By abolished he means merged, in the subsequent revelations of Mahommed.
they were dispatched to the royal capital, and being formed into battalions of five hundred each, under the command of officers well instructed in the faith, they were honoured with the distinction of Islam*: they were finally distributed to the principal garrisons, with orders for a daily provision of food, apparel, and other requisites; and the year of their reception into the pale of Islam, is designated in the following distich, each hemistic of which contains the date.† The firmament is enlightened by the sect of Ahmed—God is the protector of the religion of Ahmed; and, as a distinctive appellation for this race, they were thenceforth called Ahmedy.” A proceeding of this horrible nature, recorded in his own words, and sung by the laureat of the court, as one of the exploits of his reign, gives an authentic impress of mind, which no professed delineation of character is capable of conveying: the true numbers were about thirty thousand: the murderous consequences of thus wantonly driving off the peaceful and unoffending inhabitants of his own country into captivity and agony, were not so fatal as in some subsequent cases when the captives were exclusively from the sea coast; but as far as could be ascertained from conjecture, one third of the number did not survive the first year.

In returning to the upper countries the route through Bullum afforded an opportunity of quelling, for a time, the long pro-

* Actually the males of every age!

† Dates for inscriptions, are always recorded in verses, the powers of whose numerical letters amount to the required numbers. Ahmed and Mahommed are from the same root, which signifies, praise, not generally, but exclusively the praise of God. The Chelas of the western coast received the name of Ahmedy, in the manner described in the text: those from Coromandel were named Assud Ullah, Lions of the Lord.
tracted rebellion of these mountaineers: and thence the army proceeded, for a similar purpose, into the adjacent hills and forests of Coorg. The brave and unconquerable natives of this country, yielding occasionally to overwhelming force, had never failed to re-assert their independence, whenever the pressure was removed; and held in a perfectly impartial repugnance the Mahommedan faith, and the braminical code, to which it had succeeded in Mysoor, as well from religious abhorrence, as from the common invasion of all the rights of landed property practised by the professors of both religions. We have seen that early in 1782 Hyder had made a considerable detachment under Woffadar to the woods of Coorg, where a fort (Mercara) which he had built for overawing the natives, had been invested soon after his descent into Coromandel, and provisioned with difficulty by the provincial troops. Woffadar was so far successful as to capture the family of the Raja recently deceased, among whom was a youth aged fourteen, afterwards Raja, the author of the historical tract noticed in the preface *; but had entirely failed in tranquilizing the country, or possessing any portion of it beyond the ground actually occupied by his military posts. When Tippoo entered it with his whole army, the inhabitants yielded, as usual, to necessity, and apparent quiet was restored. The Sultaun, after reciting, in a style worthy of the thousand and one nights, his adventures in a cave † of several leagues in extent in pursuit of the head of the insurgents, Oootê Naîg ‡, who escaped and died at Tellicherry, relates his having called together the inhabitants

* Page xix.
† Ghar, divested of fable, it was probably a deep glen.
‡ The person, whom he nicknames Cootê Naick, Captain Dog; see preface.
CHAP. to harangue them on the subject of their moral and political sins. “If” says he, “six brothers dwell together in one house, and the elder brother marries, his wife becomes equally the wife of the other five, and the intercourse, so far from being disgraceful, is familiarly considered as a national rite*; not a man in the country knows his father, and the ascendency of women, and bastardy of children, is your common attribute; from the period of my father’s conquest of the country, you have rebelled seven times, and caused the death of thousands of our troops; I forgive you once more, but if rebellion be ever repeated, I have made a vow to God, to honour every man of the country with Islâm; I will make them aliens to their home, and establish them in a distant land, and thus at once extinguish rebellion, and plurality of husbands, and initiate them in the more honourable practices of Islâm.”

A considerable period intervened between this pacification and the next revolt, in which (independently of Mahratta affairs and the regulation of his government, to both of which subjects we shall return) he made a progress to Bangalore, accompanied by the whole of his harem, which he established in this salubrious spot, and did not remove until the siege of 1791.

A person named Zeen-ul-ab-u-Deen-Mahdavee was left as foujedâr of Coorg, and in the exercise of a power too customary among Mussulmans, forcibly carried off the sister of a person named Mummatee, who being enraged at the indignity, incited the inhabitants, who sought but an ostensible motive, and a leader, to rise in a general revolt; and the foujedâr soon found

* Perfectly true.
his possessions limited to the walls of Mercara. Among the Sultaun’s officers, was a person of the same name, as the foujedâr, surnamed Shustereeh* (from Suza, the birth-place of his ancestors) who had entered his service in Coromandel; in the interval between his father’s death and his departure for Bednore, this person had, with a view to his future fortunes, made himself well acquainted with the English system of tactics; he had travelled into most of the European settlements, and had observed in an acute, but superficial manner, the institutions which might be introduced as improvements among his countrymen, and his taste for innovation coincided with the ruling passion of his new master; he would any where in India be deemed a man of letters, and at Tippoo’s court was decidedly at the head of the few who possessed any literary pretension. Among the improvements already introduced was a repudiation of the infidel words of command in the exercise of the infantry, and the substitution of terms adopted from the Persian language, which, with a corresponding treatise on tactics, Tippoo had distributed as his own for the guidance of his officers. Among the most masterly branches of this performance was esteemed the instructions for military operations in a close country; and the Sultaun thought he could not do better than send the author who held the rank of brigadier, attended by a suitable reinforcement, to suppress the rebellion. The military flame did not seem to blaze with much lustre in the breast of the man of letters; no progress was made; he wrote to the Sultaun that nothing but his own presence with the main army would terminate the war,

* The person noticed in the preface, page xx.
and Tippoo answered with the bitter taunt of wondering why he could not execute his own theory. He did, however, move late in October, and entering Coorg in two columns, burned and destroyed the patches of open country, and compelled the inhabitants to take refuge in the woods, where they, as usual, refrained from any decisive operation. Some delay was necessary in making strong detachments to the frontier, in every direction, with a view to his ultimate measures for the future tranquillity of Coorg; but every thing being ready along the whole circumference, his troops began to contract the circle, beating up the woods before them as if dislodging so much game*, and by these means closed in on the great mass of the population, male and female, amounting to about 70,000, and drove them off like a herd of cattle to Seringapatam, where the Sultaun's threats were but too effectually executed. The proprietors of land constitute the greater portion of the military population of Coorg; the labours of husbandry are chiefly performed by a perfectly distinct race (adscripti glebæ) conjectured to be the aboriginal possessors, and their masters to be descended from the conquering army of the Cadumba Kings. These slaves were separated from the other prisoners, and assigned to new Mahommedan settlers, who were to be encouraged to remove thither from various parts of his possessions; but this scheme, at first attended to, and soon afterwards falling into neglect and abuse, from the prevalence of some newer project, shared the common fate of a large portion of his abortive designs.

* The description of Aurungzebe's field sports, in Somerville's Chace, is a true picture of the actual Eastern hunt.
In the interval between these two expeditions to Coorg which convenience of narrative has drawn together, operations were in progress which ended in more serious hostility. The peace of Mangalore was evidently concluded to avert an impending confederacy with a distinct view to the separate subjugation of its members: at the very moment of signing this peace, and at every subsequent period of his life, the Sultaun openly avowed to his own subjects, and to his French* allies, the determination of waiting a more favourable opportunity to unite with them for the destruction of the English power; and any European interference being for the present effectually removed, he was at liberty to begin with either of his other enemies, the Mahrattas or Nizam Ali, the latter of whom had certainly been unfaithful to the confederacy against the English, whatever the original merits of that confederacy may have been. Immediately after the Sultaun’s return from Mangalore in 1784, he had tried the effect of terror on this prince by asserting claims of sovereignty over Vijeyapoor, and the consequent royal right (whence derived over the successor to the kingdom of Golconda does not appear) of enforcing the adoption of his newly invented measures of length and capacity, and other novelties, sealed standards of which were transmitted for the purpose. In

* Kirkpatrick’s Tippoo’s letters; a performance to which I acknowledge great obligation in fixing a variety of dates, from the early part of 1785, to the beginning of 1787. I have carefully compared the translation in Colonel Kirkpatrick’s work of the manuscript memoir of Tippoo’s life, in his possession, with the corresponding passages in the Sultaun-u-Towareekh, and find little or no variation, excepting that the latter appears to have been much better written: the reader has had the opportunity of appreciating the small portion of truth contained in either.
what manner this absurd insult was received does not distinctly appear, except in the early arrival at Seringapatam of an envoy from Nizam Ali; and the very obvious consequence of his seeking a closer union with the Mahrattas against these alarming pretensions of the Sultaun, with whom they were known at the same time to have a separate ground of quarrel.

When Hyder, in consequence of his negotiations with Ragoba, possessed himself of the Mahratta territory, between the Kistna and Toombuddra, he felt the expediency of conforming to the suggestions of Ragoba's envoy, in leaving certain of the forts and territories in the hands of their Mahratta possessors, satisfied with the usual loose profession of allegiance to the state of Mysoor: among these was the Dêshaye of Neergôond, a hill fort of considerable strength, situated between two branches of the river Malpurba. This chief was connected with the family of Purseram Bhow, of Meritch, a leader of considerable power, by a double intermarriage of their respective sons and daughters; and his refusal of certain demands made by Tippoo, was followed by an intimation from Poona early in 1785, that an arrear of three years' tribute* was due by Mysoor. The debt was not denied, but evaded; in order that by the previous possession of Neergôond, and other similar places, he might have a stronger hold of this new line of frontier, before the commencement of a Mahratta war: and the Mahrattas, who did not on the other hand question his claim of customary tribute from Neergôond, declared that they would not suffer the

* Eleven lacs a year; see page 210, of this volume.
exaction of the larger demand made by Tippoo, founded on the allegation of plunder and misconduct. Tippoo for once argued reasonably, that there was an end of his authority, if a foreign power were at liberty to dictate his conduct to his own subjects; and dispatched a respectable force under his cousin and brother-in-law Burhan-u-Deen. Kummer-u-Deen (his cousin german) who had previously been ordered from Kurpa to Seringapatam, was directed to change his route and proceed in the same direction. Burhan-u-Deen appears to have commenced the siege late in February or early in March; Kummer-u-Deen did not join before the 10th or 12th of April; and immediately afterwards the forces which had been collected by Purseram Bhow, for the purpose to which they were sufficient, of relieving the place when besieged by only one of the corps, were attacked by the combined force which raised the siege for that purpose; there was little serious fighting, and the superiority was claimed by both, but the result was clearly testified, by the forward movement of the Mysoreans, which enabled them to reduce on the 5th of May, the fort of Ramdroog, beyond the northern or true Malpurba, an acquisition which covered and facilitated their subsequent operations against Neergôond. The siege of that place was accordingly resumed; but the absurd arrangement of ordering the two divisions to co-operate, instead of vesting the command in one superior officer, soon produced its natural effects: no dramatic representation can exceed the childishness of their reciprocal complaints to the Sultaun, or his simplicity in desiring them to be good friends, and follow the advice of three excellent old officers, assigned to them as a sort of military council, either of whom would have finished the siege in half
In spite of these blunders, the place was reduced to such extremities, that Kāla Pundit (or Kallapa), the Dēshaye, was induced to capitulate: this extremity had been deemed imminent very long before it actually occurred; and the Sultaun’s ferocious and unprincipled mind was abundantly unfolded in his orders to put to the sword in the event of assault, every living thing, man, woman, child, dog, or cat; with the single exception of Kāla Pundit (of course, for future torture); but to employ every contrivance of truth or falsehood * which may induce the besieged to surrender the fort.” The unhappy Dēshaye demanded for his security the sanction of oaths;—“But what,” said the Sultaun, “is the use of oaths on this occasion? You must conjointly by every possible artifice and deceit persuade the besieged to evacuate the fort.” The possession of his own letters gives a picture of premeditated atrocity, which, however practised by other tyrants, has seldom been established by evidence of equal authenticity; and the sequel can excite no surprise. The Dēshaye descended under the escort of a select guard of his own men, on the faith of personal security, and free permission to depart; he was detained under a variety of pretences, and the vigilance and desperate aspect of his little guard, was such as to restrain Burhān-u-Deen for nearly two months from overpowering them by open violence, the object however was effected on the 6th of October. The unfortunate Kāla Pundit was dispatched in irons to Seringapatam, and thence to the well known fort at Cabaldroog, with his family, one individual excepted, a daughter, who was seized for the harem of the Sultaun. Kittoor the

* Such is the literal translation of the words rendered by Colonel Kirkpatrick; means, fair or foul.
residence of another Dêshaye, was next seized by a similar treachery, and Burhân-u-Deen cantoned in the neighbourhood of Darwar.

The Mahrattas being foiled in their purpose of saving Neergôond, and being desirous before undertaking a serious invasion of Mysoor, to insure the co-operation of Nizam Ali, and if possible, of the English; postponed, until the ensuing year, the execution of their designs; and Tippoo’s envoys at Poona, continued by a series of deceptions to prolong their stay; the mind of the Sultaun seeming to fluctuate between the alternative of paying the money due, or attempting by a war to relieve himself from past and future claims.

Meanwhile, the force under the separate command of Kummer-u-Deen was ordered to return to Seringapatam. The Sultaun had originally planned the seizure, by surprise, of Advânée, the jageer of the late Bazálut Jung, and now the possession of Nizam Ali, with whom he was at peace, by directing this force, on the pretext of returning to Kurpa, to cross the Toombuddra at the ford of Comply, to the eastward of Vijeyanuggur, a direct route which would lead him without suspicion within reach of his enterprise; but the state of affairs in Coorg requiring at this juncture a large portion of his disposable force, he directed the route to be changed for the more direct road to the capital. Kummer-u-Deen, however, continued the eastern road for the alleged convenience of forage, and was reported at court to have sent an envoy to Hyderabad, and to have shewn direct indications of a design to join Nizam Ali with the force under his command, and to place himself and his jageer under the protection of that prince. While the Sultaun was engaged in the arrangements
preparatory to entering Coorg, the second time, the death occurred of a person of some eminence, Serāj-u-Deen Mahmood Khan, formerly Mufti at Arcot, and afterwards the chief officer in Mysoor of the department of Justice. The Sultaun ordered his remains to be placed in a palankeen, and conveyed, with all the circumstances of honourable distinction, to be interred at Seringapatam. As the procession drew near, the rumour was spread, that the Sultaun was dead, and his corpse approaching. This report circulated with the utmost rapidity over all India, including the European settlements, and was so entirely and steadily credited, that Mr. Macpherson, then Governor-General of the English possessions, actually dispatched from Bengal an embassy* to the successor, or rather the Lord Protector, in behalf of the infant heir; an office which the same rumour assigned to Kummer-u-Deen. The designed propagation of such a rumour was, in all subsequent times, so steadily denied at court, that the general opinion in Mysoor refers it to the accidental circumstance above related: but any other foundation than design would involve an early anxiety to contradict the rumour, and Kummer-u-Deen, for whom it was evidently designed, deceived by reiterated assurances of the fact, acted as might reasonably be expected on the supposition either of good or of bad intentions; he left orders with his troops to follow by forced marches, and proceeded post to the capital, where he was instantly placed under arrest; stripped of all his jageers and offices, and the troops which had hitherto been subject to his immediate authority, were dispersed and incorporated with the other

* The error was discovered before they could leave Madras.
divisions of the army. For two years after this event, Kummer-u-Deen remained in disgrace, and without any provision for his maintenance; at the expiration of that time, a monthly pay of five hundred rupees, or 750l. a year, was assigned to him, and such was the highest amount of personal provision ever made by Tippoo, for a chief who, in the opinion of the English Government, held the first place and the highest influence at his court. In effect, Kummer-u-Deen, together with the troops of his immediate contingent, had immediately after his father's death in 1781 been placed by Hyder under the orders and particular protection of Tippoo; and the former, an enterprising and indiscreet young officer, was in the habit of treating with levity both the commands and the military pretensions of his relation: on Tippoo's accession to empire he was not of a disposition to be scrupulous in finding pretexts, if they did not exist. The overt precipitation of Kummer-u-Deen in seeking to avail himself of his sovereign's supposed death, formed a sufficient ground for the indulgence of avarice as well as resentment: and it is no novelty in the history of oriental despotism, that in a predicament to quench the ardor and shake the allegiance of a native of the west, he was afterwards employed on occasions of difficulty, to execute particular services; but although exercising occasional command, he never did, after 1785, possess any other influence or authority than what might eventually arise from the good opinion of the troops.
CHAPTER XXXI.

Negotiations of the Poona Mahrattas, for the eventual conquest of Mysoor — Sindia's experiment on the new Governor-General, Mr. Macpherson — Demand of Choute — Forced apology and disavowal — Nana Farnavese persuades himself, that he may consider the English as a reserve at command, in case of danger, but is unwilling to allow them a participation of advantage — Begins the war confederated with Nizam Ali only — Tippoo assumes the rank of King — Circumstances attending the ceremonial — Reasons — Confedérates open the campaign with the siege of Baddanee — Burhán-u-Deen acts defensively — The Sultana makes his first marches in that direction — but deviates to Adwánee — Reasons for this line of operation — Siege pushed with precipitation — Assault repelled with great slaughter — A second assault repulsed — Confedérates approach — Tippoo raises the siege — Reasons for evacuating the place — Operation covered by a partial action — River fills immediately after they had retired across it — Tippoo returns to resume the siege — but the garrison march out at the opposite gate, and he takes quiet possession — Removes the stores, and dismantles the place — Determines to remove the seat of war across the river — A daring attempt, which succeeds from its great improbability — Confedérates arrive too late — Operations — Tippoo's junction with Burhán-u-Deen — Hostile armies encamp in view of each other, near Savanooor — Night attack, and cannonade in the morning, favourable to Tippoo — Confedérates assume a position near Savanooor — Dislodged — Tippoo enters the town — The Nabob takes the protection of the Mahrattas, in preference to that of his son-in-law — Cause of the disagreement — Demands exacted in a manner ruinous to the country — and consequent resentment — Quiet celebration of an annual festival in both armies — Negotiation — Tippoo's challenge to Holkar — and his reply — A more successful night attack — Corps mounted on camels — Tippoo moves to Behauder Benda — Siege and capture — Infraction of the capitulation — Subsequent movements
— Night attacks — Reasons of each for severally desiring peace —
Conditions ultimately settled — Cessions — Pecuniary payments by Tippoo — Instances of bad faith and inhumanity — Confederates retire — Tippoo instantly re-occupies one of the ceded places — Sultan’s account of his night attacks — Seizure and murder of the poligars Raidroog and Harponelly, and assumption of their territory.

In the meanwhile Nana Furnavese, the minister at Poona, was employing all the arts of Indian diplomacy, to frame such a confederacy as should ensure, not only the exaction of the unpaid tribute, but the recovery of the territory between the rivers, lost in the civil war of Ragoba. To the moment of the ratification of peace with Tippoo, Mr. Hastings had not only encouraged his advances, but actually urged their execution; and when he had given his reluctant assent to the treaty of Mangalore, which he greatly disapproved, he was deemed by the Mahrattas to have considered it as a truce of short continuance. Mr. Macpherson succeeded him early in 1785; and Sindea, who had paid to the talents and energy of Mr. Hastings the homage of a very sincere desire to preserve the relations of amity, considered the nerve and intellect of the new Governor-General the fair object of a decisive Mahratta experiment, the requisition of choute. A mere refusal did not seem to the new Governor-General to meet the character of the demand; and he declared without hesitation, that if Sindea should decline to apologise for the insult, and instantly to disavow all claim of choute, on any and every part of the British possessions, his refusal or his silence should be considered and treated as a declaration of war. The disavowal was prompt; and this incident was considered by Nana as direct evidence of a disposition to give effect to an op-
Union known to be nearly universal among the English, that the peace of 1784, was a history of indignities incompatible with that character which formed the basis of their power. There is ground for believing, that a construction to this effect was annexed by the envoy to some observations which fell from Mr. Macpherson in conversation on the subject, and the communications of Mr. Anderson at Sindea's court, did not at any time discourage such opinions. On the occasion of the supposed death of Tippoo, the avowal of the Governor-General of his wish to improve the alliance with both Nizam Ali and the Mahrattas appeared to them an indirect advance for an offensive treaty; and it is supposed that the Mahratta envoy at Calcutta stated his own conviction, that English co-operation was attainable, on such conditions as they should deem advantageous to themselves. This was the precise issue which Nana desired; for he believed that the object might be attained by the union of every branch of the Mahratta confederacy with Nizam Ali; and excepting in the case of urgent necessity, he did not seek the participation of the English in the expected advantages of the war, which extended in prospect to the entire partition of the Mysorean dominions. All the preliminary conditions, including the previous exaction of a considerable sum by way of choute from Nizam Ali, were adjusted; and the armies assembled for field operations, early in 1786; and soon afterwards formed a junction near the Kistna, where a personal conference was held between Nana and Nizam Ali, for the purpose of digesting the plan of the war; after which they returned to their respective capitals, leaving the command of the Mahratta contingents of all the chiefs to Hurry Punt, and of Nizam Ali's to Tohuvver Jung.
Tippoo Sultaun's return from Coorg to his capital took place early in January, when the question of peace or war was still undecided. Previously to the act of circumcision, on one and the same day, of the great mass of the Coorgs, it was necessary to fix on an auspicious moment, and none could be so proper for proclaiming the royal dignity which he had now determined to assume, as that on which so great a number of infidels should be converted to the true faith: the services of all the astrologers were accordingly put in requisition. The whole intention does not seem to have been publicly announced, but all Mahommedans were summoned to attend the reading of the Khutba, at the mosque of the Lâll Baugh. Rumour had announced that something extraordinary was to occur, and an immense croud was assembled. The officiating priest does not even seem to have been intrusted with the secret, and Ali Reza (the person afterwards known to the English as one of the guardians of the hostage princes) ascended the mimer (pulpit;) when he came to that part of the Khutba in which prayers are offered up for the reigning sovereign, instead of the name of Sha Aalum, as then customary over all the mosques of India, he substituted that of Tippoo Sultaun, to the entire astonishment of the great body of the auditors: the reason assigned by the Sultaun, in one of his official letters, is sufficiently conclusive, that Sha Aalum was "the prisoner or servant of Sindea, and none but an idiot could consider him as a sovereign." From that day forward, the chôbdars and attendants were ordered, in announcing the salutations of persons who entered the durbar, to observe the formalities of the court of Delhi, and proclaim the presence of a king, by which title (Padsha) he was ordered to be ad-
dressed and designated by all his subjects; and it was during the march to Bangalore for the Mahratta war, that the change of title became universally known to the army.

The confederates opened the campaign with the siege of Bâ-dâme, a place of strength possessed by the Sultaun, near his northern frontier; the town was carried by a general assault on the 20th of May, and the citadel soon afterwards surrendered. The Mahratta horse spread themselves over the country, while the regular troops were employed in the reduction of the fortresses, in order that they might ultimately advance in strength, having nothing hostile in their rear. On the part of the Sultaun Burhân-u-Deen although reinforced by the disposable troops of Bednore under Budr-u-Zemân Khân his father-in-law, an able and experienced officer, was too weak for offensive operations, but continued to hold the army in check, prudently keeping within a moderate distance of the woods of Soonda and Bednore, as a security for his eventual retreat. The Sultaun, instead of moving as expected by the enemy in the direction of the confederate army, to form a junction with Burhân-u-Deen, as indicated by the early direction of his march from Bangalore, suddenly diverged to the right, and proceeded by forced marches to Adwânée, (Adoni), the strong frontier post of Nizam Ali south of the Toombuddra; and the fact of its containing the family * of his late brother, and his nephew, Mohabbut Jung, is the reason expressly assigned by Tippoo for attacking it: if the confederates should march to oppose him, he would give them battle, and an open field would be left for Burhân-u-Deen; if they should per-

* "Nâmoos," the honour;—meaning the females of the family.
severe in their actual line of operations, he would take Adwânée, and carry off the harems of the brother and nephew of Nizam-Ali. The operations of the siege were pushed, not only with vigour, but precipitation; and an assault was ordered before the breach was deemed practicable, in any opinion but that of the Sultaun. Mohabbut Jung who commanded, knowing the insufficiency of the garrison, and feeling like a Mussulman, the delicacy of his charge, had on Tippoo’s arrival, offered a large sum to purchase his forbearance, and the widow of the deceased had addressed to him a letter of the utmost humility, imploring his commiseration. To both of these propositions, the most coarse and contumelious answers were returned, and having determined that the assault should be given, and would succeed, his orders were less directed to those combinations on which its success must depend, than to the subsequent security of the treasure and captures; and his mind seemed to be far less occupied with the possibility of failure, than with obscene jests, regarding the future destination of the inhabitants of the harem. But Mohabbut Jung, on the rude rejection of his first offers, had made the most manly and determined arrangements for a desperate defence, and repelled the several columns of assault, at every point, with great slaughter, and soon afterwards a similar assault of another breach, was repulsed with the same energy and effect. The approach of the confederates had probably contributed to this premature attempt, for not only their united army, but a separate force from Hyderabad, were in forced march to save the place. — In about ten days, therefore, after this failure, he necessarily raised the siege, having previously removed all his guns and
Chap. stores from the batteries, and occupied a position a few miles to
the southward of the place.

The period of the annual swelling of the rivers had arrived;
it was therefore for the confederates to decide on transferring
the seat of war to the south of the Toombuddra, on this new
line, where no depôts or communications had been previously
established, or after removing the women, to leave Adwânee to
its fate; and they adopted the latter alternative. Moghul Ali
Khân, youngest brother of Nizam Ali, made a forward move-
ment, with a large division of the army, and brought on a par-
June 27. tial action, while the remainder manoeuvred to impress on
the enemy the intention of a combined attack on the ensuing
day, but in effect to compel a concentration of his force, and
restrict his intelligence of the actual evacuation of the place,
which commenced on the instant of their arrival, and was com-
pleted in three days, a degree of haste which proved to have
been fortunate, as regarded the plan of operations actually
adopted, for they had scarcely recrossed the river when it filled,
and rendered it impracticable for Tippoo to follow them, if he
had been so disposed. And this inconsistent reasoner, who in-
cessantly bestows on his enemies epithets to designate their
being the objects of divine wrath, ascribes their escape on this
occasion to the aid of the Almighty. The arrangements for
retreat, however precipitate, must have been conducted with
ability, as the nearest ford of the river is distant twenty-five
miles, and the Sultaun had no opportunity of molesting even
their rear-guard. The filling of the river left him free, as
he supposed, to resume the siege; but on his return, he found
this labour unnecessary. Such were the miserable combinations of the confederacy, that this strong and important frontier fortress was not provided with the stores deemed requisite for a siege; and whether by order, or through fear, the garrison left for its defence, marched out by the west face, while the Sultaun's troops entered it by the south, without an attempt at dismantling the place; the guns were found mounted on the works, the arsenal and storehouses, the equipage of the palace, down, as Tippoo affirms, to the very clothing of the women, was found in the exact state of a mansion ready furnished for the reception of a royal establishment. The Sultaun, however, foresaw the probability of being obliged to relinquish the place on the conclusion of peace, as he immediately removed the guns and stores to Gooty and Bellary, and effectually destroyed the fortifications.

The confederates deemed themselves secure, during the season in which the rivers should be full, of an unmolested scope for their operations to the northward of the Toombuddra, and moved to the more western line on which they had commenced their operations, and where little was to be apprehended from the inferior force of Bûrhan-u-Deen. The Sultaun affirms that he determined to remove the seat of the war to the northward of the river, contrary to the opinion of a council of his generals, who predicted the destruction of the first division which should pass, before it could be supported; but it is certain that the actual operation was founded on the remote distance of all means of effectual resistance; the greater portion of basket-boats required for the passage of the river were constructed in the province of Bednore, and floated down the river, to various points higher up
the stream than the intended scene of operation: an arrangement indicating not much respect for the vigilance of an enemy, who could allow their unobserved descent. On the 23d of August a detachment of a thousand men crossed in the night at a place named Kurrucknaut*, and seized a small village fort which commanded the passage. In the morning of the 24th, the infantry and guns commenced passing in basket-boats and rafts, and on the 30th the whole army and all its equipments had gained the northern bank without any opposition, during those seven critical days, that amounted to more than mere skirmishing. The operation had really succeeded from its great improbability; for the confederates had never reckoned on an attempt so daring and dangerous among the grounds of calculation. They approached however when too late, and encamped within a few miles of the Sultaun; the ground was found to be unfavourable to the employment of their superior cavalry, and after examining the position, they moved in the direction of Savanoor with the view of drawing the Sultaun into the plain country. He followed, keeping the river as close on his left as the ground admitted, drawing his subsistence from the opposite bank; and determined to avoid a general action until he should be joined by Burhân-u-Deen who was descending by the left bank of the Werda, pressed by superior numbers. Two night attacks were attempted by the Sultaun as he approached Savanoor, the first on the 11th of September, and the second a few days afterwards; neither was attended with any decisive effect. On as-

* I have omitted to make any written note of the exact situation of this place, and cannot supply the defect, either from memory or a reference to any of the maps.
ascending towards the confluence of the two rivers, a considerable bend occurs in the united stream, and a plain is to be crossed to attain the point on the Werda most favourable for effecting the junction; but before attempting this combined movement, he detached by a circuitous route a reinforcement for Burhān-u-Deen of two brigades, and some irregulars under Ghâzee Khân, the Sultaun’s earliest military preceptor, and esteemed by Hyder the best partisan in his army. Every thing succeeded. The junction was formed, without serious impediment; the confederates encamped some miles in front of the fort of Savanoor, and the Sultaun occupied a strong position in full view of their camp, with the river Werda, then fordable, in the rear of his right.

For two or three days, Tippoo made every afternoon demonstrations of a serious attack, and after driving in the outposts, returned to his position. On the third or fourth night, when he expected the enemy to reckon on no more than a similar bravado, he made his dispositions for a serious attack, of which his own narrative corresponds in all material circumstances, with more authentic information. He divided his force into four columns, the left centre of which was commanded by himself; and after retiring from his afternoon’s bravado, and merely giving the troops time for their evening meal, he moved off by a considerable detour of the two right columns, for the purpose of a combined attack on the enemy’s left and centre, about an hour before day-light. It was concerted, that on the head of his own column reaching its destined point of attack, he should fire a signal gun, (a strange branch of an attack by surprize,) which was immediately to be answered by the heads of the other three, in order that each might ascertain the position of the others, and in-
stantly afterwards commence the attack. On approaching a small outpost, his own column was challenged; and the Sultaun, as if determined on communicating information of his approach, personally gave orders for the discharge of a few platoons of musquetry. He then advanced, and when near the camp fired the signal gun, but looked and listened in vain for reply: after much delay and anxiety he fired another signal, which was answered by one only. He however moved on, and entering the camp a little before the dawn, he actually found himself accompanied by no more than three hundred men. A dark and rainy night had caused the heads of all the columns, excepting his own, to lose their way, and each column had, from the same causes, been broken into several divisions, each pursuing at random separate routes; fortunately, as the light became more perfect, all were within view, and he was enabled to make a disposition; but the camp was empty, and the hostile army appeared regularly drawn up on a height which overlooked their late ground: a cannonade ensued, and according to the Sultaun’s account, he ordered no return to be made from his guns of good calibre, for the purpose of encouraging the enemy to advance* in the confidence of their being left in camp; the deception is said to have succeeded and the enemy to have been repulsed with heavy loss; and there can be no doubt of the day having terminated unfavourably for the confederates, who fell back to a position resting its left on the fort of Savanoor. From this position they were dislodged after an interval of two days, and the Sultaun entered

* The peculiar phraseology of the Sultaun has been noticed in the preface; a particular term for describing the movements of the enemy, was there omitted; hurry-kut-e-mezboohy; “the convulsive motion of a slaughtered animal.”
without opposition into Savanoor, which had been evacuated by the nabob Abd-ul-Heckeem, who placed himself at the mercy of the Mahrattas, in preference to the protection of the person whom he had been accustomed to address as a son. We have seen * that on the occasion of a double marriage between the families in 1779, one of the conditions of enlarging the possessions of Savanoor, was the maintenance for Hyder’s service of a body of two thousand select Patân horse, to be commanded by one of his sons, and this body had joined Hyder for the invasion of Coromandel. The hardships of the service, and particularly Tippoo’s improvidence in marching cavalry into the low countries of Canara in 1783, had destroyed great numbers of horses, and the same cause had induced individual horsemen, mounted and dismounted, to abscond and return to their homes. On the Sultaun’s return from Mangalore, in 1784, he ordered a muster of this contingent, and 500 men and horses only were forth-coming. He therefore commanded the ministers of Savanoor, to repair to Seringapatam, and settle the account of deficiencies, and he made out a balance in his own favour, of 21 lacs of rupees, for which the ministers gave the conditional engagement of two soucars, (bankers) who had the usual collateral security of the revenues, and the sanction of a guard of the Sultaun’s troops, to enforce the collection. Abd-ul-Heckeem, who had debts, and not treasures, gave up, in the first instance, all his family jewels, estimated at only three lacs, and desired his ministers and soucars, to levy the remainder on the country, in the best manner they were able. It is only for readers unacquainted

* Vol. ii. page 206.
with the details of Mahommedan finance, that it may be requisite to relate the ordinary consequences of anticipated revenue, put into such a train of liquidation. These harpies, exclusively of the regular receipts, found pretexts for seizing and putting to the torture, all landholders suspected to possess money; an amount superior to the balance was supposed to be levied, but the ministers and bankers taking into their joint consideration, how large a portion was due by ordinary usage, for their own trouble, allowed about one-half the amount to reach the Sultaun's treasury, and represented the impossibility of raising the remainder. One of the bankers paid the debt of nature, in the midst of his iniquities, and the other was remanded to Seringapatam. According to precedent, he ought to have been able to compromise this bad debt, for a small sum, but he actually remained in prison, and was murdered (perhaps contrary to intention) in the general massacre of prisoners in 1791. Abd-ul-Heckeem continued to be goaded and threatened for the balance, up to the very opening of the campaign, when the Sultaun began to relax and endeavour to deceive: but this unfortunate and improvident chief, disgusted to the last degree, by the harshness and cruelty inflicted on himself and his country, determined to join the confederates with the handful of men he was still able to keep together, and on this occasion, the retreat of his friends, leaving his capital at the Sultaun's mercy, he fled to their camp, and thence as a fugitive, a wanderer, and a pauper, he was advised for the present to take refuge behind the Kistna.

After these movements, neither party seemed desirous for some time of coming into serious contact, the confederates moving eastward for better forage, and the Sultaun establishing
his head quarters about nine miles from Savanoor; in which situations both the Mahommedan armies quietly proceeded to perform the ceremonies of the Moherrem, during which period no attempt was made on either side beyond the desultory skirmishing of Hindoo partisans and foragers, and on the Sultaun’s the uninterrupted plunder of every thing of value left in Savanoor. From this ground he dispatched a diplomatic messenger, really to treat of peace, but according to his own statement for a very different purpose. The incident of Brigadier-General Macleod’s challenge in 1783 was too rich and original to be dismissed with one specimen of eloquence and prowess. He accordingly relates, that the herald was charged to deliver to Tuccajee Holkar (in the absence of Nizam Ali to whom the precedence was due) a speech to the following effect. “You have obtained experience in feats of arms, and are distinguished among the chiefs for superior valour. Now that war has commenced its destructive career, and thousands are doomed to fall; why should we longer witness the causeless effusion of human blood? It is better that you and I should singly descend into the field of combat, let the Almighty determine who is the conqueror and who the vanquished, and let that result terminate the contest. Or if you have not sufficient confidence in your own single arm, take to your aid from one to ten men of your own selection, and I will meet you with equal numbers. Such was the practice in the days of our prophet, and though long discontinued, I desire to renew that species of warfare. But if prudence should dictate your declining the second proposition also, let the two armies be drawn out, select your weapons, and let us, chief opposed to chief, horseman
CHAP. to horsemanship and foot soldier to foot soldier, engage in pitched battle, and let the vanquished become the subjects of the victors? This speech (not more fictitious perhaps than parallel records of classical literature, but presenting an efficient contrast to the taste and intellect of those admired productions) is represented to have caused Holkar to tremble for his life, not a very consistent effect on an individual distinguished for rash fearlessness. But the reply exhibits a nearer approach to the national character; "the passion for fighting (he is made to say) had not descended to him from his ancestors, but rather the hereditary trade of flying, plundering, burning, and destroying, and the petty warfare which involves but little danger." The warlike herald of romance was however the real harbinger of peace, he was charged with separate instructions to propitiate some of the chiefs by bribery: and with assurances of a pacific nature to the confederates at large. Under cover however of the negligence and security which he expected these demonstrations to produce; the Sultaun moved on pretence of forage, and by a forced march from his new ground he made another and more successful night attack, in which, without encountering any serious opposition, he got possession, among other booty, of the splendid camp equipage of Tohuvver Jung*, and the camels which conveyed it; variously estimated, in different manuscripts, but in none at less than five hundred animals; a vain impediment which caused the capture of nearly the whole of the useful stores of that army: the Mahrattas, who on all occasions are entitled to the praise of vigilance, lost neither animals nor stores; and

* He commanded the forces of Nizam Ali.
the retreat of both was conducted with so much rapidity, as to produce no other military consequences of importance. It is probable that the number of camels captured, considerably exceeded five hundred, for that exact number was immediately formed into a corps of 1000 men, each camel carrying two foot soldiers armed with muskets, who in the spirit of contempt for established practice which marked all the Sultaun's theories, were also charged with the care and feeding of those delicate animals*, a business which every child in his army knew to be the trade, and not an easy one, of a particular class of men; and few of the animals survived that single campaign.

From the ground thus precipitately abandoned, the confederates moved north-east towards Gujjender Ghur, and Tippoo, in a more easterly direction, towards Copul, and Behauder Benda, two little forts near to each other, which had (treacherously as he states) been surrendered to the confederates in the early part of the campaign. After a short siege, of which a long and inflated account is given, the latter place surrendered by capitulation; the Arabs, composing a portion of the garrison, were suffered to depart with their arms, but in violation of the terms, the Hindoo match-lock men, formerly of Tippoo's garrison, who had transferred their allegiance to the Maharattas, were punished by the excision of their noses and ears, and Hamaumut Naig their chief, by the amputation of both his legs.

The subsequent movements, which, on the Sultaun's part had chiefly for their object, the disturbance of the enemy's night-

* Hardy, as regards thirst, but in every other respect requiring great care to keep them in working condition: this remark is confined to the south of India, the only situation to which the author's means of personal observation have extended.
quarters, were generally unfavourable to the confederates, and particularly to the ill organized troops of Nizam Ali who had reason to be weary of the war. On the part of the Mahrattas the confidence had been such at its commencement as to keep back a large portion of their contingents, and particularly the respectable infantry of Sindea. We have stated the grounds on which Nana Farseenavi had hoped for the eventual support of the English, but Lord Cornwallis, who had in this year succeeded to the Government-General, had anticipated the question, by directing all equivocal expectations to be extinguished, and a distinct avowal to be made, that the English would engage in none but defensive wars. A gratuitous declaration; of dubious expediency; uncalled for by any demand of explanation; and exclusively advantageous to his expected enemy.

There is reason to conclude that Tippoo believed in the original expectations of his adversary, and distrusted the pacific intentions of the English, whose military establishments, directed for the first time by military governors, were at this period organized with a degree of care, which seemed to indicate the expectation of war; for on any other grounds it would be difficult to explain his open anxiety for terminating a contest in which he had uniformly triumphed. However this may be, on the return of answers to the letters which he had really addressed to Holkar and Rastia, through whose mediation the advances were made, he sent a public deputation of two persons of the highest rank in his service, Bдри-p-Zemân and Ali Reza Khân, a measure of Indian diplomacy liable to the construction of inferiority. The negotiations however were drawn to a considerable length, chiefly by reciprocal subterfuge,
but at length were terminated on the following principles. Tippoo was indebted in the whole sum of four years' tribute, which, previously to the war of Coromandel, Hyder had stipulated to pay, on the condition of being acknowledged as the indisputed lord of every thing south of the Kistna from sea to sea. The annurnal sum was twelve lacs of rupees tribute, and three lacs durbar expences, total sixty lacs, from which a deduction was obtained of fifteen lacs in compensation of damages* sustained by the war; of the remaining forty-five lacs thirty were actually paid, and fifteen were promised at the expiration of a year. The cession of Badâmi and the restitution of Advânce, Kittoor, and above all of Neergóond, the original cause or pretext of the war, completed the indications of submission, and confirmed the existence of some motive more powerful than the apparent state of the campaign. Of the payment and restitutions not a word is to be found in the King of histories, excepting that on adjusting the conditions, the Mahrattas begged, for the gratification of their prince, who was an infant, something to buy sweetmeats, and one or two villages as a jageer dependent on the Sultaun. Of his ill faith and inhumanity, it may be received as an illustration, that on the very day that the conditions were finally settled, he ordered his commandant at Advanee, "to collect with the utmost expedition, all he could from the country, to encompass completely two or three towns, and getting together five or seven thousand people, report the particulars, as men are wanted for the Assul Illahee corps." The Mahrattas were too well aware of character to move before all

* "Pai-mâulee;" what is trodden under foot.
the conditions were completely fulfilled; but this accomplished, they had scarcely re-crossed the Kistna before Kittoor was reoccupied by the Sultaun's troops.

The success of his night alarms, in the late campaign, had been really considerable, and he is diffuse in his description of various stratagems, by which he kept his enemies perpetually awake, and made them spend their nights "like the owls of ill omen, in the mountains and forests:" of his sending sixteen rocket men in four detachments, to represent the four columns in which he usually moved, and by the discharge of a signal rocket each, to put the confederate army into motion; at length, he says, it became the enemy's custom, to load the baggage after sun-set, and change their ground, in order that he might not know where to find them*: an universal practice of the Indian partisan cavalry, from which he borrowed the tale or they the imitation; and it is certain, from the impression produced in every part of India, by the events of this campaign, that it must have been conducted, on the part of the Sultaun, with a degree of energy and enterprize which established a general opinion of his military superiority.

On his return by a route passing nearly midway between Harponelly and Raidroog, he made detachments, on the pretence of dispersing his army in cantonments, of two brigades, with secret instructions to each of those fortresses; and having

* Among the royal jests, is one regarding Hurry Pundit, the Mahratta Commander-in-chief, who, on the occasion of a night attack, called to his valet for his drawers, and in the dark thrust his two legs into the place intended for one: "you rascal," he exclaimed, "you have given me a bag;" and groping about, found the under garment of his wife, with which he adorned himself, to the great amusement of the beholders, when day light enabled them to discover the mistake.
previously removed all grounds of suspicion, by repeated personal acknowledgments to the poligars of those places, for the distinguished services they had rendered in the late campaign, he seized their chiefs and their principal officers in camp on the same day and hour that the brigades overpowered the unsuspecting garrisons. The cash and effects of every kind, not excepting the personal ornaments of the women, were carried off as royal plunder, and the chiefs were ultimately sent to the accustomed fate of Cabaldroog. The Sultaun relates with complacency the success of his arrangements for the annexation of these dependencies to the royal dominion; their allegiance to his father had been precarious; and on every invasion, they had shewn more attachment to the enemy than to him. In the late campaign, they had concurred in a conspiracy for the assassination of the Sultaun, and the time of retribution had at length arrived! On reading this statement to one of the Sultaun's most zealous advocates, he uttered an involuntary exclamation of its absolute falsehood; and declared, that no two officers, Mahommedan, or Hindoo, had given more distinguished proofs of allegiance to his father and himself than these unfortunate men.
APPENDIX.

No. I.

Curious facts illustrative of the characters of Hyder and Tippoo, referred to from a note in page 146.

It was previously to this campaign, that Hyder exacted from his son the following strange compact, which was found among the archives at Seringapatam, and a fac simile of the original, together with a translation, is published by Major-General Kirkpatrick in his curious and interesting selection of Tippoo's letters.

"Agreement.

"1st. I will not do (any) one thing without the pleasure of your blessed Majesty, Lord of Benefits (or my bountiful Lord): if I do, let me be punished, in whatever manner may seem fitting to your auspicious mind. — One article.

"2d. If in the affairs of the Sircar, I should commit theft, or be guilty of fraud great or small, let me, as the due punishment thereof, be strangled. * — One article.

* Original: — Gul báyed ădd, of the meaning of which expression, I am far from being certain. It may possibly signify to "extinguish," and hence figuratively to put to death. — Kirkpatrick.

Literally, let me be hanged. Gul déna, to hang, (Hindostanee,) and in Mysoor Persian, Gul dáden. It is no impeachment of the learned translator's knowledge, that he did not understand this provincialism. — W.
"3d. If I be guilty of prevarication, or misrepresentation, or of deceit, the due punishment thereof is this same strangulation. — One article.

"4th. Without the orders of the Presence, I will not receive from any one, Nuzzers, &c.; neither will I take things from any one (meaning perhaps forcibly): if I do, let my nose be cut off, and let me be driven out from the city. — One article.

"5th. If, excepting on the affairs of the Sircar, I should hold conversation (probably cabal or intrigue), with any person, or be guilty of deceit, &c., let me, in punishment thereof, be stretched on a cross. — One article.

"6th. Whenever a country shall be committed to my charge by the Sircar, and an army be placed under my command, I will carry on all business regarding the same, with the advice, and through the medium of such confidential persons as may be appointed (for the purpose) by the Sircar; and if I transact such affairs through any other channel than this, let me be strangled. — One article.

"7th. If there should be any occasion for correspondence by writing, or to buy or give (away) any thing, or any letters should arrive from any place, I will do nothing (in such matters) without the concurrence and advice of the person appointed by the Sircar. — One article.

"8th. I have written and delivered these few articles of my own free will; keeping the contents thereof in my heart’s remembrance, I will act in each article accordingly. If I forget this, and act in any other (or different) manner, let me be punished agreeable to the foregoing writing.”

If such a performance were discovered in a miscellaneous mass
of papers, unconnected with names and circumstances, it would probably be interpreted, as the silly contrivance of some savage, to frighten a child. But those who have had access to know the manners of this court, and the characters of the parties, strange as the assertion may seem, will see in it internal evidence of authenticity.

Hyder, from the earliest youth of Tippoo, made no secret of lamenting, that his intellect was of an inferior order, and his disposition wantonly cruel, deceitful, vicious, and intractable. Among the pranks which he practised about this period, two gave particular offence to his father. 1st. In taking his exercise on horseback, it was his particular delight to hunt the sacred bulls of the Hindoo temples, (the Indian apis,) wounding them, and sometimes destroying them with his lance, (indeed after his own accession he made no scruple of recommending this divine animal to his associates as the best beef). Hyder was shocked at these wanton and unprofitable outrages, on the feelings of the great mass of his subjects. 2d. An English soldier who had been made a prisoner during Colonel Smith’s war, had remained in Mysoor, on the liberation of his associates. Tippoo one day took the opportunity of having him suddenly seized, and causing the outward and visible sign of Islam to be inflicted in his presence. Hyder was at the time particularly anxious to conciliate the English; he abused his son in the grossest terms, put him in solitary confinement, and when released, forbade his courtiers to speak with him; an interdiction which was frequently repeated, as the consequence of subsequent offences. On this occasion, as on many others, he predicted that this worthless successor, would lose the empire
which he had created; he observed, that in order to indulge a 
silly prejudice, he had insulted and injured the soldier, in a 
manner which could answer no one rational purpose, and might 
one day bring the vengeance of the English nation on his house. 
On the subject of the second article of the compact, it may 
be necessary to explain, that Tippoo never returned from a de-
tachment, without attempting secret embezzlement of the plun-
der. Hyder on such occasions would lose all patience, and in 
plain terms call him a thief, and a blockhead; observing that he 
had not the common sense to perceive that he was stealing 
from himself: for unhappily, said he, you will be my successor; 
would that I had begotten Ayâz instead of you, (of this Ayâz 
we have already spoken.)

Persian seals are usually marked with the date on which 
they were engraved; the seal to this instrument, inscribed Tip-
poo Sultaín appears to have been engraved in 1769, and as 
General Kirkpatrick observes, this circumstance proves, that the 
title Sultaun was not assumed on his succession, as had been 
supposed, and had become an object of serious diplomatic dis-
cussion, (see the journal of the late Sir C. Ware Mallet in Kirk-
patrick's Tippoo's Letters,) but had probably been given at his 
birth. The observation is perfectly correct, and this may be a 
proper opportunity for explaining the history of the name.

Hyder, from personal communication, and established charac-
ter, had a particular veneration for the celebrated abstracted 
devotee, Tippoo Sultaun of Arcot, (not Colar as stated by Sir 
C. Mallet,) whose superb mausoleum at that place, embellished*by

* The Nabob Tippoo Sultaun, in the year 1786, applied for permission to repair 
and embellish, at his own expense, the mausoleum of the saint, whose name he bore, 
but the permission was refused by Mahommed Ali.
the contributions of pious Mahommedans, continues to be a favourite resort of the devout, from every part of the south of India; and being in Coromandel at the period of the birth of his eldest son, named him after the holy father, who, like most soofi, (pure or abstracted saints,) assumed the royal designation, Shah or Sultaun, the conqueror of his passions, the spiritual lord, the king of the affairs of another world, as the temporal monarch is of this. I do not find among my notes, any temporal history of this spiritual lord. It is probable that he was from the upper country, from the name Tippoo, which in the Canarese language signifies tyger, and he probably assumed that designation, from the tyger being the monarch of the woods, both members of the name thus indicating this ideal sovereignty. This also is the ground of the Sultaun having adopted the stripe of the royal tyger as a part of his insignia. In some extracts from the Dâbistân, lately communicated to me by Mr. Jonathan Scott, the learned translator of Ferishta's history of the Decan, the author states that Shah, (the more usual adjunct of these saints,) in its primitive meaning, signifies pure. The orthography of the royal adjunct in the Dâbistân, and in all works that I have examined, is the same; I am far from desiring to discredit the authority of the Dâbistân, but if this were the primitive meaning of the word, it has certainly long been disused, and I believe that it cannot be produced in the sense of pure in any Persian author, from the date of the Dâbistân until the present day; and that it is universally applied by the religious, and by all others, in the sense which I have endeavoured to explain. If this received sense of the word Shah were doubtful, it would be confirmed by the adoption of the Arabic synonyme Sultaun, from a root which signifies prevalence, power, authority.
No. II.

(Referred to from Page 245.)

Extracts from some Letters written by the late Reverend Mr. Swartz, to one of His Majesty's Chaplains, and another Friend in 1779 and 1780.

In the year 1773, the Nabob found means to usurp the Tanjour country, which he ruined by inhuman exactions. After two years and an half, Lord Pigot arrived and reinstated the King.* Now the nabob left no means untried, and exhausted all his provinces, for to regain possession of Tanjour. His troops, consisting, besides the infantry, of seven fine regiments of cavalry, who were in a high state of discipline, receiving no pay, and some revolting through bitter hunger, were for the greatest part disbanded, and went away with grief, and some even with tears. Hydernaick received these people with joy. The troops of Tanjour, already short after the nabob's usurpation, had almost to a man entered into Hyder's service. Thus were the hands of this tyrant strengthened against our Government. Lord Pigot sought to reclaim the nabob, for he clearly foresaw whereabouts it would end: but he was soon rendered incapable to act. Probably his intentions were laudable, but he began not with God.

We had lost our church in Tanjour, after that fort had fallen into the hands of the nabob. He amused us with empty promises. But when we were quite at a loss where to assemble

* Meaning the Raja of Tanjour.
for Divine service, my pious friend, Major Stevens, built us a fine mud-wall church at his own expence, which cost him upwards of an hundred star pagodas. But the congregation increasing rapidly, and a fresh covering with straw being requisite from time to time, we began in January 1779, to think of building a spacious and permanent church. A subscription was set on foot, but the amount was shamefully insignificant. At Madras, about 10,000 pagodas were cheerfully contributed towards erecting a playhouse. But to build a prayhouse, people have no money. Major Stevens, who could have effectually promoted the subscription, and superintended the building, and who intended to return to Europe, and make a faithful representation of what might promote the true interest of the Honourable Company, and the welfare of this country, chiefly of youth, was killed on the 14th of October 1778; before Pondicherry. General Munro, who knew, as well as every body, that Major Stevens and I lived together as brethren, condoled me in the kindest manner, saying, you will not so soon get a Stevens again; however, I request you'll consider me as your friend. Although we are bid not to place our reliance upon man, and although their promises are seldom any thing more than compliments; yet I praise the Lord, whenever he makes any one's heart willing to further the work of God, even in the smallest degree. At a visit which General Munro and I paid the rajah, the General observed, that Christianity is far to be preferred to Paganism: I am convinced, said the rajah, that the Christian religion is an hundred thousand times better than idolatry; but the conduct of the Europeans makes a bad impression on his mind.
In full reliance on the help of God, I set about the building of the church in the little fort, which was to be 90 feet long, and 50 feet wide. On the 10th of March 1779, the General laid the foundation stone, 9 feet deep, and I held a short sermon on Psalm lxvii.

As I had rendered the General some little services, by translating the letter which the Court of Directors had wrote to the King*, by doing chaplain's duty in camp for a short time, and otherwise; I was informed that he had requested Government to make me a present for my trouble. Instantly when I heard it, I wrote to Madras, declining any present for myself; but if they would do me a favour, I requested that they would make a present of bricks and lime, of which the Company had here a quantity in store, towards the building of this church, as we had not even money enough to pay the labourers, much less to purchase materials. The General, who went to Madras, promised to support and promote this my request. It lasted a good while, ere I heard any thing. At last, in May, the General wrote me word to come up instantly to Madras, because the governor, Sir Thomas Rumbold, had something of importance to communicate unto me. I go, and behold to my astonishment I am desired to make a journey to Seringapatam, and to assure Hydernaik, that our Government had no other but thoughts of peace. Sir Thomas addressed me nearly as follows: — It seems that Hyder Ally Cawn meditates upon war; he has in some letters expressed his displeasure, and even speaks in a menacing tone. We wish to discover his sentiments in this weighty affair with certainty, and

* The Raja.
think you are the fittest person for this purpose. You'll oblige us if you will make a journey thither, sound Hyder Ally, and assure him that we harbour peaceable thoughts. The reason why we have pitched upon you, is, because you understand the Hindostanee, consequently need no translator in your conferences. We are convinced that you'll act disinterestedly, and won't allow any one to bribe you. In particular, you can travel privately through the country, without external pomp and parade, and thus the whole journey will remain a secret (which is of great importance to us) until you shall speak with Hyder Naik himself. You will have nothing else to do, than to refer Hyder to his own letters, and to answer some dubious circumstances; and if you perceive him to be peaceably disposed, inform him that some principal members of council will come to him for to settle the business finally. As the intention of the journey is good and christian, namely, to prevent the effusion of human blood, and to preserve this country in peace, this commission militates not against, but highly becomes your sacred office; and therefore we hope you will accept it.

I requested time to consider of the proposal, prayed that God would give me wisdom, and thought it my duty not to decline it. The grounds which determined me, were:

1st. Because the mission to Hyder was not attended with any political intrigues. To preserve the blessings of peace was the only aim I had in view, and at that time I really believed Sir Thomas's intentions to be upright and peaceable. I considered, that if God, according to the riches of his mercy, would vouchsafe to employ poor me, as an instrument to establish the happiness of British India; I durst not withdraw myself, nor shrink.
back on account of the danger of the undertaking, whereof I was fully aware, but I ventured upon it in firm reliance upon God and his fatherly protection.

2d. Because this would enable me to announce the gospel of God my Saviour in many parts, where it had never been known before. And

3d. As the Honourable Company and the Government had shewn me repeated kindness, I conceived that by this journey I might give them some marks of my gratitude.

But at the same time I resolved to keep my hands undefiled from any presents, by which determination the Lord enabled me to abide; so that I have not accepted a single farthing of presents, save my travelling expenses. These were given me, and I went over to Tanjour, where I left directions with the native teachers, how they were to act during my absence, to Trichonopoly, where I preached to the Europeans and natives in the absence of Rev. Mr. Pohle, who was on a tour to Pallamcottah, from which he returned the 8th of July.

On the 5th of July, 1779, I set out from Trichinopoly. On the 6th, in the evening, I reached Caroor, Hyder's frontier garrison, about forty miles to the west of Trichinopoly: here I tarried a whole month in expectation of Hyder's answer to my letter. However I had always enough to do, going out daily among the heathens with the catechist (now country priest) Satthianâdhen, and announcing to them the whole counsel of God concerning our salvation. I constantly instructed, and at the end of the month baptized some servants of my landlord, a German officer of Hyder's, and had divine service and daily prayers with him and his household.
On the 6th of August we left Caroor, and proceeded on our journey. On the 22d, being Sunday, we made a halt, according to my custom, at Madenemuley, a fine town, where there is a strong bridge* of twenty-three very substantial arches. After each rain the magistrates of the place must send people to replace any earth that may have been washed away. Hyder's economical rule is to repair all damages without losing an instant, whereby all is kept in good condition and with little expense. The Europeans in the Carnatic leave every thing to go to ruins.

(N.B. It will be remembered, that this was not written in our days, but near thirty years ago.) (Missionary Compiler.)

On the 24th, we arrived near the fort of Mysoor. An high mountain, with a pagoda on its summit, was formerly dangerous to travellers. The Pagan inhabitants of that mountain, imagining that their idol was highly gratified with the sacrifice of noses, &c. used to rush out upon travellers, cut off their noses, and offer them unto their idol. But Hyder has most rigorously prohibited it. The glacis of the fort had the appearance of the finest green velvet. Here also I observed, that, wherever some earth has been washed away by rain, the people instantly repaired it.

On the 25th of August, we arrived at Seringapatam. I had a tent on the glacis of the fort, because an epidemical fever raged within. I had full liberty to go into the fort at all times, nobody preventing me.

Hyder's palace is a fine building in the Indian style. Oppo-

* Over the river Caupance, it was built by the Dulway Deo Raja, about 1735.
site to it is an open place. On both sides are ranges of open buildings, where the military and civil servants have their offices, and constantly attend. Hydernaik can overlook them from his balcony. Here reigns no pomp, but the utmost regularity and dispatch; although Hyder sometimes rewards his servants, yet the principal motive is fear. Two hundred people with whips stand always ready to use them. Not a day passes on which numbers are not flogged. Hyder applies the same cat to all transgressors alike, gentlemen and horsekeepers, tax-gatherers, and his own sons. And when he has inflicted such a public scourging upon the greatest gentlemen, he does not dismiss them. No! they remain in the same office, and bear the marks of the stripes on their backs, as public warnings; for he seems to think, that almost all people who seek to enrich themselves, are void of all principles of honour.

Once of an evening, I went into the palace, and saw a number of men of rank sitting round about; their faces betrayed a conscious terror, Hyder’s Persian secretary told me, they were * collectors of districts. To me they appeared as criminals expecting death. But few could give a satisfactory account; consequently the most dreadful punishments were daily inflicted. I hardly know whether I shall mention how one of these gentlemen was punished. Many who read it, may think the account exaggerated, but the poor man was tied up; two men came with their whips and cut him dreadfully; with sharp nails was his flesh torn asunder, and then scourged afresh; his shrieks rent the air.

* It will be observed, that they had all been assembled at this period. See p. p. 198. 203, of this volume.
But although the punishments are so dreadful, yet there are people enough who seek such employments, and out-bid each other. The bramins are by far the worst in this traffic. When they have obtained a district, they flay the people with unrelenting and inhuman cruelty, and with the most philosophical sang froid. At last they pretend to be poor, receive Hyder's chastisement, and return into their district.

When I came to Hyder, he desired me to sit down alongside of him. The floor was covered with the most exquisite tapestry. He received me very politely, listened friendly, and with seeming pleasure to all what I had to say; he spoke very openly and without reserve, and said, that the Europeans had broken their solemn engagements and promises, but that nevertheless, he was willing to live in peace with them, provided ***. At last he directed a letter to be wrote, had it read unto me, and said, what I have spoken with you, that I have shortly mentioned in the letter. You will explain the whole more at length. (But the nabob at Madras and others, found means to frustrate all hopes of peace.)

When I sat near Hydernaik, I particularly observed in what a regular succession, and with what rapid dispatch his affairs proceeded one after the other. Whenever he made a pause in speaking, an account was read to him of the district, and letters received. He heard it, and ordered the answer immediately. The writers ran, wrote the letter, read it, and Hyder apposed his seal. Thus, in one evening, a great many letters were expeditiated. Hyder can neither read nor write, but his memory is excellent. He orders one man to write a letter and read it to
him; then he calls another to read it again. If the writer has in the least deviated from his orders, his head pays for it.

What religion people profess, or whether they profess any at all, that is perfectly indifferent to him. He has none himself, and leaves every one to his choice.

His army is under the care of four chief officers, called Buchshee, (from the Persian word Buchsheeden, to give). One might call them Paymasters. But they have to do, not only with the pay, but also with the recruiting services and other things which belong to an army. They are also judges, who settle differences. With these men I had frequent discourses. Some spoke Persian, others only Hindostanee; but all were Mahometans. They asked me what the right prayer was, and to whom we ought to pray. I declared unto them, how we, being sinful men, and therefore deserving God's curse and eternal death, could not come before God but in the name of our Mediator Jesus Christ; and I explained unto them also the Lord's Prayer. To persons who understood Tamul, I explained the doctrines of Christ in Tamul; to the others, in the Hindostanee language.

As the ministers of Hyder's court are mostly bramins, I had many conversations with them. Some answered with modesty; others did not choose to talk on so indefensible a subject, and only meant, that their noble pagodas were not built in vain. I said, the edifices may indeed serve for some use, but not the idols which ye adore.

Without the fort were some hundred Europeans, commanded by a Frenchman, and a squadron of hussars under the command of Captain Budene, a German. Part of those troops were Ger-
mans, others Frenchmen. I found also some Malabar Christians. Every Sunday I performed divine service in German and Malabar, without asking any body's leave, but I did it, being bound in conscience to do my duty. We sang, preached, prayed, and nobody presumed to hinder us.

In Hydernaik's palace, high and low came to me, and asked what our doctrine was, so that I could speak as long as I had strength. Hyder's youngest son (not Tippoo) saw and saluted me in the durbar or hall of audience. He sent to request me to come into his apartment, I sent him word that I would gladly come, if his father permitted it, without his father's leave I might hurt both him and myself. Of this he was perfectly sensible. The most intimate friends dare not speak their sentiments freely: Hyder has his spies every where. But I knew that I might speak of religion night and day, without giving him the least offence.

I sat often with Hyder in an hall that is open on the garden side. In the garden the trees were grafted and bear two sorts of fruit. He had also fine cypress trees, fountains, &c.

I observed a number of young boys, bringing some earth into the garden. On enquiry I was informed, that Hyder had raised a battalion of orphans, who have nobody else to provide for them, and whom he educates at his own expence: for he allows no orphan to be neglected in all his dominions. He feeds and clothes them, and gives little wooden firelocks, with which they exercise. His care for orphans * gave me great pleasure. Oh,

* This strange misapprehension is a singular example of the good father's credulity. The persons, whose situation excited this eulogium on Hyder's humanity, were the chélas, captive slaves described in vol. ii. p. 190, to which the reader is particularly requested to refer.

VOL. II.
how much were it to be wished, that we might follow this example, and improve upon it, particularly as to religious instruction, so as it becometh Britons, and as God shall certainly require it at our hands, which he hath therefore armed with power, that we should use it chiefly for his service and glory, and not merely for our own.

On the last evening, when I took my leave from Hyder, he requested me to speak Persian before him, as I had done with his people (he understood Persian*, but he does not speak it). I did so; and explained the motives of my journey to him: — "You may perhaps, wonder," said I, "what could have induced me, a priest, who has nothing to do with political concerns, to come to you, and that on an errand, which does not properly belong to my sacerdotal functions. But, as I was plainly told, that the sole object of my journey was the preservation and confirmation of peace; and having witnessed, more than once, the misery and horrors attending on war; I thought within my own mind, how happy I should deem myself, if I could be of service in cementing a durable friendship between the two Governments; and thus securing the blessings of peace to this devoted country and its inhabitants. This, I considered as a commission in no wise derogatory to the office of a minister of God, who is a God of Peace." He said, with great cordiality — "Very well! very well! I am of the same opinion with you; and wish that the English may be as studious of peace as you are. If they

* This misconception is easily accounted for; the words, God, peace, war, friendship, two Governments, and several others, are the same in Persian and colloquial Hindostance, and enabled Hyder to comprehend the general scope of the father's Persian speech, and to make an appropriate answer.
offer me the hand of peace and concord, I shall not withdraw mine.”

“I took my leave of him. He had sent three hundred rupees into my palankeen, to defray my travelling expences.”

(Remark of the compiler. — From another account, which I cannot now find, I recollect, that when the Rev. Mr. S. would have declined the present, he was told by Hyder’s people, it would endanger their life, if they dared to take it back. Mr. Schwartz wished then to return it in person; but he was told by one of the ministers, that it was contrary to etiquette to re-admit him into Hyder’s presence, since he had his audience of leave; or to receive his written representation on the subject. That Hyder, knowing a great present would offend Mr. S. had purposely confined it only to the lowest amount of travelling expences, &c. Rev. Mr. S. produced the money to Government at Madras, but was desired to keep it.)

“Of my return, and the several discourses I have held with Roman Catholics, Mahometans, and Heathens, I have no time now to mention any thing more. God preserved me on the dangerous journey; gave me abundant opportunities to announce his word, and directed all circumstances so as it was most expedient for me. Praised be his gracious name!”

This journey was likewise an occasion, that both the English and the Tamulian church could be finished, which might otherwise hardly have been the case.

On my return, Government resolved instantly that I should not only have the desired bricks and lime, but also that the Reverend Mr. Pohle, at Trichinopoly, as well as I, now here at Tanjore, should henceforth receive from the Honourable Company
each an hundred pounds sterling, as chaplains to the English garrison.

Of those 100l. which I receive, I have given half to Mr. Kholhoff; with the other half, I maintain the native teachers. Rev. Mr. Pohle makes the same use of his 100l. for the benefit of the congregations and schools. But should he be obliged to take also a few pagodas of it for his own use, nobody will I suppose find fault with him for so doing.

The church in the little fort, or Siwingicotah, is 90 feet long, and 50 feet wide. In the beginning of 1780 it was consecrated and called Christ’s Church.
sketches of the south of India.